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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 24, 2022 13:29:58 GMT
What if Britain raised an Army of 4 million infantrymen from India from 1917-1918 for fighting in Europe, and mobilized Indian resources to support it as much as possible with cargo shipping, small arms, pack animals and supplies sourced from India? [Please don't educate me on the 10s or 100s of thousands of Indians and other colonial troops that actually were used by Britain in the Great War, I am talking about a hypothetical 4 million *more*. Mentioning real history in this context as if it is brilliant insight adds nothing but pedantry.] The round figure of 4 million, and 1917-1918 is deliberately chosen, to provide an Army that numerically and materially can substitute for the historical American Expeditionary Forces en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Expeditionary_Forces#Casualties , if need be. How is it done? What does it cost? What are the postwar consequences? In the "how is done?" category, how much of it can be recruited from India's population of 259 million (1914) through volunteers and incentives of pay, benefits, and bonuses? Would conscription be required to get to the numbers I am discussing? Could the Indian economy be mobilized to manufacture adequate small arms and ammunition for this number of men? What about cargo shipping? What about the agricultural surplus to feed them? At what cost to other sectors of Indian economy? Strictly speaking, the British wouldn't have to limit recruiting/conscription supply for this massive host the Imperial Expeditionary Force, from only India, I just went after India first because it is the biggest manpower pot at 259 million. The British can draw from all non-white colonies if they wish - British Africa had another 52 million, other British Asian colonies had 26 million, and British West Indies contributed a modest 1.6 million. What social and political changes would such a massive mobilization effort cause to the internal structure of the individual colonies and empire? I expect they would create demands, irresistible by the 20s or early 30s at latest, for an imperial federation of equal self-governing units, independence of major colonies, or create a major class division in the colonies between a praetorian caste with imperial service records and certain rights and privileges and natives without any. That's if the whole scheme does not just blow up in wartime itself, or immediately upon armistice - which I suppose we cannot rule out. Since any such imperial policy would be decided and guided by the British Cabinet, it does not really have to wait until 1917. Could the British Empire harness its colonial manpower once it can really tell what it's in for (1915, with the Gallipoli fail and Russia fails; 1916, with Verdun, the Somme, and Kut) to achieve the win in the Great War within an 18 or 20 month span from go-time? And what about the French with their colonial manpower? Their colonial empire had about 65 million people in it as of 1914. In OTL, about 500,000, mostly Algerians, Moroccans, and Senegalese fought in WWI. But by the end of the war they were planning on drastic expansion in use of Sub-Saharan African troops? What if the French had done mass voluntary or incentivized recruitment drives, or conscription from its nonwhite colonies a bit earlier in the war? Perhaps in reaction to the casualty shocks of the battles of 1914, or the failed Champagne offensive of 1915, or Verdun 1916? And if they stereotyped their colonial subjects less by nationality, and so freely recruited Sub-Saharan Africans besides Senegalese, and Indochinese troops, from an early point? I would imagine that would manifest in new strains on the French Colonial Empire by the 1920s. |
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Post by simon darkshade on Aug 24, 2022 14:29:08 GMT
I think you need to look at the actual numbers of infantry in the real Great War, not some imaginary charicature. - The war was an artillery one - The peak strength of the BEF, including Canadian, Australian and NZ forces, was a bit over 2 million, and by the end of 1918 was around 1.8 million out of 3.8 million in the whole British Army - 4 million was the peak strength of the entire US Army, half of whom made it to France. Of that 2 million, 1 million were combat effective, 644,000 were Services of Supply and the rest casualties or sick, by and large www.worldwar1.com/dbc/facts.htm- 34 US divisions saw action on the Western Front, but they contained ~544,000 infantry out of their total nominal strength of 952,000 - In 1917, there were 1,769 batteries in over 400 brigades totalling 548,000 men serving in the RFA and RGA - Whilst there were some shortages of infantry battalions at some stages, it wasn’t anything like the WW1 crunch Thus, there would not be a need for 4 million Indian infantrymen, not in a millenium of Sundays. You’ve plucked the number from an erroneous reading of AEF numbers and ran with it from there. Although you raise a number of interesting points subsequently, they are tainted by your original error of numbers and the presumption that they all need to be infantrymen. Rifle strength would be handy at some points, but if you want to see some changes, then they need to come in guns and shells. Everything else, including tanks, is secondary. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 24, 2022 18:00:21 GMT
