12 JUNE 1941 1700 Seated in Bismarck’s flag quarters Vizeadmiral (Rear Admiral, upper half) Brinkmann held in his hand BdU’s latest estimate of the “Englanders” and “Amis” search for him. It told him very little. Aside from a few Type IX U-boats operating this far West and South there was no other Kriegsmarine intel (in his opinion the only reports that were both reliable and accurate as to naval issues) available.
So far It had been a stressful but successful, high speed run away from Trinidad Tobago raid. The weather had cooperated in hiding him from the long range patrol flying boats, his biggest worry. Prince Eugene's damage had been minor although the loss 9 and and wounding of 16 men was regrettable. He still had been forced to keep his TG Brinkmann “closed up” to a fifty percent manning. That, at least, allowed his sailors to get some sleep, feed and attend to personal needs. Unfortunately, there had been three occasions when Kapitäns zur See Lindemann and Kommandant Seeadler’s von Luckner had ordered "Action Stations" due to either radar or sonar reports that turned out to be nothing in the end. The alarm bells and the announcement caused stressed and tired men to hurriedly race to their battle stations until the threat was evaluated as "nothing". It could not be helped this far in the enemy's back yard and almost alone Lindeman, von Luckner and especially he could take no chances. So his off watch men stumbled back to try and get some badly needed sleep before they all too soon had to relieve the watch.
He then looked at the fuel reports of his Flag and The Prince. Not good. Three days of high speed operations had reduced his bunkerage down to 75%. His UNREP with PSS Cabello was still 29 hours away. He would order speed reduced to 20 knots at nautical twilight. He was was far enough from the raid now and he had to keep in mind that in this hostile part of the Western Atlantic an encounter with enemy forces was a dstinct possibility for Vabello as well as his TG. He might need to stretch his fuel.
On the brighter side he also had a signal from BdU announcing that Hitler had conferred the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross on Fregattenkapitan Schneider, Bismarck's "first" gunnery officer. Tired as they were Lindemann had ordered a short wardroom celebration to Wet Down Schneider's award. He also ordered the cooks to prepare a holiday meal of Smoked sausage fruits, cheese, honey, freshly baked bread, chocolate and juices. He authorized a special cigarette or pipe tobacco ration and a shot of ole Jägermeister. for his sailor’s much loved “Jäger ,Bomben” which consist of a shot of Jäger dropped into a pint of beer and drunk all together. He was taking a small chance but they all needed to celebrate their epic victory and relieve the strain of this cruise.
13 JUNE 1941 2200 PSS Cabello lay one cable length ahead of his "Prince" as she took on fuel. The astern UNRED method was a long process. The fact it was working even this well was due to Fregattenkapitan Friedrich Max von Muller and his 6 man team of Marinenachrichtendienst (Naval Intelligence Division AKA MAD) special operations group aboard Cabello. Kommandant Seeadler’s von Luckner's Chief Engineer estimated 6 hours to top them off. Bismarck's tanks were bigger which meant about 8 hours. That made it mid afternoon before they were free of the tanker.
The weather had cleared and gave them this moderate sea and wind. It also made it possible for for Vizeadmiral (Rear Admiral, upper half) Brinkmann, to authorize flight operations, so the Arado's would be up at morning twilight conduct a thororgh search and then establish constant patrols out to 150 miles during daylight. That should give them plenty of warning.
14 JUNE 1941 0315 S-13's juinior sonarman was fighting sleep. He had to maintain his "Listening Watch" for another 30 minutes then he could climb into the rack of his relief and get some sleep. He began another 300 degree sweep of his JT microphones the chief had atught him to conduct his search in 10 degree increments listening three to five 5 minutes, in the forward sectors and a minute of so as the sectors moved aft to the baffles before moving on. He was listening on 030 relative when he picked up a sound source. It was intermittent and he took his time because he didn't want to report another pod of whales or school of squids. The chief told him "Report everything" until you get the hang of it. It was his fellow junior sub sailors that gave him the ribbing and that bothered him.
