stevep
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Post by stevep on May 4, 2024 10:45:28 GMT
Yes but the latter is unlikely to willingly aid the 'western capitalists'. They could help inadvertently by passing information that prompts Stalin's removal and a rift between Lenin and Mao. Without such information, especially from sources they trust the west is very much in the dark about not only the details in Mao's empire but also other key things like the depression and WWII.
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575
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Post by 575 on May 4, 2024 11:10:33 GMT
Yes but the latter is unlikely to willingly aid the 'western capitalists'. They could help inadvertently by passing information that prompts Stalin's removal and a rift between Lenin and Mao. Without such information, especially from sources they trust the west is very much in the dark about not only the details in Mao's empire but also other key things like the depression and WWII.
Didn't expect the Soviet ex-pats to aid the West certainly not with angry Japanese on the doorstep.
I did find that 39. Army was at Port Arthur commanding 7. Mech. Division, two Guards Inf. Divisions, a Machinegun-Artillery Guards Division and other Artillery units. 18 Air Division of Soviet Navy of two Yak-9P Fighter Regiments, one A-20G Boston Mine/Torpedo Bomber Regiment, one Catalina Recce. Sqd. Couldn't find exact info on ships but at least Submarines.
Unable to replace the aircraft and needing replacements for the Mech. Division they should be able to hold the Japanese.
BTW Mao did travel by train to Moscow 6 December 1949 to negotiate Stalin with first meeting 16 December. ITTL Mao was little brother... ITTL there will be no loan to get! Basically Mao is on his own...
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 4, 2024 12:23:53 GMT
Yes but the latter is unlikely to willingly aid the 'western capitalists'. They could help inadvertently by passing information that prompts Stalin's removal and a rift between Lenin and Mao. Without such information, especially from sources they trust the west is very much in the dark about not only the details in Mao's empire but also other key things like the depression and WWII.
Didn't expect the Soviet ex-pats to aid the West certainly not with angry Japanese on the doorstep.
I did find that 39. Army was at Port Arthur commanding 7. Mech. Division, two Guards Inf. Divisions, a Machinegun-Artillery Guards Division and other Artillery units. 18 Air Division of Soviet Navy of two Yak-9P Fighter Regiments, one A-20G Boston Mine/Torpedo Bomber Regiment, one Catalina Recce. Sqd. Couldn't find exact info on ships but at least Submarines.
Unable to replace the aircraft and needing replacements for the Mech. Division they should be able to hold the Japanese.
BTW Mao did travel by train to Moscow 6 December 1949 to negotiate Stalin with first meeting 16 December. ITTL Mao was little brother... ITTL there will be no loan to get! Basically Mao is on his own...
Ah I misread something earlier about Mao being in Moscow. Was thinking that referred to 1919 Mao and hence there would be two!!! of them about. However a trip in 1949, if he's already left CCP controlled territory by the 1st Dec would mean there's no Mao at all. Which would prompt something of a succession crisis and also a lot would depend on who came out on top and what his policies were.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 4, 2024 13:22:00 GMT
Didn't expect the Soviet ex-pats to aid the West certainly not with angry Japanese on the doorstep.
I did find that 39. Army was at Port Arthur commanding 7. Mech. Division, two Guards Inf. Divisions, a Machinegun-Artillery Guards Division and other Artillery units. 18 Air Division of Soviet Navy of two Yak-9P Fighter Regiments, one A-20G Boston Mine/Torpedo Bomber Regiment, one Catalina Recce. Sqd. Couldn't find exact info on ships but at least Submarines.
Unable to replace the aircraft and needing replacements for the Mech. Division they should be able to hold the Japanese.
BTW Mao did travel by train to Moscow 6 December 1949 to negotiate Stalin with first meeting 16 December. ITTL Mao was little brother... ITTL there will be no loan to get! Basically Mao is on his own...
Ah I misread something earlier about Mao being in Moscow. Was thinking that referred to 1919 Mao and hence there would be two!!! of them about. However a trip in 1949, if he's already left CCP controlled territory by the 1st Dec would mean there's no Mao at all. Which would prompt something of a succession crisis and also a lot would depend on who came out on top and what his policies were.