I think you need to look at the actual numbers of infantry in the real Great War, not some imaginary charicature. - The war was an artillery one - The peak strength of the BEF, including Canadian, Australian and NZ forces, was a bit over 2 million, and by the end of 1918 was around 1.8 million out of 3.8 million in the whole British Army - 4 million was the peak strength of the entire US Army, half of whom made it to France. Of that 2 million, 1 million were combat effective, 644,000 were Services of Supply and the rest casualties or sick, by and large www.worldwar1.com/dbc/facts.htm- 34 US divisions saw action on the Western Front, but they contained ~544,000 infantry out of their total nominal strength of 952,000 - In 1917, there were 1,769 batteries in over 400 brigades totalling 548,000 men serving in the RFA and RGA - Whilst there were some shortages of infantry battalions at some stages, it wasn’t anything like the WW1 crunch Thus, there would not be a need for 4 million Indian infantrymen, not in a millenium of Sundays. You’ve plucked the number from an erroneous reading of AEF numbers and ran with it from there. Although you raise a number of interesting points subsequently, they are tainted by your original error of numbers and the presumption that they all need to be infantrymen. Rifle strength would be handy at some points, but if you want to see some changes, then they need to come in guns and shells. Everything else, including tanks, is secondary. Let’s not get hung up on the term infantry here. Frankly, I do not care if the Indian troops are “teeth” or “tails” in the famous ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio of support to frontline combat, as long as they all support the fight and with more ready to come whenever the war ends. So if it was 544,000 infantry and 644,000 supply service troops in theater let us apply that to the proposed Indo-colonial force and pad out whatever remaining Indian Army or colonial army superstructure we have to from there to support it. Then recalculate the questions from there. That’s a better response. Than”Arrgh, you have a wrong sum, let’s just ignore all the questions and variables” On WWI being an artillery war rather than small arms war- of course- but my emphasis on lighter systems is those were the ones the US provided for themselves in WWI. Higher tech systems like tanks, aircraft, and I thought heavy artillery, American troops needed to acquire from their Allies who mastered making them. |
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Post by simon darkshade on Aug 25, 2022 0:03:06 GMT
How much of the artillery that was used by the AEF was of US manufacture?
Their 75mm were French, the 155 mm Guns M1917 were French, the 1503 155mm Schneider howitzers were French, 72/96 8” howitzers in action were British and the 40 9.2” were British. There were 5 USN 14” railway guns.
So in that, you are correct. The lighter systems did not matter. The war was not impacted or decided based on rifles or even machine guns.
Your scenario also falls down in that there were Indian divisions deployed to France, but they were so unsuited to the weather and conditions, issues of language and lack of artillery. The infantry divisions of Indian Expeditionary Force A were withdrawn by mid-late 1915 for service in the Mesopotamian theatre. Further to that, the BEF didn’t have the same support force structure as the AEF, having French and Chinese labour, various Imperial units and their own pioneers et al.
What you propose is to increase the rifle strength of the entire BEF by 100%, which would require at least 300,000 artillerymen, 200,000 other support troops and staff (all of this 550,000 minimum force need to be British) and then more labourers and a supply chain. Doubling the size of the BEF is just not logistically possible for Britain to support in terms of manufacture of artillery equipments, ammunition, other equipment and munitions and wastage of officers who can speak the language of their troops. Logistically, increasing from 75 to 150 divisions would need additional railways, 2-3 whole new Channel ports and somehow the ability to wave a wand and increase the capacity of the Amiens hub/logistical bottleneck.
There wasn’t the burning need for that many more troops, but rather, ~10 fresh British or Dominion divisions, a large proportion of which could come from the units kept at home in Britain.
Logistically, your idea is built on foundations of sand and a concept fundamentally flawed.
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 25, 2022 0:32:26 GMT
a few thoughts... which would require at least 300,000 artillerymen, 200,000 other support troops and staff (all of this 550,000 minimum force need to be British) Why? Logistically, increasing from 75 to 150 divisions would need additional railways, 2-3 whole new Channel ports and somehow the ability to wave a wand and increase the capacity of the Amiens hub/logistical bottleneck. One wonders how those 1 million Americans were able to fit into France, if extra riflemen were such burden. but rather, ~10 fresh British or Dominion divisions, a large proportion of which could come from the units kept at home in Britain. What burning need could the ~10 fresh British or Dominion divisions have met? We have never come to a shared concept or measure to judge burning needs against. Substituting for any contribution of the AEF, in its total absence? Halting the 1918 German offensives earlier? Could the white Dominions like Australia, Canada or <cough> Scotland been squeezed of any more men on that scale? |
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Post by simon darkshade on Aug 25, 2022 1:43:30 GMT
1.) The Indian Army did not field its own artillery units, very few engineers and few to no signals or the other support arms that grew in response to the needs of war on the Western Front.
2.) Silliness. The AEF was supported through different ports and operated in an entirely different sector of the front, on the other side of the French to boot. The BEF was concentrated and fought where it did for logistical reasons.
3.) Relieving and reinforcing the existing armies of the BEF. Making up for the Yanks would have been a French role, with accompanying difficulties.