14 JUNE 1941 0325 He was certain and, what's more, they were multiple contacts probably 2 but possibly three. He reported his contact report to the watch officer who came over and picked up the spare ear phones and listened for about a minute and a half. The OOW then sent for the COB and picked up the sound powered phone to inform "Cowboy" they had something on the JT and it wasn't whales banging. The CO was in the control room in three minutes; it took the COB about 5.
COB imediately clamped the spare phones on and started minipulating the JT. He said to the watch sonar operator to start a paper trace on what he gave him. He then turned to the CO, "Captain the kid has something solid, at long range and I make it three surface contacts. The bearing is 030 relative and it is definitely at least three contacts."
CO "Any idea of the distance COB"
COB "Captain it's not close but I think we are overtaking whatever it is."
CO "Well we're doing 12 knots on a course of 040 surfaced with a 80% charge. Lookouts report nothing.
This looks like a chance for you to work one of your Target motion tricks. Let's go to the DRT." COB gave the listening watch back to the kid after telling him he was doing a good job. He then, working from the log plotted the sound bearings of the last 10 minutes. He then factored in what S-13 had been doing and he came up with a rough estimate that whatever the contacts were they were not moving anywhere very fast.
The CO had been reviewing the position of all known convoys and other ships in the area. Nothing seemed close enough to be picked up by the JT.
COB, "We got to make some estimates on the speed of this bunch Captain."
CO "Use 7 knots COB." 20 minutes went by with COB plotting sound bearings and occassionally just listening on the spare phones.
COB "Captain we got to do some maneuvering to nail these guys down."
CO, "OK COB just tell the OOD what you want him to steer." "OOD this is th captain take your course from the COB I'll be right beside him."
OOD "Aye, Aye Captain." To the quartermaster "Make sure you get that order in the log Hammet." Aye, Aye Sir.
Next CO S-13 talked to the Radio watch "RM-2 Mahr this is the CO. Are you picking up anything in the very high frequency band?" RM-2 Mahr " No sir. I am copying the Fox scheds now and they are in the HF band. I can bring a UHF reciever on line but I'm alone right now."
CO S-13 "Continue to copy the Fox scheds. The RMC will be with you in a few minutes."
CO S-13 "Messenger of the watch lay down to the goat locker and tell the RMC I want him in radio yesterday."
Messenger, "AYA AYE Captain" and he shot out of the space for the "Goat Locker", AKA Chief's bunk area.
Less than five minutes later the "growler" groaned and was picked up by the OOD.
OOD, "Captain it's the RMC reporting he's in radio."
CO S-13 "Very Well. Hand me the hand set. Chief we think we found a Nazi raider group. I want to see if they are radiating their Seetakt or Fumo sets."
RMC " Sir we have a VHF reciever I can tune in but it's going to be at the top of it's frequency range. From what I kow about Seetakt & Fumo we just might be able to pick them up. Got to look at the pub on them but I'd guess it is in the low Megahertz range and that's UHF gear we don't have. Even if we can't get them on the VHF set I can screw around with our gear and drive it further up the Megahertz scale but it will probably not last too long so we got to use it for short periods."
CO S-13 "How long do you need chief?"
RMC "I can have it on line in 15 minutes Captain. If I have to modify it we are talking hours.
14 JUNE 1941 0445 The better part of an hour with two more course changes yielded a TMA Solution of sorts.
COB "Captain it works out to a target course of 075 plus or minus 5 degrees; at 5 knots plus or minus 1 knot; and a range of 55 miles plus or minus 15 miles. That's the best I can do. This TMA is real new to me and our gear was not designed with it in mind."
CO S-13 "Good job COB. I can work with that.
COB was thinking "now is the time "Cowboy" gets to earn his pay. Imediate sighting report based on JT listening tracking and experimental TMA? No doubt the Nazis were monitoring fleet frequencides and could make a shrewed guess they had been spotted. Stay silent and close the range on the surface at 15 knots and try to get a visual confirmation of the target? If it's Bismack and that heavy cruiser they would have FORD on radar at about 10 miles. Too far for a visual ID. At that range they could sink us without too much trouble.
