Choices: Simon Goes A-Timelining/ISOTing

[stevep]

May 22, 2022 10:30:20 GMT simon darkshade said:

Foreign Policy

- The main principle is to prevent the emergence of a hostile rival, let alone a rival bloc
- Splendid isolation is neither splendid nor truly isolated. Being the big boy and separate from the others can result in potential trouble
- Britain’s future does not lie in any permanent bloc, alliance or grouping in Europe, as it is more of a global power than the land-centric states
- Germany is the most immediate rival of the British Empire, but not the only one. Removing Berlin’s capacity to impede British interests, taking key colonies and removing any fleet challenge are the initial issues, but beyond that, an Imperial Germany isn’t necessarily a blood enemy of Britain
- Keeping Austria-Hungary intact keeps a balance of power possible and prevents the creation of a vacuum that can only be filled by Russia or Germany
- There are few colonial issues remaining with France and no territory that is particularly enticing/necessary. Paris will seek some form of alliance against Germany eventually, but there is not a basis for a long term marriage. Allow France to grow too powerful and problems will emerge
- Italy is well down from Britain in every indice of power, so does not present a threat at this time. Harnessing their issues and desires is part of creating a new, stable Concert of Europe. Keeping it out of the Dodecanese is a good start, but denying it Libya is also advantageous
- Spain is the sick man of Western Europe, yet with some encouragement and support, can play a role in the European dance. They are in need of a friend and sponsor

- Portugal is an old ally and easy to support and cultivate. Preventing her fall into internal strife and regicide preserves them as part of the Invisible Empire
- Sweden is a regional power but tended more towards Germany in @. Forging ties can break this shift and complement the friendly status of Norway, which will become an independent state
- Greece is a potentially friendly state in the Eastern Med that can grow and work towards a friendlier and more stable Balkans
- After a Boer War blip, the Netherlands is generally friendly to Britain, as is Belgium. Formal control of Katanga is difficult to engineer, but it is an area of interest

- Russia is a major rival as of 1899 and this would be maintained historically apart from the brief Entente tie. By virtue of size, position and ideology, the Russian Empire is a rival, but one that mostly exists within the current international system. If it falls to Bolshevism, this changes, the threat increases and the ‘public relations’ picture shifts.
- Russia is on a collision course with Japan and with some help, can lose as badly or worse than historical. This will make it more malleable regarding Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet

- The Ottoman Empire is a weak state that holds lands of strategic and economic interest to Britain. It’s European territories cannot be held. In the Middle East, Arabia, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia are areas Britain needs. Taking Libya to boot secures the Med to a large extent
- Taking these territories brings with it costs and trials of their own

- Japan is a rising power that could grow into a threat if if pulls a Steve Bradbury. Without that, it remains back in the pack. An AJ Alliance has short term utility, but long term costs vis a vis US relations.
- Furthermore, allowing Japan to expand into the Pacific is a trigger to later issues. Japan occupied Tsingtao (also creating issues), provided some cruiser escorts and ASW work in the Med in a different war. None of that is really a decent return on investment
- Rather than a formal alliance, some interim form of cooperation will be sought in order to temper Japanese expectations and encourage a more circumspect approach to China. Heading off a Japanese imperialist expansion well before it begins is in British interests

- The USA is an increasingly friendly state, but at the same time a current and potential rival. Whilst certain advantages can be engineered, it is difficult to alter America’s trajectory towards economic and industrial superpower status
- This does not automatically transfer to hard power, specifically naval power, without events intervening. The USN is well back from the RN in numbers and composition at this point and now is at a disadvantage technologically. This needs a specific post in its own right
- Competition will come in the form of commercial interests rather than the more direct rivalries of the European empires

  A lot of interesting stuff here.  Some I agree with but some I'm doubtful about.

a)  Agree that splendid isolation was the latter but not the former.  Britain needs to have an active role in diplomacy and is weak and exposed when we're not active and possessing friendships if not defensive alliances.

b)  On the main nations:

Removing Germany's capacity to threaten British interests - or even their intent - either means seriously breaking their power [either economic and/or militarily] or changing their political system to one that will accept a role other than dominant over all others.

I don't think France have the ability to be too strong, especially with their demographic problems but they can definitely be a problem depending on the situation.

Austria - Definitely agree that a stable and successful Danubian state probably under the Hapsburg would be a benefit to stability in Europe provided its able to rally popular support.  It would also be a check on both Germany and potentially Russia but of course support for it would mean being in Italy's bad books.  Also it will mean Serbia and Romania are likely to be opponents and hence potential tools for Russia or others who wish to reduce the Austrian empire.

Russia is a potential major threat simply because of its size and also its aims in the south and east.  How to handle it will be a continual problem.  In the short term and arguably the longer one a Russia that goes the communist route - although that is highly unlikely with foreknowledge and a shorter WWI - would actually be the least threatening simply because its so incompetent.  What might be the most dangerous one could be a democratic but still nationalistic Russia.

Italy - It lacks the resources to be a true 1st rank power but shouldn't be overlooked as a possible source of disruption and distraction from greater problems as Mussolini showed OTL.

Ottoman Empire is almost certainly dying as there seems little capacity for reform, at least of a nature that would be morally palatable to western opinion.  However whether you can have a reasonably stable Turkey emerging as OTL which is a check on Russian expansion without the OTL genocide or at least massive ethical cleansing I don't know.  Nor whether an alternative, say a resurgent greater Greece would be any more stable.

  I would agree its useful for Britain to have a role in eastern Arabia, Kuwait and Mesopotamia but most of the rest of the Arabic part of the Ottoman empire is of no real benefit to Britain and a burden to govern,  Possibly if post-WWI we manage to get a unified Arabic kingdom under one of the Hashemite family which would look towards Britain for support against possible threats but again that is likely to be a working system for a couple of generations at most unless some serious external threat emerges. 

