Would the Entente entertain a separate peace on battlefield status quo lines with the Ottomans after
Sept 9, 2022 10:20:19 GMT
American hist likes this
Post by raharris1973 on Sept 9, 2022 10:20:19 GMT
If the rulers of the Ottoman Empire decided to seek a separate peace, on uti possedetis lines based on the battlefield status quo (I keep what I have, you keep what you have) after the Bolshevik revolution, would the Entente powers have entertained and/or accepted the offer, offered to accept only a version significantly modified in Entente favor territorially, or refused any deal short of the terms of the Treaty of Sevres?
Looking at the time frame, there is a range of times the Ottomans could offer this proposal. The Bolshevik revolution happened in November 1917. I figure the Ottoman offer to the rest of the Entente could come possibly any time after the signing of the Bolshevik-Central Powers Armistice of December 1917 took Russia de facto out of the war, or wait until the signature of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk formally, de jure, took Russia out of the war in March 1918, or in any of the months in between.
Ottoman motives to exit the war at this time in particular. While on the one hand Russia's dropout from the war suggests the Ottoman war policy is successful and should continue, on the other hand, it suggests "mission accomplished". The war has killed off the national archenemy, Tsarist Russia, and thus done a lot to protect the survival of the state from an empire religiously motivated to partition and take it over.
After knocking out Russia and thus removing that threat for a good couple decades/or generation, staying in the war against the French, Italians, British, and now, at least indirectly, the Americans, offers fast diminishing returns, because neither the British nor Americans are waning powers.
Would Enver Pasha ever make this offer? Possibly not. Probably not. He would probably double-down on the bet of German victory, even though he grew distracted by the idea of expansion north and east, rather than defense and counter-attack in the Arab south and west. But I think the other leaders of the CUP triumvirate Djemal, and Talaat, could have been much more open to the idea of abruptly cutting their losses and dropping out.
An uti possedetis peace requires some painful territorial sacrifices in Arabia, Iraq, and Palestine (after December, from Jerusalem on south) already conquered by the British and Arabs, but persisting in the war only offers a slim chance of recovering those territorial losses and just as much, and realistically greater, chances, of further territorial losses in Syria, Lebanon, Asia Minor, Thrace, northern Palestine, and northern Iraq, to the British and others.
For the Entente, accepting an uti possedetis peace requires is no real sacrifice to the Americans or Italians, who had no for forces engaged on Turkish fronts. It offers the prospect of freeing up British help for the western and Italian fronts. For the French, it means giving up a prospective empire in Syria and Lebanon, but not one France has bled for yet, and could free up British help for a faster conclusion of the big war to liberate France (including Alsace-Lorraine) in the west as a lower cost in French blood.
The prospects Britain and Lloyd George, that Turk-hater of the Gladstonian tradition, have to give up, are psychologically at least much greater. The British are on the verge of of making more conquests in northern Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, northern Iraq, and Kurdistan, that a Turkish separate peace would cut short, and to provide more support to client groups along the way.
However, materially, much of the further campaign, in Syria for example, would be in land pledged alternatively to go under France's influence or under Prince Feisal's influence.
On the other hand, the Turkish 'bargaining chip' of opening up the straits when they make peace is now far less relevant and valuable to the Entente that there is no fighting Russia to make contact with on the other side of those straits.
Knowing that the Americans are slow to arrival, and that French offensive spirit is low, and that the Germans are now free to move troops from the east (Russian front) to west, and from the Italian front (Caporetto) to west, would the Entente, and particularly, the make-or-break British, be tempted by an Ottoman offer?
This would be against the backdrop of anticipating a big German push in the west in 1918, that would extra troops would be handy to have. Would the Entente/British try to haggle the Ottomans into giving up Syria-Lebanon, Mosul? Or stretch a counter-offer to a point where the Turks likely refuse by demanding Sevres like conditions like a breakaway Armenia and Kurdistan?
If the Entente and Ottomans make a deal in December-January 1917-1918, what are the effects on the western front 1918?
In the Balkans, are the Romanians still alive and kicking enough that with aid provided through the straits, they can avoid any form of capitulation to the CPs? Could this possibility be amplified, if the Ottoman-Entente armistice permits movement of Entente troops, through Thrace to attack and outflank the Bulgarian border with Turkey from the beginning of 1918?