14 JUNE 1941 0445 CO S-13 was reviewing the nautical almanac entries for this position. Morning nautical twilight begins at 0454 and full sunrise is 0543. If that Nazi TG boss knows what he is doing he'll have his scout planes up at 0500 and conduct a local area search before they go off on morning patrol. When they fly our way we should see them before they see us, if I go to PD about 0545. No, I need my lookouts not the limited view from a perisacope.
His decision made "Cowboy" announed. "This is the Captain. I have the conn. Bring us down to "decks awash. Course 090 and cut back the speed to 7 knots to reduce our wake. Pointing directlly at them, even in this sea, we'll have to be within visual range for them to pick us up on their radar.
14 JUNE 1941 0450 The growler groaned and was picked up by the CO S-13. "Captain here"
RMC " Took a while but we got them Captain. Intel Pub says both Seetakt and FuMO transmit on a Frequency of 368 Mhz . We have two close sources at 070 true. Those sets are suppose to pick up a destroyer size ship at 10 to 12 nautical miles."
CO S-13 "I'd given up on you when you told me no luck with our VHF set and were going to try to jury rig it into the UHF range. Chief this entire crew just might make it back to Gitmo now. Damn well done. Standby for a flash sighting report to CincLantFlt. "
CO S-13 picked up a blank meesage form and wrote out a short concise sighting report:
LFT
DE RFG NR 121 U 140500 E JUN
FM SS-318
TO CINCLANTFLT
WD GRNC
BT
FLASH
1. Sighted TG Brinkmann
2. My Position Latitude: 18 57 41.5 Longitude: 59 51 37.3
3. TG Brinkmann bears 070 degrees True at 55 miles, on course 075 true at 5 knots
4. SS-318 Has not been detected.
5. Will continue to track and report
BT
NNNN
CO S-13 to watch messenger "Bring this to the Com Officer and tell him I said to encode it and transmit ASAP. Keep transmitting until he gets a reply from Admiral King."
14 JUNE 1941 0503 Radio Room abaord KMS Bismarck watch Funker (Radio operator) was picking up transmissions from a fairly close source "west" of Bismarck. After 3 minutes of monitoring he informed the radio watch Maat (PO) of his findings. The Maat came over and plugged in his head phone set. No doubt abpout it the kid had something and it was in code.
The Maat informed the watch officer of the transmission.
Watch Officer "Matt what do you make of it?
Matt, " I agree with the Funker Sir. It is definitely close by and from the west. It also is in code but I have no idea whose. That Frequency could be one of our type IXs operating this far out."
Watch Officer to the Encoding watch Warrant Officer "I need to know if this signal is one of our codes now." The WO took the punched paper tape and fed it into a teletype that printed out the signal letters. He then reviewed it and determined it was not one of theirs.
Encoding watch WO, " It is not one of ours. The format is all wrong for an enigma cypher. It looks like an Ami code. At least it does not look like any Englander code I ever saw Herr Erster Wachoffizier (Watch Officer).
The Erster Wachoffizier quickly informed the OOD who informed Kapitäns zur See Lindemann who informed Vizeadmiral (Rear Admiral), Brinkmann on his flag bridge watching his tanker disappear to the south West. An aide handed him the SP phone and he listened to the report. The Vizeadmiral quickly ordered a flashing light, immediate execute signal to come to course 090 speed 28 knots. It was once again time to run but this time to his next operating area in the Cape of Good Hope convoy Lanes. The Englanders were forced to send much of their shipping to North Africa around the Cape because the Med was too dangerous for most convoys. He also ordered the Prince to arm an Arado with bombs and send it along the bearing of the radio transmission. Make sure the air crew knows no matter what nationality they found they were to silence that radio immediately after we acknowledged their sighting report.