  In terms of the smaller states the ones in the North are likely to be friendly and good trade partners unless the UK does something really stupid.  Those in Iberia and the Balkans need social and political reform to be longer term viable rather that worsening basket cases.  This doesn't necessarily mean ending the monarchies as a constitutional monarchy can be a useful tool for social and political stability, especially in a crisis but breaking the power of the aristocracy and military to dictate terms to everybody else.

Japan I would say is a useful ally if we can keep it reasonably liberal although race here is a potential pit-fall as OTL.  However with careful handling it shouldn't be impossible to keep it as a friend if not a defensive allies, which would also secure Australia and New Zealand.

How to handle the US is a big problem.  At this stage a drastic and permanent reduction of its power is pretty much impossible.  Hence you need to wean it off the American exceptionalism mentality that too often emerges.  Plus you have the fact that for the US to become a super power and Britain to stay at least a great one is pretty much incompatible because of their economic and geographical nature.  Even if you can persuade Washington that other nations should be accepted as equals there will be rivalry here.  Because of its geography sooner or later the US will seek to supplant the UK as the primary naval power and is unlikely to be satisfied until the UK is reduced economically and militarily to at most the sort of level it had ~1945.

[simon darkshade]

Colonial Policy

- Development rather than neglect
- Malaya to advance well up the Kra
- SW Africa and German East Africa are in the way and German New Guinea is too close to Australia
- Form a South African state post war and have Smuts as a South African Expeditionary Force commander
- Encourage British and European migration to South Africa to shift the position of the Afrikaners
- Rhodesia and Kenya to also get sponsored migration
- West Indian colonies being nudged together
- Move towards Imperial integration in stages
- Gandhi vs Zulus
- No partition of Bengal
- Hong Kong to be expanded up past the @ New Territories, which will be ceded in perpetuity

More to be added

[stevep]

May 22, 2022 11:07:12 GMT simon darkshade said:

USN vs the RN

1900: 6 USN vs 25 RN, with 6 and 23 ships under construction
1901:
1902: USA: + 5
1903: USA: + 3
1904: USA: + 4
1905: USA: + 1
(25 US PDN vs 48 RN PDN)

1906: USA + 2 DN1
1907: USA + 2 DN1
1908:
1909: USA + 2 DN1
1910: USA + 2 DN1
(8 DN1 vs 10 RN DN1)

1911: USA + 2 DN2
1912: USA + 2 DN2
1913/14: USA + 2 DN2
1915: USA + 3 DN2
(9 DN2 vs 10 RN DN2)

1916/17: USA + 2 DN2
1917: USA + 4 DN2
(6 DN3 vs 10 RN DN3)

The last part is complicated by the disruption to wartime programmes and construction on both sides of the Atlantic.

Some observations:
- The USN predreadnought programme allowed a catch up to 2:1 from 4:1, or rather more when we discount the old Royal Sovereigns
- It can be anticipated that there would be a strong USN programme in the early 1900s, or at least the beginning of one. If it is cut off at 17-20 ships, that upsets US plans
- The Americans won’t have the advantage of rather faster design speeds. They will need that 12 months to finalise and probably modify their all big gun design, putting them 4-0 and then 8-2
- There will be a driver for them to go to 14”, which outclasses 12” ships but doesn’t render them derisory. This is where the US caught up historically and the details of the WNT allowed the 14” bulk numbers to stick around rather more effectively than the RN 13.5” ships. A conclusion I draw is that going for lower calibres is a bit of a false economy
- They will also head for 16” in response to what is known of the 3rd generation British ships
- Heavier armoured battlecruisers compounds the challenge for the likes of the USN.
- I don’t discount the American desire for a fleet second to none, nor their raw financial and industrial capacity. However, this does not equate to being able to do it in every time and circumstance
- As long as they go at 2/year, they are well back. At 4/year, which was not done historically but is possible, they get to a ratio of 3:2
- Eventually, I can see the US try to flex its muscles

This is where the perspective of an American naval point of view would be great!

  Been busy with other things for a couple of hours so catching up now.

  Sorry are those what is planned for TTL or OTL?  If the latter I didn't realise they had so many pre-dreads.  Also how do you avoid the OTL 1916 programme which would complicate factors?

[simon darkshade]

Steve,

I’ll have to answer the main part of that tomorrow, but for now, the USA:

- It cannot be reduced. It cannot be actively constrained or contained, but passive constraints (not removing all their threats and rivals, a Continent not committing collective suicide and ending up in hock to American finance) can help
- I see the point on exceptionalism; it does come down to what is practical
- The USN of 1900 is a lot further behind than that of 1918 and the US economy is not yet streets ahead, at $312 billion to $184 billion (1990 USD). The Yanks do grow to $460 bill by 1910 with Britain at $207, but that is part of the central notion of the timeline. There will be those, like Teddy R, who call for a fleet second to none, but there won’t really be the scope for it

Simon

[simon darkshade]

May 22, 2022 17:19:14 GMT stevep said:

May 22, 2022 11:07:12 GMT simon darkshade said:

USN vs the RN

1900: 6 USN vs 25 RN, with 6 and 23 ships under construction
1901:
1902: USA: + 5
1903: USA: + 3
1904: USA: + 4
1905: USA: + 1
(25 US PDN vs 48 RN PDN)

1906: USA + 2 DN1
1907: USA + 2 DN1
1908:
1909: USA + 2 DN1
1910: USA + 2 DN1
(8 DN1 vs 10 RN DN1)

1911: USA + 2 DN2
1912: USA + 2 DN2
1913/14: USA + 2 DN2
1915: USA + 3 DN2
(9 DN2 vs 10 RN DN2)

1916/17: USA + 2 DN2
1917: USA + 4 DN2
(6 DN3 vs 10 RN DN3)

The last part is complicated by the disruption to wartime programmes and construction on both sides of the Atlantic.

