The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

[lordroel]

April 2nd 1898

United States - Journal Of Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Washington, D.C., Saturday, April 2nd, 1898.

— ; —

Owing to Mr. Snyder’s (1) illness, and my own engrossment in Departmental matters, have not written anything for my journal since the 20th March. It has been a period of incessant activity and pressure. The report of the Court of Inquiry upon the Maine disaster has come in, to the effect that the explosion was from the outside and, therefore, willful and malicious. The report, however, is unable to fix the responsibility upon any person or persons. The result is intense feeling in Congress. It looks very much as if war might be precipitated without sufficient previous deliberation and, perhaps, without exhausting all means of peaceable settlement. The President (2) is under a weight which is almost more than man can bear, and, for the last few days, has shown a good deal of weariness and nervous strain

Footnote 1: Snyder was Long’s secretary at the Navy Department.

Footnote 2: President William McKinley.

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Official Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry into the loss of the Battleship MAINE (Sampson Board)

U.S.S. IOWA, First Rate,
Key West, Fla.,
Monday, March 21, 1898.
After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it, the court finds as follows:

First - That the United States battleship MAINE arrived in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on January 25, 1898, and was taken to buoy 4, in from five and a-half to six fathoms of water by the regular government pilot. The United States consul-general at Havana had notified the authorities at that place the previous evening of the intended arrival of the MAINE.

Second - The state of discipline on board the MAINE was excellent, and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly carried out. All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled. Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there.

The magazines and shell rooms were always locked after having been opened; and after the destruction of the MAINE the keys were found in their proper place in the Captain's cabinet, everything having been reported secure that evening at 8 P. M. The temperature of the magazines and shell rooms was taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the after ten-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the MAINE was destroyed. The torpedo war heads were all stowed in the after part of the ship, under the wardroom, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the MAINE.

The dry gun cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft, and remote from the scene of the explosion. Waste was carefully looked after on board the MAINE to obviate danger. Special orders in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer. Varnishes, dryers, alcohol and other combustibles of this nature were stowed on or above the main deck; and could not have had anything to do with the destruction of the MAINE. The medical stores^1 were stowed aft, under the wardroom, and remote from the scene of the explosion. No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in any of the other staterooms.

The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the forward magazines and shell rooms, four were empty, namely, B3, B4, B5, B6. A15 had been in use that day, and A16 was full of New River coal. This coal had been carefully inspected before receiving on board. The bunker in which it had been stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth side at this time, on account of bunkers B4 and B6 being empty. This bunker, A16, had been inspected that day by the engineer officer on duty. The fire-alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the MAINE.

The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a reliable watch. These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the divers and are in fair condition.

The finding of the court of inquiry was reached after twenty-three days of continuous labor, on the 21st of March instant, and having been approved on the 22d by the commander-in-chief of the United States naval force on the North Atlantic station was transmitted to the Executive.

On the night of the destruction of the MAINE everything had been reported secure for the night at 8 P.M. by reliable persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding officer. At the time the MAINE was destroyed the ship was quiet, and therefore least liable to accident caused by movements from those on board.

Third - The destruction of the MAINE occurred at 9:40 P.M. on February 15, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two explosion of a distinctly different character, with a very short but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the nature of a report, like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more open, prolonged and of greater volume. The second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the MAINE.

Fourth - The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers, did not enable the court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the wreck, although it was established that the after part of the ship was practically intact and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of the forward part. The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however, established by the testimony:

That portion of the port side of the protective deck which extends from about frame 30 to about frame 41 was blown up aft and over to port. The main deck, from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up aft and slightly over to starboard, folding the frame forward part of the middle superstructure over and on top of the after part.

This was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the MAINE.

Fifth - At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one half feet from the middle line of the ship and six feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water; therefore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship been uninjured. The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V shape, the after wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating extending forward.

At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two and the flat keel is bent at an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is now about six feet below the surface of the water, and about thirty feet above its normal position.

In the opinion of the court, this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18, and somewhat on the port side of the ship.

Comments:

1. The testimony and investigations have been numerous and all over the place:

a. Spanish forensics was fair to good, based on external circumstantial evidence; but incomplete due to US objections that disallowed Spanish authorities from examining the physical interior of the wreck. The reason was not jingoism. The USS Maine contained secret technology that the US did not want the Europeans to know about. Essentially shell handling and torpedo launch systems were at issue.

b. I do not know what paintjob the Sampson Board was ordered to whitecoat the crew of the USS Maine, but the crew were known to have failed a port safety inspection prior to the Havana deployment which noted numerous ship-keeping errors directly connected to operational cleanliness of fuel (coal) and volatiles (paints, varnishes, and oils.). The automatic fire suppression system installed in the coal bunkers (Overhead sprinklers with melt out sprayer plug heads stolen from the French as a safety feature for the coal bunkers.) was never checked or tested.

c. The keel was bent into an inverted V. Whether that was due to a primary water hammer from a mine or caused by a bottom reflected shock wave is impossible to determine down to the present. It is true that the USS Maine was forced to moor outside and adjacent to a harbor defense minefield by the Spanish authorities. This minefield was of the Bustamente command / or contact detonated type. One of those mines could have broken loose and drifted from its moorings.

d. The presence or absence of dead fish could never be reliably established since the tides carried away evidence.

e. The water column or lack of seems to be a point that is disputed. Not all ship minings produce a water column.

f. The two explosions hypothesis could be either a mine or coal bunker as the first cause, but definitely the magazines adjacent to the hull rupture site is the second.

g. On board ship sabotage has never been considered. It is too late now to forensically examine for this possibility.

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My opinion is of two parts.

a. First the Spanish admiral commanding Havanna was a crazed lunatic who wanted to start a war with the United States.
b. Captain Philip R. Alger of the USN was a leading world authority on ordnance and the handling of fuel and the dangers thereof in storage and use. He concluded a coal fire and methane explosion set off the 6 inch propellant in the adjacent magazines.

One can hypothesize anything from the fragmentary and incomplete evidence. US authorities did not jump to an automatic conclusion that the USS Maine was blown up by a Spanish act of war. The Sampson board was, for the time, surprisingly honest for what it was and did. They jumped to a conclusion based on explosive forensics which is all that they had.

The Rickover Investigation agreed with Captain Alger that it was a coal fire and methane gas explosion.

The National Geographic investigation found that a crater blown into the Havanna harbor bottom "could have" been the result of a mining event, but read above where I speculated a reflected shock wave could have bent USS Maine's keel.

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Cuban and Russian communist "alleged historians" have raised the idea that the US blew their own ship up to create an incident. This goes against the strategic correlation of forces and the geopolitics of the McKinley administration as well as defies common sense. The US was preparing to fight a war, if necessary, but US planning for Cuba at the time was based on the 1900 timeframe when the USN would be actually strong enough to handle the Armada. In 1898, the correlation of forces as of February, as ONI estimated, actually favored the Spanish. The experts did not like the odds.

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My belief is the coal fire hypothesis. Captain Sigsbee was a sloppy captain who ran a lax and sloppy ship. His past record indicated that he did not enforce tight discipline or maintain standards in either safety or combat efficiency. He let a situation develop where a coal fire could outbreak and a magazine explosion could be the result.

[lordroel]

April 3rd 1898

Cebu, Philippines

An insurrection against Spanish rule breaks out on the island of Cebu in the Philippines.

