WI: Operation Compass extended?

[575]

Apr 9, 2022 2:45:28 GMT melanie said:

575 , stevep , Good points. How will the Norwegian Resistance/Norwegian anti-German partisans react and coordinate with the Allied invasion of Northern Norway?

They will be directed from Norwegian Government in Exile in London to coordinate with the Allies.

[575]

OK – to wrap up 1941 (and look into 1943):
As Libya is swiftly conquered the few German troops in area that survives as their General Rommel cross the border into Tunesia on 15/16. February. The German-Italian Armistige Commission squeeze General Nogué to let them fly out to Sicily which happens.
Then Hitler wants ports and airfields in Tunesia as OTL to support a German go at Libya; Vichy wawers and OKH doesn't like it as Hitler also wants to use 7. Fliegerdivision to parachute into Tunesia to secure airfields. The Generals want to preserve the Parachute capability for use in Marita-Mercury or Russia. Squabbling back and forth takes time. General Bethouard who commanded the French Forces at Narvik talk General Nogué into resisting letting the Germans into Tunesia as according to Armistige Stipulations it should be the Italians requesting.
More time wastede as Musso is ordered by Hitler to do the request which the FNA reject as the Italians are despicable and already defeated; Hitler is furious orders Luftwaffe to move the 7. Fliegerdivision to Sicily for parachuting into Tunesia and orders Vichy to open Tunesia. He also tries Franco once again; Franco again rejects Vichy drags its feet though Admiral Darlan want to cooperate OKH protest movement of 7. Fliegerdivision and Hitler orders Directive 19 occupation of Vichy if Colonial forces rebels which again see OKH protest as it will drain off forces for occupation of Vichy.
Somebody is able to read German ciphers and tells Vichy what is happening and the Cat is out of the bag.
General Nogué realize Vichy have been doublecrossed by Hitler and renounces allegiance; Admiral Darlan orders the French Navy forces in FNA to sail to Toulon which a number does.
French Airforce side with Nogué.
OKH agree to occupy Vichy and Hitler orders 7. Fliegerdivision back to Germany.
The day following the return of French Navy units from FNA the Germans and Italians move into Vichy unoccupied territory mainly the Med coast and Hitler makes a new deal with Petain which falls through as Admiral Darlan orders the French Navy to scuttle or flee.

The French Colonial Empire declare for de Gualle though some negotiating is needed – say some three/four months.
Germans defeat the British in Crete.
Japan occupies all of FIC. Britain by late May move troops to Burma. Monsoon begins and all settle down though General Hutton commander Burma continue building up depots to the north in the event of an invasion and following retreat.
The Japanese Army realize is have to redraw operations in SEA/Burma – Malya – Siam.

A month later Germany launch Barbarossa.
French Army in NA is rebuilding; Airforce is active as are remaining units of French Navy. General Dentz in Syria have joined Allies.

Already during 1938 Britain had begun ordering light landing craft so a capacity is available from the beginning of War. This would be used for small scale attacks like Commando operations in Norway and the Med against the Italian Dodecanese Islands.
Until June/October 1942 Britain will be the supplier of landing craft/ships then US production kicks in see www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Stats/US_Landing_Craft_Monthly_Acc.htm and naval-encyclopedia.com/ww2/uk/british-amphibious-ships-and-landing-crafts.php

The entry into war by US at the Japanese attack 7. December 1941 according to Admiral Yamamotos plan makes for a huge logistical constraint being lifted off the British.
The French Colonial Empire had little if any industrial base but lots of manpower. Britain had to supply everything though the French did command the majority of the French gold reserve in Dakar and Canada to resume buying warmateriel from the US – Aircraft and trucks.
The US doesn't like de Gaulle but agree to refit Battleship Richelieu that is moved from Dakar to New York on condition that it is operated in the Indian Ocean and Pacific – one year ahead of OTL – as the US have just lost their Pacific BBs.

British does much better in Burma and is able to hold a forward defence of India in mid-Burma as well as keep the Burma Road open.