Likewise, if no Entente-Ottoman deal emerges until March-April 1918, what are the effects on the western front 1918?
Likewise the Balkan effects on Romania, for outflanking of Bulgaria, etc.?
Looking at the time frame, there is a range of times the Ottomans could offer this proposal. The Bolshevik revolution happened in November 1917. I figure the Ottoman offer to the rest of the Entente could come possibly any time after the signing of the Bolshevik-Central Powers Armistice of December 1917 took Russia de facto out of the war, or wait until the signature of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk formally, de jure, took Russia out of the war in March 1918, or in any of the months in between.
Ottoman motives to exit the war at this time in particular. While on the one hand Russia's dropout from the war suggests the Ottoman war policy is successful and should continue, on the other hand, it suggests "mission accomplished". The war has killed off the national archenemy, Tsarist Russia, and thus done a lot to protect the survival of the state from an empire religiously motivated to partition and take it over.
After knocking out Russia and thus removing that threat for a good couple decades/or generation, staying in the war against the French, Italians, British, and now, at least indirectly, the Americans, offers fast diminishing returns, because neither the British nor Americans are waning powers.
Would Enver Pasha ever make this offer? Possibly not. Probably not. He would probably double-down on the bet of German victory, even though he grew distracted by the idea of expansion north and east, rather than defense and counter-attack in the Arab south and west. But I think the other leaders of the CUP triumvirate Djemal, and Talaat, could have been much more open to the idea of abruptly cutting their losses and dropping out.
An uti possedetis peace requires some painful territorial sacrifices in Arabia, Iraq, and Palestine (after December, from Jerusalem on south) already conquered by the British and Arabs, but persisting in the war only offers a slim chance of recovering those territorial losses and just as much, and realistically greater, chances, of further territorial losses in Syria, Lebanon, Asia Minor, Thrace, northern Palestine, and northern Iraq, to the British and others.
For the Entente, accepting an uti possedetis peace requires is no real sacrifice to the Americans or Italians, who had no for forces engaged on Turkish fronts. It offers the prospect of freeing up British help for the western and Italian fronts. For the French, it means giving up a prospective empire in Syria and Lebanon, but not one France has bled for yet, and could free up British help for a faster conclusion of the big war to liberate France (including Alsace-Lorraine) in the west as a lower cost in French blood.
The prospects Britain and Lloyd George, that Turk-hater of the Gladstonian tradition, have to give up, are psychologically at least much greater. The British are on the verge of of making more conquests in northern Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, northern Iraq, and Kurdistan, that a Turkish separate peace would cut short, and to provide more support to client groups along the way.
However, materially, much of the further campaign, in Syria for example, would be in land pledged alternatively to go under France's influence or under Prince Feisal's influence.
On the other hand, the Turkish 'bargaining chip' of opening up the straits when they make peace is now far less relevant and valuable to the Entente that there is no fighting Russia to make contact with on the other side of those straits.
Knowing that the Americans are slow to arrival, and that French offensive spirit is low, and that the Germans are now free to move troops from the east (Russian front) to west, and from the Italian front (Caporetto) to west, would the Entente, and particularly, the make-or-break British, be tempted by an Ottoman offer?
This would be against the backdrop of anticipating a big German push in the west in 1918, that would extra troops would be handy to have. Would the Entente/British try to haggle the Ottomans into giving up Syria-Lebanon, Mosul? Or stretch a counter-offer to a point where the Turks likely refuse by demanding Sevres like conditions like a breakaway Armenia and Kurdistan?
If the Entente and Ottomans make a deal in December-January 1917-1918, what are the effects on the western front 1918?
In the Balkans, are the Romanians still alive and kicking enough that with aid provided through the straits, they can avoid any form of capitulation to the CPs? Could this possibility be amplified, if the Ottoman-Entente armistice permits movement of Entente troops, through Thrace to attack and outflank the Bulgarian border with Turkey from the beginning of 1918?
Likewise, if no Entente-Ottoman deal emerges until March-April 1918, what are the effects on the western front 1918?
Likewise the Balkan effects on Romania, for outflanking of Bulgaria, etc.?