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April 4th 1898

United States

President McKinley's war message to Congress is delayed to April 6 and then April 11 after Spain submits a new plan (short of armistice) for Cuban autonomy and US Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee in Havana asks for more time to evacuate Americans. Other factors contributing to the delay include news that the Spanish Atlantic Squadron is still near the Cape Verde Islands and that US Attorney General John W. Griggs needs more time to draft McKinley's message.

The New York Journal issued a million copy press run dedicated to the war in Cuba. The newspaper calls for the immediate US entry into war with Spain.

Philippines: Battle of Tres de Abril

Philippine rebels drive the Governor, General Montero, and his Spanish volunteers into Fort San Pedro and take control of Cebu City but when the Spanish gunboat Maria Cristina opened fire, the Philippine rebels are force to retreat to the Chinese quarter of Lutao.

Callao, Peru

Battleship USS Oregon arrived in Callao, after traveling a distance of 4,112 miles in sixteen days. The only relaxation the crew experienced during this first leg of the dash was the traditional visit of King Neptune as the vessel crossed the equator. However, throughout the run, the ship's band was given permission to perform evening concerts to entertain the crew. At Callao, a friendly port, the crew worked furiously to replenish coal and supplies, with extra watches placed as a guard against any Spanish sympathizers who might attempt sabotage. The vessel was coaled from lighters in the safety of the center of the harbor rather than from the docks.

While in Callao, Captain Charles Clark is informed by cable from Washington that the Spanish torpedo boat, Temerario has left Montevideo, Uruguay, and may be stalking the Oregon. Fear of torpedo boats ran high, since, for the first time in history, a small vessel with torpedoes could attack a large vessel and sink her through the use of the newly invented torpedo. The Oregon's crew would have to be on their guard against a torpedo attack, which could occur at any time and with little warning.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Hongkong, April 4, 1898.

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

I have chartered the British steamer Nanshan, having over 3,000 tons of coal now on board. Before the outbreak of hostilities can and would purchase this steamer. I request the earliest information in order to conclude arrangements. Can not be made after the outbreak of hostilities.

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

Washington, April 4, 1898.

Dewey, Hongkong:

Can you purchase immediately supply steamer? What will be the cost of?.

Long

United States - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Washington, 4/5/98

DEWEY, Hong Kong, China.

Revenue cutter McCulloch, now at Singapore has been ordered to proceed to Hong Kong and report to you for duty in the squadron under your command.

Long

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April 5th 1898

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

From Secretary of the Navy

To COM’D’R-IN-CHIEF

Date April 5, 1898.

Subject Purchase auxiliaries.

War may be declared.

Purchase immediately Nanshan one more vessel for supply.

Charge special appropriation.

Send the receipt to the Department.

Enlist for special service if possible one year unless sooner discharged the crew.

Detach and order to assume command of each and officer.

Arm if possible.

War may be declared.

Condition very critical.

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April 6th 1898

Vatican

Pope Leo XIII asked US President McKinley not to go to war.

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station

LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL Washington, April 6, 1898

Sir:

In the event of hostilities with Spain,the Department wishes you to do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.

2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries of Havana,Santiago de Cuba,or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case,the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object,viz., the destruction of the enemy’s vessels,without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries.

There are two reasons for this:

1st: There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold,or to protect from riot and arson,until after the dry season begins,about the first of October.

2nd: The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain’s most formidable vessels.

3. The Department further desires that,in case of war,you will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba,particularly at the ports of Havana,Matanzas,and,if possible,of Santiago de Cuba,Manzanillo and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over.

4. All prizes should be sent to Key West or other available United States ports for adjudication.

5. Should it be decided to furnish the insurgents with arms and ammunition,the Department suggests that Nuevitas and Puerto Padre would be the most suitable places to land them and establish communications with the Cuban forces.

6. Should the Department learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Puerto Rico,it is possible that the Flying Squadron may be sent thither,in which case some of your vessels may be needed to reinforce that squadron.

7. The Department hopes to be able to cut the cable off Santiago de Cuba, even if it has to employ a special cable vessel for this purpose,and it also has under consideration the practicability of cutting the cable near Havana and connecting the end to one of the vessels of your command so that you can always be in communication with the Department. Whether or not this plan is feasible has not yet been determined. Please consider it.

8. The Department need not impress upon you the necessity for stringent sanitary regulations. It leaves this matter,as to details in regard to conducting operations to the Commander-in-Chief, in whose judgment it has the greatest confidence.

Wishing you every success,

Very respectfully,

John D. Long,

Secretary.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

HongKong, April 6, 1898.

Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.:

I have purchased Nanshan and I have engaged her crew. Will detail an officer for command. I have ordered three officers, 50 men from Monocacy to fill vacancies here. I hope to get another steamer (1) * * * The receipt of telegram April 6 acknowledged, to expedite delivery (2).

Dewey.

Footnote 1: Dewey purchased the Nanshan and the coal it carried in compliance with a 4 April 1898, order from Secretary Long. Long then ordered Dewey to purchase a second vessel and to crew and arm in anticipation of the coming conflict with Spain. Dewey chose to take 3 officers and 50 men from the gun-boat Monocacy, because the Civil War era steamer was believed to be ill-suited for combat in the Philippines. Furthermore, Dewey was ordered by Acting Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to leave the Monocacy in coastal China in the event of any sortie to the Philippines.

Footnote 2: See: Long to Dewey, 4 April 1898.

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Captain Charles E. Clark

Translation:

Washington, April 6, 1898,

Oregon, Callao, Peru.

Proceed at once to Rio Janeiro or Montevideo. The Spanish torpedo boat Temerario is in Montevideo. Marietta has been ordered to proceed to Sandy Point Patagonia to arrange for coal. How many tons of coal will you require for Marietta and the Oregon to proceed together. Keep secret your destination. Keep secret this message.

Long

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April 7th 1898

United States

The ambassadors of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy Austria-Hungary and Russia appeal US President McKinley for peace. President McKinley reply to them: 

The Government of the United States recognizes the good will which has prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranquility of the American nation by the character and consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sentiment of humanity. The Government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable.

Philippines: Battle of Tres de Abril

500 men of the 73rd Native Regiment and Spanish cazadores arrive under the command of General Tejeiro, and with the cruiser Don Juan de Austria, forcing the Philippine rebels to retreat to San Nicolas.

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April 8th 1898

Singapore 

Revenue Cutter USRC McCulloch which is her shakedown cruise, a voyage which began in Philadelphia and taking here via the Suez Canal and the Far East to her first duty station at San Francisco, California arrives at Singapore.

United States - Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U.S.Flagship New York,1st Rate,

Key West, Florida,

April 8th,1898.

Sir:-

1. Referring to the Department’s telegram of the 2nd instant requesting my plan of operations,and my reply thereto,I have the honor to suggest to the Department in this connection as follows:-

2. It is highly important that the scheme of operations against the forces and possessions of Spain should be clearly and cogently laid down and thoroughly understood by all officers in position of command and responsibility. There are now,as I understand the situation,two squadrons ready for offensive operations; the one which I have the honor to command,and the Flying Squadron under the command of Commodore Schley. I request that I may be informed of the Department’s intentions and expectations as to the scope of action of the two forces,and especially as to the portion of the line of operations which is to be taken care of by the Flying Squadron.