Following a winter experience of convoys to Murmansk the WA begin planning an amphibious landing in North Norway by Spring 1942 to ease their own losses and to ease Soviet ones (and get Stalin off their backs). I have found a Luftwaffe Norway bases document.
That may be the major obstacle and lack of CV numbers!!! There just isn't a landmass in Fighter range to take off from and no Mustangs till October 42. Fighters based out of Murmansk will only provide cover over Finnmark.
The German obstacles will be lack of communications within Norway and reinforcing the defenders as well as getting sufficient aircraft replacements into area.
Pulled successfully off German counterattacks will happen though Sweden will be ready to be very friendly to the Allies – ballbearings shipped from Narvik etc.
German airbases North Norway:
Alta Fiord – Seaplanes recce unit.
Altengard/Elvebakken – close to Altenfiord; 1 Fighter Sqn.
Andenes – emergency field close to Swedish border NW Narvik – unused
Banak – west of Altengard close to Porsanger Fiord; RAF use 1940, main LW base for attacks on Convoys – Met. Flight, 2 Bombers Sqn.
Bardufoss - between Narvik and Tromso; major base, Recce, 2 Bombers Sqn.
Billefjord – seaplane station N of Banak; 1+ Sqn.
Bodo – southern end of Westfiord; RAF use 1940, 1 Fighter Sqn.
Bodo Sea – 1 seaplane recce sqn.
Elvenes – satellite SW of Bardufoss; 1 Fighter Sqn.
Hammarfest port – seaplane station; unit?
Harstad – seaplane station; not in use
Hattfjelldal – 190 km S of Bodo; refuelling station
Kirkenes – border with Finland; LW command and supply, Depot etc. North
Kirkenes Høybuktmoen – 1 Recce, 1 Stuka, 1 Bf-110 Sqn.s
Kirkenes Soldatbukten – seaplane resque unit
Narvik – seaplanes, Depot
Rognan – S of Bodo close to Swedish border, satellite of Bodo
Sørreisa – W of Bardufoss; Seaplane torpedobombers 1 Sqn.
Tromsø – large Seaplane base 5+ Sqn.s

By then it is time to go for the large Med islands Crete, Rhodes, Sardinia, Corsica (de Gaulle will love it) and of course Sardinia.

1943 go for invasion of France! Leave Italy to rot and only France north AND south – the Alpes will be a nice block in the south. Don't get into Winnie's Balkan sillyness (possible to avoid???)
Then long slog to Berlin..

[oscssw]

Apr 6, 2022 20:20:05 GMT stevep said:

Apr 5, 2022 16:00:54 GMT simon darkshade said:

Steve,

A lot of what you raise is correct, but I think there would be pressure to do it anyway:

- Regarding experience, there was Sicily, Salerno and Anzio pre D-Day in @, along with the Pacific ops. The latter two weren’t the decisive factors in influencing Overlord in my view.
- Yes to the Funnies and Mulberry, which came from overall drivers rather than Sep 43 and Jan 44 drivers; both were the children of Dieppe.
- Opening the Med means more ships (escorts) in the Atlantic in 1941 and 1942, making it a case of swings and roundabouts.
- Knocking the Luftwaffe for six did take 18 months, so will be a factor.
- It would be a closer run show, but put up against it is the potential for a fair bit of force available otherwise chewed up in Africa.

It is the first piece in a winning puzzle. Deter or strangle Japan’s push south and there is the better part of 40 Allied divisions freed up.

  Simon

  Its not just amphibious experience but also general experience.  If N Africa is liberated in 1941 and later the allies take Sicily there is very little experience gained, especially by the US army in terms of general operations.  You could have something like the Kasserine Pass occurring during the landing operation which could be disastrous for the entire operation.  Ditto with both UK & US experience in air support for ground forces.

  With Mulberry its not just the idea, assuming Dieppe still occurs, but the time and resources.  Will the UK be able to spare such in 1943 with the U boat war still not won.  The forces freed up from the Med being a lot quieter will help but you could see an earlier war with Japan and that would drain RN resources especially.  Even without that I doubt your going to have a clear victory in the Battle of the Atlantic significantly earlier than OTL and you need to get a lot of forces and supplies for them into the UK without the country suffering even greater shortages itself.

  Deterring or strangling a Japanese drive south could still tie up forces for most of 42 and a good chunk of 43.

  Also would there be the necessary resources for the transport network in N France to be pounded like it was for about 6 months by the strategic bombers and what opportunity costs would there be for that?

  As I said I'm not saying that a 43 invasion of France will definitely failure but its going to be a hell of a lot less certain than OTL Overlord and failure here could have wider consequences as well.

  Steve

I'm a bit late to this excellent ATL but I really like what I am reading. 

OK here is what someone who has taken part in both wartime and peacetime exercise amphibious landings thinks.  The wartime ones (in Vietnam)were small scale (battalion level Amphibious raids.) and pretty much unopposed with complete air and sea control.

Some of the Peacetime exercises were, large multi national, full fledged, large amphibious landings.   One of the exercises was Nato's  "Dragon Hammer" Med ops off Sardinia.  One time we played with the Army defenders, not the amphibious force attackers, and we helped the Army whip the Nato Navies/Marines collective asses. 

Got a very nice letter of commendation signed by the commanding Army general out of that.  Even that didn't count enough to get me my warrant .... but I digress.

However, they, were both boat/beach landings and Helo "vertical envelopment"

(if I remember the Jarhead terms correctly ).   Would it be reasonable to say the "vertical envelopment", was just an improved WW II airborne landing? I'm not sure.

The beach landings were pretty much the same as WW II and Korea, even using mostly boats and LVTs that were not much more than "improved" WW II craft.  I'm pretty sure Joint Publication (JP) 3-02 Amphibious Operations, JP 3-02.1  Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation and especially NATO - ATP-08 VOL I DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS - VOLUME II Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Amphibious Operations are nothing more than the latest version of the late WW II amphibious doctrine.