Some observations:
- The USN predreadnought programme allowed a catch up to 2:1 from 4:1, or rather more when we discount the old Royal Sovereigns
- It can be anticipated that there would be a strong USN programme in the early 1900s, or at least the beginning of one. If it is cut off at 17-20 ships, that upsets US plans
- The Americans won’t have the advantage of rather faster design speeds. They will need that 12 months to finalise and probably modify their all big gun design, putting them 4-0 and then 8-2
- There will be a driver for them to go to 14”, which outclasses 12” ships but doesn’t render them derisory. This is where the US caught up historically and the details of the WNT allowed the 14” bulk numbers to stick around rather more effectively than the RN 13.5” ships. A conclusion I draw is that going for lower calibres is a bit of a false economy
- They will also head for 16” in response to what is known of the 3rd generation British ships
- Heavier armoured battlecruisers compounds the challenge for the likes of the USN.
- I don’t discount the American desire for a fleet second to none, nor their raw financial and industrial capacity. However, this does not equate to being able to do it in every time and circumstance
- As long as they go at 2/year, they are well back. At 4/year, which was not done historically but is possible, they get to a ratio of 3:2
- Eventually, I can see the US try to flex its muscles

This is where the perspective of an American naval point of view would be great!

  Been busy with other things for a couple of hours so catching up now.

  Sorry are those what is planned for TTL or OTL?  If the latter I didn't realise they had so many pre-dreads.  Also how do you avoid the OTL 1916 programme which would complicate factors?

All of those are historical ships and building. 

Avoiding 1916? Any war will be over by then; Wilson won’t be President; and Britain would have stepped on the accelerator long before then.

The desire will be there, but the practicality will run into issues. 

[stevep]

May 22, 2022 16:38:15 GMT simon darkshade said:

May 22, 2022 15:50:23 GMT stevep said:

  simon darkshade ,

a) Good.  Plus it sounds like there might be a change in Australia from hard line policies in favour of coal to one more concerned about its longer term costs, which many in Australia are already paying unfortunately.

b)  £4 million isn't a massive amount overall but I think that's only construction costs?  You need to think about full costs, especially manpower and operations and since you have markedly larger ships and more of them that is likely to be significant.  Its going to be too early to move from coal to oil - which would have substantial costs in itself if you want to deploy the ships worldwide and not sure if any other moves that would cut the running costs.  Note manpower isn't just restricted to the crews of the ships as there will be more needed ashore as well as related escort vessels to accompany those units which will presumably also be larger in number.

c)  With the Germans given the greater size of the RN build up I think its highly likely that at some stage the army will step in and say "NO, we can't afford this", backed by the politicians.  Tirpitz has some influence, especially with some of the industrial companies who are making good money selling guns, armour etc but I don't think it will be enough in the face of the costs of trying to challenge Britain at sea.  Once Germany fairly openly conceded and there's a clear majority over them there will be strong pressure for cutting back and Britain could end up with a large but fairly elderly fleet as a result.

d)  In terms of selling older ships don't forget that the existence of so many dreadnoughts will make those fairly obsolete and I don't know if the prices you quote in a later post are the original construction costs but you won't get that for 2nd hand items.  Remember that OTL the southern cone nations were buying dreadnoughts not 2nd hand pre-dreads.

e)  Yes interests rates were low compared to later time but the predominant feeling at the time was for reducing expenditure and debt.  The Liberals were elected in 1906 in part over concerns about free trade but also an idea to cut back government expenditure.  Which was also one of the reasons why the debt from the Boer war was paid off so quickly.  You will have to increase debt levels considerably, in peace time, or increase taxes by a fair amount or some of both to achieve the military build ups your talking about. 

Steve,

a.) It has no effect on me, as my concerns are more prosaic, such as getting a job and not becoming homeless, rather than supposed worries over coal; that characterisation doesn’t reflect the facts on the ground here. I wrote more on it in the Australia thread.

b.) I’ve got details and plans accounting for all of those factors; running cost is roughly 10% of the price, with wartime level ops more costly.

c.) If Jerry calls uncle, so much the better. Britain won’t have an elderly fleet, as its frontline capital ships will be new. When the Gen 2s come, the Gen 1s go out East and into reserve and so forth. However, I think that you might be overstating the override power of the Army prewar a tad. 

At this stage of planning, there will be an attempt to keep up from some countries, but it will be as if Britain has some sort of intangible advantage…

d.) The South Americans will buy brand new. The minor Euros will buy a mixture. The Others (such as China and the Turks) will be glad for what they can get. They will pay 2nd hand prices on 2nd hand ships.

e.) The Boer War debt was serviced and paid down somewhat, not paid off. When there was a bad year, 3-4 years careful penny pinching was wiped out in one go. It is a policy that never really worked over the 19th century and will have issues in the 20th when modern costs kick in.

There will be initial borrowing during the Boer War years, then new income from other measures at the same time as income taxes are cut and finally there will be some of the miscellaneous means down the line. However, the chief means of getting more bang for buck, to use the Americanism, is economic growth. That is the best means of getting more for defence and across the board.