3. The line of attack against Spain covers the distance from the western end of Cuba to Porto Rico (the islands held by Spain and the adjacent waters traversed by her fleet) and may extend into the Atlantic beyond Porto Rico for the purpose of intercepting her vessels of war coming from transatlantic ports;especially her torpedo Flotilla. Upon this line she has one strongly fortified port (Havana) and two heavy armored modern cruisers. These two factors are substantially all of a strictly military character with which we have at present to deal. My desire to attack Havana without delay has already been conveyed to the Department and I have asked for the return of the MASSACHUSETTS and the ordering here of the AMPHITRITE to aid in its reduction. I am in hourly expectation of the arrival of the PURITAN. With the battle ships and these monitors I should expect to speedily destroy its batteries and render the Cuban capital defenseless. With a smaller force I still hope to satisfactorily accomplish this,but there is a certainty about overwhelming force in war which renders its employment desirable. Should,however, the batteries of Havana prove to be unexpectedly strong,thereby rendering it inadvisable to push the attack to a conclusion,I shall at once substitute a close blockade of the port,which will be extended east and west to the smaller places.

4. As to the VISCAYA and OQUENDO. Those vessels have left Havana,and where they are at present is not known to me. They cannot operate without coal. Our object should therefore be to cut them off from all coal supply. The capture of Porto Rico and the destruction of its supplies of coal at one end of the line,and the effective blockade of Cuban ports at the other end would speedily put them in a very unpleasant predicament. The moment would soon arrive when they would be obliged to decide between returning to Spain or remaining upon the chances of fighting their way into a blockaded port,only,perhaps,to be surprised by a battleship. I think it may be assumed that under such circumstances with diminishing coal,they would not attempt to raid the Atlantic Coast,with the chance of being caught in a trap without means of escape.

5. My opinion that these cruisers should be steadily and relentlessly pursued,their supplies cut off,and no rest allowed them,is indicated in the foregoing. We have but three ships -the New York, TEXAS and BROOKLYN which are their equals in both speed and power. We have two others,the COLUMBIA and MINNEAPOLIS which are their superiors in speed,although not equal in power. Four of these vessels are in the Flying Squadron and these four could run down and capture the VISCAYA and OQUENDO or chase them out of the Cuban Atlantic. It is, I think safe to assume that this once accomplished,no vessels of Spain would again appear in these waters.

Very respectfully,

W.T. Sampson

Captain,Comdr.-in Chief,

U.S.Naval Force on North Atlantic Station.

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April 9th 1898

Spain 

Spain agrees to the March 29 ultimatum's demand that it ask for an armistice with the Cuban rebels, but the McKinley administration says the concession comes too late.

Philippines

Spanish Army General Basilio Augustín becomes Governor-General of the Philippines. He creates a consultative assembly to avert open rebellion against Spain, but most Filipinos reject it as illegitimate. Emilio Aguinaldo establishes military organizations in each area under Filipino rebel control.

United States - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U.S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate.

Key West, Florida,

April 9, 1898.

My dear Mr. Secretary:--

I have received your confidential letter of April 6th (1).

2. I sympathize with all you say about guarding our big ships against a possibly serious loss, while the enemy’s fleet is still intact. At the same time I regard it as very important to strike quickly and strike hard as soon as hostilities commence. Havana is well defended by three or four batteries to the Eastward of the entrance, mounting guns from 6” to 12” calibre. On the Western side of the entrance there are three batteries, the guns varying in calibre from 6” to 12”, and two mortar batteries. All the batteries face seaward, and those to the West of the entrance are quite near the shore. All are open batteries, with heavy traverses between the guns. The guns and people who serve them are quite unprotected.

3. These batteries are well calculated to keep off a feet from seaward, which approaches to within a moderate distance of a few thousand yards. I do not think they are well placed to resist an attack, (for instance, the Western batteries) from the Westward and close in shore; where the batteries would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the fire of our big ships at short range, where the secondary batteries would have full effect. Even under these circumstances, the ships must have such a heavy fire that the men in the batteries would be overwhelmed by its volume. Before the PURITAN and AMPHITRITE arrived I was not entirely sanguine of the success of such an attack. Since their arrival yesterday, I have little doubt of its success.

4. Although the monitors are weak in secondary fire I expected to put a cruiser with heavy secondary fire in the interval between each two of them. In this way I do not think the Spaniards would be able to fire---they would be driven away from their guns and kept away; while the fire of the ships would so injure the guns or mounts that they would be unserviceable. Although the defences West of the entrance are stronger than those East, the first has the advantage for us that all the projectiles which miss the batteries will fall in the city and furnish an additional inducement for the surrender of the City.

5. In the memo which I furnished to the Commanding Officers of ships I provided that if our ships were not numerous enough, or the Spaniards proved better than I expected, we were at once to haul off and substitute for the direct attack, a close blockade of the port, which was to be extended East and West to adjoining ports as quickly as possible. Having silenced the Western batteries, it would be quite practicable to shell the City, which I would do only after warning given twenty-four hours in advance.

6. I see the force of your reasoning that we would have no troops to occupy the City if it did surrender, yet, Mr. Secretary, it will be very unfortunate, besides a great loss of time, if we must delay until the rainy season is over. Probably a close blockade would terminate the trouble before October.

7. I shall do my utmost to carry out your wishes as set forth in your letter. At the same time I hope you will consider the plan I have here outlined. I have discussed the matter freely with Captain Evans, Taylor, and Chadwick, and all unite with me that the direct attack is sufficiently promising to warrant its trial.

8. I don’t think the plan of cutting the cable at Havana, and taking the end on board ship, would succeed, for a ship could not anchor off Havana. I have already telegraphed you to send means for grapnalling a cable, with the intention of cutting those at Guantanamo and Santiago.

9. I will try to keep you informed of our doings after leaving here, by a cruiser sent here to the telegraph line.

10. We are working day and night to keep the ship in readiness for service. The HELENA and PURITAN are now under repairs, which will occupy several days. There will be no delay in moving when the order comes.

Respectfully,

W.T. Sampson

Footnote 1: See: Long to Sampson, 6 April 1898.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

HongKong, April 9, 1898.

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

I have purchased the British steamer Zafiro, for supplies, for £18,000 sterling. I will arm, equip, and man vessel immediately (1).

Dewey.

Footnote 1: The Zafiro was purchased under orders from Secretary Long to act as a supply ship for the Asiatic Squadron.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Commander Oscar W. Farenholt

United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

FLAGSHIP OLYMPIA,

HONGKONG, APRIL 9, 1898.

Sir:

1. Referring to your letters Nos, 15 and 19 (1), I am pleased to learn that you can obtain supplies, and also, it is hoped, coal, at Shanghai.

2. In the event of war and of operations by this squadron in the Philippines, I shall be dependent in large measure upon your tact and ability to procure these necessities for the squadron, in spite of international complications that may arise.

3. It is hoped that I can be in telegraphic communication with you and that, on my dispatching one of the two purchased supply steamers2 to Woosung or such other port as may be preferable, you will be able to have the supplies and coal meet them and be transferred without interference by the Chinese or other authorities (2).

Very respectfully,

George Dewey

Commodore, U.S. Navy,

Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

Footnote 1: Collier Nanshan and supply steamer Zaphiro.

Footnote 2: Dewey’s decision to order Farenholt, commander of the Monocacy, to disregard Chinese neutrality in the event of war with Spain was in league with the contemporary practices of Western powers concerned more with expediency than the Chinese sovereignty.

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Apr 5, 2022 2:50:57 GMT lordroel said:

April 5th 1898

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

From Secretary of the Navy

To COM’D’R-IN-CHIEF

Date April 5, 1898.

Subject Purchase auxiliaries.

War may be declared.

Purchase immediately Nanshan one more vessel for supply.

Charge special appropriation.