If you are really a glutton for punishment and have whole bunches of spare time you could read 3-02

Don't say I didn't warn you.

www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_02.pdf

All I'm saying is that doing it up North really complicates the seaborne portion of the Op.   Landing inexperienced troops from LCVPs and LCMs (main WW II Landing craft), in freezing water  with North Atlantic coastal conditions IMO, is a very chancy thing.  As for the Mulberry's and other "Funnies", such as DD tanks.  It is one thing to do it in the channel which is really only a very wide "River Crossing".  If memory serves even in the channel one Mulberry was wrecked.  The DD tanks were nothing but death traps for the crews and their failure materially contributed to the Omaha beach butcher's Bill.   It is quite another thing to try it over Northern Norwegian beaches, even in summer, especially with the U-Boat still undefeated and the Luftwaffe still able to contest the landings.

We had drilled into our thick skulls at a course I took at the Coronado Amphibious "School".

"Amphibious landing of troops on a beachhead is the most complex of all military maneuvers."

 

"Landings require rigorous planning, detailed intelligence and impeccable logistics. Troops must be well trained, motivated and audacious to storm beaches and airdrop behind enemy lines. And in the end, unpredictable weather conditions can easily derail the whole operation."

Was that possible in 1943 without Operation Torch?

Keep up the good wirk guys.

 

[stevep]

   575 , oscssw ,

  Some good points here and a few comments.

a)  While I can see many of what 575 suggests like oscssw I have doubts about landings in northern Norway.  Its a long way from any friendly base - I wouldn't rely on Stalin to open up areas around Murmansk for allied use and you would have to get the men and equipment there.  Also its going to be cold, even in summer let alone spring and especially if early in the spring there's not going to be much light at those latitudes.  Coupled with the relative lack of any experience at amphibious assaults I fear it would end very badly and with the U boats present and also air attack from German bases you could also see a lot of maritime losses as well.  Tirpitz or Sharnhorst still being about would also mean that we need to keep powerful naval forces available all the time to defend landing forces and supply lines to them against a sudden sortie.  Air power on both sides could also be affected by bad weather but this is more likely to affect allied CV, which as said are short in numbers with demands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to face the Japanese.

  I could see plans made for such a landing but there will be doubts and Japan entering the war at the OTL period, especially with a successful Pearl Harbour attack will probably sink the idea at least for a year or two.  Note that with butterflies just about anything could happen with Pearl.  Things might go badly wrong for the Japanese but could also be worse for the US - if say a successful attack find a CV or two there or the Pacific fleet, with a little warning, sortie but the Japanese get wind - say from one of their agents on the island and the USN is caught at sea.  Probably less total damage as ships can maneuver but anything sink will see much heavier casualties and won't be re-floated and repaired.

b)  Depending on the circumstances if British forces are on Crete they might win against a German attack similar to OTL.  Since IIRC we're assuming Britain doesn't land forces on the mainland the garrison is likely to be more firmly established rather than poorly equipped escapees from the mainland, already strained by that combat.  Alternatively Britain may not have forces there at all.

c)  If Britain can move land, air and naval forces east from the ME and Med, some before and most after a Japanese attack, then it would depend on how much, what quality and of course how the luck goes.  Despite the experiences off Norway, Dunkirk and in the Med - the latter being markedly reduced this time the range and efficiency of Japanese aircraft could still come as a very nasty surprise for them as it did for the US and as a result you could have a Force Z type defeat possibly with larger losses.  However the key factors are the land and air components as carrier air power has limited stamina.  Especially if we get radar warning systems in place and some decent a/c with experienced pilots.

  Here while Burma would be very valuable, especially in aiding China and avoiding famine in Bengal Malaya, Sumatra and possibly at least some of Java would be very much more important as they would deny the Japanese of many of the resources they need.  Also pull them into a war of attrition that provided the defenders adjust to the initial attacks the Japanese can't win.  Its not as far from their bases as the Solomon's but a lot more important and still difficult to get their forces there through contested waters.

  Nearly forgot, are we assuming that Thailand joins Japan as OTL, fights them or is possibly split on the issue.  IIRC their forces did resist one of the landings in the Kra peninsula and caused the Japanese a lot of problems until they were ordered by Bangkok to lay down their arms.

d) related to a) but I can't see Sweden making a move to join the allies until their at least secured most of northern Norway.  Currently their totally surrounded by Axis controlled territories and while the initial German attacks on Moscow have failed they still hold large chunks of the most important parts of the USSR with Japan - if anything like the historical having smashed a good chunk of the USN and possibly a chunk of the RN and taking probably still a lot of territory. 

e)  I'm not sure, given the fact they will be reeling from the Japanese attacks and that the US is finally entering the war and seeking to sort out plans and ramp up both production and its own military, that there would be much capacity for seizing Med islands in 42.  Possibly one or two but could be risky.  If we hold Crete then Churchill might push for the Dodecanese and seeking to open up a front in the Balkans while the French would favour Sardinia and then Corsica as a way of freeing up another part of France and as a path to the French mainland.  Sicily and Sardinia might be the best pair if two are possible as that opens up much safer supply for the western and central Med and possibly all the way through if we hold Crete as well.  Also it would tie up Italian and probably some German forces.  However I think two would be the most available with very limited US forces and the French having to be equipped with new equipment and brought up to speed, especially with the Japanese demanding attention.

