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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 18, 2022 1:56:45 GMT
To put my cards on the table, I will say I am a believer that the Italians were a net positive for any coalition they were a part of in both world wars, regardless of any complaints one may have about their military proficiency. More guys on your side, shooting at the guys on the side, is always better than the reverse - even if they are not that talented. Taking military tactical critique so far as to say the Italians were a detriment to the Entente in WWI (and then the Axis in WW2) is an argument that is too clever by half.
The argument that a neutral Italy would make things relatively worse for the Entente powers is pretty straightforward. It goes -- neutral Italy means less pressure on Austria-Hungary means more Austro-Hungarians pressure on Serbia and Russia so probably earlier collapses for each of those and an earlier collapse and no entry at all for Romania and Greece on the Entente side. Those factors can all lead to more resilience for Bulgaria and Turkey and Germany.
This argument would seem to scale down to an Italy that isn't always neutral, but even to an Italy that possibly gets into the war late, in 1916 or 1917 instead of 1915. And if Italy gets in the war on the Entente side earlier, in 1914, things should go better for the Entente. Indeed, if Italy does not get in the war by 1915 like OTL, anti-Entente events may have an opportunity to snowball so that it may become too late for Italy to join before the Entente loses, or joining the war becomes even *less* attractive for Italy each succeeding year of neutrality.
All those general calculations of trends aside. What if that champion of Italian neutrality, Giolitti, held on to national leadership, and kept Italy neutral through 1915 and 1916.
In those years, I anticipate Austria-Hungary will suffer less damage. Its final defeat of Serbia will be speedier, and far fewer retreating Serbian forces and South Slav defectors will make it out of the conquest of Serbia via Albania. Austria-Hungary should be performing better against Russia, and Russia should be taking more damage.
Italy will be an additional leak in the blockade of the CP, along with the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries.
None of these factors should change the outcomes of the offensives on the western front at Ypres and Champagne in 1915, nor on the Somme and Verdun in 1916 however. None of these factors should change the course of the Gallipoli campaign, or the occupation of Salonica, or Bulgarian entry into the war, or the Russo-Ottoman Caucasian front.
Theoretically, greater Austro-Hungarian "throw-weight" or "spare capacity" in 1915-1916 should attrite the Russians more, possibly moving forward a Russian revolutionary crisis by a significant number of months. It may also negate the visible success of the Brusilov offensive while leaving Austria-Hungary to appear more formidable, discouraging Romania from joining the Entente in 1916, which may keep Falkenhayn in his job longer and delay the decision for Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, the break in relations with the US, the Zimmerman Telegram, and US entry into the war.
But is it implausible for those events, the Russian Revolution(s), and USW and US entry, to unfold at basically the same pace as OTL, even in this changed, Italian neutrality scenario?
Perhaps Russia lucks through some additional months without its February revolution equivalent, with some officials making more lucky or competent food distribution or troop placement decisions. Maybe some Austrian troops, strong against the Italians in OTL, aren't as stellar on the Russian front. Maybe Falkenhayn gets fired and replaced by Hindy and Ludy at the end of 1916 anyway, Romanian entry or not, since Verdun was probably the real reason? USW unfolds in February, and relations worsen with the US. A Russian revolution happens in March, but no desertion of the war. By April, the US declares war on Germany.
Perhaps by this point, with the USA getting in, the pro-war factions in Italy re-group and resurge and feel they have new arguments for getting into a war on the Entente side they are now more certain will win, and Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary in May 1917, followed by Germany at some later point, maybe after some submarine attack on an Italian ship helps justify it.
Italy launches itself onto the Austrian Alpine front, having had two additional years to prepare. Who knows how it will perform? No guarantees it will be any better than historical, and the Austrians will be both more experienced and more weary. But even tactically unimpressive participation would be very, very burdensome on the Austro-Hungarians and strain CP reserves. In the best case, with good operational performance, the Italian attacks add to pressures along with the Kerensky offensive that knock Austria-Hungary out of the war while the British Flanders offensives tie down Germany. In the worst case, Austria-Hungary fends off the offensives, and it is Russia that has its second revolution and gets knocked out of the war. But Italy still stands.
In 1918 the Germans have to shoot their last bolt in a western offensive, and the Americans and Entente will have a counterattack they can't resist after that. The Italians will take the initiative and never give it up on their front.
In the end, the Italians will win the irredenta. Doing so over over 18 months should axiomatically be less expensive in blood and treasure than doing it over the course of OTL's 40 months, right?
Is it plausible for things to work out this way, for Italy to join only after America declares war? Or would such delay (not that it would be deliberately chosen for this reason) in almost all cases mean that the CP position would be too strong and it would be *too late* for the Entente to win and for Italy to join to make its gains?
Could Italy beat the spread by even more and join only in May 1918, for the last 6 months of the war?
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575
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Post by 575 on Aug 18, 2022 7:23:41 GMT
Hmm, it will serve to lessen Italian war casualties of course but still the WAllies may have to prop them up with 8 division equivalents as OTL. Which would be the bad press the Italians got post war and Churchills talk of the Germans having the fun this time - WWII.
Maybe the Italians will get better prepared but that takes some General Staff with a sound perception of whats needed; and why should Giolitto go build the Army up for war if he doesn't want it??? That is a contradiction in itself.
Eastfront may see a sooner Russian collapse due to more A-H troops thrown into the fray there but I don't expect such immediately. The A-H will surely bungle their initial build up and that didn't count Italy in on the WAllies so they will still lose heavily initially to the Russians though in the long run the Germans "may" have to prop them up less - perhaps they'll even be able to handle Romania on their own should those try their hand at alliance with WAllies.
A weak ally isn't automatically an asset - not if you have to send off resources to make it fight your fight.
Re WWII - initially Italy was an asset though the Germans had to feed it coal to make its industry run though it tied down Allied Navies in the Med making for more raiders room of manouevre on the seas.
I know that Hitler wanted Franco in to close down Strait of Gib but he was not acting sane and his Generals didn't want it and hence his insistence on very marginal troops for NA initially - he knew Italy to become the troop sink.
Of course without Italy entering WWII in any form it would quite another war.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 18, 2022 14:34:19 GMT
In general agreement although there might be some counter factors in play. For instance without the need to defend against Italy might Austria be more [over]-confident against Serbia and reject German aid, making the war in the Balkans as long and costly?
Possibly more to the point the failure of Romania in 1917 meant that the Russians, although their condition was pretty dire by this time morale wise, had to step in to guard at least part of the eastern front in Bessarabia which lengthened the front by about 40% I think it was.
Or you could simply have an issue where the allies, possibly especially the Russians on the eastern front are more cautious, say especially Austro-German forces are more offensive in the east so the Russians are more on the defensive.
However would generally agree that Italy was still a net bonus to the allies in WWI as they tired down a lot of Austrian and later some German forces and removed the danger of them joining the CPs which would have given a theoretical threat of a major concentration of naval power threatening allied control of the Med. I say theoretical because the very poor relations between Vienna and Rome and their respective navies make it unlikely I think they would co-operate that well at all.
If they don't join in 1915 I could see them joining in later, say once the US joins the war or even later. As well as being a jackal at the feast they might simply be prompted by German actions, especially if USW goes as OTL. Given how many neutral ships were being sunk by the Germans, including far from the action allied shipping line I could see a fair number of Italian ships being attacked, prompting anger in Italy which is a possible significant factor.