Send the receipt to the Department.

Enlist for special service if possible one year unless sooner discharged the crew.

Detach and order to assume command of each and officer.

Arm if possible.

War may be declared.

Condition very critical.

a. This would be the SS Zafiro. 
b. Both USS Nanshan and USS Zafiro would need "American" crews as the rules of neutrality prohibited Chinese and British nationals serving as mercenaries. However, in a curious international law loophole, the crews could "enlist" in the United States Navy. This would make them temporary "Americans" for the period of enlistment. A very reverse example of this practice is the "Chinese admiral", Philo Norton McGiffin (USN), who participated in the Battle of the Yalu River (1894) and gave the Japanese a very rough time of it, after his Chinese superior was Joe Hookered.
c. Notice the insistence on American officers to oversee the (Chinese national) crews? It was common British practice to man their east Asian commercial vessels with low-cost Chinese and Indian and Malayan seafarers shanghaied into British merchant marine service. Both Zafiro and Nanshan had British officered and mostly Chinese crew.

Apr 6, 2022 2:58:34 GMT lordroel said:

2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries of Havana,Santiago de Cuba,or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case,the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object,viz., the destruction of the enemy’s vessels,without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries.

Admiral Sampson was known to be a jingoist and far too reckless. The inclusion of these special instructions was designed to avoid what he later tried to do with bombardments at San Juan and Havanna which did endanger the-all-too-few and precious battleships available. 

More on Admiral Sampson should be noted.   

Apr 8, 2022 2:00:28 GMT lordroel said:

4. As to the VISCAYA and OQUENDO. Those vessels have left Havana,and where they are at present is not known to me. They cannot operate without coal. Our object should therefore be to cut them off from all coal supply. The capture of Porto Rico and the destruction of its supplies of coal at one end of the line, and the effective blockade of Cuban ports at the other end would speedily put them in a very unpleasant predicament. The moment would soon arrive when they would be obliged to decide between returning to Spain or remaining upon the chances of fighting their way into a blockaded port, only, perhaps,to be surprised by a battleship. I think it may be assumed that under such circumstances with diminishing coal,they would not attempt to raid the Atlantic Coast, with the chance of being caught in a trap without means of escape.

5. My opinion that these cruisers should be steadily and relentlessly pursued, their supplies cut off, and no rest allowed them, is indicated in the foregoing. We have but three ships -the New York, TEXAS and BROOKLYN which are their equals in both speed and power. We have two others, the COLUMBIA and MINNEAPOLIS which are their superiors in speed, although not equal in power. Four of these vessels are in the Flying Squadron and these four could run down and capture the VISCAYA and OQUENDO or chase them out of the Cuban Atlantic. It is, I think safe to assume that this once accomplished, no vessels of Spain would again appear in these waters.

   1. First and most important to consider is that Captains Crowninshield and Mahan were tearing their hair out with Sampson's utter failure to mousehole Havanna.  The escape of ARS Oquendo and ARS Vizcaya was inexcusable.  The American navy had excellent intelligence as to the coaling states and supplies for both vessels as of 17 March 1898. All one had to do was read a local AMERICAN newspaper.as to where and when things happened. Coaling was not an instantaneous exercise. Once Vizcaya started coaling, a shadow ship should have detached from Key West and parked on Havana to watch. 

   2. As the hammer and tongs action between ARS Vizcaya and USS Brooklyn will later show, Sampson's airy assumptions about which ship is "superior" should have been less a question of "paper statistics" and far more of human factors. As was his assessments of Havana's shore defenses and the effectiveness of his own naval artillery, we see here early, the utter incompetence and poor judgment on display which already causes the Navy Department to explicitly direct him as to HOW to conduct his operations in a most detailed manner that we do not read at all with the likes of Dewey or Schley.  
  

[lordroel]

April 10th 1898

Cuba

Spanish Governor General Blanco in Cuba suspends hostilities in the war in Cuba.

April 11th 1898

United States

President William McKinley requested authorization from the US Congress to intervene in Cuba, with the object of putting an end to the war between Cuban revolutionaries and Spain.

United States - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Washington,

April 11, 1898.

Sir:

The Strategy Board has the honor to report as follows (1):

If it seems unlikely that hostilities will occur for some weeks, then all the vessels possible, and especially the TEXAS and MASSACHUSETTS, should be docked (2). The Board would much like to have exact information as to when the New York and Port Royal docks will be ready to receive battleships. If there is any doubt about the New York dock being fit, then it would seem to be worth while to do everything possible to put the Port Royal dock in trim.

The four ships that have just been made auxiliary cruisers will be armed with ten instead of eight big rapid-fire guns (3) The Board has come to the conclusion that these vessels should form part of the deep-sea patrol for the protection of the coast trade, and undefended seaboard at once, from Cape Hatteras to Eastport.4 With this end in view they must be given a formidable battery, so as to enable them to out-fight any privateer or unarmored vessel likely to be brought against them. As there must be six of these patrols the Board recommends that the NITCHEROY, if purchased, be fitted with one 8-inch and six 5-inch modern rifles (4); and that another cruiser to carry eight, and if possible then, rapid-fire 5-inch guns be purchased. The ST. LOUIS and ST. PAUL should be used primarily as dispatch boats and huge colliers, and only need two or three four inch guns apiece (5)

The Board has telegraphed to Admiral Sampson to find out what vessels are needed for blockaders if the coast of Cuba is to be blockaded, and also as to what kinds of vessels (6) For this blockade service the Board is inclined to think that smaller vessels, carrying but two or three rapid-fire guns apiece, will be sufficient.

Two colliers and a dispatch boat should be sent to the Flying Squadron at once, and this squadron, or at any rate the COLUMBIA and MINNEAPOLIS, should be exercised off the coast so as to get into good trim.

If possible confidential men should be obtained at the Cape Verdes and Port au Prince, who will telegraph us all possible information. The Bureau of Steam Engineering already have one such man at the Cape Verdes (7).

Very respectfully,

T. Roosevelt

Assistant Secretary.

Footnote 1: The Strategy or Home Board are other names for the Naval War Board.

Footnote 2: There is concern that the ships required maintenance. 

Footnote 3: The four auxiliary cruisers are: St. Paul, Yale, Harvard, and ST. LOUIS.

Footnote 4: Panic has spread along the East Coast as there is fear there will be an attack by the Spanish fleet. To allay this fear, the Flying Squadron, Northern Patrol Squadron, Coastal Signal Service, Auxiliary Naval Force, and coastal defense measures have been established.

Footnote 5: Nitcheroy (originally El Cid) was purchased from Brazil by Capt. Charles E. Clark (Oregon) and subsequently fitted out as the auxiliary cruiser Buffalo.

Footnote 6: The St. Paul (Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee) and St. Louis (Capt. Caspar F. Goodrich) were used in reconnaissance and cable-cutting missions.

Footnote 7: The Department of the Navy, through the Office of Naval Intelligence, use the naval attachés and State Department networks to gather information.

United States - Lieutenant Commander William W. Kimball,Commander, Torpedo Boat Flotilla, To Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station

U. S. T. B. DU PONT,

Key West,Florida,

April 11 th, 1898.

Sir:-

Under instructions from the Chief of Staff I have to make the following statement and suggestions in regard to torpedo boats in port:

1. CUSHING Disabled.Leaky condenser.17 tubes plugged and work going on. Coaling and watering <b>y carts. Probably be ready for extended service evening of the 12th inst.