f)  In terms of 43 I don't think there will be the resources or forces for attack in both south and north France.  At least unless things are going a lot better for us and worse for the Germans.  As I've said earlier I'm doubtful of how practical a 43 landing will be in the north and OTL the allies lacked the resources to do simultaneous ones in north and south as initially planned.  At least unless a lot of capacity is freed up from the Pacific, which might be possible if we can deny them most of their most vital OTL conquests and then its decided to give a clear priority to Europe.

g)  I'm not sure how impractical a Balkans campaign is IF the allies have clear control of the Med, i.e. with Sicily, Sardinia and Crete - possibly also part of southern Italy, which could as OTL knock Italy out of the war.  It does have the advantage of local support from Greeks, Serbians and possibly Bulgarians give their somewhat reluctant attitude to the Axis, especially if Tsar Boris survives his OTL sudden death.  Once you get that far then two huge strategic gains are possible apart from adding a new front that Germany will have to defend while in bad logistical position with the limited transport links to the region, even before allied air power comes into play.

1)  The obvious one is that it puts Polesti into very easy range for allied air attack, along with traffic along the Danube, both of which would cause Germany serious problems.

2)  There is at least a change of bringing Turkey in on the allied side.  Even without that civilian merchant shipping can traverse the straits so such could be used to send aid to the Soviets in a far more efficient way than via Murmansk or Iran provided that the allies have control of the Med.

h)  In terms of the impact of the amphibious Shermans at D-Day what I've read is that the officer commanding the ship from what they were launched off Omaha beach insisted on them being launched much further out than they should have been, hence the bulk of them sinking in the wilder waters.  There was no problem with them on other beaches where the proper launching distance was used.

[simon darkshade]

Steve,

Where there is great danger, there is oft great gain. Flipping things on their head, if strategic surprise is achieved, there just needs to be a coordinated hammering by carrier aircraft and bombers of a few Jerry airfields in the area. Then the Commandos and Royal Marines go in to seize some initial areas. This would then be followed by and large by administrative landings of a couple of divisions and then fighters.

Don't think of it as Overlord in Norway, but an entirely different concept. Jerry doesn't have enough troops in situ to pull an Atlantic Wall defence on every port, every fjord and every area of ingress just yet.

[oscssw]

Now that is food for thought Simon. Taking Norway on a shoe string instead of rolling the dice for all the marbles in a Overlord in Norway. I like the idea of taking key airfields and then the administrative landings at ports captured mostly intact.

I do have serious concerns about using only RN CVs (I assume we are talking pre-Pearl Harbor),because RN CVs don't have very large air groups and you don't have many of them. You also would need major fleet units and those CVs ready to repeal the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe so you could not dedicate the limited number of attack birds on ground support and airfield suppression.  Maybe Bomber Command supported by FAA fighters could do the job?  Only problem is the abysmal historical performance of bomber raids in WW II, particularly in the early years. Hitting the fields is going to be hard enough.  Doing enough damage to keep them out of action for a material period of time is quite another.

Given there are only a limited amount of usable airfields in Northern Norway, I'd think the Germans would concentrate adequate number of their 300,000 garrison to their protection from units as small as Commandos and Royal Marines.
I'd think German practice was to keep a very strong mobile reserve to cover such contingencies.

Those transports would have to run a U-Boat, Luftwaffe, E-Boat and major Kriegmarine unit gauntlet to reach the Northern Norway ports. I would guess those ships would be staged from northern UK and/or the Faroes or Shetlands or maybe Iceland?

So we have "He who dares wins"? What works for the SAS and other spec warfare types does not necessarily work for taking and holding a major hunk of strategically valuable territory.

Last point, since Hitler was convinced Norway was a very likely objective, there would be no trouble getting to send everything he could to reinforce that 300,000 man garrison AND to expend what was left of his surface fleet to hold it. This is unlike Normandy where he was convinced it was a feint.

That said, having little imagination and as an E-8 having never been consulted as to Strategic decisions,
what would I know?

[simon darkshade]

It would be post PH, likely in 1942 or so. Use fleet carriers and escort carriers to boot.

If North Africa is wrapped up, there *might* be scope for something like a Northern Torch, given the US dislike of Med ops. At the least, Norway can be justified as working against the U-Boat menace, aiding the Soviets and getting to grips with the Germans in a European theatre.

I’ll add more, but I’ve got to knock of an equity assignment first!