Steve
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 19, 2022 2:53:01 GMT
but still the WAllies may have to prop them up with 8 division equivalents as OTL. Which would be the bad press the Italians got post war and Churchills talk of the Germans having the fun this time - WWII. We shouldn't take British authors' jokes too seriously just because British guys wrote them. This is precisely what I'm arguing against. Any division equivalent's worth of 'propping' the Entente expends on the Italians, the Italians are probably engaging several more division equivalent's worth of CP forces. and why should Giolitto go build the Army up for war if he doesn't want it??? That is a contradiction in itself. Good point. The A-H will surely bungle their initial build up and that didn't count Italy in on the WAllies so they will still lose heavily initially to the Russians Yes- Austria-Hungary's 1914 and 1915 until May are not any better than OTL, and they were pretty bad, at least all the way until things started to turn around in Galicia-Poland in May. For instance without the need to defend against Italy might Austria be more [over]-confident against Serbia and reject German aid, making the war in the Balkans as long and costly? I doubt that will be a big enough factor to negate advantages versus Serbia or make it worse for Austria. The Austro-Hungarians are going to grind them down by numbers and the Bulgarians will hit the Serbs from behind. Possibly more to the point the failure of Romania in 1917 meant that the Russians, although their condition was pretty dire by this time morale wise, had to step in to guard at least part of the eastern front in Bessarabia which lengthened the front by about 40% I think it was. I think this is a stronger point - this scenario increases the likelihood of Romania staying neutral, which is helpful for the CP in some ways, but also helpful for Russia, by keeping its front shorter. By 40% seems a bit much, but adding Romania did lengthen the line. A neutral Romania should mean more food for sale for everybody on both sides of the line. As well as being a jackal at the feast they might simply be prompted by German actions, especially if USW goes as OTL. Given how many neutral ships were being sunk by the Germans, including far from the action allied shipping line I could see a fair number of Italian ships being attacked, prompting anger in Italy which is a possible significant factor. All valid points. |
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michelvan
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Post by michelvan on Aug 19, 2022 10:04:18 GMT
Let look into history and play with it
Italy Was part of Central Power block despite "issue" with Austria-Hungary (about Territory of Venice claimed by A-H and things like there War Ship fleet)
in same time Italy got Issue with French about there War Ship fleet, expansion in Africa and Territory claims by both.
This was main reason why Italy was part of Central Power block prior 1914
Had Italy stay in Central power ?
it would had interesting outcome since France had to mobilised army to Italian border to defend or invade Italy since there bad ones
but bind forces in south France needed in battle of Marne...
But Italy politicians went Neutral as hell broke lose in 1914
until the French and British came with proposals to join the Entente in exchange for Territory and compensation by central powers (the Entente lied...)
Italy jump on Band wagon and there army got almost anhilhated by Central powers only get nothing by French and British during Conference in Versailles
what let to rise of certain Mussolini.
So Italy stay Neutral true WW1 ?
They would save there dignity, and see it right to be neutral after Romania fiasco
Here french lured Romania to attack central powers, but without external support, you not fight superior enemy, special it your army personnel can't read or write...
Italy would come out of WW1 unharmed and Mussolini would remain publisher of leftist news papers...
So Italy join Entente late in War ?
They declare war in may 1915, but what if the Italians prepared better for this and needed more time. let say 1916 or 1917 ?
and accepted US Troops from Italian-Americas origin in 1917 ?
European map could look quite different after Treaty of Versailles
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 19, 2022 10:54:05 GMT
Let look into history and play with it Italy Was part of Central Power block despite "issue" with Austria-Hungary (about Territory of Venice claimed by A-H and things like there War Ship fleet) in same time Italy got Issue with French about there War Ship fleet, expansion in Africa and Territory claims by both. This was main reason why Italy was part of Central Power block prior 1914 Had Italy stay in Central power ?
it would had interesting outcome since France had to mobilised army to Italian border to defend or invade Italy since there bad ones
but bind forces in south France needed in battle of Marne...But Italy politicians went Neutral as hell broke lose in 1914 until the French and British came with proposals to join the Entente in exchange for Territory and compensation by central powers (the Entente lied...) Italy jump on Band wagon and there army got almost anhilhated by Central powers only get nothing by French and British during Conference in Versailles what let to rise of certain Mussolini. So Italy stay Neutral true WW1 ?
They would save there dignity, and see it right to be neutral after Romania fiasco
Here french lured Romania to attack central powers, but without external support, you not fight superior enemy, special it your army personnel can't read or write...
Italy would come out of WW1 unharmed and Mussolini would remain publisher of leftist news papers...So Italy join Entente late in War ? They declare war in may 1915, but what if the Italians prepared better for this and needed more time. let say 1916 or 1917 ? and accepted US Troops from Italian-Americas origin in 1917 ? European map could look quite different after Treaty of Versailles
I think part of the reason why Italy got so little in the way of gains was a combination of how limited their impact on the war was plus the conflict between the other great powers over the nature of the peace. If the US is fighting with France and Britain over whether you have a peace that keeps Germany weak or the historical one that cripples the allies more then Italy would tend to get overlooked.
I doubt US troops joining a newly belligerent Italy in 1918 - which is when the American forces started to see active service in any numbers they wouldn't make much difference. For one thing the US army so massively expanded it was short of properly trained men and many of the officers that did come to France were reluctant to accept advice from their allies. Plus if such forces were serving in Italy, rather than on the main front where the prime threat was its likely they would be significantly down the list for equipment from the allies and I suspect the Italians wouldn't have much spare. It might be however that a later entry gives the Italian army a chance to see what's happening in more detail - say by military observers, possibly even on both sides? - and actually prepare for war.
Plus how many Italians joined the US army in WWI. As I understand it most were still not US citizens, and as such could have been exempt from the draft. They only changed their national status when changes in US laws on migrants meant they had to do so to avoid possible expulsion, which occurred after the war.
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 19, 2022 23:38:33 GMT
I will sketch out a possible timeline in general terms based on the above:
Italy remains under Giolitti and neutral through 1915 and 1916. Perhaps his hold over national politics will slip by the end of 1916.
The western front campaigns of 1915-1916 and the extra-European (African, Pacific, Mideast, submarine) campaigns of those years are nearly identical in their course or net results as OTL. The crushing of Serbia in late 1915 is a bit more thorough. Russia is a bit more on the back foot in the campaigns of 1915 and 1916, and Austria-Hungary is a bit stronger and less beat up, although just like OTL, it still had a terrible 1914. Gallipolli and Bulgaria joining the war go similar. The Ottoman-Russian Caucasus campaigns go about as OTL, disastrous for Ottomans at first, and then Russian-dominated. Perhaps by 1916 the Russians aren't quite as advanced in east Anatolia as OTL because Russia holds more troops in Russia opposite Austria.
Romania is not inspired to join the war in late 1916, because Austria-Hungary doesn't look as weak and the Brusilov offensive doesn't look as strong. That is convenient and helpful for the CPs, at least in the short term. But it helps Russia in a way too, since the Russians do not need to extend their front lines to cover Romania or southwest Ukraine.
Falkenhayn still gets fired in late 1916 (because of Verdun) and is replaced by Hindy & Ludy. They decide to launch USW in early 1917, & put in their munitions-centric economic plan that harms the economy. Russia has its historical Feb/Mar revolution over bread riots in Petrograd. USW leads the US to declare war by April.
USW provides the excuse, and opportunism provides the motive, for Italy to declare war on the CP in May 1917, attacking headlong into the Austrian front. It is a bloody mess for the Italians, but a bloody shock for the Austrians too. Meanwhile, the French have to be passive after the Nivelle Offensive and mutinies of April 1917. Romania, inspired by the Italian example and opportunism, and possibly also using USW as an excuse, declares war on the CP and attacks Austria in June 1917. From July, the British start continuous attacks on the Flanders front.
Combined Italian, Romanian, and Russian pushes in late June overwhelm Austria-Hungary's ability to resist and force the Austrians to steadily cede ground. The Germans can only send limited and tardy support, because the British are at their peak strength to date on the western front and attacking hard.
Local successes in their sectors and an increased prisoner take, especially of Austro-Hungarians, encourage the Entente powers to press on. In the meantime, the Salonica-based, multinational, French commanded Army of the Orient senses vulnerability as Austrian and German reinforcements and supplies for the Bulgarians are pulled back. They launch a breakout in October, with Greece finally declaring war, and all forces pushing north to liberate Serbia.
This sense of progress inspires French troops to resume attacks on the western front, and the still very limited #s of American troops on the line to seek action, by the end of October. By 1 November - the Russians are at Warsaw, Krakow, and Breslau, the Romanians are at the Tisza river, and the Italians have conquered Austria proper, including Vienna, while German troops are being pushed back in France and Belgium.
The Austrians and Bulgarians capitulate by 2 November, with the Ottomans following suit on 22 November, and the Germans on Dec 11.
The sudden entrance of Italy and Romania into the war in the spring/summer was the decisive turn overthrowing the Austrian and CP position in 1917.
Postwar effects:
Russia: Have Democratic Socialist (non-Bolshevik) governments, catering to peasant interests above all, land reform is the biggest issue post-war. Russia holds together with the exception of Poland, west of the Curzon line, being permitted independence, and Finland being granted near total self-government.