Good catch stevepSo I just looked this up. Mao would still be on the Chinese side of the border on 1 December. About 5 or 6 or 7 days later, it would have been different, and he would have vanished from the timeline. Per wikipedia, he began his 10-day train ride to Moscow on 6 December. Probably crossing the international border within no more than 48 hours of that, given comparative distances to cover in the PRC, possibly Mongolia, and the USSR. The December 16 arrival date tracks with what 575 cites. Also, I appreciate 575's detailed order of battle info on the Soviet forces present within the Kwangtung peninsula leased ports of Port Arthur/Lushun and Dalian, however, in the Original Post, I specified that this area, which was a sovereign leasehold zone of Japan back in 1919 (home of the infamous "Kwangtung Army" in fact), does not get ISOT'ed back in time from 1949 to "over-write" the old Japanese possession - so Port Arthur/Ruijin and Dairen as the Japanese called it would still be occupied by 1919 Japanese. There would still be Soviet technicians, advisors, and active duty military personnel in other assignments in other parts of Communist-ruled China who *do* get ISOT'ed back however. A small scale naval training mission with small naval craft, a few destroyers and subs, old Soviet ones and a few defected Nationalist ones, in some of the Communist controlled ports of the Yellow Sea. Soviet staff advisory missions at Beijing and Shanghai. Soviet pilots and aircraft who were flying CAP protecting against Chinese Nationalist bombing raids that were still being launched from Taiwan against the Shanghai area and Southeast China as part of Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to keep up a blockade of all the parts of China he just lost. Soviet pilots and heavy-lift transport aircraft were also in-country and had been lent for the purposes recently of speeding the Chinese Communist takeover of the vast western Xinjiang province, to secure it for the Communists and the Soviet border, and to forestall joint collaborative plotting between the CIA, the local Muslim troops under the Ma family Generals, and possibly British intelligence. The Soviets had also set up armor and artillery schools and and at least small-scale factories for trucks and artillery in longer-occupied Manchuria, assisting with technical experts in the rear, and since the PLA was running the table on the battlefield and risk of capture was minimal, now with some field units on the ground. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 4, 2024 20:11:07 GMT
Ah I misread something earlier about Mao being in Moscow. Was thinking that referred to 1919 Mao and hence there would be two!!! of them about. However a trip in 1949, if he's already left CCP controlled territory by the 1st Dec would mean there's no Mao at all. Which would prompt something of a succession crisis and also a lot would depend on who came out on top and what his policies were.
Good catch stevep So I just looked this up. Mao would still be on the Chinese side of the border on 1 December. About 5 or 6 or 7 days later, it would have been different, and he would have vanished from the timeline. Per wikipedia, he began his 10-day train ride to Moscow on 6 December. Probably crossing the international border within no more than 48 hours of that, given comparative distances to cover in the PRC, possibly Mongolia, and the USSR. The December 16 arrival date tracks with what 575 cites. Also, I appreciate 575 's detailed order of battle info on the Soviet forces present within the Kwangtung peninsula leased ports of Port Arthur/Lushun and Dalian, however, in the Original Post, I specified that this area, which was a sovereign leasehold zone of Japan back in 1919 (home of the infamous "Kwangtung Army" in fact), does not get ISOT'ed back in time from 1949 to "over-write" the old Japanese possession - so Port Arthur/Ruijin and Dairen as the Japanese called it would still be occupied by 1919 Japanese. There would still be Soviet technicians, advisors, and active duty military personnel in other assignments in other parts of Communist-ruled China who *do* get ISOT'ed back however. A small scale naval training mission with small naval craft, a few destroyers and subs, old Soviet ones and a few defected Nationalist ones, in some of the Communist controlled ports of the Yellow Sea. Soviet staff advisory missions at Beijing and Shanghai. Soviet pilots and aircraft who were flying CAP protecting against Chinese Nationalist bombing raids that were still being launched from Taiwan against the Shanghai area and Southeast China as part of Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to keep up a blockade of all the parts of China he just lost. Soviet pilots and heavy-lift transport aircraft were also in-country and had been lent for the purposes recently of speeding the Chinese Communist takeover of the vast western Xinjiang province, to secure it for the Communists and the Soviet border, and to forestall joint collaborative plotting between the CIA, the local Muslim troops under the Ma family Generals, and possibly British intelligence. The Soviets had also set up armor and artillery schools and and at least small-scale factories for trucks and artillery in longer-occupied Manchuria, assisting with technical experts in the rear, and since the PLA was running the table on the battlefield and risk of capture was minimal, now with some field units on the ground.
Thanks for clarifying. It was 575's catch actually but good that's its cleared up.  |
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575
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Post by 575 on May 4, 2024 20:44:47 GMT
Ah I misread something earlier about Mao being in Moscow. Was thinking that referred to 1919 Mao and hence there would be two!!! of them about. However a trip in 1949, if he's already left CCP controlled territory by the 1st Dec would mean there's no Mao at all. Which would prompt something of a succession crisis and also a lot would depend on who came out on top and what his policies were.
Good catch stevep So I just looked this up. Mao would still be on the Chinese side of the border on 1 December. About 5 or 6 or 7 days later, it would have been different, and he would have vanished from the timeline. Per wikipedia, he began his 10-day train ride to Moscow on 6 December. Probably crossing the international border within no more than 48 hours of that, given comparative distances to cover in the PRC, possibly Mongolia, and the USSR. The December 16 arrival date tracks with what 575 cites. Also, I appreciate 575 's detailed order of battle info on the Soviet forces present within the Kwangtung peninsula leased ports of Port Arthur/Lushun and Dalian, however, in the Original Post, I specified that this area, which was a sovereign leasehold zone of Japan back in 1919 (home of the infamous "Kwangtung Army" in fact), does not get ISOT'ed back in time from 1949 to "over-write" the old Japanese possession - so Port Arthur/Ruijin and Dairen as the Japanese called it would still be occupied by 1919 Japanese. There would still be Soviet technicians, advisors, and active duty military personnel in other assignments in other parts of Communist-ruled China who *do* get ISOT'ed back however. A small scale naval training mission with small naval craft, a few destroyers and subs, old Soviet ones and a few defected Nationalist ones, in some of the Communist controlled ports of the Yellow Sea. Soviet staff advisory missions at Beijing and Shanghai. Soviet pilots and aircraft who were flying CAP protecting against Chinese Nationalist bombing raids that were still being launched from Taiwan against the Shanghai area and Southeast China as part of Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to keep up a blockade of all the parts of China he just lost. Soviet pilots and heavy-lift transport aircraft were also in-country and had been lent for the purposes recently of speeding the Chinese Communist takeover of the vast western Xinjiang province, to secure it for the Communists and the Soviet border, and to forestall joint collaborative plotting between the CIA, the local Muslim troops under the Ma family Generals, and possibly British intelligence. The Soviets had also set up armor and artillery schools and and at least small-scale factories for trucks and artillery in longer-occupied Manchuria, assisting with technical experts in the rear, and since the PLA was running the table on the battlefield and risk of capture was minimal, now with some field units on the ground. Missed that though it will make for a harder time of the CCP.