WINSLOW Disabled. Leaky boiler tubes. Has plugged two. Probably ready for service tomorrow evening.

DU PONT Laid up for 24 hours to make up fresh water supply with evaporators,one of the pair of which has just been retubed. It was impossible to make up feed with one evaporator while making trips and while standing by to make them for last three days.

FOOTE One evaporator choked. Needs coal and water. Will lie off guard after 3.30 P.M. to coal a[n]dclear evaporator. Probably ready tomorrow night.

PORTER Ready for service; but will need to fill up with coal if she runs much tonight and tomorrow.

ERICCSON Same.

2. The boats can continue to do their present duties of guard,relief guard,and picket,for a long time,gradually deteriorating in material and personnel meanwhile; and at any given time probably two boats will be ready for full power work,with the other four in various stages of preparation according to time allowed for repairs,coaling,watering,etc., since last duty,and according to the seriousnessof casualties that may have occurred during last tour of duty.

3. I would suggest:-

a. That if all the boats mustbe ready to do full

power work at the beginning of a period of extended service, that all boats be allowed two or three days preparation before such beginning.

b. That if the requirements of possible extended service can be met by one or two boats ready for full power work and the other capable of from 16 to 22 knots speed, there is no necessity for allowing time for preparation providedserious accidents have not occurred while doing their present duties.

4. If there were ordinarily good facilities for coaling,watering and getting access to the machine shops the time for preparation mentioned in suggestion (a),paragraph 3,could be much shortened.

Very respectfully,

Wm. W. Kimball

Lieut.Commander,U.S.N.

Commanding Atlantic T.B.Flotilla

[lordroel]

April 12th 1898

Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON,

April 12, 1898.

Sir:

The Secretary of War asked me to present to you the fact that effort should be made to prevent the Spaniards from getting coal from the United States. They are getting ammunition and food also. Of course the delay is all in their favor, but I don’t see how the Navy Department can act in the matter.

The Board recommends that the Mosquito Fleet be stationed at Port Eads in the event of war; and that if possible one old monitor be spared for the defense of the mouth of the Mississippi, but that the deep-sea patrol of the Gulf Coast must be left to the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron. He will probably close the [passes?] to the south as well as to the north of Cuba.

The Board earnestly recommends that the Flying Squadron be sent to see for two or more days for exercise and drill. It is important that these ships should be drilled together, as the MINNEAPOLIS and COLUMBIA will be of little use unless they are given such sea drill, three fourths of the crews being new.

I enclose herewith a list of vessels we have already purchased, and a list of those which we are meditating purchasing.

Very respectfully,

Theodore Roosevelt

Assistant Secretary

[miletus12]

There is a sort of quiet mutiny in the Navy Department as NavSec John Long has taken ill. 

Apr 10, 2022 5:01:44 GMT lordroel said:

United States - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Washington,

April 11, 1898.

Sir:

The Strategy Board has the honor to report as follows (1):

If it seems unlikely that hostilities will occur for some weeks, then all the vessels possible, and especially the TEXAS and MASSACHUSETTS, should be docked (2). The Board would much like to have exact information as to when the New York and Port Royal docks will be ready to receive battleships. If there is any doubt about the New York dock being fit, then it would seem to be worth while to do everything possible to put the Port Royal dock in trim.

The four ships that have just been made auxiliary cruisers will be armed with ten instead of eight big rapid-fire guns (3) The Board has come to the conclusion that these vessels should form part of the deep-sea patrol for the protection of the coast trade, and undefended seaboard at once, from Cape Hatteras to Eastport.4 With this end in view they must be given a formidable battery, so as to enable them to out-fight any privateer or unarmored vessel likely to be brought against them. As there must be six of these patrols the Board recommends that the NITCHEROY, if purchased, be fitted with one 8-inch and six 5-inch modern rifles (4); and that another cruiser to carry eight, and if possible then, rapid-fire 5-inch guns be purchased. The ST. LOUIS and ST. PAUL should be used primarily as dispatch boats and huge colliers, and only need two or three four inch guns apiece (5)

The Board has telegraphed to Admiral Sampson to find out what vessels are needed for blockaders if the coast of Cuba is to be blockaded, and also as to what kinds of vessels (6) For this blockade service the Board is inclined to think that smaller vessels, carrying but two or three rapid-fire guns apiece, will be sufficient.

Two colliers and a dispatch boat should be sent to the Flying Squadron at once, and this squadron, or at any rate the COLUMBIA and MINNEAPOLIS, should be exercised off the coast so as to get into good trim.

If possible confidential men should be obtained at the Cape Verdes and Port au Prince, who will telegraph us all possible information. The Bureau of Steam Engineering already have one such man at the Cape Verdes (7).

Very respectfully,

T. Roosevelt

Assistant Secretary.

Footnote 1: The Strategy or Home Board are other names for the Naval War Board.

Footnote 2: There is concern that the ships required maintenance. 

Footnote 3: The four auxiliary cruisers are: St. Paul, Yale, Harvard, and ST. LOUIS.

Footnote 4: Panic has spread along the East Coast as there is fear there will be an attack by the Spanish fleet. To allay this fear, the Flying Squadron, Northern Patrol Squadron, Coastal Signal Service, Auxiliary Naval Force, and coastal defense measures have been established.

Footnote 5: Nitcheroy (originally El Cid) was purchased from Brazil by Capt. Charles E. Clark (Oregon) and subsequently fitted out as the auxiliary cruiser Buffalo.

Footnote 6: The St. Paul (Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee) and St. Louis (Capt. Caspar F. Goodrich) were used in reconnaissance and cable-cutting missions.

Footnote 7: The Department of the Navy, through the Office of Naval Intelligence, use the naval attachés and State Department networks to gather information.

The history of the SS NITCHEROY is a curious one that goes directly to the United States Navy's Western Hemisphere rival, the Brazilian Navy.

Auxiliary cruiser with dynamite gun Nitcheroy (Brazil / USA)

October 6, 2016


The United States became the first country to adopt dynamite guns. Almost simultaneously with them, the Brazilian fleet acquired similar weapons. In 1893, the Brazilian navy received the auxiliary cruiser Nitcheroy, on board of which there was only one dynamite gun. Despite the small number of original weapons and short service life, the Brazilian cruiser is of great interest with technical and historical points of view.

The only Brazilian cruiser with dynamite weapons was part of an emergency shipbuilding program that was a response to the uprising of the naval fleet which began in September 1893. The early years of the Brazilian old republic, transformed from the Brazilian empire, took place against the backdrop of a political crisis, which eventually led to the uprising. On September 6, the commander of the navy, Admiral Castodio de Mello, called the country's president a traitor to the constitution and gave a number of orders. Almost all ships and ships of the fleet, including all modern ones, joined the rebellion and came under the direct command of the admiral, refusing to obey the official authorities.



At the disposal of the President, General Florian Peixoto, were ground forces, ground infrastructure and finance. Nevertheless, there was simply nothing to resist the rebellious fleet: only a few auxiliary vessels that did not have weapons and were unsuitable for participation in the battles did not join the uprising. Shortly after the start of the uprising, it was decided to order new ships, which in the near future should take part in the suppression of the rebellion. It was planned to build new combat units on their own, as well as to order abroad.

Representatives of President F. Peixoto in New York bought several vessels of different classes, and also signed a number of contracts for the restructuring of this technology with the aim of turning it into warships. New ships of the Brazilian loyalist fleet were to be the pleasure yachts Javelin and Feissen, which were planned to be rebuilt into torpedo boats, as well as the merchant ships El Cid and Britannia, which were considered to be future auxiliary cruisers.