[oscssw]

Ok Simon, post Pearl Harbor. Would you agree to these assumptions?
1.USA committed to the war as in the OTL
2.All Carrier losses as in the OTL
3. Summer landing?
4. June 1942
5. Carrier building program as in OTL

If so here is what we have to work with From the USN
Pac Fleet Operational CVL and CV 4
Lant Fleet " " " 1

Pac Fleet operational CVEs 1
Lant Fleet " " 1

Midway kicked off June 4'42. Guadalcanal begins Aug 7'42. I'd think we would not get far trying to "borrow" any of Nimitz's carriers and I know "god almighty" Ernie king would back him to the hilt. I doubt even Churchill could get his good buddy FDR to overrule his two top Admirals.


So that leaves CV Ranger and ONE CVE.
Largest air group ever carried by Ranger was 76 aircraft So it would be a mix of SBDs, F4Fs and either TBDs or TBFs.
Early CVE,s like Long Island and Charger carried about 30 aircraft usually F4Fs and TBF.

Ranger, with a maximum Air Group, would have been a substantial addition to the RN's CVs.

[stevep]

Apr 11, 2022 17:53:37 GMT oscssw said:

Ok Simon, post Pearl Harbor. Would you agree to these assumptions?
1.USA committed to the war as in the OTL
2.All Carrier losses as in the OTL
3. Summer landing?
4. June 1942
5. Carrier building program as in OTL

If so here is what we have to work with From the USN
Pac Fleet Operational CVL and CV 4
Lant Fleet " " " 1

Pac Fleet operational CVEs 1
Lant Fleet " " 1

Midway kicked off June 4'42. Guadalcanal begins Aug 7'42. I'd think we would not get far trying to "borrow" any of Nimitz's carriers and I know "god almighty" Ernie king would back him to the hilt. I doubt even Churchill could get his good buddy FDR to overrule his two top Admirals.


So that leaves CV Ranger and ONE CVE.
Largest air group ever carried by Ranger was 76 aircraft So it would be a mix of SBDs, F4Fs and either TBDs or TBFs.
Early CVE,s like Long Island and Charger carried about 30 aircraft usually F4Fs and TBF.

Ranger, with a maximum Air Group, would have been a substantial addition to the RN's CVs.

  Would agree.  The allied navies were very stretched in 42 and even in 43, when after all HMS Victorious was loaned to the USN as USS Robin.  True the quick ending of the fighting in N Africa might mean HMS Ark Royal survives its OTL fate but if the allies are fighting more successfully for SE Asia or butterflies mean the US loses a CV or two at pearl or the RN in a force Z disaster then it could be even worse than OTL for carrier strength.

  Plus carriers have limited endurance for air operations and are likely to use up stocks of fuel, ammo and the like in a day or two which would mean they then need replacing by other units while they return to base to restock.  Not to mention Arctic waters can be very storm with a lot of fog and the like as well.  Not very good relying on them for support until you can seize airfields, then get those in working order, bring in a/c and also ground crews and supplies to keep them operating.

[oscssw]

Steve, the US carriers should not have to return to port to restock.
The art of UNREP (underway replenishment) had been SOP in the USN prior to WW II. The size of the Replenishment fleet would grow huge, as did the entire US Navy, as the war progressed.

According to Naval History and Heritage Command Lant Fleet

ATLANTIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM 12CM-42
From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
To: ATLANTIC FLEET.
Subject: United States Atlantic Fleet Organization, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.
That would make it about January 1942. US Fiscal year now runs from Oct. 1 to Sept. 30.
However, Prior to 1976, the fiscal year began on 1 July and ended on 30 June.
. . .

TRAIN SQUADRON SEVEN
(AR10) Repair Ship ALCOR Flagship AO means Oiler
(AE 2) Ammo Ship NITRO (AO22) CIMARRON (AO28) SANGAMON
(AE 4) Ammo Ship KILAUEA (AO11) SAPELO (AO29) SANTEE
(AF12) Stores Ship MIZAR (AO37) MERRIMACK (AO34) CHICOPEE
(AF11) Stores Ship POLARIS (AO15) KAWEAH (AO38) WINOOS
(AF13) Stores Ship TARAZED (AO17) MATTOLE (AO16) LARAMIE
(AF 9) Stores Ship UKON (AO18) RAPIDAN (AO 9) PATOKA
(AF14) Stores Ship URANUS (AO26) SALAMONIE (AO19) SALINAS
(AKS2) Stores Ship POLLUX (AO29) SANTEE (AO28) SANGAMON
(AO34) CHICOPEE (AO11) SAPELO
(AO38) WINOOS (AO37) MERRIMACK

[stevep]

Apr 11, 2022 21:01:16 GMT oscssw said:

Steve, the US carriers should not have to return to port to restock.
The art of UNREP (underway replenishment) had been SOP in the USN prior to WW II. The size of the Replenishment fleet would grow huge, as did the entire US Navy, as the war progressed.

According to Naval History and Heritage Command Lant Fleet

ATLANTIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM 12CM-42
From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
To: ATLANTIC FLEET.
Subject: United States Atlantic Fleet Organization, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.
That would make it about January 1942. US Fiscal year now runs from Oct. 1 to Sept. 30.
However, Prior to 1976, the fiscal year began on 1 July and ended on 30 June.
. . .