So Mao won't board the train for Moscow and be all on his own.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 5, 2024 5:12:33 GMT
The Japanese will be mightily P-O'd by getting cut down in Manchuria and losing contact to its 70,000 troops in Sibiria. Still they should be able to utilize the Amur Railway to keep in touch with their Sibirian force. As they were highly offensive in Sibiria I don't see them backing off fighting the PRC and certainly they will defend Taiwan. What about the 30,000 Japanese troops fighting for the PRC? They might want to join the revived Empire!
I think Mao will have some serious decisions to make. The Soviets are still far away held off by Admiral Kolchak east of Tobolsk though they are also on the border of the Ma Clique. Without Soviet supply he may have some problems in continueing the Civil War.
Why is the the tone of this response like 1919 Japan’s anger and dissatisfaction and reactions are the big things to worry about, and it is mainly Mao and his Party and Army with a thirty year technology and knowledge edge are the ones with the most to worry about and all the hard decisions? Let’s consider your points in turn. Of course Japan will have questions about where its expat business people and guard troops and logistics people on the Manchurian railways, and the Chinese won’t have good answers for them, except as both sides figure out the weird supernatural thing. But the Chinese will be damned if they let the Japanese reoccupation Manchurian rails, and they could smash any Japanese attempts to move up from the Guangdong peninsula or Korea into Manchuria. The Japanese would also wonder where their occupying force in Qingdao, Shandong province disappeared to. By the same token, the Chinese will be like, “what the heck are you doing here - instead of our Soviet guests” in reaction to the Japanese being at Port Arthur, and in reaction to the Japanese being in charge of Korea instead of their North Korean comrades. The Japanese could continue to support their intervention force via the main line of the Trans-Siberian on exclusively Russian territory, even without Manchuria however, like you say. But that is close to CCP-PLA controllled Manchuria so the supply is very vulnerable to their intervention across the border. On the one hand the Japanese intervention in Russia’s Far East did show Japan had a sizable force on the mainland and an interest in it. On the other hand. The Japanese of this period did not seem so brainwashed into pro-militarism as later, and public support for Siberia mission in Japan, and associated taxied and troop levies caused substantial public opposition and protest. Regarding the few hundred or thousand Japanese troops fighting for the PRC (you got a figure of 30k ?), there is not a practical way for them to defect back to 1919 Japan of the Taisho Emperor. They are scattered among Chinese forces, surrounded by them, and if they try to crossover to Japanese lines they’ll just get shot in the head before they get very far. Any strength thee Whites have at the time of the ISOT is deceiving and short term . The November map shows the Bolsheviks not in Siberia yet, but the Jan the Bolsheviks are deep into Siberia and the Far East. In any case, territorial contiguity with the USSR of 1919 is a “nice to have” for the 1949 PRC, not a vital lifeline of support. To suppose otherwise is to invert the true patron client relationship in this mashed up reality. Here China is the patron, the USSR is the client, not the other way around. |
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575
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Post by 575 on May 5, 2024 8:58:04 GMT
The Japanese will be mightily P-O'd by getting cut down in Manchuria and losing contact to its 70,000 troops in Sibiria. Still they should be able to utilize the Amur Railway to keep in touch with their Sibirian force. As they were highly offensive in Sibiria I don't see them backing off fighting the PRC and certainly they will defend Taiwan. What about the 30,000 Japanese troops fighting for the PRC? They might want to join the revived Empire!
I think Mao will have some serious decisions to make. The Soviets are still far away held off by Admiral Kolchak east of Tobolsk though they are also on the border of the Ma Clique. Without Soviet supply he may have some problems in continueing the Civil War.
Why is the the tone of this response like 1919 Japan’s anger and dissatisfaction and reactions are the big things to worry about, and it is mainly Mao and his Party and Army with a thirty year technology and knowledge edge are the ones with the most to worry about and all the hard decisions? The tone of the response is that of the earlier responses!
What 30 year tech gap - bolt action rifles, machineguns, tanks, aircraft? Navy - besides what may have been captured from the Japanse, don't expect something groundbreaking to have survived the Japanese occupation of the Chinese coastal areas.
The Chinese license US designs and Soviet, Japanese and US donated surviving aircraft is going to end up on the scrapheap soon if Mao doesn't get some industry up and working. Shenyang Arsenal though that is making Japanese WWII equipment not exactly a game changer. Also the Soviets managed to dismantle a substantial part of Manchuria industrial sector so I tend to assume that this will need some rebuilding to make for a solid manufacturing base.
Mao got an ally and a loan of 60 mill. US$ a year for a total of 300 US$ which according to a quick search equate to 787,392,000 US$ of today.
So besides rebuilding his nation incorporating the last areas of the Empire on the Mainland Mao will also have to think of the Japanese and possible other threats such as the Europeans who during 1919 had little care for China.