The El Cid vessel was a dry cargo ship with the ability to carry a certain number of passengers. It was built at the Chesapeake Dry Dock & Construction Company (now Newport News Shipbuilding) for the carrier Morgan Line. Interestingly, this was only the sixth order completed by the recently opened shipyard. The construction of the dry cargo ship was completed at the very beginning of 1893. On August 24, the vessel, which had passed all the necessary tests, was handed over to the customer for use in transportation.



(That is the dynamite gun fitting and mount forward. M.)

The project on which the El Cid steamer was built, as well as its sister ships; El Sud, El Norte and El Rio, had a curious feature. In the design of the ship there were some elements that allowed in the shortest possible time to carry out the installation of weapons, making it a warship with a sufficiently high firepower. In addition, some ideas and solutions aimed at increasing survivability were applied. They were mostly borrowed from warships of the time. Thus, on the upper deck, a place was provided for the installation of large-caliber guns, the hull was divided by watertight bulkheads, and the coal pits were located at the sides and closed the engine room. In addition, the maximum speed of El Cid reached 17 nodes, which was quite a lot for merchant ships of the late XIX century.

(Not surprising as the United States was building dual use shadow program raider auxiliary cruisers to fight Great Britain at the time. M.)

Apparently, it was the “double appointment” of the cargo ship that interested the customer in the person of the Brazilian government. Without wasting time, the Brazilian delegation initiated the signing of a contract for the transfer of the vessel for restructuring. October 26 El Cid officially changed its host. According to some reports, negotiations on the new contract were conducted in an atmosphere of extreme haste and customers hardly had time to inspect the purchased cargo ship. It took an entire 24 of the day to rebuild and upgrade a merchant ship. Already on November 20, the rebuilt ship El Cid departed from New York, heading for Brazil. Now it was not a cargo ship, but the auxiliary cruiser Nitcheroy.

The rapid implementation of the Brazilian order contributed to the main features of the original project. The design of dry-cargo ships initially provided for the possibility of re-equipment, including the installation of a nose-gun installation with a relatively large-caliber guns. Thanks to this, the American specialists needed only to install the required armament on the available fastenings, and also slightly modify the design of the vessel in order to install some new units. Most of the systems could remain without any changes.



Dynamite gun on the bow installation. Photos of Laststandonzombieisland.com

El Cid / Nitcheroy was a vessel with a displacement of 6635 and a length of 123,7 m and a width of 14,7 m, both before and after reconstruction. The internal volumes of the hull were divided into several compartments using waterproof bulkheads. On the deck there was a single-tier superstructure, divided into several parts, which contained posts and other necessary premises. There were large hatches in the deck to load the holds.



After the restructuring performed in the autumn of 1893, the layout of the cargo ship has undergone some changes. The main armament in the form of a dynamite gun with a set of all necessary units was installed in the corresponding volumes of the forward part of the hull. The central compartment was still placed under the boilers, and a single-shaft steam engine was to be placed in the stern. Power last issued on a single propeller shaft. The machine with the 3600 horsepower, according to calculations, allowed it to reach a maximum speed of up to 17 nodes, although in practice this parameter did not exceed the 14,5 node.



The project initially envisaged the possibility of equipping a merchant ship with weapons of relatively large caliber. In accordance with the Brazilian-American contract, this opportunity should have been fully realized. On the existing site should install a dynamite gun, ordered from the American company Pneumatic Dynamite Gun Company. The artillery part of the gun was to be installed outside the hull, on the deck. Pneumatic units, in turn, occupied a large volume inside the ship and installed on all its decks.


One of the naval 120-mm guns. Shipscribe.com Photos


(That is a US model 1885 5 inch / 31 gun. M.) Never can trust a Russian to get anything right. 

Unable to wait for the development of new weapons in accordance with their own requirements, the Brazilian authorities ordered the Pneumatic Dynamite Gun Company to order one 15-inch 1890 model cannon of the year, also known as Rapieff-Zalinski. it weapon It was originally created for use in coastal batteries and was offered to the American fleet. By 1893, the 15-inch gun project reached the point of preliminary work and assembling the required weapon. One of the new guns had to be transferred to the factory that was rebuilding the El Cid vessel. To simplify and speed up the work, the dynamite gun for the Brazilian cruiser should have minimal differences from the basic version for coastal batteries.



In the forward part of the deck of the carrier vessel, a round hole was made for the withdrawal of the gun mount. The carriage and some other gun units were proposed to be installed on the middle deck, which has now become battery-operated. Due to the large height of the gun carriage and the gun in general, the barrel should not have risen significantly above the upper deck. Below the middle deck were located pipelines and other systems necessary for connecting the artillery part with the pneumatic one. Gas tanks, a compressor and other components of the pneumatic system were placed on the lower deck, directly under the gun installation.



With the exception of processing the layout of some units associated with the need for installation on the ship, the design of the Rapieff-Zalinski gun has not undergone significant changes. Still used carriage with a U-shaped system for the installation of the swinging block of the trunk. The carriage had horizontal and vertical guidance drives, as well as a pipeline for supplying compressed air to the gun. On the left rack of the gun carriage there were platforms for calculation. With the help of the left gunner could use controls placed on the side surface of the gun carriage. The controls consisted of several levers and handwheels for targeting and monitoring pneumatic operation. The shot was made using a small steering wheel on the upper part of the barrel.




The gun Rapieff-Zalinski in the composition of the coastal battery. Drawing Weaponsandwarfare.com

The cruiser Nitcheroy received a barrel gun unit, developed earlier for coastal batteries. A long, smooth barrel of the 15 inch caliber (381 mm) was used, mounted on a supporting beam to prevent it from bending under its own weight. On the breech there was an additional housing used to supply compressed gas. Also used piston valve, open when charging guns. Inside the breech housing there was a set of valves for supplying compressed gas, responsible for the shot. The valves were controlled by the steering wheel at the gunner’s workplace.



For additional protection of the guns, it was proposed to use two guards covering the gunners. Another additional casing covered the upper part of the breech, equipped with shot control mechanisms.



In the cruiser's hold was a compressor based on a steam engine, whose task was to create a working pressure in cylinders for compressed gas. Pressure on the 2000 pounds per square meter was created in several cylinders. inch (136 atmospheres). The pipelines were connected to a set of gas reducers that ensured the correct acceleration of the projectile. It was proposed to smoothly change the speed of compressed air into the barrel, so that a constant pressure of 1000 feet per square meter was maintained in the cavity behind the projectile. inch (68 atmospheres).



For use with the Rapieff-Zalinski XNUM (15)-inch cannon, several types of shells were offered. They had a streamlined body with a tail part, equipped with a stabilizer. Inside the case was placed a charge from the explosive jelly of a particular weight. The total mass of the proposed shells ranged from 110 pounds (50 kg) to 2204 pounds (1000 kg). The type of projectile influenced both the power of the charge and the firing range. The lightest shells could be sent to a distance of 4.5 km or 2.8 miles. (I had to edit the article supplied figures to reflect US Department of the Navy data for the 15 inch bore dynamite gun. The values given in the source article are hilariously wrong. M.)



Auxiliary cruiser scheme. You can see the placement of aggregates of a dynamite gun. Figure Laststandonzombieisland.com

It was proposed to store the shells on the middle deck and deliver to the gun with the help of a special chute located to the right of the superstructure. To load the gun turned at a certain angle, after which it was possible to feed ammunition into the barrel. After charging, the gun returned to the desired angles of guidance and could make a shot. There was the possibility of horizontal guidance within a sector width of about 300 °. The remaining sector overlapped superstructure.