Simon

  Simon

 a)  Unfortunately too many people are making the mistake you are, in arguing that denying a problem will make it disappear.  It might not affect our lifespan - if we're lucky - but that's unlikely to be the case for later generations, including many people on this board unless we really get our act together.  The facts are what they are.

c)  If Germany calls uncle ~1908 say then Britain has a clear majority, possibly a restoration of the 2 power standard in dreadnoughts and its going to be very difficult to excuse the same rate of building of even larger and more expensive ships.   Given both the privileges and status of the army and the clear threat from France and Russia if Tirpitz is calling for programmes that will take funds away from the army it will be leading a powerful coalition of forces.

d)  I'm not sure you can unload that much old ships on the market, especially given possible competition from others.  OTL Turkey bought fairly new i.e. two 2nd hand ships that Brazil had decided to replace with newer models before they were completed so its likely to want the same here.

e)  With all the additional spending your planning it will be difficult to avoid tax increases even with some secret knowledge.  Apart from anything else explaining how the government suddenly owes a number of very productive mines would raise some questions and Parliament will want to know where the cash is coming from.  You did mention an increase in indirect taxes by a tariff which will help.  If you avoid social spending, which you suggested somewhere, then you leave Britain with an under-educated, malnourished and increasingly alienated population to work with which will not go well.  To get economic growth, especially needs investment in the productive parts of the economy, most especially its people.

  Steve

[stevep]

May 22, 2022 17:31:02 GMT simon darkshade said:

Steve,

I’ll have to answer the main part of that tomorrow, but for now, the USA:

- It cannot be reduced. It cannot be actively constrained or contained, but passive constraints (not removing all their threats and rivals, a Continent not committing collective suicide and ending up in hock to American finance) can help
- I see the point on exceptionalism; it does come down to what is practical
- The USN of 1900 is a lot further behind than that of 1918 and the US economy is not yet streets ahead, at $312 billion to $184 billion (1990 USD). The Yanks do grow to $460 bill by 1910 with Britain at $207, but that is part of the central notion of the timeline. There will be those, like Teddy R, who call for a fleet second to none, but there won’t really be the scope for it

Simon

  I think I did read once, can't remember the source, that Teddy actually said, believe it was somewhere near the end of his life, that the US should never do anything to restrict the RN as it was the best defence the US had - especially since they didn't have to pay a penny for it.  However status will be important and the US will seek to control areas where otherwise Britain has an economic advantage - although this may be reduced somewhat by ending free trade - by other means.

[simon darkshade]

Steve,

A.) It isn’t a matter of denying it, but simply addressing more pressing priorities - I simply don’t give a tinker’s cuss about it. With my genes, heart and what not, I’m not in the business of being able to make long term plans, even if I could afford them. It is a topic better discussed elsewhere
C.) I can tell you now that the Germans aren’t going to drop out. There will be frustration, fussing and screaming, but no dropping out.
D.) Brazil ordered 4, Argentina 2, Chile 2, Turkey 3, Greece 2 and the Netherlands 4. There is a market and, even if not all of the RN ships are sold, that is fine. There will be plenty of uses for them.
E.) Tariffs are a part of it. Plenty of back room arrangements didn’t get hauled in front of Parliament, such as the acquisition of a controlling interest in the Anglo Persian Oil Company, defence arrangements and more, just in the WW1 era alone.

I don’t believe I’ve said anything about avoiding social spending at all; to the contrary, there will be more of it and more effectively used.

Simon

[simon darkshade]

May 22, 2022 17:15:13 GMT stevep said:

May 22, 2022 10:30:20 GMT simon darkshade said:

Foreign Policy

- The main principle is to prevent the emergence of a hostile rival, let alone a rival bloc
- Splendid isolation is neither splendid nor truly isolated. Being the big boy and separate from the others can result in potential trouble
- Britain’s future does not lie in any permanent bloc, alliance or grouping in Europe, as it is more of a global power than the land-centric states
- Germany is the most immediate rival of the British Empire, but not the only one. Removing Berlin’s capacity to impede British interests, taking key colonies and removing any fleet challenge are the initial issues, but beyond that, an Imperial Germany isn’t necessarily a blood enemy of Britain
- Keeping Austria-Hungary intact keeps a balance of power possible and prevents the creation of a vacuum that can only be filled by Russia or Germany
- There are few colonial issues remaining with France and no territory that is particularly enticing/necessary. Paris will seek some form of alliance against Germany eventually, but there is not a basis for a long term marriage. Allow France to grow too powerful and problems will emerge
- Italy is well down from Britain in every indice of power, so does not present a threat at this time. Harnessing their issues and desires is part of creating a new, stable Concert of Europe. Keeping it out of the Dodecanese is a good start, but denying it Libya is also advantageous
- Spain is the sick man of Western Europe, yet with some encouragement and support, can play a role in the European dance. They are in need of a friend and sponsor

- Portugal is an old ally and easy to support and cultivate. Preventing her fall into internal strife and regicide preserves them as part of the Invisible Empire
- Sweden is a regional power but tended more towards Germany in @. Forging ties can break this shift and complement the friendly status of Norway, which will become an independent state
- Greece is a potentially friendly state in the Eastern Med that can grow and work towards a friendlier and more stable Balkans
- After a Boer War blip, the Netherlands is generally friendly to Britain, as is Belgium. Formal control of Katanga is difficult to engineer, but it is an area of interest

- Russia is a major rival as of 1899 and this would be maintained historically apart from the brief Entente tie. By virtue of size, position and ideology, the Russian Empire is a rival, but one that mostly exists within the current international system. If it falls to Bolshevism, this changes, the threat increases and the ‘public relations’ picture shifts.
- Russia is on a collision course with Japan and with some help, can lose as badly or worse than historical. This will make it more malleable regarding Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet

- The Ottoman Empire is a weak state that holds lands of strategic and economic interest to Britain. It’s European territories cannot be held. In the Middle East, Arabia, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia are areas Britain needs. Taking Libya to boot secures the Med to a large extent
- Taking these territories brings with it costs and trials of their own