A bowl of rice and what more to expect!
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 5, 2024 11:10:24 GMT
Why is the the tone of this response like 1919 Japan’s anger and dissatisfaction and reactions are the big things to worry about, and it is mainly Mao and his Party and Army with a thirty year technology and knowledge edge are the ones with the most to worry about and all the hard decisions? The tone of the response is that of the earlier responses!
What 30 year tech gap - bolt action rifles, machineguns, tanks, aircraft? Navy - besides what may have been captured from the Japanse, don't expect something groundbreaking to have survived the Japanese occupation of the Chinese coastal areas.
The Chinese license US designs and Soviet, Japanese and US donated surviving aircraft is going to end up on the scrapheap soon if Mao doesn't get some industry up and working. Shenyang Arsenal though that is making Japanese WWII equipment not exactly a game changer. Also the Soviets managed to dismantle a substantial part of Manchuria industrial sector so I tend to assume that this will need some rebuilding to make for a solid manufacturing base.
Mao got an ally and a loan of 60 mill. US$ a year for a total of 300 US$ which according to a quick search equate to 787,392,000 US$ of today.
So besides rebuilding his nation incorporating the last areas of the Empire on the Mainland Mao will also have to think of the Japanese and possible other threats such as the Europeans who during 1919 had little care for China.
A bowl of rice and what more to expect!
Apologies. Finger problems. Please ignore.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 5, 2024 11:31:30 GMT
The Japanese will be mightily P-O'd by getting cut down in Manchuria and losing contact to its 70,000 troops in Sibiria. Still they should be able to utilize the Amur Railway to keep in touch with their Sibirian force. As they were highly offensive in Sibiria I don't see them backing off fighting the PRC and certainly they will defend Taiwan. What about the 30,000 Japanese troops fighting for the PRC? They might want to join the revived Empire!
I think Mao will have some serious decisions to make. The Soviets are still far away held off by Admiral Kolchak east of Tobolsk though they are also on the border of the Ma Clique. Without Soviet supply he may have some problems in continueing the Civil War.
Why is the the tone of this response like 1919 Japan’s anger and dissatisfaction and reactions are the big things to worry about, and it is mainly Mao and his Party and Army with a thirty year technology and knowledge edge are the ones with the most to worry about and all the hard decisions? Let’s consider your points in turn. Of course Japan will have questions about where its expat business people and guard troops and logistics people on the Manchurian railways, and the Chinese won’t have good answers for them, except as both sides figure out the weird supernatural thing. But the Chinese will be damned if they let the Japanese reoccupation Manchurian rails, and they could smash any Japanese attempts to move up from the Guangdong peninsula or Korea into Manchuria. The Japanese would also wonder where their occupying force in Qingdao, Shandong province disappeared to. By the same token, the Chinese will be like, “what the heck are you doing here - instead of our Soviet guests” in reaction to the Japanese being at Port Arthur, and in reaction to the Japanese being in charge of Korea instead of their North Korean comrades. The Japanese could continue to support their intervention force via the main line of the Trans-Siberian on exclusively Russian territory, even without Manchuria however, like you say. But that is close to CCP-PLA controllled Manchuria so the supply is very vulnerable to their intervention across the border. On the one hand the Japanese intervention in Russia’s Far East did show Japan had a sizable force on the mainland and an interest in it. On the other hand. The Japanese of this period did not seem so brainwashed into pro-militarism as later, and public support for Siberia mission in Japan, and associated taxied and troop levies caused substantial public opposition and protest. Regarding the few hundred or thousand Japanese troops fighting for the PRC (you got a figure of 30k ?), there is not a practical way for them to defect back to 1919 Japan of the Taisho Emperor. They are scattered among Chinese forces, surrounded by them, and if they try to crossover to Japanese lines they’ll just get shot in the head before they get very far. Any strength thee Whites have at the time of the ISOT is deceiving and short term . The November map shows the Bolsheviks not in Siberia yet, but the Jan the Bolsheviks are deep into Siberia and the Far East. In any case, territorial contiguity with the USSR of 1919 is a “nice to have” for the 1949 PRC, not a vital lifeline of support. To suppose otherwise is to invert the true patron client relationship in this mashed up reality. Here China is the patron, the USSR is the client, not the other way around.
I don't remember any great comment about the 'threat' from Japan to CCP controlled China. It will be anger about the loss of its interest and people as will be the assorted western powers but the issue is what does the CCP do? As you say its going to be angry about the Japanese at Port Arthur and the disappearance of their ally in N Korea so the question is what does Mao do? Given his ego and that he will realise that he had a large veteran army and a 30 year tech gap - although as 575 points out that's as much myth as reality - will he strike against Japanese interests? Quite possibly broader western ones as well? There is also the Japanese intervention, along with other powers in support of the whites in the Russian civil war coupled with the bitter hatred of Japan due to the occupation so I think attacks on the Japanese are highly likely but how Mao treats the other 'western' interests would be a question.
In turn if there's a CCP attack on Japan what is the response of both Japan and the rest of the world. Japan may be less willing to quit than you think because while nothing like the militaristic mess of the 1940's its the victim here so that could greatly reduce any hostility towards fighting and many Japanese will be worried about an aggressive - and suddenly communist - China seeking to overrun Korea as if the CCP attacks its not going to stop on the 39th parallel. Similarly a suddenly aggressive CCP is likely to change views, especially in the US say about the merit of Japan as a balancing force in the region.
