What did PM Salisbury want to do to the Ottomans over the Armenian massacres circa 1895-96?
Jun 8, 2023 1:01:12 GMT
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Post by raharris1973 on Jun 8, 2023 1:01:12 GMT
What did PM Salisbury *really* want to do to the Ottomans over the Armenian massacres circa 1895-96?
Here's one way to think of the question: If he could have used three wishes from a genie he let out of a bottle, one to change parliamentary/domestic opinion on what to spend/risk, another to make one or more non-Ottoman great powers decide to go along with a solution he liked, and a third to change Ottoman policy, what would he have wished for specifically?
Was his goal merely to 'be seen' as 'very concerned' about the Armenians?
Was it pro-Armenian relief and reform in the Ottoman Empire?
Was it regime-change in the OE, getting rid of Abdulhamid, in punishment and rage for the massacres, with the expectation of that leading to pro-Armenian relief and reform?
Was it a full partition of the OE, including establishment of a territorially contiguous Armenian state?
In a partition scenario, was he willing to see the straits and Armenia fall under Russia?
What did he want other countries to do, especially in the third scenario, partition? What roles did he see for Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, France? Did he have any fixed ideas on who could and could not be allowed to pick up which pieces?
What did all the other powers of Europe want to have happen relative to the Armenian massacres and how much punitive action and sovereign impairment were they willing to have imposed on the Ottomans over this question at the time? Talking about Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, and France here. Did they want any particular pieces in a partition scenario and like the idea of an immediate partition? Even in collaboration with Britain?
I ask all this in hope of finding more knowledge and informed perspectives. I've read a few different diplomatic history accounts by Norman Rich and others and wikipedia pages that paint part of a picture, and Rich seems credible in his sourcing. But there's an even more vivid picture filled in by AH.com user or former user that I haven't seen directly contradicted, but I have not seen directly backed up by other sources.
The 'vivid' picture painted by the AH.commer is thus:
Here's one way to think of the question: If he could have used three wishes from a genie he let out of a bottle, one to change parliamentary/domestic opinion on what to spend/risk, another to make one or more non-Ottoman great powers decide to go along with a solution he liked, and a third to change Ottoman policy, what would he have wished for specifically?
Was his goal merely to 'be seen' as 'very concerned' about the Armenians?
Was it pro-Armenian relief and reform in the Ottoman Empire?
Was it regime-change in the OE, getting rid of Abdulhamid, in punishment and rage for the massacres, with the expectation of that leading to pro-Armenian relief and reform?
Was it a full partition of the OE, including establishment of a territorially contiguous Armenian state?
In a partition scenario, was he willing to see the straits and Armenia fall under Russia?
What did he want other countries to do, especially in the third scenario, partition? What roles did he see for Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, France? Did he have any fixed ideas on who could and could not be allowed to pick up which pieces?
What did all the other powers of Europe want to have happen relative to the Armenian massacres and how much punitive action and sovereign impairment were they willing to have imposed on the Ottomans over this question at the time? Talking about Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, and France here. Did they want any particular pieces in a partition scenario and like the idea of an immediate partition? Even in collaboration with Britain?
I ask all this in hope of finding more knowledge and informed perspectives. I've read a few different diplomatic history accounts by Norman Rich and others and wikipedia pages that paint part of a picture, and Rich seems credible in his sourcing. But there's an even more vivid picture filled in by AH.com user or former user that I haven't seen directly contradicted, but I have not seen directly backed up by other sources.
The 'vivid' picture painted by the AH.commer is thus:
{Vivid Picture}
1. Salisbury was so worked up over the crisis he wanted to break up the Ottoman Empire, including breaking off Armenia.
2. But despite UK massive naval and financial power, he felt UK couldn't break it up alone and sought to encourage a European coalition to do it with the UK.