TRAIN SQUADRON SEVEN
(AR10) Repair Ship ALCOR Flagship AO means Oiler
(AE 2) Ammo Ship NITRO (AO22) CIMARRON (AO28) SANGAMON
(AE 4) Ammo Ship KILAUEA (AO11) SAPELO (AO29) SANTEE
(AF12) Stores Ship MIZAR (AO37) MERRIMACK (AO34) CHICOPEE
(AF11) Stores Ship POLARIS (AO15) KAWEAH (AO38) WINOOS
(AF13) Stores Ship TARAZED (AO17) MATTOLE (AO16) LARAMIE
(AF 9) Stores Ship UKON (AO18) RAPIDAN (AO 9) PATOKA
(AF14) Stores Ship URANUS (AO26) SALAMONIE (AO19) SALINAS
(AKS2) Stores Ship POLLUX (AO29) SANTEE (AO28) SANGAMON
(AO34) CHICOPEE (AO11) SAPELO
(AO38) WINOOS (AO37) MERRIMACK

  By the latter stages of the war I would agree.  However in early 42 how much would be available for such an operation in the European theatre?  Also given its in the Arctic how freely would they be able to operate there due to temperate and weather constraints?  Not to mention did the USN resupply ships actually in a combat zone, i.e. within range of enemy air attack?  Or would they have pulled back out of such range to do operations safely, which means the CVs as well as lacking supplies for defensive operations would have to steam out of range and then back in again.

  Interesting that the US Fiscal year started the previous 1st July if I'm reading you correctly?  Also that when oilers were in such desperate supply in the Pacific there were 20 such with the Atlantic fleet.

[oscssw]

All good questions Steve. I'll answer as best I can.

However in early 42 how much would be available for such an operation in the European theatre?
Every one of those ships was operational in 1942 and part of the Atlantic fleet. At a guess I'd say 1/3 roughly 6 AOs could be freed up for an Op of "limited" duration. They have to "service" one Carrier Task Force 1 CV and a CVE along with roughly 4 Cruisers and a dozen DDs for 2 weeks, at most. If we don't have those airbases operational by then the landing was a disater.

Also given its in the Arctic how freely would they be able to operate there due to temperate and weather constraints?
I have unrepped in a late war Gearing DD in both the North Pacific off Hokaido and the Bearing sea.
The AO was steady as a rock we, on the other hand,earned our sea pay, especially the poor deck apes.
Actually, if you set your course proper to the wind and have plenty of power (which a DD does) and are very maneuverable (which a DD also is) it's not that difficult. I'd say no more than an averagely competent full LT as OOD and a QM2 or BM2 as Helmsman can handle the job nicely.

Not to mention did the USN resupply ships actually in a combat zone, i.e. within range of enemy air attack? Or would they have pulled back out of such range to do operations safely, which means the CVs as well as lacking supplies for defensive operations would have to steam out of range and then back in again.

Yes it was then as it is now SOP to rendezvous with the Replenishment force in a relatively "Safe" area. Given the range of Luftwaffe aircraft of 1942, that really isn't all that far. It would be the Fast ships 25+kts, on half their plant, CVs, CAs/CLs and DDs that would be going off station to meet the replenishment force so that would materially reduce the time out of action. Furthermore, night time Unreps although not as common then as now were doable in 1942, hell they were actually safer when there was a real threat close by. Since the Luftwaffe was mainly a VFR force, the night time replenishment area could be a lot closer than you think.

Interesting that the US Fiscal year started the previous 1st July if I'm reading you correctly? Also that when oilers were in such desperate supply in the Pacific there were 20 such with the Atlantic fleet.

Actually Steven, prior to Pearl Harbor the USN was concentrating a lot of it's assets to "Fight" the undeclared Neutrality Patrol war and had been for a few years by 1942. Just three days after the 1 September 1939 outbreak of World War II, U.S. Navy air and surface neutrality patrols were initiated in the Atlantic. They were to continued into the final months of 1941, by which time operations had transitioned to de facto support of the Allies’ cause.

You know there just has to be a worthwhile ATL covering this period of US Naval Ops. Maybe the USS North Carolina BB-55 takes on the SMS Bismark after she sinks Hood, drives off POW, eludes the RN (no torpedo damage and the PBY does not see her) and heads West to slaughter convoys?

BB-55 was in full commission in April of '41, she could make 28 kts, had an unrepped range of20,080 mi at 15 kts and had those beautiful 9 16 inch Mk 6 guns.  By fudging the timing just a little she gets Mark 3 fire-control radar sets for the main battery, Mark 4 radars for the secondary guns, a CXAM air-search radar, and an SG surface search radar a few months Earlier than the OTL.