I fully agree that any Japanese soldiers working with the CCP are unlikely to escape to Japan. Quite possibly the case for any westerners in the affected area.
Overall the CCP is potentially a massive military threat, especially in east Asia and possibly parts of SE Asia and NE Asia. However a lot of its tech advantage will be short lived and its going to lack naval power to any significant degree which will limit its ability to project power. The devil is of course in the detail.
The other issue I think relevant is how much information gets out to the rest of the world and how quickly. Basic details about the 'next' 30 years would potentially have a massive influence on public opinion. For instance how does news of the 3rd Reich affecting feeling among its neighbours about Germany? Or how does the US react to news about the depression and then Pearl Harbour and the brutality of the war in the Pacific.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 5, 2024 13:31:47 GMT
Why is the the tone of this response like 1919 Japan’s anger and dissatisfaction and reactions are the big things to worry about, and it is mainly Mao and his Party and Army with a thirty year technology and knowledge edge are the ones with the most to worry about and all the hard decisions? The tone of the response is that of the earlier responses!
What 30 year tech gap - bolt action rifles, machineguns, tanks, aircraft? Navy - besides what may have been captured from the Japanse, don't expect something groundbreaking to have survived the Japanese occupation of the Chinese coastal areas.
The Chinese license US designs and Soviet, Japanese and US donated surviving aircraft is going to end up on the scrapheap soon if Mao doesn't get some industry up and working. Shenyang Arsenal though that is making Japanese WWII equipment not exactly a game changer. Also the Soviets managed to dismantle a substantial part of Manchuria industrial sector so I tend to assume that this will need some rebuilding to make for a solid manufacturing base.
Mao got an ally and a loan of 60 mill. US$ a year for a total of 300 US$ which according to a quick search equate to 787,392,000 US$ of today.
So besides rebuilding his nation incorporating the last areas of the Empire on the Mainland Mao will also have to think of the Japanese and possible other threats such as the Europeans who during 1919 had little care for China.
A bowl of rice and what more to expect!
China’s territory had more to offer economically than rice alone. A good start had been made in rebuilding Manchuria’s looted industrial plant for arms factories producing Soviet and Japanese style gear up to and including ammo, light arms, artillery tubes and spares. Copious arms and vehicles of US and Japanese make, some heavily used, some lightly used, some hardly used had been captured by Communists in the great encirclement campaigns of Beijing and Huai-Hai at the beginning of 1949 and their conquest of. Shanghai and China south of the Yangtze over the spring, summer, and fall months of 1949. Much of the captured American gear was still fresh when paraded through Tiananmen Square for the proclamation ceremony of the PRC in October 1949. So, the Chinese will have reserve and stockpiles of stuff for awhile, and and ability to keep. Various pieces of equipment going with home produced spares and ammo, even as some pieces become useless. Eventually in protracted industrial warfare against enemies mobilized for ground combat, the great majority of better artillery, armor, aircraft, vehicles providing a tech edge would run out or. Run scarce. But a saving grace for the Chinese is the relative backwardness of western and Japanese air power at this time, which makes deep strategic and accurate bombing out of reach for them for a decade, keeping China’s limited industrial plant in Manchuria and urban areas relatively safe. It also make accurate reconnaissance behind Chinese lines pretty difficult. The later enhances the Chinese ability to bluff and portray their strength as greater than it is in multiple sectors, to help induce caution and defensiveness on enemy forces, or wasteful deployments to safeguard locations. |
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Post by raharris1973 on May 5, 2024 19:59:38 GMT
From stevep: “The other issue I think relevant is how much information gets out to the rest of the world and how quickly. Basic details about the 'next' 30 years would potentially have a massive influence on public opinion. For instance how does news of the 3rd Reich affecting feeling among its neighbours about Germany? Or how does the US react to news about the depression and then Pearl Harbour and the brutality of the war in the Pacific.” This is an important point, we have been overlooking so far. Especially your last sentence. Although I’ve had fun speculating on a Chinese Communist omnidirectional rampage in Asia against all sorts of neighboring Japanese and western imperialists, Communist China, deploying “news from the future” has plenty of tools for more subtle diplomatic approaches and a “divide and conquer” strategy to prevent a strong ant-Chinese global coalition from forming and mobilizing. I can imagine Mao and his Party deploying smooth talker Zhou Enlai for such diplomatic purposes. Like you said, talking to Americans, diplomats and journalists alike, about Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, and the overall brutality of the Pacific War. The obvious aim here would be to incite anti-Japanese feeling and suspicion. And to 1920 American minds, already with misgivings about involvement in the late war, the peace treaty, and wartime allies, news of a second global war in only two decades, with much higher American losses, won’t inspire preparedness and coalition building as much as revulsion and isolationism. Zhou Enlai could produce from among 1949 American missionaries, businessmen, diplomats in China people who can corroborate his factual outlining of WWII in Europe and the Pacific, Japanese brutality, rampant KMT corruption, Communist success at winning popular and political support to add credibility. From the other end, Zhou Enlai and other comrades can offer to speak to Japanese Zaibatsu businessmen, diplomats, Diet members, Imperial Privy Council members and military officers and describe future history and show dramatic film footage to demonstrate a couple things. Japan tries a a conquest of China, but it ultimately will fail, just costing both countries lots of lives and treasure. Further, this China war will bring Japan into a war with the white powers, that Japan will lose badly, its commerce blockaded, fleets naval and commercial sunk, cities burned, and two cities obliterated by the most terrible