3. Russia, despite its history of using Ottoman Christian oppression as an excuse to expand, and interest in the straits, did *not* want to break up the OE at this time, and found Salisbury's suggestions alarming and threatening rather than enticing for several reasons, including: a. Not trusting the Armenians, b. Not trusting a partition could be managed without great power war, c. seeing other powers, notably Britain, gaining more from a partitioned, broken OE than Russia, d. Britain's screwed us so long, if they say it's their idea, it *must* be bad for us, or a trick, or a trap. (even though similar to something Nicholas I suggested in 1850 something)
4. Germany thought this was a crazy, harebrained, reckless British scheme that would unleash war on Europe, maybe designed to set Germany and Russia at war with each other somehow.
5. No definite word ever heard from France or Austria-Hungary. I would suppose silence is objection for France, which held most of the Ottoman public debt, and had the greatest cultural influence. For Austria-Hungary, I would think the same- some Austrians wanted to advance to Salonika and ultimately Austria annexed Bosnia, but the empire moved lethargically, and its schizophrenia was such the Hungarian half never wanted to move or expand at all. Yet at the same time, it was often ready to take whatever stance would screw over the Russians.
6. Italy, in a phase of kissing the UK's butt at the time, was all ready to sign up with Britain for an anti-Ottoman crusade, with an eye on Libya and other marginal Ottoman territories.
7. The Belgian King said his Congolese Force Publique was all ready to go in with British support and clean up the Armenian situation and stop the Turkish massacres. He said it. That is all. Nothing more, nothing less.
8. As a result of all this British Ottoman relations were pretty crappy for the next decade or so, and Ottoman relations with the Russians were better than usual for about the next decade, roughly the dozen years through 1908 in which Abdulhamid was still in power. German-Ottoman relations also did well. British diplomatic isolation from Europe increased due to this 'bad idea' of intervention, not really starting to recover until the 1904 Entente Cordiale with France.
1. Salisbury was so worked up over the crisis he wanted to break up the Ottoman Empire, including breaking off Armenia.
2. But despite UK massive naval and financial power, he felt UK couldn't break it up alone and sought to encourage a European coalition to do it with the UK.
3. Russia, despite its history of using Ottoman Christian oppression as an excuse to expand, and interest in the straits, did *not* want to break up the OE at this time, and found Salisbury's suggestions alarming and threatening rather than enticing for several reasons, including: a. Not trusting the Armenians, b. Not trusting a partition could be managed without great power war, c. seeing other powers, notably Britain, gaining more from a partitioned, broken OE than Russia, d. Britain's screwed us so long, if they say it's their idea, it *must* be bad for us, or a trick, or a trap. (even though similar to something Nicholas I suggested in 1850 something)
4. Germany thought this was a crazy, harebrained, reckless British scheme that would unleash war on Europe, maybe designed to set Germany and Russia at war with each other somehow.
5. No definite word ever heard from France or Austria-Hungary. I would suppose silence is objection for France, which held most of the Ottoman public debt, and had the greatest cultural influence. For Austria-Hungary, I would think the same- some Austrians wanted to advance to Salonika and ultimately Austria annexed Bosnia, but the empire moved lethargically, and its schizophrenia was such the Hungarian half never wanted to move or expand at all. Yet at the same time, it was often ready to take whatever stance would screw over the Russians.
6. Italy, in a phase of kissing the UK's butt at the time, was all ready to sign up with Britain for an anti-Ottoman crusade, with an eye on Libya and other marginal Ottoman territories.
7. The Belgian King said his Congolese Force Publique was all ready to go in with British support and clean up the Armenian situation and stop the Turkish massacres. He said it. That is all. Nothing more, nothing less.
8. As a result of all this British Ottoman relations were pretty crappy for the next decade or so, and Ottoman relations with the Russians were better than usual for about the next decade, roughly the dozen years through 1908 in which Abdulhamid was still in power. German-Ottoman relations also did well. British diplomatic isolation from Europe increased due to this 'bad idea' of intervention, not really starting to recover until the 1904 Entente Cordiale with France.