WOULD YOU LIKE TO KNOW A LOT MORE?

www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1941/prelude.html

[575]

Been off a while - the scenario oscssw of USN participating in a Northen Norway invasion is better than I thought still going with US forced into the war around the turn of 1941/2. I had counted on a max. of 6 Fleet Carriers and 2 Escort Carriers for a total of 247 A/C with a fighter Wing in Murmansk area to really offset the LW as the one OTL operating there for a short while.
Steve earlier mentioned something about U-boats operating during summer in Arctic waters would make it easier to spot them from the air. This ops should take off during summer if only to minimize adverse weather effects. However this would also serve for making ops run 24 hours a day!

The limited number of German airfields which were upgraded come 1943 leave little room for increasing LW numbers.
Also the Germans only build the road/railway all the way to North Norway during the war; it didn't exist prior to 1940 with ferries making up for much transport along the coastal stretch. Even so I guess the Germans would have problems concentrating their reserves as there be very little room for manouevre in the hinterlands before they reach the Swedish border.

There had been a small invasion/cross fiord crossing during the fight for Narvik with participating of Norwegian troops along the French Foreign Legion which succeeded.
The Norwegians and something like a reinforced Brigade for ops which should be rated as mountain troops and there was the 52. Lowland Division which seemed train for such. Then Commando's and Para's and whatever could be raised.

Once the ops is underway the Germans have to decide if they are to free the few Divs. being stuck fighting the Soviets in Northern Finland to react or move reinforcements up a very long way.. Don't really see the Finn's react as they weren't at war with Britain and would like it continue that way.

The Swedes would prefer waiting it out till the Allies is secure - all they need is to deny the Germans movement of reinforcements on internal Swedish lines. Then they are also to let the Norwegian "Police" units training in Sweden across the border once its reached by the landing force. Tiny but everything counts.

Edit: pretty sure I counted the Ark out of the FC hull numbers; will make for more airsuppport.

[simon darkshade]

Just going on the previous numbers, 4 Jerry fighter squadrons and 5 bomber squadrons is a force that can be locally overwhelmed with the right approach and forces. The key is to isolate them and pick them off individually whilst drawing German attention elsewhere.

Hit Southern Norway with raids from Scotland and Shetland and feint somewhere else, prior to the carrier fleet walloping the fighter fields, whilst using commandos and sabotage to hit the bomber fields. Once their very narrow window of threat is closed, then start putting 160-200 RAF planes ashore. The essence of hitting Norway is that the seaward flank is bally large, giving plenty of space to move.

[575]

Apr 10, 2022 18:19:21 GMT stevep said:

   575 , oscssw ,

  Some good points here and a few comments.

a)  While I can see many of what 575 suggests like oscssw I have doubts about landings in northern Norway.  Its a long way from any friendly base - I wouldn't rely on Stalin to open up areas around Murmansk for allied use and you would have to get the men and equipment there.  Also its going to be cold, even in summer let alone spring and especially if early in the spring there's not going to be much light at those latitudes.  Coupled with the relative lack of any experience at amphibious assaults I fear it would end very badly and with the U boats present and also air attack from German bases you could also see a lot of maritime losses as well.  Tirpitz or Sharnhorst still being about would also mean that we need to keep powerful naval forces available all the time to defend landing forces and supply lines to them against a sudden sortie.  Air power on both sides could also be affected by bad weather but this is more likely to affect allied CV, which as said are short in numbers with demands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to face the Japanese.

  I could see plans made for such a landing but there will be doubts and Japan entering the war at the OTL period, especially with a successful Pearl Harbour attack will probably sink the idea at least for a year or two.  Note that with butterflies just about anything could happen with Pearl.  Things might go badly wrong for the Japanese but could also be worse for the US - if say a successful attack find a CV or two there or the Pacific fleet, with a little warning, sortie but the Japanese get wind - say from one of their agents on the island and the USN is caught at sea.  Probably less total damage as ships can maneuver but anything sink will see much heavier casualties and won't be re-floated and repaired.

b)  Depending on the circumstances if British forces are on Crete they might win against a German attack similar to OTL.  Since IIRC we're assuming Britain doesn't land forces on the mainland the garrison is likely to be more firmly established rather than poorly equipped escapees from the mainland, already strained by that combat.  Alternatively Britain may not have forces there at all.

c)  If Britain can move land, air and naval forces east from the ME and Med, some before and most after a Japanese attack, then it would depend on how much, what quality and of course how the luck goes.  Despite the experiences off Norway, Dunkirk and in the Med - the latter being markedly reduced this time the range and efficiency of Japanese aircraft could still come as a very nasty surprise for them as it did for the US and as a result you could have a Force Z type defeat possibly with larger losses.  However the key factors are the land and air components as carrier air power has limited stamina.  Especially if we get radar warning systems in place and some decent a/c with experienced pilots.

  Here while Burma would be very valuable, especially in aiding China and avoiding famine in Bengal Malaya, Sumatra and possibly at least some of Java would be very much more important as they would deny the Japanese of many of the resources they need.  Also pull them into a war of attrition that provided the defenders adjust to the initial attacks the Japanese can't win.  Its not as far from their bases as the Solomon's but a lot more important and still difficult to get their forces there through contested waters.