7. 7.18 BEF Orbat
GHQ
Cav (1 Cav, 2 Cav, 3 Cav), 16, 25
First Army
I (1, 11, 55), VIII (20, 24, 52), XVII (15, 51, 56), Can (59, 1 Can, 2 Can, 4 Can), Port (2 Port)
Second Army
II (33,34,36,49), VII (14,30,39), X (-), XV (9,29,31,40,1 Aus), XIX (6,35,41)
Third Army
IV (37, 42, 57, 62, NZ), V (12, 17, 21, 38, 63), VI (Gds, 2, 32, 3 Can)
Fourth Army
III (18, 47, 58, 66), IX (-), XXII (8, 50), Aus (2 Aus, 3 Aus, 4 Aus, 5 Aus)
Fifth Army
XI (5, 61, 74), XIII (3, 4, 46), 19, 1 Port
4.) Letting the Germans overextend themselves and run out of supplies was advantageous for Amiens and the Hundred Days.
5.) No, Australia and Canada were pushed to maintain their forces in the field, to the point of disbanding/merging units. Scotland was an integral part of Britain, so the reference to it as a Dominion simply doesn’t work.
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Post by Max Sinister on Aug 25, 2022 3:29:17 GMT
And what about the costs?
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michelvan
Sub-lieutenant
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Post by michelvan on Aug 25, 2022 8:53:29 GMT
Maxsinister is right
you can rase a Army of 4 million infantrymen from India
but can you afford it ?
We talking about Training, feed, equip and transport them to this meat grinder called the west front or Ottoman empire
That allot of cash needed to maintain such Army
Also what is impact on India Economy if 4 million men are pull from their Workplace ?
Special if India is needed for War effort and financing the payback of Credits to US !
That reason Stalin went with ration of 4:1 after Wehrmacht instead of 8:1, men were needed in production of War Economy
Side note this play also a role
in 1917 the Belgium Military wanted raise a Large Army from Congolese (from Belgium colony) to fight the Germans and liberate occupy Belgium.
The Belgium Government outright refused the proposal, they feared what experience Congolese Soldiers would do on return to Belgium Colony: war of independence !
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Post by simon darkshade on Aug 25, 2022 10:38:53 GMT
The conclusion to draw if it can’t be afforded, the language and officer issues and that it would be logistically impossible is that no, it can’t be done.
Mistaking raw numbers with actual numbers is a common error.
India already fielded a substantially large all-volunteer force in WW1 and that allowed Britain to field large armies in Gallipoli, Palestine and Mesopotamia whilst also supporting 2 million men in the most well-armed and equipped army around on the Western Front. Not every tool is suitable for every task.
Could the Indian Army have been larger in WW1? Yes, but the required planning would need to start a decade before and involve extra expense.
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 25, 2022 16:42:21 GMT
Well screw discussion of the British Empire, apparently it did everything optimally in the circumstances of 1914. Maybe the only thing they could have done better would be to add 10 fresh Divisions of troops from Britain itself or the Dominions. Let's discuss the French Empire instead, as I mentioned as an alternate point of discussion in the OP, and as you hint at yourself here in this comment: Making up for the Yanks would have been a French role, with accompanying difficulties. OK - so imagine there is no AEF available, and it's France's problem to fill its manpower gap, how can it use its nonwhite imperial population to fill the gap from not having American troops and formations in the last year or so of the war, and what consequences would it have? Or would that run into virtually identical problems the British would have in massively upscaling the Indian army at the last minute? I got at these questions a bit in the OP, I'll quote them here again: And what about the French with their colonial manpower? Their [the French] colonial empire had about 65 million people in it as of 1914. In OTL, about 500,000, mostly Algerians, Moroccans, and Senegalese fought in WWI. But by the end of the war they were planning on drastic expansion in use of Sub-Saharan African troops. What if the French had done mass voluntary or incentivized recruitment drives, or conscription from its nonwhite colonies a bit earlier in the war? Perhaps in reaction to the casualty shocks of the battles of 1914, or the failed Champagne offensive of 1915, or Verdun 1916? And if they stereotyped their colonial subjects less by nationality, and so freely recruited Sub-Saharan Africans besides Senegalese, and Indochinese troops, from an early point? I would imagine that would manifest in new strains on the French Colonial Empire by the 1920s. in 1917 the Belgium Military wanted raise a Large Army from Congolese (from Belgium colony) to fight the Germans and liberate occupy Belgium. The Belgium Government outright refused the proposal, they feared what experience Congolese Soldiers would do on return to Belgium Colony: war of independence ! Based on everything else I am hearing, if the Belgian government hadn't turned down the idea at the first instance, the British government would have, because the Congolese would have been completely dependent for the British for arms and ammunition supply and logistics lines which ran right through British sectors. Belgian independent decision making was limited because only the tiniest sliver of the country was unoccupied and under constant bombardment, and the Congo had zero manufacturing and barely any native literacy. |
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