16 JUNE 1941 0945 USS Brooklyn CL-40 morning Curtiss SOC Seagull scout, about 80% of the way out on his sector search is spotted first by Bismarck's Arado Ar 196. At contact the Arado Ar 196 was above the Seagul and in the sun. The German pilot imediately dived for the Seagul in a blow through attack. His two wing mounted 20mm auto canons and one forward firing 7.92 MG ripped through the tail and after cockpit of the SOC killing the Observer. The shaken and wounded Seagul pilot transmitted an aircraft sighting report but is killed before he could transmit his posit. The brief transmission was picked up by only two ships in Hewitt's force, Brooklyn and Dunlap's DD-384. The incomplete sighting report gives him a first proof a German capital ship is in the area. No firm Datum, No course and speed, no confirmation of which ship or ships it is but he and Lee are very sure it is Bismarck/and or The Prince.
16 JUNE 1015 TG Brinkmann's Arado aircraft continued with it's sector scout and at the very end of it's fuel outbound fuel reserve sighted what appeared to be either convoy or a naval formation "bumps" on their horizon. The aircraft commander decided these ships being over 200 miles away from his TG it was prudent not to trans mit a posit report from right on top of them. He then selected a dog leg course back to TG Brinkmann. Heading to the North until he judged himslef out of radar range and then dropped down and headed straight for his TG. After another 30 miles he came up to best cruising altitude, leaned out his fuel mixture and hoped his guages were accurate.
16 JUNE 1941 1045 despite marginally acceptable flying conditions and sea state Hewitt orders Lee to launch a recon SOC to the last estimated position of the downed Seagull. Lee selected LT Stryker OIC of his Air Det and his observer Chief Craig on this very dangerous but vital mission because they would do the job no matter what the odds. LT Stryker was also the nephew of CMDR Joe Stryker, BB-55's Executive Officer. He informed both men what happend to the CA-40's aircraft. Pilot was ordered to conduct a sector search and if successful to take whatecer action he deemed neccessary to ensure his sighting report is acknowledged by Hewitt's TG. He was then to shadow the German force signalling posit, course and speed changes. Lee agin thanked God for Hewitt because the man had the iron to order a couple of good young men to their death. Also because Hewitt was taking a big chance, by breaking radio silence, Lutgens would pick up the acknoldgement and know the Seagull's home was a USN capital ship and atleast it's bearing from Bismack.
16 JUNE 1941 1230 2nd scout reaches last position of Brooklyn's aircraft and begins sector search to the North West .
16 JUNE 1941 1345 Stryker and Craig spot The Prince steaming SOUTH East at 19 kts and imediately transmit sighting report which is not recieved by TG 39.1 Stryker orders Chief Craig to keep sending that "Fvcking signal until we get an acknowledgement" and then takes the SOC into a cloud bank. For the next half hour Stryker skips in and out of the clouds, varifying The Prince's Course and speed and avoiding another Arado Ar 196.
16 JUNE 1941 1420 Chief Craig recieves TG 39.1 acknowledgement of the sighting report. Actually BB-55 had transmitted it's first acknowledgment at 1250. Hewitt authorized further trasmissions at 1355, 1409 and 1416. The American reconnaissance aircraft spotted Nazi warships, prompting Hewitt to order his ships to condition two (half crew on watch and guns manned and ready at all time). The four destroyers were arrayed ahead of BB-55 and USS Brooklyn CL-40.
The American task force, having been operating as TG 39.1 for some time and was a coherent unit with a well understood and practiced doctrine. BB-55, thanks to the "Gun Club's very best Gunner "Ching" Lee, was a well drilled, technically expert in visual and radar guided fire control, experience in shooting their main battery, by day and night. To put it brutally Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were up against the best gunnery ship in the USN, commanded by an absolute master of this black art. It would be a case of "Diamond scratch Diamond.