Romania: Achieves all territorial aims:
Serbia: Restored and merged with Croatia and Slovenia
Austria-Hungary: dismantled into national states , much like OTL
Poland: is created, west of the Curzon line, with a corridor to the sea
Italy: gains all territorial irredenta, and wins all territorial disputes against Yugoslavia because of its more advantageous starting position (Fresh power in 1917, as opposed to a totally occupied power (Serbia), with a smaller army in exile. Italy wins a 'Vittoria Soddisfacente' a 'satisfactory victory' instead of 'Vittoria Mutilata'. As a result, it never becomes a Fascist dictatorship. Although, Italian governments may pursue repression against left-wing strikes and other Socialist and Communist non-parliamentary activities. Italy can also be prouder of its part in the war, it is linked more decisively in time and space to the final victory. Therefore, it is less likely to feel a compulsion to trifle with Ethiopia and conquer it in the coming decades. "We won the Great War, Ethiopia is so small time". Of course Italy will also be confident, so if Ethiopia offends or threatens Italy's colonies, Italy won't hesitate to defend them, counterattack, and punish Ethiopia to the point of wiping it off the map.
France: regains Alsace-Lorraine, gets to temporarily occupy the Saar, and Rhineland, with other western Allies. Other Allies like Britain, Italy, and the USA however oppose French ambitions for setting up separatist Rhineland state or annexing the Rhineland.
Ottomans dismantled - but never forced to sign something as harsh as Sevres.
Britain - gets a year shaved off their war.
America - Because of slowness to mobilize and speed with which the war ends, is only able to get about 875 of its men killed by desperately rushing them into random battles where they aren't really needed.
America ends the war with a case of wartime "blue balls" all dressed up for the main event, with nowhere to go. There will have been time for some wartime measures that were unpopular to have emerged, but not all of them. Millions would have been conscripted, but many fewer sent abroad, Only a tiny minority of those sent abroad have seen combat. And, as noted before, by WWI standards, hardly any of them died.
This leaves America with little anti-war and isolationist backlash, and almost a desire to go around proving itself. The USA willingly signs a postwar treaty committing itself, along with Britain, to the defense of France and Belgium for 25 years.
Germany - It gets hit with a settlement about as territorially harsh as OTL's Versailles, but owing reparations to more countries, now including Russia. It also never gets the experience of feeling that it did beat the Russian Empire into submission and that this is a manageable achievement. [OTL's German victory over Russia in WWI, and success imposing Brest-Litovsk, and ability to run wild beyond the B-L treaty's limits, though short-lived, was, in my view, foundational to later Nazi German underestimation of Soviet strength and the belief that merely "kicking the door in" could send the Soviets crashing down.]
A key point of tension at the Versailles Conference is the future of the Japanese occupied former German colony in China at Qingdao. The Chinese delegation, led by Wellington Koo, angrily walks out of the peace conference when the Conference awards the territory to Japan based on treaties concluded early in the war.
However, American opinion is uncomfortable with Japanese expansion during the war, both in China and the Pacific, and demagogues the China issue, with politicians championing the Chinese cause and vilifying the Japanese.
The Wilson-House-Lansing Administration offers major loans, financial support, and arms supplies to the Chinese Beiyang Republic to support its standing up to Japan, indeed breaking away from Japan from summer 1919, and the US starts to reconcentrate its fleet in the Pacific.
The Japanese, in response to American-sponsored Chinese Japanophobia, react to their sudden loss of influence by using their agents of influence more aggressively, supporting a coup by Qing dynasty royalists in Manchuria, and sending the Kwangtung Army to back it up, in August 1919.
In September 1919, the US sanctions Japan, boycotting imports (like silks) from Japan and embargoing exports (like cotton, oil, and iron) and demanding Japanese evacuation from Manchuria. The US continues to reinforce its Pacific and Asiatic fleets, and begins to convoy troops to the US Pacific possessions in the Philippines, Guam, Wake, and Hawaii, slowing down the post-war demobilization. Beiyang Republic forces put up resistance against the Japanese around Manchuria and a skirmish line at the Great Wall, although it is pathetically doomed. Beiyang troops also begin assaults on the Japanese at Tsingtao, although they are also repelled with disproportionately heavy losses to the attackers.
As a result of these threatening Chinese, US economic, naval, and military measures and demands, the Japanese declare war on both countries, and launch a rapid campaign to secure the Chinese capital of Beijing and China's principal coastal ports like Shanghai, and attack US forces in China whenever this can be done without attacking non-belligerent third-country (British, French) or multinational concession cessions. Other Japanese Army forces are sent to invade the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island with fleet transports while the battle fleet is sent to come to grips with the US Asiatic Fleet.
The US declares war on Japan and denounces its attacks and the Philippines, Guam, and Wake are all lost by spring 1920.
The US is finally in the epic war it prepared for, but did not get, in Europe. Meanwhile, all of the European belligerents, including Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, have declared strict neutrality.
China is the Americans only ally. Japanese Army forces generally win the field wherever and whenever they come into contact with Chinese forces. The size and roughness of China's terrain, and the multiplicity of new willing leaders and armies who show up for the popular cause of challenging the Japanese, are much more of a problem for the Japanese than any combat capability or cohesion of any particular Chinese combat force. Fairly quickly into 1920 and 1921, all coastal routes for the Americans in particular to deliver any practical arms aid to the Chinese are cut off by Japanese port occupations.
1920 after the conquest of US Pacific territories is largely a stalemated year, so is 1921, although the US fleet is built to gargantuan size, far outpacing the British. Early 1922 sees the US fleet and US fleet supply train take key parts of the Marshall Islands, and then the Marianas islands while heavily damaging the Japanese fleet this is followed by mid-year battles in the Philippine sea and some landings in the outlying Philippine islands. Australia and Canada, breaking ranks with Britain, declare war on Japan and permit the US to use their territory for logistic purposes, and send in forces on a small scale. France, after having reinforced Indochina with colonial troops, a hard core of metropolitan troops, and fleet units, and being nagged by the US, declares war on Japan a few months into 1922, and their participation and opening of Danang and Haiphong harbor to advance US fleet units also logistically eases US operations for the comprehensive counter-invasion of the Philippines, the costliest ground operations to date for the US army since 1917, indeed since the American Civil War.
War-weariness and war-related anxiety grows in the US as battlefield reports from the Philippines flow in.
Fortunately for the French, by the time they've declared war, the Japanese fleet is so weak, and the Japanese have so many land points to defend from potential landings by the Americans, that the Japanese never are able to send a large enough invasion force to overwhelm Indochina's defenses. There is however, some war-related unrest in the colony.
The Philippines are near completely liberated in 1922, and this effectively establishes a blockade of Japan. US troops are able to enter the Chinese mainland via beaches unoccupied by Japanese and to bypass Japanese held points by landing in French-held Tonkin, and marching up in to China, and use Haiphong as a main supply route to support Chinese forces as well as American, especially as Japanese naval ability to interdict has been nearly ground down to dust.
Japan has made attempts to negotiate its way out of the war since 1921, but the US alternately refused to entertain the idea at all, or found the Japanese terms, usually based on battlefield status quo, unacceptable. In late 1922 and early 1923, the Japanese started offering some terms yielding some of the status quo, as their military and naval position became less sustainable, but the US was still rejecting terms.
However, war weariness, mother's protests, and strikes at home were reaching worrisome proportions by 1923.
Russian-mediation, obtained by Japan at the price of retroceding southern Sakhalin island to Russia, succeeds in helping the USA, Japan, and China reach the peace of Petrograd by June 1st, 1923.
By its terms, Japan yields all its Micronesian islands conquered from Germany to the United States, evacuates any remaining troops from the Philippines, evacuates all troops from China, including Taiwan (included at the insistence of China, but also the US, desiring a buffer for the Philippines against attack), and the Kwangtung peninsula, and yields Southern Sakhalin to Russia. Japan retains its home islands, the Kuriles, the Bonins, the Ryukyus, and Korea. Japan accepts the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which British neutrality declarations had rendered a dead letter anyway.
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michelvan
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Post by michelvan on Aug 20, 2022 2:30:49 GMT
I doubt US troops joining a newly belligerent Italy in 1918 The US offers them Troops in 1917, the Italian say "NO THANKS, we manage on our own" and lost almost entire army in following battle... |
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575
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Post by 575 on Aug 20, 2022 9:54:59 GMT
raharris1973:
I get the effect of a late entry of both Italy and Romania could be unsettling to CP because of sudden need of Germany to prop up A-H instead of the dripping effect OTL.