  Nearly forgot, are we assuming that Thailand joins Japan as OTL, fights them or is possibly split on the issue.  IIRC their forces did resist one of the landings in the Kra peninsula and caused the Japanese a lot of problems until they were ordered by Bangkok to lay down their arms.

d) related to a) but I can't see Sweden making a move to join the allies until their at least secured most of northern Norway.  Currently their totally surrounded by Axis controlled territories and while the initial German attacks on Moscow have failed they still hold large chunks of the most important parts of the USSR with Japan - if anything like the historical having smashed a good chunk of the USN and possibly a chunk of the RN and taking probably still a lot of territory. 

e)  I'm not sure, given the fact they will be reeling from the Japanese attacks and that the US is finally entering the war and seeking to sort out plans and ramp up both production and its own military, that there would be much capacity for seizing Med islands in 42.  Possibly one or two but could be risky.  If we hold Crete then Churchill might push for the Dodecanese and seeking to open up a front in the Balkans while the French would favour Sardinia and then Corsica as a way of freeing up another part of France and as a path to the French mainland.  Sicily and Sardinia might be the best pair if two are possible as that opens up much safer supply for the western and central Med and possibly all the way through if we hold Crete as well.  Also it would tie up Italian and probably some German forces.  However I think two would be the most available with very limited US forces and the French having to be equipped with new equipment and brought up to speed, especially with the Japanese demanding attention.

f)  In terms of 43 I don't think there will be the resources or forces for attack in both south and north France.  At least unless things are going a lot better for us and worse for the Germans.  As I've said earlier I'm doubtful of how practical a 43 landing will be in the north and OTL the allies lacked the resources to do simultaneous ones in north and south as initially planned.  At least unless a lot of capacity is freed up from the Pacific, which might be possible if we can deny them most of their most vital OTL conquests and then its decided to give a clear priority to Europe.

g)  I'm not sure how impractical a Balkans campaign is IF the allies have clear control of the Med, i.e. with Sicily, Sardinia and Crete - possibly also part of southern Italy, which could as OTL knock Italy out of the war.  It does have the advantage of local support from Greeks, Serbians and possibly Bulgarians give their somewhat reluctant attitude to the Axis, especially if Tsar Boris survives his OTL sudden death.  Once you get that far then two huge strategic gains are possible apart from adding a new front that Germany will have to defend while in bad logistical position with the limited transport links to the region, even before allied air power comes into play.

1)  The obvious one is that it puts Polesti into very easy range for allied air attack, along with traffic along the Danube, both of which would cause Germany serious problems.

2)  There is at least a change of bringing Turkey in on the allied side.  Even without that civilian merchant shipping can traverse the straits so such could be used to send aid to the Soviets in a far more efficient way than via Murmansk or Iran provided that the allies have control of the Med.

h)  In terms of the impact of the amphibious Shermans at D-Day what I've read is that the officer commanding the ship from what they were launched off Omaha beach insisted on them being launched much further out than they should have been, hence the bulk of them sinking in the wilder waters.  There was no problem with them on other beaches where the proper launching distance was used.

Steve;

a, d) covered above

b) this is iffy as either Churchill have let Wawell et al. run stuff in the Med and let them decide on Greece or not. If not then only a Brigade in Krete and an easy Axis victory with continued annoying German Para capability. If more troops even if evacuees from Greece - kicking the Italians out of Africa may make Winnie gung-ho - then the Germans Paras bleed in Crete! Hence my going with a British engagement in Crete.. Alternatively landing them in Tunesia with Vichy support (Darlan would be willing I think from reading on the Armistige Commission) to overturn any ideas so far - hence a 1941 campain in Tunesia with perhaps the British chased all the way back across the coast to Egypt OR if Generals Nogué and Betouard have their way defeated in Tunesia.. either way British will be limited in actions as OTL.

c) I assumed the Thais would still support the Japanese though with a larger British force in Burma the Japanese will have to rething the Malaya ops and the Thais who were already considering shifting allegiance may do so and then it gets interesting.

e) the British have been building landing craft since 1938 or at least started fiddling around with them then and had some in the Med to initiate small scale ops in the Greek isles so too here. Of course the main effort would be dependant upon US industry churning units out!

f) my best estimate was for OTL like operations in space-time though actually I won't mind abandoning Dragoon and let the French loose in the Appenines which may break Axis defences there and open the way into the Balkans from Trieste if really lucky.

g) there will be gains in a Balkan campain but the Germans proved themselves rather stubborn in mountainous terrain.. ITTL the Italian may not fold as early as OTL as they haven't sustained a long war in NA but then of course their Army may be in Russia.. Which also make it difficult for the Italians to switch sides. I think the Allies will have to decide where to commit forces as spread too much out they Germans may pick off the easy ones too early and then its all a mess. Ploesti is the obvious but it was reached from southern Italy by B-24s.

h) Looking up the development of the DD tank summer 1942 may be too early to test it operationally. I certainly wouldn't like to be navigating one up a Norwegian fiord.