16 JUNE 2300 The Prince spotted Hewitt's DD screen ships with his forward FuMO 23 radar. Luckner sent his sighting report and turned about to take up her station abreast of Biamarck. BB-55's search radar picked up the Nazi cruiser at about the same time, followed by a much larger blip, Bismarck soon after. In the TC Tolley's team had plotted the positione on the DRT. Rear admiral Hewitt had decided to run this battle from the TC and was there with "Ching" Lee.
16 JUNE 2310 first CL-40's, soon followed by BB-55's fire control radars, began tracking the Nazi vessels. Hewitt , also a member of the Gun Club, knew he who fired first acurately had a big advantage in a sea fight and ordered guns "Free " as he closed the range. Both of his capital ships were now free to opened fire when ready. BB-55 fired first with her main battery at 2317 at a range of 18,000 yds landing over. Bismarck returned fire shortly after but her first salvo was aimed at the American destroyer screen, allowing BB-55 to target TG Brinkman's Flagship, with her second and third salvos unopposed. The third salvo scored a significant 2 shell hit that knocked out 1/4 her propulsion machinery and started a fire. First blood to BB-55.
16 JUNE 2322 with the range down to 16,500 yds CL-40 fired a 15 gun AP salvo of her 6 inch Mark 16/16DP at Prince Eugen scoring three hits. Her Gunnery officer imediately adjusted his fire control solution Luckner had put his helm over hard turning away from Bismarck. Therefore CL-40's 2nd main battery salvo fell short but her third salvo was over. Brooklyn now thought they had the range and commenced to blanket The Prince with full 15 gun salvoes at the rate of 12 per minute.
The Prince returned fire with her four forward 8 inch SK C/34 naval guns under radar control. She straddled Brooklyn with salvo 1. CL-40 took evasive action that caused her next two salvos to score only 2 hits, neither of which did more than light damage to The Prince.
16 JUNE 2330 an error in the electrical switchboard room knocked out power aboard BB-55, disabling her radar systems and leaving the ship all but blind to the Nazi vessels approaching the force. By this time, Brinkmann's ships had inflicted serious damage on the American destroyer screen; two of the destroyers were hit by 8 inch fire and a third was destroyed by gunfire. 3 members of BB-55's DC party, led by EM3 but once EM-1 SS Madrick, managed to restored electrical power but it did take time. Until power was restored BB-55's captain, Ching Lee, kept his ship on the disengaged side of the flaming wrecks of the destroyer screen until BB-55 was forced to turn in front of one of the burning destroyers to avoid a collision, which backlit her to the Nazi ships, drawing their fire.
16 JUNE At 2358, even with electrical power restored it took RMC O'Shea and his other radar techs time to restore and calibrate the gear. Captain Lee ordered two of his 5 inch mounts to fire star shells to illuminate TG Brainkmann. That was the old school way to aid his Gun boss and fire control team as they engaged Bismarck using visual his directors in visual mode. Mounts 54 and 52 (the marine manned twin gun secondary) were assigned the illumination mission. GM1c Borgnino USN (AKA Ernie Borgnine) and 1st Sgt Carlo Morano had done their jobs well because the mount and it's gun crew perfromed flawlessly. While her radars were down BB-55 managed to score some straddles and a few close aboard overs and unders but no solid hits.
At last BB-55's radar picked up the Nazi ships again less than 5 nautical miles ahead. Two minutes later, the Prince illuminated BB-55 with her search lights and the Nazi line promptly opened fire, scoring several hits. BB-55, opened fire, under radar control now, assigning only mount 54 fired star shells, while the rest joined her main battery in battering Bismark at a range of 8,400 yards. BB-55 scored nine 16-inch hits and as many as forty 5-inch hits, inflicting moderate damage. Bismarck was holed below the waterline, her forward two turrets were knocked out temporarily. Bismarck's steering was very sluggish due to her rudder pintals being bent by the jack hammer blows of near misses, forcing the helmansman to fight her with every bit of skill he had. Even then it was impossible to keep her on a straight course for long. She also developped an increasing starboard list.
With BB-55 back in the fight CL-40 shifted fire to the Prince alone and though straddling her, failed to score any vital hits; the barrage nevertheless convinced the German cruiser to turn off her search lights and reverse course in an attempt to launch torpedoes.