weapon ever, the country occupied by American soldiers raping Japanese women with impunity and Japanese authorities providing brothels for occupation troops, overseas Japanese expelled from the empire, killed or held for slave labor in Siberia, and south Karafuto/Sakhalin and the Kuriles de-Japanized and repopulated with white Soviets. This could show senior military genro like the esteemed Yamagata Aritomo that an invasion of China, and Japan trying to boss China from a superior position, far from uniting the Orient under Japanese leadership as hoped and planned for under Imperial ideology as articulated by him and others, to stand up to inevitably hostile white powers, instead divided the two great Eastern nations against each other, to their great cost, leading to the ultimate white partition of Asia, and the first defeat, surrender, and foreign occupation of Japan’s history. And then Zhou can offer the alternative of Sino-Japanese cooperation as equals and self strengthening against the white powers, or even common action against them. After all, the 1919 Japanese will already have seen the racial equality clause rejected at Versailles by this time. They can hand Japanese people books, written in Japanese, complaining about the unequal terms of the Washington Naval Treaties imposed on Japan, how the western powers pressed Japan out of Shandong, how Britain ditched its alliance with Japan, and how, in the same year Japan became western style liberal democracy with universal suffrage, 1925, the USA slapped Japan in the face by replacing the old “Gentleman’s Agreement” limiting labor immigration with an outright ban on Japanese immigration, and a refusal to treat Japanese with the same quota system used on even minor Europeans. As an extra spice they can add the 1931 Hays film code, forbidding portrayal of Asian-white romantic relationships, which killed the career of Sessue Hayakawa, still a millionaire Hollywood star and heart-throb, the Japanese Valentino, in 1919. The Chinese could produce collarating defected Japanese along with film, recorded and printed material to substantiate all this. For the British Empire, they could provide evidence of the doom of their anti-Bolshevik intervention, America’s complete retreat to isolationism and unreliability in the interwar, its pressure to make Britain drop the Japan alliance, pressure on Irish issues, damage to the whiskey industry through prohibition, stubbornness on loan repayment, and then later bad news of the rise of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, Militarist Japan, humiliating clashes in China over concessions, and then Japan’s rapid invasion and conquest of British colonies up to India and it’s atrocities to PoWs and civil internees, all kicking Britain while it was down fighting Germany for life. And it can point out how while the Americans came to help, but came late, offering nothing for free, and making sure Britain transferred its last financial reserves to to them, nagged them constantly about colonial affairs, strutted around their homeland and Dominions “overpaid, oversexed and over here”, stole their best weapons research, and left Britain having to give up independence to India and Jewish terrorists in Palestine while *still* having rationing at home four years after the end of the war. They could find Brits in the country to substantiate the factual account, along with English language material by British authors, along with sympathetic British observers in China who would also attest to the efficiency, practicality, popularity and lack of corruption in Communist rural administration, like Dr. Michael Lindsay. (The dark corners of Communist rule, like punishment areas for wavering Party members and class enemies, had been carefully hidden from many firsthand western observers’ view before full PRC takeover) |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 5, 2024 23:10:44 GMT
From stevep : “The other issue I think relevant is how much information gets out to the rest of the world and how quickly. Basic details about the 'next' 30 years would potentially have a massive influence on public opinion. For instance how does news of the 3rd Reich affecting feeling among its neighbours about Germany? Or how does the US react to news about the depression and then Pearl Harbour and the brutality of the war in the Pacific.” This is an important point, we have been overlooking so far. Especially your last sentence. Although I’ve had fun speculating on a Chinese Communist omnidirectional rampage in Asia against all sorts of neighboring Japanese and western imperialists, Communist China, deploying “news from the future” has plenty of tools for more subtle diplomatic approaches and a “divide and conquer” strategy to prevent a strong ant-Chinese global coalition from forming and mobilizing. I can imagine Mao and his Party deploying smooth talker Zhou Enlai for such diplomatic purposes. Like you said, talking to Americans, diplomats and journalists alike, about Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, and the overall brutality of the Pacific War. The obvious aim here would be to incite anti-Japanese feeling and suspicion. And to 1920 American minds, already with misgivings about involvement in the late war, the peace treaty, and wartime allies, news of a second global war in only two decades, with much higher American losses, won’t inspire preparedness and coalition building as much as revulsion and isolationism. Zhou Enlai could produce from among 1949 American missionaries, businessmen, diplomats in China people who can corroborate his factual outlining of WWII in Europe and the Pacific, Japanese brutality, rampant KMT corruption, Communist success at winning popular and political support to add credibility. From the other end, Zhou Enlai and other comrades can offer to speak to Japanese Zaibatsu businessmen, diplomats, Diet members, Imperial Privy Council members and military officers and describe future history and show dramatic film footage to demonstrate a couple things. Japan tries a a conquest of China, but it ultimately will fail, just costing both countries lots of lives and treasure. Further, this China war will bring Japan into a war with the white powers, that Japan will lose badly, its commerce blockaded, fleets naval and commercial sunk, cities burned, and two cities obliterated by the most terrible weapon ever, the country occupied by American soldiers raping Japanese women with impunity and Japanese authorities providing brothels for occupation troops, overseas Japanese expelled from the empire, killed or held for slave labor in Siberia, and south Karafuto/Sakhalin and the Kuriles de-Japanized and repopulated with white Soviets. This could show