- Japan is a rising power that could grow into a threat if if pulls a Steve Bradbury. Without that, it remains back in the pack. An AJ Alliance has short term utility, but long term costs vis a vis US relations.
- Furthermore, allowing Japan to expand into the Pacific is a trigger to later issues. Japan occupied Tsingtao (also creating issues), provided some cruiser escorts and ASW work in the Med in a different war. None of that is really a decent return on investment
- Rather than a formal alliance, some interim form of cooperation will be sought in order to temper Japanese expectations and encourage a more circumspect approach to China. Heading off a Japanese imperialist expansion well before it begins is in British interests

- The USA is an increasingly friendly state, but at the same time a current and potential rival. Whilst certain advantages can be engineered, it is difficult to alter America’s trajectory towards economic and industrial superpower status
- This does not automatically transfer to hard power, specifically naval power, without events intervening. The USN is well back from the RN in numbers and composition at this point and now is at a disadvantage technologically. This needs a specific post in its own right
- Competition will come in the form of commercial interests rather than the more direct rivalries of the European empires

  A lot of interesting stuff here.  Some I agree with but some I'm doubtful about.

a)  Agree that splendid isolation was the latter but not the former.  Britain needs to have an active role in diplomacy and is weak and exposed when we're not active and possessing friendships if not defensive alliances.

b)  On the main nations:

Removing Germany's capacity to threaten British interests - or even their intent - either means seriously breaking their power [either economic and/or militarily] or changing their political system to one that will accept a role other than dominant over all others.

I don't think France have the ability to be too strong, especially with their demographic problems but they can definitely be a problem depending on the situation.

Austria - Definitely agree that a stable and successful Danubian state probably under the Hapsburg would be a benefit to stability in Europe provided its able to rally popular support.  It would also be a check on both Germany and potentially Russia but of course support for it would mean being in Italy's bad books.  Also it will mean Serbia and Romania are likely to be opponents and hence potential tools for Russia or others who wish to reduce the Austrian empire.

Russia is a potential major threat simply because of its size and also its aims in the south and east.  How to handle it will be a continual problem.  In the short term and arguably the longer one a Russia that goes the communist route - although that is highly unlikely with foreknowledge and a shorter WWI - would actually be the least threatening simply because its so incompetent.  What might be the most dangerous one could be a democratic but still nationalistic Russia.

Italy - It lacks the resources to be a true 1st rank power but shouldn't be overlooked as a possible source of disruption and distraction from greater problems as Mussolini showed OTL.

Ottoman Empire is almost certainly dying as there seems little capacity for reform, at least of a nature that would be morally palatable to western opinion.  However whether you can have a reasonably stable Turkey emerging as OTL which is a check on Russian expansion without the OTL genocide or at least massive ethical cleansing I don't know.  Nor whether an alternative, say a resurgent greater Greece would be any more stable.

  I would agree its useful for Britain to have a role in eastern Arabia, Kuwait and Mesopotamia but most of the rest of the Arabic part of the Ottoman empire is of no real benefit to Britain and a burden to govern,  Possibly if post-WWI we manage to get a unified Arabic kingdom under one of the Hashemite family which would look towards Britain for support against possible threats but again that is likely to be a working system for a couple of generations at most unless some serious external threat emerges. 

  In terms of the smaller states the ones in the North are likely to be friendly and good trade partners unless the UK does something really stupid.  Those in Iberia and the Balkans need social and political reform to be longer term viable rather that worsening basket cases.  This doesn't necessarily mean ending the monarchies as a constitutional monarchy can be a useful tool for social and political stability, especially in a crisis but breaking the power of the aristocracy and military to dictate terms to everybody else.

Japan I would say is a useful ally if we can keep it reasonably liberal although race here is a potential pit-fall as OTL.  However with careful handling it shouldn't be impossible to keep it as a friend if not a defensive allies, which would also secure Australia and New Zealand.

How to handle the US is a big problem.  At this stage a drastic and permanent reduction of its power is pretty much impossible.  Hence you need to wean it off the American exceptionalism mentality that too often emerges.  Plus you have the fact that for the US to become a super power and Britain to stay at least a great one is pretty much incompatible because of their economic and geographical nature.  Even if you can persuade Washington that other nations should be accepted as equals there will be rivalry here.  Because of its geography sooner or later the US will seek to supplant the UK as the primary naval power and is unlikely to be satisfied until the UK is reduced economically and militarily to at most the sort of level it had ~1945.

Steve,

I tend to agree on splendid isolation. It needn't be full formal alliances to the extent of @, but being involved in the affairs of Europe to effect a balance is common sense.

1.) Breaking Germany too far results in it shattering or going Red. The aim would be a quick and decisive defeat, followed by reasonable terms and reincorporation into the European system. Without a long war, there aren't the grounds to redesign constitutions or impose truly punitive terms. France may want more in order to permanently remove a German threat, but won't get it. The base terms for a peace would be some modest military limitations, loss of certain colonies, Alsace-Lorraine and an unravelling of the alliance blocs. I can see later issues arising with German vs Russia and a Polish state resulting as part of that.

2.) Demographically, France can't be a Germany. It does have better ports, a multi-ocean access and presence, a huge hunk of Africa and a population that will rise without the bloodbath of WW1 destroying a generation. It is the enemy of the enemy rather than a bosom friend as of 1899/1900.

3.) Italy's disapproval over Austria matters less when their real performance and capacity is known. Austria-Hungary, as a Danubian entity, is a stabilising influence on Eastern Europe in some ways. Romania isn't the most guaranteed enemy, but Serbia will need to be dealt with. If only Russia backs Serbia in that case, things may change.

4.) Communist Russia can pull the anti-imperialist line to influence the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Imperial Russia can't really do this, being the Big Bad Wolf in that sense, whilst not being the threat that a more modern state would be. Therefore, the general course will be to counter Russia but really hammer the Bolsheviks abroad; a Tsar has generally known objectives.