Interesting US/China - Japan War; I'd expect the Naval war of this to be more US sided solely on numbers count the USN was superior even if it maintains 5. Battle Sqn and support in the Atlantic as post-WWI Europe there really is no need for more.
Of course there is no radar to aid the USN but its still on parity in BB/BC though with 2 more delivered 1919 and has 20 pre-dreadnoughts and 20 old Cruisers to silly around just looking for the IJN and is still able to make parity on Cruisers and double on DD's. With everybody mostly coalfired at this point its a question of watching the forward IJN bases in the Pacific to establish their whereabouts (difficult to refuel such on the move) - boots on the ground and hulls in the water are needed as the US haven't broken the IJN codes at this time - though of course due to the new situation they will try obtain the code books; any Room 40 help on this?
As there is no Pearl yet and IJN focusing on the Chinese coast and defending the Marianas - Phillippines - Guam - Wake the waters to watch is somewhat narrowed down.
With Australian territory close to now occupied Philippines as well as Carolines and Marshall Is. the old German Navy base at Rabaul, New Britain will get some importance due to position.
Australia does have a Navy of a BattleCruiser, three LightCruiser, one old Cruiser (a second as Depot Ship HMAS Pioneer) and 6 Submarines. The Canadians may still have their old light Cruisers.
If the IJN is as range handicapped as it was in WWII there is little to fear of a cross-Pacific raid but the US having lost its Western Pac bases is of course handicapped too so may need an island-hop though as outlined with Can-Oz alliance this will to some extend not be needed.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 20, 2022 12:40:12 GMT
I doubt US troops joining a newly belligerent Italy in 1918 The US offers them Troops in 1917, the Italian say "NO THANKS, we manage on our own" and lost almost entire army in following battle...
Interesting thanks.  Never heard that and given the reluctance to use US forces other than in a solely US army it does surprise me. How many forces were they offering because I understood that most of the small US standing army was parceled out trying to train the flood of new conscripts? |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 20, 2022 13:24:01 GMT
I will sketch out a possible timeline in general terms based on the above: Italy remains under Giolitti and neutral through 1915 and 1916. Perhaps his hold over national politics will slip by the end of 1916. The western front campaigns of 1915-1916 and the extra-European (African, Pacific, Mideast, submarine) campaigns of those years are nearly identical in their course or net results as OTL. The crushing of Serbia in late 1915 is a bit more thorough. Russia is a bit more on the back foot in the campaigns of 1915 and 1916, and Austria-Hungary is a bit stronger and less beat up, although just like OTL, it still had a terrible 1914. Gallipolli and Bulgaria joining the war go similar. The Ottoman-Russian Caucasus campaigns go about as OTL, disastrous for Ottomans at first, and then Russian-dominated. Perhaps by 1916 the Russians aren't quite as advanced in east Anatolia as OTL because Russia holds more troops in Russia opposite Austria. Romania is not inspired to join the war in late 1916, because Austria-Hungary doesn't look as weak and the Brusilov offensive doesn't look as strong. That is convenient and helpful for the CPs, at least in the short term. But it helps Russia in a way too, since the Russians do not need to extend their front lines to cover Romania or southwest Ukraine. Falkenhayn still gets fired in late 1916 (because of Verdun) and is replaced by Hindy & Ludy. They decide to launch USW in early 1917, & put in their munitions-centric economic plan that harms the economy. Russia has its historical Feb/Mar revolution over bread riots in Petrograd. USW leads the US to declare war by April. USW provides the excuse, and opportunism provides the motive, for Italy to declare war on the CP in May 1917, attacking headlong into the Austrian front. It is a bloody mess for the Italians, but a bloody shock for the Austrians too. Meanwhile, the French have to be passive after the Nivelle Offensive and mutinies of April 1917. Romania, inspired by the Italian example and opportunism, and possibly also using USW as an excuse, declares war on the CP and attacks Austria in June 1917. From July, the British start continuous attacks on the Flanders front. Combined Italian, Romanian, and Russian pushes in late June overwhelm Austria-Hungary's ability to resist and force the Austrians to steadily cede ground. The Germans can only send limited and tardy support, because the British are at their peak strength to date on the western front and attacking hard. Local successes in their sectors and an increased prisoner take, especially of Austro-Hungarians, encourage the Entente powers to press on. In the meantime, the Salonica-based, multinational, French commanded Army of the Orient senses vulnerability as Austrian and German reinforcements and supplies for the Bulgarians are pulled back. They launch a breakout in October, with Greece finally declaring war, and all forces pushing north to liberate Serbia. This sense of progress inspires French troops to resume attacks on the western front, and the still very limited #s of American troops on the line to seek action, by the end of October. By 1 November - the Russians are at Warsaw, Krakow, and Breslau, the Romanians are at the Tisza river, and the Italians have conquered Austria proper, including Vienna, while German troops are being pushed back in France and Belgium. The Austrians and Bulgarians capitulate by 2 November, with the Ottomans following suit on 22 November, and the Germans on Dec 11. The sudden entrance of Italy and Romania into the war in the spring/summer was the decisive turn overthrowing the Austrian and CP position in 1917. Postwar effects: Russia: Have Democratic Socialist (non-Bolshevik) governments, catering to peasant interests above all, land reform is the biggest issue post-war. Russia holds together with the exception of Poland, west of the Curzon line, being permitted independence, and Finland being granted near total self-government. Romania: Achieves all territorial aims: Serbia: Restored and merged with Croatia and Slovenia Austria-Hungary: dismantled into national states , much like OTL Poland: is created, west of the Curzon line, with a corridor to the sea Italy: gains all territorial irredenta, and wins all territorial disputes against Yugoslavia because of its more advantageous starting position (Fresh power in 1917, as opposed to a totally occupied power (Serbia), with a smaller army in exile. Italy wins a 'Vittoria Soddisfacente' a 'satisfactory victory' instead of 'Vittoria Mutilata'. As a result, it never becomes a Fascist dictatorship. Although, Italian governments may pursue repression against left-wing strikes and other Socialist and Communist non-parliamentary activities. Italy can also be prouder of its part in the war, it is linked more decisively in time and space to the final victory. Therefore, it is less likely to feel a compulsion to trifle with Ethiopia and conquer it in the coming decades. "We won the Great War, Ethiopia is so small time". Of course Italy will also be confident, so if Ethiopia offends or threatens Italy's colonies, Italy won't hesitate to defend them, counterattack, and punish Ethiopia to the point of wiping it off the map. France: regains Alsace-Lorraine, gets to temporarily occupy the Saar, and Rhineland, with other western Allies. Other Allies like Britain, Italy, and the USA however oppose French ambitions for setting up separatist Rhineland state or annexing the Rhineland. Ottomans dismantled - but never forced to sign something as harsh as Sevres. Britain - gets a year shaved off their war. America - Because of slowness to mobilize and speed with which the war ends, is only able to get about 875 of its men killed by desperately rushing them into random battles where they aren't really needed. America ends the war with a case of wartime "blue balls" all dressed up for the main event, with nowhere to go. There will have been time for some wartime measures that were unpopular to have emerged, but not all of them. Millions would have been conscripted, but many fewer sent abroad, Only a tiny minority of those sent abroad have seen combat. And, as noted before, by WWI standards, hardly any of them died. This leaves America with little anti-war and isolationist backlash, and almost a desire to go around proving itself. The USA willingly signs a postwar treaty committing itself, along with Britain, to the defense of France and Belgium for 25 years. Germany - It gets hit with a settlement about as territorially harsh as OTL's Versailles, but owing reparations to more countries, now including Russia. It also never gets the experience of feeling that it did beat the Russian Empire into submission and that this is a manageable achievement. [OTL's German victory over Russia in WWI, and success imposing Brest-Litovsk, and ability to run wild beyond the B-L treaty's limits, though short-lived, was, in my view, foundational to later Nazi German underestimation of Soviet strength and the belief that merely "kicking the door in" could send the Soviets crashing down.] A key point of tension at the Versailles Conference is the future of the Japanese occupied former German colony in China at Qingdao. The Chinese delegation, led by Wellington Koo, angrily walks out of the peace conference when the Conference awards the territory to Japan based on treaties concluded early in the war. However, American opinion is uncomfortable with Japanese expansion during the war, both in China and the Pacific, and demagogues the China issue, with politicians championing the Chinese cause and vilifying the Japanese. The Wilson-House-Lansing Administration offers major loans, financial support, and arms supplies to the Chinese Beiyang Republic to support its standing up to Japan, indeed breaking away from Japan from summer 1919, and the US starts to reconcentrate its fleet in the Pacific. The Japanese, in response to American-sponsored Chinese Japanophobia, react to their sudden loss of influence by using their agents of influence more aggressively, supporting a coup by Qing dynasty royalists in Manchuria, and sending the Kwangtung Army to back it up, in August 1919. In September 1919, the US sanctions Japan, boycotting imports (like silks) from Japan and embargoing exports (like cotton, oil, and iron) and demanding Japanese evacuation from Manchuria. The US continues to reinforce its Pacific and Asiatic fleets, and begins to convoy troops to the US Pacific possessions in the Philippines, Guam, Wake, and Hawaii, slowing down the post-war demobilization. Beiyang Republic forces put up resistance against the Japanese around Manchuria and a skirmish line at the Great Wall, although it is pathetically doomed. Beiyang