senior military genro like the esteemed Yamagata Aritomo that an invasion of China, and Japan trying to boss China from a superior position, far from uniting the Orient under Japanese leadership as hoped and planned for under Imperial ideology as articulated by him and others, to stand up to inevitably hostile white powers, instead divided the two great Eastern nations against each other, to their great cost, leading to the ultimate white partition of Asia, and the first defeat, surrender, and foreign occupation of Japan’s history. And then Zhou can offer the alternative of Sino-Japanese cooperation as equals and self strengthening against the white powers, or even common action against them. After all, the 1919 Japanese will already have seen the racial equality clause rejected at Versailles by this time. They can hand Japanese people books, written in Japanese, complaining about the unequal terms of the Washington Naval Treaties imposed on Japan, how the western powers pressed Japan out of Shandong, how Britain ditched its alliance with Japan, and how, in the same year Japan became western style liberal democracy with universal suffrage, 1925, the USA slapped Japan in the face by replacing the old “Gentleman’s Agreement” limiting labor immigration with an outright ban on Japanese immigration, and a refusal to treat Japanese with the same quota system used on even minor Europeans. As an extra spice they can add the 1931 Hays film code, forbidding portrayal of Asian-white romantic relationships, which killed the career of Sessue Hayakawa, still a millionaire Hollywood star and heart-throb, the Japanese Valentino, in 1919. The Chinese could produce collarating defected Japanese along with film, recorded and printed material to substantiate all this. For the British Empire, they could provide evidence of the doom of their anti-Bolshevik intervention, America’s complete retreat to isolationism and unreliability in the interwar, its pressure to make Britain drop the Japan alliance, pressure on Irish issues, damage to the whiskey industry through prohibition, stubbornness on loan repayment, and then later bad news of the rise of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, Militarist Japan, humiliating clashes in China over concessions, and then Japan’s rapid invasion and conquest of British colonies up to India and it’s atrocities to PoWs and civil internees, all kicking Britain while it was down fighting Germany for life. And it can point out how while the Americans came to help, but came late, offering nothing for free, and making sure Britain transferred its last financial reserves to to them, nagged them constantly about colonial affairs, strutted around their homeland and Dominions “overpaid, oversexed and over here”, stole their best weapons research, and left Britain having to give up independence to India and Jewish terrorists in Palestine while *still* having rationing at home four years after the end of the war. They could find Brits in the country to substantiate the factual account, along with English language material by British authors, along with sympathetic British observers in China who would also attest to the efficiency, practicality, popularity and lack of corruption in Communist rural administration, like Dr. Michael Lindsay. (The dark corners of Communist rule, like punishment areas for wavering Party members and class enemies, had been carefully hidden from many firsthand western observers’ view before full PRC takeover)
It will definitely have some effect. I think your missing one of the biggest ones, in terms of the details of what Nazi Germany does and how that could really complicate matter in Europe for any united front against either communist state.
Its also likely to have an impact on a US already retreating into isolationism again. However I can't see Japan accepting a subordinate role to a communist China. They might well choose not to attack but their not going to side with them and will defend their possessions against CCP attacks, as best as they can anyhow.
The reaction of Britain to such a propaganda campaign would probably vary depending on the people involved and who was used to supply the info, which would affected how trusted it was. The CCP would have to be careful it only sent very friendly westerners to give its side of the story and the fact it was denying access to other if/when that comes out would undermine their case. Again after such a costly war and with disorder in assorted places Britain may try making a deal with the CCP for some sort of peaceful coexistence but that would depend on CCP actions.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 6, 2024 18:30:57 GMT
From stevep : “The other issue I think relevant is how much information gets out to the rest of the world and how quickly. Basic details about the 'next' 30 years would potentially have a massive influence on public opinion. For instance how does news of the 3rd Reich affecting feeling among its neighbours about Germany? Or how does the US react to news about the depression and then Pearl Harbour and the brutality of the war in the Pacific.” This is an important point, we have been overlooking so far. Especially your last sentence. Although I’ve had fun speculating on a Chinese Communist omnidirectional rampage in Asia against all sorts of neighboring Japanese and western imperialists, Communist China, deploying “news from the future” has plenty of tools for more subtle diplomatic approaches and a “divide and conquer” strategy to prevent a strong ant-Chinese global coalition from forming and mobilizing. I can imagine Mao and his Party deploying smooth talker Zhou Enlai for such diplomatic purposes. Like you said, talking to Americans, diplomats and journalists alike, about Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, and the overall brutality of the Pacific War. The obvious aim here would be to incite anti-Japanese feeling and suspicion. And to 1920 American minds, already with misgivings about involvement in the late war, the peace treaty, and wartime allies, news of a second global war in only two decades, with much higher American losses, won’t inspire preparedness and coalition building as much as revulsion and isolationism. Zhou Enlai could produce from among 1949 American missionaries, businessmen, diplomats in China people who can corroborate his factual outlining of WWII in Europe and the Pacific, Japanese brutality, rampant KMT corruption, Communist success at winning popular and political support to add credibility. From the other end, Zhou Enlai and other comrades can offer to speak to Japanese Zaibatsu businessmen, diplomats, Diet members, Imperial Privy Council members and military officers and describe future