5.) Italy could be a threat. However, without Libya, it is limited to Eritrea and Somalia, which don't provide an Imperial threat. It can attack France or Austria, straight into the teeth of alpine fortress lines, or try and take Malta by coup de main, but the former are not likely to succeed and the latter will be addressed. Without an outlet, Italy is a frustrated threat at worst.

6.) Greece doesn't have the population, economy or manpower to fill the Ottoman void, even with Constantinople. Turkey as an Anatolian state is supportable, but nothing beyond that. An Arab kingdom or confederation of kingdoms works well. The absolute British requirements are the Arabian oil fields, Kuwait, Mesopotamian airbases and oilfields and Palestine (in order to protect Suez). That leaves Arabia, Syria-Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq as Arab ruled protectorates.

7.) The general preference that Britain will push is for constitutional monarchies or constitutionalising monarchies, as they are less likely to go Red.

8.) Japan and Britain ultimately have interests that will diverge as the padawan seeks to supplant the master. It is over 4000km away from Australia and not going to be allowed to get any closer. It will be handled and encouraged, but not indulged or built up to more than what it needs to be. Without the removal of France, Germany and Russia as naval powers, Japan is way back from the pack and, additionally, can be counterbalanced with China.

Australia and New Zealand will get squadrons of their own and the RN won't be pulling out of the Far East to focus wholly and solely on Germany. There will also be South African and Canadian navies/squadrons, which will add to the overall British Empire capacity.

[simon darkshade]

Some more Army brainstorming

- Maintain red coats as part of service uniform, whilst having khaki for field dress/uniforms
- Start testing and phasing in helmets
- MGs to be fielded by their own Corps at a rate of 1 platoon of 8 guns/battalion, with the LMG to be introduced initially at infantry platoon level
- New boots, great coats and webbing to be designed
- Develop better rations as a result of South Africa
- Telegraph Battalion to transform into Royal Corps of Signals and radio use to be advanced
- Army to have it’s our armoured car units and acquire standardised lorries from (certain motor companies)
- Katyushas
- Secret development of gas masks and capes, along with phosgene and mustard as a weapon to keep in reserve in case of great need
- Annual manoeuvres gradually rise to larger numbers up to corps level
- Updated maps of France and Belgium from ‘tourists’ and aviators
- Creation of detailed mobilisation and war plans against a variety of opponents
- Guns from scrapped battleships to be converted to siege howitzers and long term development of superheavy howitzers capable of cracking any fortress in the world

RN Brainstorming: 
- The German 28cm L/45 carried on the historical Nassaus could penetrate 11” of belt armour at 11,000 yards and 8” at 13,000 yards. Defending BBs against that is straightforward and BCs a bit more difficult
- Jerry then went to a 12”/50 for the bulk of their other Dreadnoughts. That could penetrate 13.6” at 11,000 yards and 12” at 13,000 yards
- There isn’t any data on Navweaps for the 35cm as it never went to sea, but approximate figures can be extrapolated from the performance of their 38cm gun
- As it is too costly to field DN1s with 14” belts, there needs to be the tactics and weapons to fight at more than 13,000 yards
- The Nassaus and Helgolands had 300mm belts and the Kaisers and Konigs 350mm. To penetrate 12” and 14” at 15,000 yards, a 12”/50 needs the superheavy shells used by the Yanks on the Alaskas
- British turrets will have a higher maximum elevation of 30 degrees, allowing much longer ranged fire; deck penetration needs a few other tricks
- www.admiraltytrilogy.com/pdf/Jutland_Impact.pdf
This is a shorter version of a subject gone into great detail in The Riddle of the Shells in Conway’s Warship journal. 
- Rather than Lyddite, there is time to get Shellite developed and used for naval shell filling
- The 15”/50 DN2 shells will be 2000lb in their ordinary version and have the capacity to penetrate German belts at every reasonable combat range for the era

- 12” on the DN1s and 15” on the DN2s makes for strong ships, but their advantage in guns, fire control and speed over their opponents exacerbates this. Throw in secondary fire from 5”/45 twin turrets for extra seasoning 

- To add insult to injury, as it were, the 9.2”/50 offers some useful potential for development, particularly once it’s dispersion issues are addressed and a superheavy shell introduced. They aren’t meant to be used in the main fleet battle, but have the potential for long range use in other engagements against colonial squadrons

- In destroyers, the RN already had generally larger prewar ships than the Germans in @. This will be more pronounced, with better guns, better torpedoes and greater speed

- German CLs carried 4.1” after British use of the 6”, so that wouldn’t change here overnight. The British ships will start at C/D class size and grow, with an emphasis on high speed and armament 

- The 13.5" was officially designated the '12" A' historically, so there are grounds to fudge the size of the SDN armament, locking in the opposition to certain choices before the truth comes out


- Fleets to consist of the Grand Fleet (Home) Atlantic Fleet (Gib), Mediterranean Fleet (Malta), East Indies Fleet (Singers) + China Station, North America and West Indies Station, South Atlantic Station, Australia and New Zealand Station, West Africa Station, Cape of Good Hope Station, East Africa Station and Pacific

realistic training - every level, from the lowliest swabbie to the CNO.

Pay the people, so there's an incentive to keep good quality in service.

R&D and engineering workups for future ships, including a NACA like facility for testing hulls and propulsion systems (did such an animal exist in OTL - with sufficient funding?) An earlier shift to oil?

R&D for ships weapons (do the torpedoes, current main and secondary guns and ammunitions perform to expectation? That should include financing live fire tests of everything)

R&D for aviation (what's the most reasonable expectations for types of aircraft - LTA/HTA, Carriers or Long-range Land based)

R&D for expeditionary power projection ( Marines and their necessary equipment, how to sustain a field force over thousands of miles for a long time - not so crazy, as that was kinda-sorta the backend part of Plan Orange).