troops also begin assaults on the Japanese at Tsingtao, although they are also repelled with disproportionately heavy losses to the attackers. As a result of these threatening Chinese, US economic, naval, and military measures and demands, the Japanese declare war on both countries, and launch a rapid campaign to secure the Chinese capital of Beijing and China's principal coastal ports like Shanghai, and attack US forces in China whenever this can be done without attacking non-belligerent third-country (British, French) or multinational concession cessions. Other Japanese Army forces are sent to invade the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island with fleet transports while the battle fleet is sent to come to grips with the US Asiatic Fleet. The US declares war on Japan and denounces its attacks and the Philippines, Guam, and Wake are all lost by spring 1920. The US is finally in the epic war it prepared for, but did not get, in Europe. Meanwhile, all of the European belligerents, including Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, have declared strict neutrality. China is the Americans only ally. Japanese Army forces generally win the field wherever and whenever they come into contact with Chinese forces. The size and roughness of China's terrain, and the multiplicity of new willing leaders and armies who show up for the popular cause of challenging the Japanese, are much more of a problem for the Japanese than any combat capability or cohesion of any particular Chinese combat force. Fairly quickly into 1920 and 1921, all coastal routes for the Americans in particular to deliver any practical arms aid to the Chinese are cut off by Japanese port occupations. 1920 after the conquest of US Pacific territories is largely a stalemated year, so is 1921, although the US fleet is built to gargantuan size, far outpacing the British. Early 1922 sees the US fleet and US fleet supply train take key parts of the Marshall Islands, and then the Marianas islands while heavily damaging the Japanese fleet this is followed by mid-year battles in the Philippine sea and some landings in the outlying Philippine islands. Australia and Canada, breaking ranks with Britain, declare war on Japan and permit the US to use their territory for logistic purposes, and send in forces on a small scale. France, after having reinforced Indochina with colonial troops, a hard core of metropolitan troops, and fleet units, and being nagged by the US, declares war on Japan a few months into 1922, and their participation and opening of Danang and Haiphong harbor to advance US fleet units also logistically eases US operations for the comprehensive counter-invasion of the Philippines, the costliest ground operations to date for the US army since 1917, indeed since the American Civil War. War-weariness and war-related anxiety grows in the US as battlefield reports from the Philippines flow in. Fortunately for the French, by the time they've declared war, the Japanese fleet is so weak, and the Japanese have so many land points to defend from potential landings by the Americans, that the Japanese never are able to send a large enough invasion force to overwhelm Indochina's defenses. There is however, some war-related unrest in the colony. The Philippines are near completely liberated in 1922, and this effectively establishes a blockade of Japan. US troops are able to enter the Chinese mainland via beaches unoccupied by Japanese and to bypass Japanese held points by landing in French-held Tonkin, and marching up in to China, and use Haiphong as a main supply route to support Chinese forces as well as American, especially as Japanese naval ability to interdict has been nearly ground down to dust. Japan has made attempts to negotiate its way out of the war since 1921, but the US alternately refused to entertain the idea at all, or found the Japanese terms, usually based on battlefield status quo, unacceptable. In late 1922 and early 1923, the Japanese started offering some terms yielding some of the status quo, as their military and naval position became less sustainable, but the US was still rejecting terms. However, war weariness, mother's protests, and strikes at home were reaching worrisome proportions by 1923. Russian-mediation, obtained by Japan at the price of retroceding southern Sakhalin island to Russia, succeeds in helping the USA, Japan, and China reach the peace of Petrograd by June 1st, 1923. By its terms, Japan yields all its Micronesian islands conquered from Germany to the United States, evacuates any remaining troops from the Philippines, evacuates all troops from China, including Taiwan (included at the insistence of China, but also the US, desiring a buffer for the Philippines against attack), and the Kwangtung peninsula, and yields Southern Sakhalin to Russia. Japan retains its home islands, the Kuriles, the Bonins, the Ryukyus, and Korea. Japan accepts the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which British neutrality declarations had rendered a dead letter anyway.
Interesting TL. I'm not sure about the CPs being overwhelmed that quickly. Italy will have a fresh and hopefully better led and prepared army but the terrain is still heavily in the Austrian favour. Similarly while I've read the Russian army was in its best material condition since the start of the war by early 1917 its morale was dire and the follow up to the February revolution with the Bolsheviks gaining so much power rapidly made this worse. Although things would be a lot better for everybody if that early CP's defeat would occur.
It might also cause a political conflict in Britain at least given the 'easterners' have been calling for such actions in the Balkans rather than bashing at the strongest German defences for years now and will argue now that their been justified.
Some questions on the peace deal. The US will have a lot less influence as their not really put boots on the ground and also with Russia [hopefully] stable and democratic to the east its needed less as a balance to German power given the OTL destruction of the Russian and Austrian empires has only now occurred in the latter case. However a willingness to agree a defence treaty with Britain and France will go a long way. You are still likely to see some restrictions on Turkey as well especially probably some decent Armenian state while a Greco-Turkish war is still a possibility.
Would there still be the 'Spanish' Flu pandemic? That is generally recommended to have killed more people than WWI OTL and assuming it still emerges it will distract a lot of people for a year or two. Although without the war in its early stage there might be more attention to its impact and also less millions of people being moved about so the totals may be a little less.
You might get the Japanese-American war although it could depend on how much the US pushes as Japan was still relatively moderate at this point but some clash over China may occur and with a bullish US that could start this path with embargoes prompting a full scale war. Although since Japan isn't as alienating to other powers and the US is less economically dominating this could be less influence even with sanctions busting. I think such a war is going to be a bit longer than you suggest as neither side is really ready for war. [The US isn't going to maintain those large numbers of conscripts they started recruiting in 1917 passed the end of the war in Europe so they will have to start from scratch although their previous experience and the fact less army units would be needed for a Pacific war would help]. Plus in this scenario Japan will be less concerned about the Russians I suspect. Not to mention that Japan will be fighting markedly closer to its home base so its still going to be a tough fight although no doubt that the US will win.
Not sure what the status of Britain and the dominions would be. Definitely hostile to any Japanese invasion of mainland China so they might impose their own embargoes and if not then still likely to send some aid to China although that might be reduced once a open fighting war starts. They will seek to mediate from the start and its probably as likely that London rather than St Petersburg/Petrograd could be where the peace is signed if Britain isn't pulled into the fighting itself. At this point I can't see either Australia or Canada joining such a war without British support.
The naval situation is going to be interesting. a) US - There will still be a pause in their 1916 programme due to the urgent need for escorts and the like but once the war ends a few months later the capital ship programme is likely to be resumed but possibly at a slower rate. This might give them time to improve some of the designs, especially for the Lexington class although they may not have the input from Britain this time around to help. Its unlikely many of the 1916 ships will be completed to see service in the Japan war however because when that starts the ships near completion will be the top priority and others could get pushed down the priority list. Especially since the USN has a substantial numerical advantage over the IJN. Likely the 4 Washington's are completed and see service but the other 12 may be delayed or even later cancelled due to feelings post war. If not possibly a call for more modern designs making use of experience gained in the recent war. Which would be easier to get past a Congress who are looking at the bill for an expensive war if the ships being scrapped are barely started.
b) Japan is likely to try and continue its own 8-8 programme even after the war starts but then quickly have to see reason and again put the longer planned ones on the back burner. Plus possibly shortly after the war ends your going to have the Great Kanto quake in September 1923. As such their fleet is going to be largely destroyed and probably very strict restraints similar to those on Germany imposed after the war ends. Although probably somewhat larger than what German had at Versailles as Japan is an island nation dependent on trade for survival so it will need at least more cruisers and escorts for such activities.
c) The UK and RN will be interesting. With a shorter and hence less expensive war its in a better material and human condition, especially since this should exclude the OTL expenses of things like the interventions in Russia and fringe involvement in the Greece-Turkish conflict would be avoided here. Coupled with the lack of any naval treaty and then a US-Japanese conflict there is definitely going to be new capital ships developed. Possibly the three improved Hoods will be completed here although you could see all four not completed and after some testing Britain moving onto something like the G3s. Assuming that Britain doesn't get pulled into the Pacific war then you could see two sets of 4 under construction or 4G3's and 4N3's - or TTL's equivalent - by the time the latter ends. Note here that the Pacific war will be good for anyone who isn't Japan or the US in terms of a big trade boost.