The auxiliary cruiser Nitcheroy was to receive a developed auxiliary armament, consisting of guns of various types. Two main 120-mm rapid-fire guns with shield cover were to be installed in front of the main caliber. In addition, on the battery deck, six lazports of different sizes were provided on each side, in which additional guns of different calibers were placed. Several small-caliber guns and machine guns could be mounted on the roof of the superstructure. According to some information, during the restructuring the ship also received four torpedo tubes under the arms of the American design.


(Never installed before the Spanish American War. These would have been of the Howell Torpedo Launcher configuration. M.)


20 November 1893, a convoy of two torpedo boats and two cruisers, previously yachts and merchant ships, departed from New York. The cargo compartments of the new warships contained ammunition for all guns, including dynamite shells for the main caliber of the Nitcheroy cruiser.




Brazilian battleship Aquidabã, 90-s of the XIX century. Photo of Wikimedia Commons

It took some time for the Brazilian fleet to master the new technology. 16 April 1894, the new ships for the first time took part in the battles. The Nitcheroi cruiser and several torpedo boats approached the shores of Santa Catarina, where the battleship Aquidabã was in shallow water - one of the newest ships of the Brazilian fleet captured by the rebels. As a result of a joint attack, several loyalist ships using torpedoes managed to hit the rebels once or twice. Soon the battleship, which received a hole in the forward part of the hull, sank to the bottom. During this battle, the torpedo boats fought against the enemy's ship, while the auxiliary cruiser was engaged in firing at the nearest fortress capable of protecting the battleship.



It soon became known that a few days before the attack on the battleship Aquidabã, Admiral Castodio de Mello and the crews loyal to him went to Argentina and asked for political asylum. The petition was granted, and the ships crossed the Argentine fleet. At this rebellion actually ended. Soon the authorities were able to restore legal order, for which it was necessary to suppress several minor insurrections on the coast. The damaged battleship was later raised, repaired and returned to service.



Regarding the combat use of the auxiliary cruiser Nitcheroy there is a variety of information. Some sources claim that during the battle with the battleship Aquidabã, the cruiser managed to make several shots from the 15-inch gun, while others write exclusively about the use of torpedo weapons. One way or another, in a combat situation the ship used its main weapon with limited force. Moreover, he no longer had another opportunity to use the Rapieff-Zalinski cannon in battle.


(Based on the best information I can find, the NITCHEROY got off three warshots, which all spectacularly missed the AQUIDABA. She had more success with the shore batteries guarding the anchorage. Two war shots landed close enough to scare off the gun crews. Otherwise: there was no damage. M.)

  

Former cruiser, and now USS Buffalo transport during an expedition to Alaska, 1914. Photo by Laststandonzombieisland.com

After the end of the suppression of the uprising auxiliary cruiser, having limited combat capabilities, moved to second roles. For some time the Nitcheroy steamer was used as a training ship for training seafarers and, naturally, did not participate in any battles. In addition, by the end of the decade the ship was disarmed. The command of the Brazilian Navy decided that the guns used on it could be mounted on other ships, and the auxiliary ship could do with a reduced composition of weapons.



In 1898, the US-Spanish war began. By this time, the US Navy had already begun to operate the USS Vesuvius dynamite cruiser, which had three 381 mm caliber guns. To strengthen the fleet, it was decided to rebuild a number of merchant ships, including the dry cargo ships El Cid, El Sud, El Norte and El Rio, one of which had been owned by Brazil for several years. 11 July 1898, the American representatives signed an agreement with the Brazilian fleet, according to which the training ship Nitcheroy was transferred to the United States. By this time, the ship was deprived of guns, because of what he had to send to rework along with other ships of the series.



22 September of the same year Nitcheroy was included in the US Navy under the name of USS Buffalo. The fleet also received the same type of ships USS Yosemite (El Sud), USS Yankee (El Norte) and USS Dixie (El Rio). During the rework, four cargo ships received two 5-inch guns (130 mm) and four 4 inch guns (100 mm) each. All guns were mounted on tumbov installations and were located along the perimeter of the deck, allowing to fire at targets in any direction.


(The USN was short of ships and desperate. So, why not buy back the shadow program auxiliary from Brazil? They were not using her as intended. M.)

 

4-inch Buffalo Ship Cannon (US Model 1892 4 inch /40  M.)

Four ships were commissioned at the end of September. By this time, the United States and Spain had already concluded a truce. The fighting was officially stopped on August 12, i.e. a month and a half before the completion of the restructuring of the four ships. The parties did not violate the terms of the truce, so that by the end of the year a full-fledged peace treaty emerged that finally stopped the war. The ships, which underwent revision specifically for the war with the Spaniards, remained out of work.



In the summer of 1899, the cruiser USS Buffalo sailed to Manila, after which he returned to the United States. Soon after, the ship was again sent for repairs and rebuilding. In early April of next year, he returned to service as a training ship for crew training. Over the next five years of this service, Buffalo made four trips to the shores of the Philippine Islands. From one of these voyages, the ship returned through the Indian and Atlantic Ocean, making a circumnavigation.



In 1905, the construction of the shipyard Mare Island Navy Yard began, to which the vessel USS Buffalo was assigned. Now the steamer had to solve transportation problems of various kinds. First of all, it transported various products and materials used at the construction site. In addition, with its help, the interchangeable crews of the ships traveled to remote bases in the Pacific Ocean. In 1914, the ship participated in an expedition to the shores of Alaska, the purpose of which was to deploy new radio stations. Some of these objects later worked until the early sixties.




USS Buffalo while serving in Europe, November 12 1918. Photo by Laststandonzombieisland.com

During World War I, the USS Buffalo remained a transport ship, providing work for other ships and their crews. In 1917, the ship’s crew had to solve an interesting transportation problem: it should have arrived at the shores of Russia, where the revolution had recently taken place, and ensured the evacuation of the American diplomatic mission. Soon after, the ship underwent a new modernization and began to ensure the operation of warships. Until 1919, Buffalo served off the coast of Europe, after which it received an order to transfer to the Pacific Ocean.



15 November 1922, the outdated, morally and physically, steamer was decommissioned. Over the next few years, (s)he served as a floating barracks and no longer went to sea. 27 May 1927, the ship finally written off. A few months later it went on its last voyage to the place of cutting for metal. By this time, USS Buffalo was the only representative of its series: three other ships were decommissioned and disposed of by 1922.



Nitcheroy, the auxiliary cruiser of the Brazilian navy, became the second and last in the world surface ship carrying dynamite cannons. This cruiser was built in conditions of shortage of warships, because of which the main requirements for it were cheapness and speed of construction. In the future, the ship only once was able to take part in the battle, after which it lost its weapons and received new roles. The short service field as a Nitcheroy / Buffalo warship became an auxiliary vessel, and eventually ended his career with an unremarkable floating barracks. In the 1921 year, the U.S. Navy decommissioned and disposed of the former dynamite cruiser USS Vesuvius, from the 1904 of the year serving as an experimental vessel. In 22, the same fate befell USS Buffalo. On this, the story of dynamite-armed cruisers ended. Recent advances in the field of gunpowder artillery left no chance for dynamite guns.