Since we're in the wank biddness..... work on some form of standardized shipping crates/containers. Not necessarily RoRo, but easier to load, unload, store, and transfer to rail/trucks.

Do the design work, and prototype better landing craft - including earlier Roebling and Higgins types

Pre plan for how to significantly upgrade dockyard/building and repair facilities, in case war does come with little warning. (i.e. the US Army was woooooooefully unprepared for the DoW in WW1. They had to buy land for bases, beg, steal, borrow, pillage textile sources just to come up with tents, blankets, cots and uniforms. The navy wasn't in that bad of shape, but the Army's experience should serve as a cautionary event)

Ships (second on the priority list)

Get more cruisers and sea-going escorts of various sizes built.

Get more supply ships either built, or subsidized: colliers, oilers, tankers, repair and salvage ships, and basic cargo haulers. Get the legal paperwork done to appropriate passenger ships as needed for Expeditionary work in time of need.

[miletus12]

May 22, 2022 17:15:13 GMT stevep said:

How to handle the US is a big problem.  At this stage a drastic and permanent reduction of its power is pretty much impossible.  Hence you need to wean it off the American exceptionalism mentality that too often emerges.  Plus you have the fact that for the US to become a super power and Britain to stay at least a great one is pretty much incompatible because of their economic and geographical nature.  Even if you can persuade Washington that other nations should be accepted as equals there will be rivalry here.  Because of its geography sooner or later the US will seek to supplant the UK as the primary naval power and is unlikely to be satisfied until the UK is reduced economically and militarily to at most the sort of level it had ~1945.

Notice I did not bring it up?

Best advice to this timeline? Learn to adapt to growing American power. That second Roosevelt has an antagonism, of the British Empire that is based on his profound study of American and British history of imperialism. He "dismantled" the American empire. He will operate according to his political and social conscience.

[simon darkshade]

No, you did not. He was responding to my brainstorming post earlier.

My earlier request was based on not getting the whole business sidetracked through the continuation of earlier frank discussion between the both of you elsewhere, which started to bring in a lot of OTL events that have not yet occurred here and won't be occurring here.

I don't disagree with your interpretation of FDR's motives/attitudes as they stood historically, but that particular circumstance may not arise here. I'm interested in the much bigger picture - a Great Depression in the early 1930s isn't necessarily guaranteed as of 1899, nor is Roosevelt's rise to power, nor is the same Anglo-American relationship and power dynamic of the 1920s and 1930s.

Learning to adapt to growing American power is sensible; my interpretation of 'adapt' goes to the first general meaning, of shaping or modifying for changing purpose. This doesn't necessarily mean accepting or acquiescing to every aspect of that power as was necessary historically.

My general broad brush thinking at this stage:
- The US economy will grow markedly as it did historically
- Without the same WW1, there won't be the abrupt shift of financial power from the City to Wall Street, but more of a gradual ebb and flow that won't necessarily go one way
- Industrially, the US is already double that of Britain or Germany in most key stakes and their production will continue to rise on account of their internal market
- There is not a significant area of difference between US and British interests at this time
- That said, there is competition, particularly in South America
- As detailed upthread, the US can build PDNs pretty fast, but they won't be a factor for very long
- In the absence of overt tensions, the US won't see the RN as being built up against them per se
- They can build, but the design process still needs to be done by hand, which creates a bottleneck

A lot of what happened historically is up in the air, as the drivers and circumstances will change, incrementally to begin with. Britain won't need the United States, but will be on good terms with them. The Great Rapprochement has no reason to fail.
- The US fleet in 1900 and indeed in 1916 was not very balanced, lacking cruisers
- The USN will react to rising foreign battleship gun sizes

[miletus12]

May 24, 2022 4:03:44 GMT simon darkshade said:

I don't disagree with your interpretation of FDR's motives/attitudes as they stood historically, but that particular circumstance may not arise here. I'm interested in the much bigger picture - a Great Depression in the early 1930s isn't necessarily guaranteed as of 1899, nor is Roosevelt's rise to power, nor is the same Anglo-American relationship and power dynamic of the 1920s and 1930s.

It would depend a great deal on British tariff practices, imperial policy and whether or not there is an Anglo-German or Anglo-Russian arms race with or without a WWI. US emergence and Roosevelt as a corollary to THAT is almost guaranteed since some incompetent, whether Wilson or the equally disastrous Bryant or the witless Thomas Marshall will interregnum the republicans and derail prudent American foreign policy. As to some major European War, I am afraid the British are powerless to stop that at all. That freight train with the brakes off, was guaranteed to happen by Russian, German and French interactions from 1875 onward. If not Sarajevo, then some imbecility like some new Spanish crisis or some Balkan crisis or something in Africa would set it off. Heck, the fool Otto von Diederichs almost set a war accidentally off in 1898. The %s of it happening are rather high. One, as one reads the history of close calls and last-minute compromises from 1885 to 1914 among the Euro-states is amazed that those incidents did not spiral into major war before Sarajevo.