Suspect that after the Pacific war ends there will be a move towards some naval agreement although it would depend on how aggressive or not the US feels. If their feeling triumphalist after defeating Japan then you could see a lot of tension but if their got their own war weariness after that conflict its likely that some agreement would be made, almost likely with UK/US equality and everybody else a long way behind, possibly even only a third or less as the maximum level for other powers. How that would be set up and what rules there would be for new construction or an 'holiday' I don't know.
Steve
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 20, 2022 15:53:39 GMT
Interesting TL. I'm not sure about the CPs being overwhelmed that quickly. Italy will have a fresh and hopefully better led and prepared army but the terrain is still heavily in the Austrian favour. Similarly while I've read the Russian army was in its best material condition since the start of the war by early 1917 its morale was dire and the follow up to the February revolution with the Bolsheviks gaining so much power rapidly made this worse. Although things would be a lot better for everybody if that early CP's defeat would occur. That's a fair enough critique It might also cause a political conflict in Britain at least given the 'easterners' have been calling for such actions in the Balkans rather than bashing at the strongest German defences for years now and will argue now that their been justified. There will be all sorts of "I told you so" arguments and proposals. Haig's argument, and the 'westerners' argument, and it will be correct in this case, is that consistent and bloody pressing British offensives against the Germans are needed to wear the Germans down, hold them in place while other allies do the work against other CPs, and indeed can and will end the war with a few more pushes this year. The 'easterners' arguments, which maybe comes out in proposals from Lloyd George, most of which are not implemented, are for things like maybe reinforcing the Italian theater (which he advocated in OTL). Maybe some RAF air units can be helpful there or something, or Gurkhas, or tactical instructors. The British command will argue it's time to make another push on the Salonica front - which will happen with Austria under pressure. LG will probably also advocate more bigger anti-Ottoman operations, which, if they come at the expense of anything else, really are a distraction from what it takes to end the war. Some questions on the peace deal. The US will have a lot less influence as their not really put boots on the ground and also with Russia [hopefully] stable and democratic to the east its needed less as a balance to German power given the OTL destruction of the Russian and Austrian empires has only now occurred in the latter case. However a willingness to agree a defence treaty with Britain and France will go a long way. I always find it hard to pin down the exact influence of the USA on the peace settlement. Superficial pop understanding suggests that Wilson is responsible for the idea of the League of Nations, saving the Rhineland from French annexation, thinking that Austria-Hungary should become ethnic Slavic states, restoring Poland, German colonies should be made LoN mandates, etc. But that is superficial baloney. Britain had an equal interest as the US in not letting Germany get too weakened at French expense, the idea of ethnic Slavic states and a restored Poland had been around or was ready to grasp even before Wilson, the general ideas of self-determination and a postwar international organization for peace- whether called a League or not, were part of a Lloyd George 1917 speech. The main impacts strong US influence that I can detect on the OTL settlement at Versailles that see were stubborn opposition to some of Italy's territorial claims (although France may have been also happy to see Italy limited in favor of its Yugoslavian client) and the naming of ex-colonies of League of Nations mandates instead of outright colonial transfers to the victors. Since in this earlier victory, Britain is relatively more crucial than a France just getting off the mat from mutinies, Britain's position on not annexing Germany's Rhineland should stick. Since Austria-Hungary is getting overrun its nationalities should head for the exits. Since Italy is such a crucial player in the war's endgame, in a military sense, that the US is not, Italy's claims really can't be denied by the US. You are still likely to see some restrictions on Turkey as well especially probably some decent Armenian state while a Greco-Turkish war is still a possibility. This is an interesting question - I guess you would see a decent sized Armenian state, based on where Russian front lines in Anatolia were when Russia was last participating in the war, and the Russian fronts never collapsing. The Ottomans will have to capitulate, make concessions, and accept restrictions. But, as of December 1917, there are quite a few differences in where the front-lines are that should shape the settlement. In Anatolia/Asia Minor they are worse off in the northeastern, so-called 'Armenian' provinces, but in the Middle East, they still possess all of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine north of Jerusalem, and they still held Kurdistan and Iraq north of Baghdad, almost of which were lost by OTL November 1918. The Russians will have a claim to Constantinople from Sykes-Picot-Sazanov. But the will and ability to enforce it may be spotty. I think the Turks, while surrendering, would yield the rest of the Arab lands like Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq without issue, possibly even eastern Thrace, but if the Entente presses beyond for northern Kurdistan, for a sovereign takeover of Constantinople and the straits (as opposed to military bases), or for a Greek or Italian or French sector of Western Asia Minor or Cilicia, they will have to fight for them. That becomes a question of political will among the individual Allied countries. France and Italy didn't seem to have much of it. The Greeks had more, but the Turks stood a better chance of fighting them off. Lloyd George would be happy to have a continuation war to keep beating down the Turks in favor of the Greeks, but how long a leash would the British public and parliament allow him? Would there still be the 'Spanish' Flu pandemic? That is generally recommended to have killed more people than WWI OTL and assuming it still emerges it will distract a lot of people for a year or two. Although without the war in its early stage there might be more attention to its impact and also less millions of people being moved about so the totals may be a little less. Great question - I would have to look up the exact timing. The world may not miss it. The point of origin may have been in the US, so in this ATL, it may spread in greater strength across Central America and the Pacific than across Europe. I think such a war is going to be a bit longer than you suggest as neither side is really ready for war. The way I wrote it, the massive American sanctions start in September 1919, I didn't specify when precisely the Japanese assaults on US positions begin, but let's call it December 1, 1919. I have the peace of Petrograd end the war on conditional terms with significant Japanese concessions on June 1st 1923. That is a war of three and a half years or 42 months. That is not much shorter than the three years, ten months (or 46 months) of OTL's Pacific War in the 1940s. And that is with no European front calling on American resources, and Japan being a lower tech, more agricultural economy even less capable building indigenous modern platforms in wartime. And it is also with the US having had a practice mobilization and an incomplete demobilization. Actually - maybe I should have had the US-Japanese crisis break out into war in summer-fall 1918, instead of 1919? But you may have a point here. The US industrial base was not up to WWII standard yet either, and the tyranny of distance may slow operations such that I had the war go too fast. They will seek to mediate from the start and its probably as likely that London rather than St Petersburg/Petrograd could be where the peace is signed if Britain isn't pulled into the fighting itself. I treated as a coin toss, of course Britain finds the fighting awkward and wishes it to end. They sure as heck will *not* stand and fight for the Japanese or threaten to. But even with mediation, they want to be careful that the Americans genuinely welcome any mediation offer, because they are now more financially dependent on the USA, and don't want to offend US opinion. if Britain isn't pulled into the fighting itself. You figure Britain could be pulled into the fighting itself? Somehow against Japan, formally over China issues? At this point I can't see either Australia or Canada joining such a war without British support. Formally this makes sense, this is pre-Statute of Westminster and all. I treated it as a coin toss. My rationale is that the big island-hopping leaps and naval victories of the Americans by 1921-22 serve to demonstrate the USA is the new sheriff in Pacific-town, and Australia, with an eye towards future cooperative relationship and protection in times of need, wants to show it is a reliable member of the sheriff's posse. b) Japan is likely to try and continue its own 8-8 programme even after the war starts but then quickly have to see reason and again put the longer planned ones on the back burner. Plus possibly shortly after the war ends your going to have the Great Kanto quake in September 1923. As such their fleet is going to be largely destroyed and probably very strict restraints similar to those on Germany imposed after the war ends. Although probably somewhat larger than what German had at Versailles as Japan is an island nation dependent on trade for survival so it will need at least more cruisers and escorts for such activities. Constraints of impoverishment will be the greatest constraints here. Wartime and accumulated savings burnt up. Hyperinflation. Commerce and trade routes ruined and hard to reestablish. Then on top of that the costs of the Kanto earthquake reconstruction. Your statement on the Kanto earthquake is a great reminder, by the way. If you still think I made the US-Japanese war too short, w e could easily make it last from June through September 1923, and the earthquake could sort of be this war timeline's equivalent of the atomic bomb, a war-ending shock, that gives Japan an excuse and motive to sue for