WWII- Whenever driven from Libya in defeat, would Axis forces have always retreated to & occupied Tu

[raharris1973]

In any WWII scenario, whenever circumstances ultimately drive Axis forces, combined German-Italian or solo Italiano from Libya in defeat, would Axis forces have always retreated to & occupied Tunisia?

In OTL, Axis forces were driven from Libya by the British 8th Army in Jan 1943 (or retreated ahead of the British 8th Army's advance, however you want to slice it). Various popular scenarios have been mentioned that have envisioned as possibly leading to an earlier British victory on this scale earlier in the war. These include:

a) The British not diverting any forces to Greece in spring 1941 and keeping forces focused on the desert campaign
&
b) The British not getting attacked by the Japanese in December 1941 and sustaining a string of Far Eastern defeats that diverted the flow of potential reinforcement and supplies from the desert campaign to the Far East
&
c) The British being stingier with some Lend-Lease allocations to the Soviet Union & routing that support to the forces on the Egyptian-Libyan front instead

Even supposing adjustments like any of the above are enough to drive the Italians or the Afrika Korps back entirely out of Libya, as some have suggested, I have always had a follow-up question to the implication that this means it is 'game-over' in North Africa.

Namely, why wouldn't in spring 1941, or the summer of 1941, or the winter of 1941-42, the Axis forces just retreat into Tunisia, and why wouldn't Hitler and Mussolini send in a reinforcing rescue force to occupy Tunisia?
Could the Allies really just have the luck of Axis forces in western Libya simply mass surrendering in these early defeat scenarios, rather than retreating to fight on, or at least escape?
Would the Axis be satisfied with a mere desperate evacuation of all the Afrika Korps men and aircraft it could, leaving behind equipment, and leaving Vichy territory alone?

If there are reasons why Germany & Italy would have tread lightly in Tunisia and Vichy Africa during a 1941 emergency or an early 1942 emergency, but would had gotten bolder by the time of second El Alamein and Operation Torch, I would like to know what those reasons were.

If, on the other hand, the Axis would always have reacted to losing Libya by retreat to and occupation of Tunisia, it raises the next question. Once Italy and Germany have 'broken the seal' by occupying a formerly formally neutral French colony of Tunisia, why not occupy the rest of French North Africa? I mean there's limits to available forces. But violating Tunisia, and quite possibly metro France, has probably outraged Vichy commanders in the whole region and made them more prone to defection, and safeguarding Moroccan and Algerian and Moroccan shores against a Free French rising, Allied landing, or both, would seem to make sense from an Axis POV.

If Germans and Italians and Luftwaffe are on those northwest African beaches *ahead* of any landing, well Operation Torch has just become a great deal riskier than against potentially non-resisting or weakly resisting Vichy forces alone.

Looking at a specific scenario - say British non-involvement with Greece in March-April makes for a British route of the Italians in Libya by the beginning of May 1941. Concerned about the Italian collapse and possibly the collapse of last minute arrived German forces, and what idle British hands might do, Hitler could easily order the occupation of Tunisia and consolidation of Axis defenses there, and branch out from that occcupation to occupy the coastal ports of Algeria and French Morocco, to safeguard against a Free French revolt or British invasion. It is not likely at this time that Britain has the forces and shipping to mount any successful amphibious landing on any of the northwest African coasts. Suez is safe for now, and has plenty of buffer space, but the North African front is by no means over, and in fact the threat to Malta and Gibraltar has just tightened up a bit.

[stevep]

Oct 21, 2022 1:21:30 GMT raharris1973 said:

In any WWII scenario, whenever circumstances ultimately drive Axis forces, combined German-Italian or solo Italiano from Libya in defeat, would Axis forces have always retreated to & occupied Tunisia?

In OTL, Axis forces were driven from Libya by the British 8th Army in Jan 1943 (or retreated ahead of the British 8th Army's advance, however you want to slice it). Various popular scenarios have been mentioned that have envisioned as possibly leading to an earlier British victory on this scale earlier in the war. These include:

a) The British not diverting any forces to Greece in spring 1941 and keeping forces focused on the desert campaign
&
b) The British not getting attacked by the Japanese in December 1941 and sustaining a string of Far Eastern defeats that diverted the flow of potential reinforcement and supplies from the desert campaign to the Far East
&
c) The British being stingier with some Lend-Lease allocations to the Soviet Union & routing that support to the forces on the Egyptian-Libyan front instead

Even supposing adjustments like any of the above are enough to drive the Italians or the Afrika Korps back entirely out of Libya, as some have suggested, I have always had a follow-up question to the implication that this means it is 'game-over' in North Africa.