17JUNE 0013, the Nazi cruiser fired her two remaining torpedoes at BB-55 , then about 6,000 yards away. Lee combed their wakes and they both missed. TG 39.1 promptly took evasive maneuvers. At 0020, Hewitt, fearing more close range torpedo attacks, turned his TG 39.1 to open the range (he had ordered the surviving destroyer to disengage earlier in the engagement).
Bismarck was burning, still steering like a drunken whore, with moderate progressively flooding and two disabled boilers. She was still belting out 4 gun 15 inch salvoes at TG 39.1 although her accuracy was steadily declining.
17 JUNE 0025 BB-55 landed a devestating 5 round hits on Bismarck along her water line belt. Although Bismarck's DC crews fought a furious battle against flooding they lost and most of them drowned while trying to save their ship. Her pumps could not cope with the flooding and she began an ever increasing list.
17 JUNE 0031 BB-55 administered the death blow in a full 9 gun slavo that landed 7 AP rounds and tore the heart out of the proud battleship when her after powder magaine was penetrated. Brinkmann died, Linderman died along with all but 135 of her sailors. Bismarck capsized and sank with her props still turning and her guns still firing.
17 JUNE 0037 CL-40 was firing CXAM RADAR guided continuos 15 gun 6 inch /47 caliber guns at their crews most rapid rate (12 rounds per minute) combined with half her 5 in/25 caliber guns into The Prince. The prince's upper works were wrecked, her radars and fire control directors were destroyed and even her turrets and barbetts had been penterated by multiple AP hits disabling all. Her CO, XO, gunnery officer and almost all her topside crew were dead.
BUT
Her mighty 132,000 shp Blohm & Voss steam turbines were still intact and her hull was mostly sound. Her senior surviving officer, conning her from back aft, ordered up flank speed of 32 knots and made for Brooklyn. The Prince might be finished but she was going to take her murderer to hell with her.
17 JUNE 0044 BB-55 landed 3 16 inch AP rounds on the roof of her forward turrets. The shells smashed all the way down to her keel and blew her bows off. Her own 132,000 shp Blohm & Voss steam turbines drove her into the sea which defeated her water tight integrety and literally drove her under like a diving U-Boat taking the rest of her crew to the bottom with her.
17 JUNE 0050 CL-40 and the lone destroyer had formed back up with BB-55 to withdraw from the area. Hewitt hung out the signal Bravo Zulu and repeated it with both flashing light and TBS. TBS stands for “talk-between-ships”, a relatively low-powered crystal-controlled system. TBS was new and used mainly for maneuvering, target (and friendly) identification, and weapons employment. By operating in the VHF part of the electromagnetic spectrum, these radios essentially kept the range to “line-of-sight” distances, approximately 25 miles.
Hewitt also ordered TG39.1 to go to Condition III - Wartime Cruising, generally one third of the crew is on watch, and strategic stations are manned or partly manned. (e.g. weapons). His kids deserved some rest.
CO BB-55 to the OOD. "Set condition III with the exception of DC parties and those donducting essentail gear repair." After giving his crew 15 minutes to stand down to condition III Captain Lee walked over to the 1MC (ship's general annoucing system) and said to the Bosun of the watch "whistle me up a tune son I'm going to address the crew." After the pipe was finished he took the mic. This is the captain. Well done. I am proud of each and everyone of you. You just might have won the last battleship to battleship gun fight the USN will ever see. That is all"
17 JUNE 0115 In the Goat Locker BB-55 the CPOs sat around their mess tables drinking their Navy brew, liberally spliced with their own brand of scotch whiskey. To a man the chiefs went to sea with a few the largest bottles of Listerine mouthwash. About 95% of those bottles did not contain the dental hygene concoction. They did hold each chief's personal supply of liquor. It had to be Scotch even though the individual chief might have preferred bourbon, by a very large margin, or some other libation because only scotch had the same color as the listerine which was packaged in clear bottles.