peace. That would be quite clever. especially since this should exclude the OTL expenses of things like the interventions in Russia and fringe involvement in the Greece-Turkish conflict would be avoided here. Unless Lloyd George somehow gets away with pursuing such a misadventure for longer. He had a 'hate-boner' for the Turks. Suspect that after the Pacific war ends there will be a move towards some naval agreement although it would depend on how aggressive or not the US feels. If their feeling triumphalist after defeating Japan then you could see a lot of tension but if their got their own war weariness after that conflict its likely that some agreement would be made, I think the US would *not* have a lot of hostility toward Britain after concluding 3+ year war with Japan, unless Britain appeared supportive of Japan or to be a meddling diplomatic nag telling the USA not to do this or that during the war. Certainly not the kind of hostility that would motivate arms competition or geopolitical tests of will against Britain. Anti-British press would harp on the fact that Japan used a lot of British tech from their longstanding alliance, but Britain can't help that. America can feel "triumphal" but also exhausted and sick of war. Compared with the mere hundreds of men lost in combat against Germany, the Americans would have lost over 100,000 men in the Japanese war, certainly when you combine combat and disease casualties. Years of separation from home would take its toll on veterans. American bullishness and bullying, at least against those who could fight back, would be largely spent for awhile. Also, a source of Anglo-American tension would be removed during the US-Japanese war, as the Irish independence war would likely be settled with the establishment of the Irish Free State. |
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Aug 21, 2022 0:11:18 GMT
Interesting TL. I'm not sure about the CPs being overwhelmed that quickly. Italy will have a fresh and hopefully better led and prepared army but the terrain is still heavily in the Austrian favour. Similarly while I've read the Russian army was in its best material condition since the start of the war by early 1917 its morale was dire and the follow up to the February revolution with the Bolsheviks gaining so much power rapidly made this worse. Although things would be a lot better for everybody if that early CP's defeat would occur. That's a fair enough critique It might also cause a political conflict in Britain at least given the 'easterners' have been calling for such actions in the Balkans rather than bashing at the strongest German defences for years now and will argue now that their been justified. There will be all sorts of "I told you so" arguments and proposals. Haig's argument, and the 'westerners' argument, and it will be correct in this case, is that consistent and bloody pressing British offensives against the Germans are needed to wear the Germans down, hold them in place while other allies do the work against other CPs, and indeed can and will end the war with a few more pushes this year. The 'easterners' arguments, which maybe comes out in proposals from Lloyd George, most of which are not implemented, are for things like maybe reinforcing the Italian theater (which he advocated in OTL). Maybe some RAF air units can be helpful there or something, or Gurkhas, or tactical instructors. The British command will argue it's time to make another push on the Salonica front - which will happen with Austria under pressure. LG will probably also advocate more bigger anti-Ottoman operations, which, if they come at the expense of anything else, really are a distraction from what it takes to end the war. Some questions on the peace deal. The US will have a lot less influence as their not really put boots on the ground and also with Russia [hopefully] stable and democratic to the east its needed less as a balance to German power given the OTL destruction of the Russian and Austrian empires has only now occurred in the latter case. However a willingness to agree a defence treaty with Britain and France will go a long way. I always find it hard to pin down the exact influence of the USA on the peace settlement. Superficial pop understanding suggests that Wilson is responsible for the idea of the League of Nations, saving the Rhineland from French annexation, thinking that Austria-Hungary should become ethnic Slavic states, restoring Poland, German colonies should be made LoN mandates, etc. But that is superficial baloney. Britain had an equal interest as the US in not letting Germany get too weakened at French expense, the idea of ethnic Slavic states and a restored Poland had been around or was ready to grasp even before Wilson, the general ideas of self-determination and a postwar international organization for peace- whether called a League or not, were part of a Lloyd George 1917 speech. The main impacts strong US influence that I can detect on the OTL settlement at Versailles that see were stubborn opposition to some of Italy's territorial claims (although France may have been also happy to see Italy limited in favor of its Yugoslavian client) and the naming of ex-colonies of League of Nations mandates instead of outright colonial transfers to the victors. Since in this earlier victory, Britain is relatively more crucial than a France just getting off the mat from mutinies, Britain's position on not annexing Germany's Rhineland should stick. Since Austria-Hungary is getting overrun its nationalities should head for the exits. Since Italy is such a crucial player in the war's endgame, in a military sense, that the US is not, Italy's claims really can't be denied by the US. You are still likely to see some restrictions on Turkey as well especially probably some decent Armenian state while a Greco-Turkish war is still a possibility. This is an interesting question - I guess you would see a decent sized Armenian state, based on where Russian front lines in Anatolia were when Russia was last participating in the war, and the Russian fronts never collapsing. The Ottomans will have to capitulate, make concessions, and accept restrictions. But, as of December 1917, there are quite a few differences in where the front-lines are that should shape the settlement. In Anatolia/Asia Minor they are worse off in the northeastern, so-called 'Armenian' provinces, but in the Middle East, they still possess all of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine north of Jerusalem, and they still held Kurdistan and Iraq north of Baghdad, almost of which were lost by OTL November 1918. The Russians will have a claim to Constantinople from Sykes-Picot-Sazanov. But the will and ability to enforce it may be spotty. I think the Turks, while surrendering, would yield the rest of the Arab lands like Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq without issue, possibly even eastern Thrace, but if the Entente presses beyond for northern Kurdistan, for a sovereign takeover of Constantinople and the straits (as opposed to military bases), or for a Greek or Italian or French sector of Western Asia Minor or Cilicia, they will have to fight for them. That becomes a question of political will among the individual Allied countries. France and Italy didn't seem to have much of it. The Greeks had more, but the Turks stood a better chance of fighting them off. Lloyd George would be happy to have a continuation war to keep beating down the Turks in favor of the Greeks, but how long a leash would the British public and parliament allow him? Would there still be the 'Spanish' Flu pandemic? That is generally recommended to have killed more people than WWI OTL and assuming it still emerges it will distract a lot of people for a year or two. Although without the war in its early stage there might be more attention to its impact and also less millions of people being moved about so the totals may be a little less. Great question - I would have to look up the exact timing. The world may not miss it. The point of origin may have been in the US, so in this ATL, it may spread in greater strength across Central America and the Pacific than across Europe. I think such a war is going to be a bit longer than you suggest as neither side is really ready for war. The way I wrote it, the massive American sanctions start in September 1919, I didn't specify when precisely the Japanese assaults on US positions begin, but let's call it December 1, 1919. I have the peace of Petrograd end the war on conditional terms with significant Japanese concessions on June 1st 1923. That is a war of three and a half years or 42 months. That is not much shorter than the three years, ten months (or 46 months) of OTL's Pacific War in the 1940s. And that is with no European front calling on American resources, and Japan being a lower tech, more agricultural economy even less capable building indigenous modern platforms in wartime. And it is also with the US having had a practice mobilization and an incomplete demobilization. Actually - maybe I should have had the US-Japanese crisis break out into war in summer-fall 1918, instead of 1919? But you may have a point here. The US industrial base was not up to WWII standard yet either, and the tyranny of distance may slow operations such that I had the war go too fast. They will seek to mediate from the start and its probably as likely that London rather than St Petersburg/Petrograd could be where the peace is signed if Britain isn't pulled into the fighting itself. I treated as a coin toss, of course Britain finds the fighting awkward and wishes it to end. They sure as heck will *not* stand and fight for the Japanese or threaten to. But even with mediation, they want to be careful that the Americans genuinely welcome any mediation offer, because they are now more financially dependent on the USA, and don't want to offend US opinion. if Britain isn't pulled into the fighting itself. You figure Britain could be pulled into the fighting itself? Somehow against Japan, formally over China issues? At this point I can't see either Australia or Canada joining such a war without British support. Formally this makes sense, this is pre-Statute of Westminster and all. I treated it as a coin toss. My rationale is that the big island-hopping leaps and naval victories of the Americans by 1921-22 serve to demonstrate the USA is the new sheriff in Pacific-town, and Australia, with an eye towards future cooperative relationship and protection in times of need, wants to show it is a reliable member of the sheriff's posse. b) Japan is likely to try and continue