[simon darkshade]

A Very Rough RN Construction Plan


Stage 1
1900: 6+ x Duncans (as repeat Formidables), 5 x Monmouth ACs
1901: 6 x KEVII semi-dreadnoughts (4 x 12", 8 x 9.2", 12 x 6", 24 x 3", 12" belt, 18.5kts, ~18500t), 6 Monmouth ACs, 24 River class DDs, 12 x A class submarines
1902: 6 x KEVII, 12 Devonshire ACs (with 4 x 9.2" rather than 7.5"), 24 River class DDs, 12 x A class Submarines

Stage 2
1903: 4 x Dreadnought DNs, 2 x Invincible BCs, 4 x Warrior HACs, 8 Town class CLs (6250t, steam turbines, 12 x 6" in 4 x 2 and 4 x 1, 12 x 12pdr/3", 3" belt, good range and speed of 30+ knots), A/B class DDs, 8 Black Swan sloops, 12 B class submarines

1904: 4 x St. Vincent class DNs, 2 x Invincible BCs, 4 x Warrior HACs, 8 Town CLs, C/D class DDs, 8 Black Swan sloops, 12 B class submarines

1905: 4 x Colossus class DNs, 2 x Implacable BCs, 4 x Warrior HACs, 8 Town CLs, E/F class DDs, 8 Black Swan sloops, 16 C class subs

1906: 4 x Neptune class DNs, 2 x Implacable BCs, 4 x Warrior HACs, 8 Town CLs, G/H class DDs, 8 Black Swan sloops, 16 C class subs

Stage 3
1907: 4 Orion class SDNs, 2 x Lion BCs, 4 x Warrior HACs, 8 x Arethusa CLs, I/J class DDs, 16 Hunt class frigates, 8 Black Swan sloops

1908: 4 Victorious class SDNs, 2 x Lion BCs, 4 x Warrior HACs, 8 x Arethusa CLs, K/L class DDs, 16 Hunt class frigates, 8 Black Swan sloops

1909: 4 x Iron Duke class SDNs, 2 x Australia BCs, 8 x Arethusa CLs, M/N class DDs, 16 Hunt class frigates, 8 Black Swan sloops

1910: 4 x KGV class SDNs, 2 x Australia BCs, 8 Arethusa CLs, O/P class DDs, 16 Hunt class frigates, 8 Black Swan sloops

Stage 4
1911: 4 x Queen Elizabeth class SDN2s, 2 x King Alfred BCs, 12 x C class CLs, Q/R DDs, 16 Hunt class frigates

1912: 4 x Nile class SDN2s, 2 x King Alfred BCs, 12 x C class CLs, S/T DDs, 16 Hunt class frigates

1913: 4 x Royal Sovereign SDN2s, 2 x Renown BCs, 12 x C class CLs, U/V DDs, 16 Hunt class frigates

1914: 4 x Royal Oak class SDN2s, 2 Renown BCs, 6 x County class CAs, 12 x D class CLs, V/W DDs, 16 Hunt class frigates


Destroyers
112 A, B, C, D/older TBDs to be redesignated TBs in 1906

River class to be built as 875t oil fired turbine ships with 4 x new 12pdr/3" and 4 x 18", 32kts
New 12pdrs to be based of the 3 inch 20cwt with an emphasis on rate of fire for surface use.
Reclassified TBs in 1910

Follow up classes to be designed as a 1250t-1600t ship with 4 x 4", 2 x 2pdr and 4 x 1" + 6 x 21" TT. 

Next jump is to 2000t for a 4 x 5” Fletcher type (280 x R/S/V/W)


Cruisers
Decommission 9 Pearls, 21 Apollos, 8 Astraeas, 9 Eclipses, 4 Arrogants, 11 Pelorus, 3 Highflyer, 2 Challenger PCs as CLs are built (67)

Decommission 2 Blakes, 9 Edgars, 2 Powerful, 8 Diadem AC/PCs as CLs and Warriors build (21)

This is on top of  2 Nelson ACs, 2 Imperieuse ACs, 7 Orlando ACs, 2 Iris PCs, 9 Comus class PCs, 4 Leander PCs, 2 Calypso PCs, 2 Surprise PCs, 4 Mersey PCs, 2 Scout PCs, 7 Archer TCs, 5 Marathon PCs, 4 Barracouta PCs, 2 Barham PCs (54)

These 142 older cruisers are to be replaced by 100 LACs and 24 HACs, with the 24 Monmouth/Devonshires to move to reserve
Consideration of a Medium Armoured Cruiser is on the cards

6 Cressys and 4 Drakes to be sold to foreign buyers when Warriors are done

[simon darkshade]

May 24, 2022 5:18:59 GMT miletus12 said:

May 24, 2022 4:03:44 GMT simon darkshade said:

I don't disagree with your interpretation of FDR's motives/attitudes as they stood historically, but that particular circumstance may not arise here. I'm interested in the much bigger picture - a Great Depression in the early 1930s isn't necessarily guaranteed as of 1899, nor is Roosevelt's rise to power, nor is the same Anglo-American relationship and power dynamic of the 1920s and 1930s.

It would depend a great deal on British tariff practices, imperial policy and whether or not there is an Anglo-German or Anglo-Russian arms race with or without a WWI.

US emergence and Roosevelt as a corollary to THAT is almost guaranteed since some incompetent, whether Wilson or the equally disastrous Bryant or the witless Thomas Marshall will interregnum the republicans and derail prudent American foreign policy.

As to some major European War, I am afraid the British are powerless to stop that at all. That freight train with the brakes off, was guaranteed to happen by Russian, German and French interactions from 1875 onward. If not Sarajevo, then some imbecility like some new Spanish crisis or some Balkan crisis or something in Africa would set it off. Heck, the fool Otto von Diederichs almost set a war accidentally off in 1898. The %s of it happening are rather high. One, as one reads the history of close calls and last-minute compromises from 1885 to 1914 among the Euro-states is amazed that those incidents did not spiral into major war before Sarajevo.

British tariffs towards the USA will be relatively benign. Imperially, there will be a move towards integration in a series of graduated steps. There is likely to be an Anglo-German arms race of some description.

I am thinking of a different result in 1912 with Roosevelt getting the Republican nomination.

I agree that a war is inevitable, but it won't take the form, length nor result of the @ Great War.