Namely, why wouldn't in spring 1941, or the summer of 1941, or the winter of 1941-42, the Axis forces just retreat into Tunisia, and why wouldn't Hitler and Mussolini send in a reinforcing rescue force to occupy Tunisia?
Could the Allies really just have the luck of Axis forces in western Libya simply mass surrendering in these early defeat scenarios, rather than retreating to fight on, or at least escape?
Would the Axis be satisfied with a mere desperate evacuation of all the Afrika Korps men and aircraft it could, leaving behind equipment, and leaving Vichy territory alone?

If there are reasons why Germany & Italy would have tread lightly in Tunisia and Vichy Africa during a 1941 emergency or an early 1942 emergency, but would had gotten bolder by the time of second El Alamein and Operation Torch, I would like to know what those reasons were.

If, on the other hand, the Axis would always have reacted to losing Libya by retreat to and occupation of Tunisia, it raises the next question. Once Italy and Germany have 'broken the seal' by occupying a formerly formally neutral French colony of Tunisia, why not occupy the rest of French North Africa? I mean there's limits to available forces. But violating Tunisia, and quite possibly metro France, has probably outraged Vichy commanders in the whole region and made them more prone to defection, and safeguarding Moroccan and Algerian and Moroccan shores against a Free French rising, Allied landing, or both, would seem to make sense from an Axis POV.

If Germans and Italians and Luftwaffe are on those northwest African beaches *ahead* of any landing, well Operation Torch has just become a great deal riskier than against potentially non-resisting or weakly resisting Vichy forces alone.

Looking at a specific scenario - say British non-involvement with Greece in March-April makes for a British route of the Italians in Libya by the beginning of May 1941. Concerned about the Italian collapse and possibly the collapse of last minute arrived German forces, and what idle British hands might do, Hitler could easily order the occupation of Tunisia and consolidation of Axis defenses there, and branch out from that occcupation to occupy the coastal ports of Algeria and French Morocco, to safeguard against a Free French revolt or British invasion. It is not likely at this time that Britain has the forces and shipping to mount any successful amphibious landing on any of the northwest African coasts. Suez is safe for now, and has plenty of buffer space, but the North African front is by no means over, and in fact the threat to Malta and Gibraltar has just tightened up a bit.

  raharris1973,

  Well all of those options could have led to the Axis being driven out of Libya earlier but occupation of Tunisia and then most/all of FNA is an option.  I think that might depend on the time and circumstances.

  For instance if Britain avoided sending forces - material is a different matter - to Greece and Churchill was persuaded to commit to trying to clear Libya then its an option.  In this case Hitler, with both eyes really on Operation Barbarossa is likely to divert forces to restore fascist prestige and secure his southern flank by occupying Greece and if necessarily Yugoslavia as OTL.  However I doubt in this case he would seek to invade Tunisia because he would see it as largely irrelevant and also too big a commitment.  Especially since as you say the bulk of Vichy France would react badly to him breaching the armistice.  Which would probably mean occupying not only Vichy France but all FHA, which would take a fair amount of forces, especially if as is likely a lot of the French fight.  Plus Vichy provinces beyond his reach are likely to switch to the allied side.  All when he wants everything for the eastern invasion.

  I think it unlikely that Japan wouldn't attack Britain and other colonial possessions ~Dec 41 if the embargo is in place so its difficult to say what butterflies would have occurred as a result.  However again if this didn't happen for some reason then the Crusader offensive which defeated the Axis forces in Libya and relieved Tobruk might have been followed up with an advance to Tripoli although the logistics would have been difficult.  Plus with German forces already in place Hitler might use the sunken costs idea to excuse making further intervention, despite the desperate situation in the east in winter and spring 41/42.  As such I suspect its more likely Germany would seek to support their forces in N Africa.

  Not sure that sending less to the Soviets would make a lot of difference, especially since it would upset the US but there's one historical scenario that could apply.  Historically Operation Torch was a compromise with the US insisting on landings on the Atlantic coastline of Morocco for fear that landings further east would possibly see the forces cut off if Hitler was able to persuade Franco to join the Axis and hence possibly close the Med to allied forces and supplies.  This dragged the British landings westwards as well.  Originally Britain wanted to land further east including IIRC in N Tunisia.  This would have made it much more difficult for the Axis to occupy Tunisia so you could have seen most/all of FNA liberated while Rommel and his Italian allies were retreating from 2nd El Alamein.  In that case you could have seen N Africa cleared a few months earlier.  The down side of this would have been the POW haul would have been less as those German forces sent to occupy Tunisia OTL won't have gone along with similar air and logistical resources savings for then as well.  Also the forces that landed in FNA wouldn't have had the battle experience they gained OTL and exposing some of the problems which could occur later in a more dangerous situation.

[Max Sinister]

In retrospect it's quite surprising to see how much the WAllies feared despite of their material supremacy. Those wanting to write yet another "Nazis win" TL should take note.