its own 8-8 programme even after the war starts but then quickly have to see reason and again put the longer planned ones on the back burner. Plus possibly shortly after the war ends your going to have the Great Kanto quake in September 1923. As such their fleet is going to be largely destroyed and probably very strict restraints similar to those on Germany imposed after the war ends. Although probably somewhat larger than what German had at Versailles as Japan is an island nation dependent on trade for survival so it will need at least more cruisers and escorts for such activities. Constraints of impoverishment will be the greatest constraints here. Wartime and accumulated savings burnt up. Hyperinflation. Commerce and trade routes ruined and hard to reestablish. Then on top of that the costs of the Kanto earthquake reconstruction. Your statement on the Kanto earthquake is a great reminder, by the way. If you still think I made the US-Japanese war too short, w e could easily make it last from June through September 1923, and the earthquake could sort of be this war timeline's equivalent of the atomic bomb, a war-ending shock, that gives Japan an excuse and motive to sue for peace. That would be quite clever. especially since this should exclude the OTL expenses of things like the interventions in Russia and fringe involvement in the Greece-Turkish conflict would be avoided here. Unless Lloyd George somehow gets away with pursuing such a misadventure for longer. He had a 'hate-boner' for the Turks. Suspect that after the Pacific war ends there will be a move towards some naval agreement although it would depend on how aggressive or not the US feels. If their feeling triumphalist after defeating Japan then you could see a lot of tension but if their got their own war weariness after that conflict its likely that some agreement would be made, I think the US would *not* have a lot of hostility toward Britain after concluding 3+ year war with Japan, unless Britain appeared supportive of Japan or to be a meddling diplomatic nag telling the USA not to do this or that during the war. Certainly not the kind of hostility that would motivate arms competition or geopolitical tests of will against Britain. Anti-British press would harp on the fact that Japan used a lot of British tech from their longstanding alliance, but Britain can't help that. America can feel "triumphal" but also exhausted and sick of war. Compared with the mere hundreds of men lost in combat against Germany, the Americans would have lost over 100,000 men in the Japanese war, certainly when you combine combat and disease casualties. Years of separation from home would take its toll on veterans. American bullishness and bullying, at least against those who could fight back, would be largely spent for awhile. Also, a source of Anglo-American tension would be removed during the US-Japanese war, as the Irish independence war would likely be settled with the establishment of the Irish Free State.
On a few points a) Actually I think the easterners have a point. Attacking the enemies strongest point, especially the way it was done, was bloody costly and inefficient and it was only really that the allies had much greater resources and the Germans made a hell of a lot of mistakes themselves that saw the allies eventually stagger to a win. With devastating costs for everybody in that it left Europe impoverished and with a lot of chaos and future problems especially with Russia falling into a communist dictatorship.
Also the other big point about the peace conference here is that while Britain and France are less exhausted Russia is still a player rather than wracked by civil war and then a pariah state. This makes the US markedly less essential and adds another major player to the table. Unless the assumption is that Russia falls into chaos or at least persistent problems due to extreme left and/or right wing terrorism and unrest but I don't think your planning to go that way?
b) Good point on the different borders to the front in 1917 with regard to the Ottomans. However there will be butterflies here as well and its certain that things will change although which way its hard to tell. Most definitely there will be concerns about the massacres the Young Turks carried out - not just the Armenian genocide as they murdered a lot of Assyrian Christians as well and also the religious and cultural mistrust. Plus I think Britain will want at least a bit of Palestine to provide a buffer for the Canal. Which raises the question of if the Balfour Declaration still occurs in TTL?
c) The prime reason why I think the fighting will last longer is that with less advanced technology, especially in terms of air everything is going to be slower and more difficult. If Japan takes the Philippines, Guam and Wake and without open allies outside China itself the US is going to have to build up a lot of infrastructure and capabilities it doesn't have yet - although it will still be a matter of time.
d) Britain has major interests in China, political as well as economic, being the dominant power in the international settlement at Shanghai, as well as having bases at Honk Kong and Weihaiwei for instance. If Japan is running riot in China and especially if it approaches the barbarity of OTL 1936 onward - which it may not - then Britain is going to have a lot of issues over this. It may not lead to war with Japan but its likely that London will be seeking to remove Japan from China by other means. It might also 'do an Italy' shall we say  in terms of coming in towards the end either because of some issues that develops or possibly to secure its own interests and possibly a seat at the peace treaty. I suspect in the sort of scenario suggested here Britain will probably sit it out but there is likely to be some tension.
e) I doubt that Australia would do that as the fighting is largely north of Australian interests and Britain is still able to stand by as a protector/ally as well as a good trading partner. You could well see ships sent east and British support for garrisoning of possessions in locations like New Guinea with fighting near there. Australia is unlikely to join the conflict without clear British support as it would risk undermining that relationship as well as expose its trade and interests to Japanese hostilities.
f) Agree there is unlikely to be great hostility between US & UK after the war because while victorious the US will have paid some heavy costs which is likely to cool any ideas about a substantial US overseas 'empire' It will still be better off than Britain was after 3 years of WWI but the imbalance will be significantly less. The danger is if some of the more gung-ho Americans still want to expand that influence further, which would be largely at British expense. Remembering also that if as is likely Britain stays out of the conflict it will have had a chance to make hay while the US bled and was distracted on a war footing, which might, illogically as it is be a source of some resentment. However thing relations will be pretty good and some naval deal will be worked out.
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575
Captain
There is no Purgatory for warcriminals - they go directly to Hell!
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Post by 575 on Aug 21, 2022 8:31:51 GMT
raharris1973;
In the OP You mentioned a "Serbia and Russia.. earlier collapse";
In Your 3. post the sketch TL You mention Russia being ruled by a Democratic Socialist Government - Kerensky? How did that come into place with the following good Russian performance taking Warsaw? and how's the Tsar and his family doing? Did the February Revolution 1917 take place because of a badly managed Home Front?
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 21, 2022 15:43:56 GMT
raharris1973; In the OP You mentioned a "Serbia and Russia.. earlier collapse"; In Your 3. post the sketch TL You mention Russia being ruled by a Democratic Socialist Government - Kerensky? How did that come into place with the following good Russian performance taking Warsaw? and how's the Tsar and his family doing? Did the February Revolution 1917 take place because of a badly managed Home Front? I mentioned earlier collapses for both Serbia and Russia as a possibility in the OP. But, there were some further points made about Austria still doing badly in the first year, and some factors evening things out with Russia a little (no having to defend Romania in 1916). So in the sketch-out, what I settled on was Serbia gets beat harder (fewer men retreat to the Adriatic) and get beat sooner by several weeks because Italy is not in fighting in 1915 and 1916. Russia, through March 1917, is in a somewhat worse military state in 1916 and 1917, but this only translates into an internal food an revolutionary situation about as exactly as bad as OTL March 17, when Russia had its first of two revolutions. So with Italy not in the war, it stands to reason that the Tsar will not be any better off than OTL and will be overthrown on OTL schedule *at least* on time. I argue that lack of time for rot to set in and the advantage of defense on a narrow front means revolution does not come early. But the first revolution was about disgust with the monarchy and old order, and not about quitting the war immediately. Army discipline and morale will decay though and if current trends continue with Austria standing strong, Russia is looking at a second, anti war far left revolution in about six months or so. But what rescues Russia here, and Russia’s war effort, is the sudden entry of Italy and Romania into the war, throwing the Austrians on the defensive. And this is at a time when the Germans can’t help much because from the summer on the British are throwing powerful offensives at Flanders. So that keeps the Privisional Government afloat against revolution. The Tsar? He is in internal exile but unexecuted, and possibly exiled at the conclusion of the constituent assembly, which adopts a republic. |
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Never heard that and given the reluctance to use US forces other than in a solely US army it does surprise me. How many forces were they offering because I understood that most of the small US standing army was parceled out trying to train the flood of new conscripts?
in terms of coming in towards the end either because of some issues that develops or possibly to secure its own interests and possibly a seat at the peace treaty. I suspect in the sort of scenario suggested here Britain will probably sit it out but there is likely to be some tension.