Based on:

douglas-self.com/

shipscribe.com/

laststandonzombieisland.com/

navweaps.com/

modelist-konstruktor.com/

The Spanish-American and the Philippine-American Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History, Vol. 1. ABC-CLIO, 2009

Summarizing: Asst SecNav T. Roosevelt expected a longer war than happened. The four shadow-program raider cruisers were never outfitted fast enough to see their intended roles as commerce destroyers or "guard vessels" to protect the US east coast. It was a wasted 1 million dollars.  

 

United States - Lieutenant Commander William W. Kimball,Commander, Torpedo Boat Flotilla, To Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station

U. S. T. B. DU PONT,

Key West,Florida,

April 11 th, 1898.

Sir:-

Under instructions from the Chief of Staff I have to make the following statement and suggestions in regard to torpedo boats in port:

1. CUSHING Disabled.Leaky condenser.17 tubes plugged and work going on. Coaling and watering <b>y carts. Probably be ready for extended service evening of the 12th inst.

WINSLOW Disabled. Leaky boiler tubes. Has plugged two. Probably ready for service tomorrow evening.

DU PONT Laid up for 24 hours to make up fresh water supply with evaporators,one of the pair of which has just been retubed. It was impossible to make up feed with one evaporator while making trips and while standing by to make them for last three days.

FOOTE One evaporator choked. Needs coal and water. Will lie off guard after 3.30 P.M. to coal a[n]dclear evaporator. Probably ready tomorrow night.

PORTER Ready for service; but will need to fill up with coal if she runs much tonight and tomorrow.

ERICCSON Same.

2. The boats can continue to do their present duties of guard,relief guard,and picket, for a long time, gradually deteriorating in material and personnel meanwhile; and at any given time probably two boats will be ready for full power work, with the other four in various stages of preparation according to time allowed for repairs, coaling, watering, etc., since last duty, and according to the seriousness of casualties that may have occurred during last tour of duty.



3. I would suggest:-



a. That if all the boats mustbe ready to do full power work at the beginning of a period of extended service, that all boats be allowed two, or three days preparation before such beginning.



b. That if the requirements of possible extended service can be met by one or two boats ready for full power work and the other capable of from 16 to 22 knots speed, there is no necessity for allowing time for preparation provided serious accidents have not occurred while doing their present duties.



4. If there were ordinarily good facilities for coaling, watering and getting access to the machine shops the time for preparation mentioned in suggestion (a), paragraph 3, could be much shortened.



Very respectfully,



Wm. W. Kimball



Lieut.Commander, U.S.N.



Commanding Atlantic T.B. Flotilla

Comments:

1. Sampson was witless as to the role of torpedo boats. To be fair, the Spanish Armada, which was a pioneer navy in the use of torpedo boat destroyers, was not doing any better than he was, but at least Capitan de Navio Fernando Villaamil had worked out a tactical theory of how those seagoing torpedo boat destroyers were supposed to be used. How will he do with his theory? Have to wait to find out, will we not?

2. William Wirt Kimball, the complainer and excuse maker, should have been court martialed for dereliction of duty. His mission was to have his squadron ready for sortie and battleline support at a moment's notice. He will more or less fritter the war away doing nothing except what he indicates in the letter above.       

[miletus12]

Apr 11, 2022 2:50:32 GMT lordroel said:

April 12th 1898

Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON,

April 12, 1898.

Sir:

The Secretary of War asked me to present to you the fact that effort should be made to prevent the Spaniards from getting coal from the United States. They are getting ammunition and food also. Of course the delay is all in their favor, but I don’t see how the Navy Department can act in the matter.

The Board recommends that the Mosquito Fleet be stationed at Port Eads in the event of war; and that if possible one old monitor be spared for the defense of the mouth of the Mississippi, but that the deep-sea patrol of the Gulf Coast must be left to the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron. He will probably close the [passes?] to the south as well as to the north of Cuba.

The Board earnestly recommends that the Flying Squadron be sent to sea for two or more days for exercise and drill. It is important that these ships should be drilled together, as the MINNEAPOLIS and COLUMBIA will be of little use unless they are given such sea drill, three fourths of the crews being new.

I enclose herewith a list of vessels we have already purchased, and a list of those which we are meditating purchasing.

Very respectfully,

Theodore Roosevelt

Assistant Secretary

Comment.

1. It is hilarious that Spanish agents are buying up Pennsylvania anthracite coal and attempting to send it to Cuba.  Russell Alger, an idiot if there was one in the McKinley administration, should have addressed his letter to Lyman Gage, the Secretary of the Treasury. He had the authority to stop the Spanish purchases. 
   
2. USS Minneapolis and USS Columbia had been in service since 1893.  The infusion of so many "boots" to replace naval veterans shows how stretched the USN was for trained manpower. The small steel navy had scarce 50 modern steel ships, while the bulk of the fleet was still leftovers from the 1880s wooden hulled "peace cruiser" program. Those seamen aboard the peace cruisers were not available in the run up to war, for reassignment, as these ships were too far away to reach US controlled ports in time. So... the home fleet, as it expands with auxiliaries, and emergency war builds, took aboard any and all raw human talent that "volunteered" (Shanghaied they were. M.) for war duty out of a sense of "patriotism". It was on the job training to bring the home fleet up to war manning levels. This would mean more than "two or more days for exercise and drill". Fortunately, Schley was a HARD taskmaster and he could get a lot done in a hurry. His ship captains and officers were rather good trainers of men. The real secret was that the USN, unlike the US Army had an NCO corps of bosuns and chiefs who knew the drills and regs and could beat it into the mostly "international origin" crews of the old USN. These new "all American" crews are due in for a "rude awakening" as they get trained the "Old Navy" way.         

[lordroel]

April 13th 1898

United States

The US Congress agrees to President McKinley's request for intervention in Cuba, but without recognition of the Cuban Government.

Spain

The Spanish government declares that the sovereignty of Spain is jeopardized by US policy and prepares a special budget for war expenses.

United States - Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To The Commanding Officers Of Ships On The North Atlantic Station

U.S.Flagship New York, 1st Rate,

Key West, Florida,

April 13th,1898

Sir:-

1. The following confidential Memoranda,received from the

Office of Naval Intelligence is published for your information:-

------------------------------

NOTES ON SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

The latest reports giving any information upon the defenses of Santiago come from our Consul.

1. From these we learn that the Spanish authorities are preparing to mount modern guns back of Morro Castle and on Cay Smith,for the protection of the entrance,and at Blanca battery for the protection of the town.

2. The information as to mines being planted in the bay is conflicting. It has been fairly well established that several mines with complete cable outfit were landed here in 1896,but the entire supply seems to be still in the storehouse probably as it was not required for use aginst the insurgents. One report,which came quite direct, as to the effect that mines had been laid near Cay Smith,about a year and a half ago.

3. Provision was made some years ago to close the mouth of the harbor by a chain or boom and some old guns planted to secure the end,but beyond this nothing is known to have been done.

4. Locations for two new batteries were lately selected close to town,but as late as March 5th no work had been done on them.

5. The roads generally,leading to town are poor. The “Camino Reale (highway)[”]is good and leads with 1 ½ to 2 ½ miles of the coast. the best transportation for a landing party is by rail,as the railroad leading to within a short distance of town runs close to the coast for some ten miles to the eastward,and offers several good landing points.

6. The forts are of stone and brick and were constructed in 1663, and unless much improved would offer but little resistance to modern ships.

7. It has been asserted that the insurgents can capture the place at any time,but have not done so,as they had no ships to hold it with and were not strong enough to stand a naval attack from the Spanish ships.

Richardson Clover,

April 13,1898. Chief Intelligence Officer.