history and show dramatic film footage to demonstrate a couple things. Japan tries a a conquest of China, but it ultimately will fail, just costing both countries lots of lives and treasure. Further, this China war will bring Japan into a war with the white powers, that Japan will lose badly, its commerce blockaded, fleets naval and commercial sunk, cities burned, and two cities obliterated by the most terrible weapon ever, the country occupied by American soldiers raping Japanese women with impunity and Japanese authorities providing brothels for occupation troops, overseas Japanese expelled from the empire, killed or held for slave labor in Siberia, and south Karafuto/Sakhalin and the Kuriles de-Japanized and repopulated with white Soviets. This could show senior military genro like the esteemed Yamagata Aritomo that an invasion of China, and Japan trying to boss China from a superior position, far from uniting the Orient under Japanese leadership as hoped and planned for under Imperial ideology as articulated by him and others, to stand up to inevitably hostile white powers, instead divided the two great Eastern nations against each other, to their great cost, leading to the ultimate white partition of Asia, and the first defeat, surrender, and foreign occupation of Japan’s history. And then Zhou can offer the alternative of Sino-Japanese cooperation as equals and self strengthening against the white powers, or even common action against them. After all, the 1919 Japanese will already have seen the racial equality clause rejected at Versailles by this time. They can hand Japanese people books, written in Japanese, complaining about the unequal terms of the Washington Naval Treaties imposed on Japan, how the western powers pressed Japan out of Shandong, how Britain ditched its alliance with Japan, and how, in the same year Japan became western style liberal democracy with universal suffrage, 1925, the USA slapped Japan in the face by replacing the old “Gentleman’s Agreement” limiting labor immigration with an outright ban on Japanese immigration, and a refusal to treat Japanese with the same quota system used on even minor Europeans. As an extra spice they can add the 1931 Hays film code, forbidding portrayal of Asian-white romantic relationships, which killed the career of Sessue Hayakawa, still a millionaire Hollywood star and heart-throb, the Japanese Valentino, in 1919. The Chinese could produce collarating defected Japanese along with film, recorded and printed material to substantiate all this. For the British Empire, they could provide evidence of the doom of their anti-Bolshevik intervention, America’s complete retreat to isolationism and unreliability in the interwar, its pressure to make Britain drop the Japan alliance, pressure on Irish issues, damage to the whiskey industry through prohibition, stubbornness on loan repayment, and then later bad news of the rise of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, Militarist Japan, humiliating clashes in China over concessions, and then Japan’s rapid invasion and conquest of British colonies up to India and it’s atrocities to PoWs and civil internees, all kicking Britain while it was down fighting Germany for life. And it can point out how while the Americans came to help, but came late, offering nothing for free, and making sure Britain transferred its last financial reserves to to them, nagged them constantly about colonial affairs, strutted around their homeland and Dominions “overpaid, oversexed and over here”, stole their best weapons research, and left Britain having to give up independence to India and Jewish terrorists in Palestine while *still* having rationing at home four years after the end of the war. They could find Brits in the country to substantiate the factual account, along with English language material by British authors, along with sympathetic British observers in China who would also attest to the efficiency, practicality, popularity and lack of corruption in Communist rural administration, like Dr. Michael Lindsay. (The dark corners of Communist rule, like punishment areas for wavering Party members and class enemies, had been carefully hidden from many firsthand western observers’ view before full PRC takeover)
It will definitely have some effect. I think your missing one of the biggest ones, in terms of the details of what Nazi Germany does and how that could really complicate matter in Europe for any united front against either communist state.
Its also likely to have an impact on a US already retreating into isolationism again. However I can't see Japan accepting a subordinate role to a communist China. They might well choose not to attack but their not going to side with them and will defend their possessions against CCP attacks, as best as they can anyhow.
The reaction of Britain to such a propaganda campaign would probably vary depending on the people involved and who was used to supply the info, which would affected how trusted it was. The CCP would have to be careful it only sent very friendly westerners to give its side of the story and the fact it was denying access to other if/when that comes out would undermine their case. Again after such a costly war and with disorder in assorted places Britain may try making a deal with the CCP for some sort of peaceful coexistence but that would depend on CCP actions.
Agreed, very delicate situation. The diplomatic coexistence approach requires exquisite subtlety, care, and consistency. For all its costs, ultimate risks and dangers, a policy of maximal forward aggression, subversion, bluster, bluff, and pressure is *simpler*. If fortunate and things work out, the Communist powers basically clear mainland Asia of enemies, and their enemies keep the seas. If it fails, it could be a catastrophic setback for the Communists or a multi-decade slog. |
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Post by raharris1973 on May 6, 2024 18:42:37 GMT
“It will definitely have some effect. I think your missing one of the biggest ones, in terms of the details of what Nazi Germany does and how that could really complicate matter in Europe for any united front against either communist state.”
Like making France think: Screw this anticommunism business with Germany out for revenge, we want Russia strong no matter what the color, even Red; let’s make nice with the Red Chinese and Red Russians so they can hold Germany down?
Czechoslovaks come to a similar conclusion?
Possibly the Brits too?
Poles get told to not do their invasion of the USSR in 1919? Get made to accept Curzon line? Or get thrown under the Bolshevik bus entirely to keep a big Russian power watching Germany?
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