It was pretty much an open secret among the senior officers that the chiefs had their own stash and it was in the Listerine bottles. However, on BB-55 under "Ching" Lee, as long as they kept their drinking under control, they got a wink and a nod. The chiefs, being the wily old sailors they were, knew better than to let the "Skipper" down and hence the Listerine Bottles and scotch. It was far more important to keep the secret from the junior O's and enlisted for "morale purposes".
Last thing they wanted was to "spark a mutiny" was the running Goat Locker Joke. The shipwide joke, even among thr Jar heads was the Skipper was also a dead shot with an M1911A1 which was another reason not to fuck with him. All kidding aside, these pros knew Lee had started preparing them to fight, win and survive a battleship battle the day he came aboard. They loved him for that and of course being reasonable about their booze. It was their very good luck they were skippered by the best Battlleship skipper in the fleet and probably the smartest Naval officer any of them would ever see.
17 JUNE 0138 Ernie King's face was crowned with a smile as he read Rear admiral Hewitt's high priority, Top Secret Eyes Only CincLantFlt message.
" 1. Mission Accomplished
2. Both raiders sunk.
3.Our casulaties 3 DDs sunk most of their crews rescued.
4. No enemy survivors.
TG 39.1 is ready in all respects to carry out all orders.
Hewitt sends."
To his aide. "Make to Rear Admiral Hewitt ASAP by same code as his message.
1. Well done.
2. I will inform CNO and he will let POTUS Know.
3. I expect FDR to contact the PM personally.
4. Now standby for whatever we deserve beacuse I think we just dragged our country into a war that is going to get alot of poor kids killed.
5. Break out the beer for your men because I am ordering you to "Splice the Main Brace."
King sends."
He then sat back in his chair and lit up another smoke. On this momentous occasion King thought back on the path that had led him here. Born in Lorain, Ohio, on 23 November 1878, attending the U.S. Naval Academy ( The old Baltimore Barge School) beginning in 1897, including Spanish-American War service in USS San Francisco, and graduating in 1901. As a JO, serving in a variety of large and small ships, instructor duty at the "Barge school", performing engineering duties and was twice on flag staffs. He commanded the destroyer Terry (DD-25) and a torpedo boat flotilla during the "Teens". From 1915 through the First World War, he was assigned to the staff of Admiral Henry Mayo. Following "The War to End all wars", utter bull shit and another tour at the Naval Academy, now Captain King commanded a submarine flotilla and the New London, Connecticut, submarine base.
In August 1928, following flight training and further service at sea, he became Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. The next year, he moved onto command NavSta, Hampton Roads, Virginia, and, in 1930, became captain of the large aircraft carrier USS Lexington (CV-2). Promoted to Rear Admiral in 1933, he was made Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. During the later 1930s, he commanded the Battle Fleet's aircraft carriers. In early 1941, following service on the General Board and as commander of the Atlantic Patrol Force, King was appointed to lead the newly recreated Atlantic Fleet responisble for the Nuetrality Patrol among alot of other things.
He had no doubt the undeclared warfare, that was the Nuetrality Patrol up to this point, against German U-boats and raiders would all change with Hewitt's sinking of Bismarck and Prinze Eugen. He hoped that bastard Hitler would do them a favor declaring war on the USA . If not, his patron FDR would maneuver the Congress to do so IF he survived impeachment for authorizing Hewitt to commit an outright act of war. His money was on FDR paying a high price in political capital but still POTUS when that three ring circus was over.
When his aide returned King pulled a bottle of Irish and two glasses from his bottom drawer. He said, "Sit down Johnnie and join me in a drink to Hewitt, Ching Lee and all of TG 39.1. We Naval Officers & Gentlemen will have a lot of blood on our hands by the time we reach Berlin and a lot of that blood is going to be our own people. But that's what they pay us bastards for right?
Now drink up because your going to need it.
Aide, taking the offered full glass straight "Aye, Aye Sir" !
THE END.