AHC: Southern secession from the USA, without the Mexican war/Mexican cession as a catalyzing issue?

[stevep]

Jun 27, 2023 0:02:15 GMT raharris1973 said:

Jun 26, 2023 15:21:32 GMT stevep said:

  The other issue, assuming butterflies doesn't prevent Napoleon III's intervention in Mexico and interactions between the pro-French conservatives in Mexico and Texas is drastically different,

This is a big assumption.

Remove Mexico's defeat at America's hands from the historical equation, and French military intervention in Mexico becomes far from not a certain thing at all.

  Sorry, missed this because of responding to Miletus12 but agree a lot depends on what happens with Mexico.  If it can get over Santa Anna without disaster and avoid too much internal division then it has a chance of pulling through and becoming a significant regional power especially. 

  One issue that comes to mind is if Mexico isn't attacked does the US try war over the Columbia/Oregon region instead?  The expansionists will be looking for somewhere.  - Which could actually be an alternative path to the aims of the OP.  The south won't be happy about new conquests and hence future states in the 'distant' north which won't be open to slavery so they would oppose such a war.  Apart from the economic damage that would result as a result of the blockade.  Note I'm not saying the US would win as that's very unlikely but the south might fear it would, or be opposed to paying the debts/reparations after the war.

[stevep]

Jun 27, 2023 16:19:50 GMT miletus12 said:

The basic problem is perception. Mister Lincoln was not fooled. All that mattered was that Palmerston and Napoleon III were.

  You can perceive Lincoln's back-down however you like but it was still a back-down.

[miletus12]

Jun 27, 2023 21:19:06 GMT stevep said:

Jun 27, 2023 16:19:50 GMT miletus12 said:

The basic problem is perception. Mister Lincoln was not fooled. All that mattered was that Palmerston and Napoleon III were.

  You can perceive Lincoln's back-down however you like but it was still a back-down.

Lincoln did not "back down", for the Laird Rams were not delivered, nor did the British interfere.    

[raharris1973]

Jun 27, 2023 13:46:10 GMT stevep said:

At this period god did seem to look out for the American empire.

Which is the actual ending to the original quote from Bismarck.

[raharris1973]

Jun 27, 2023 21:17:37 GMT stevep said:

  One issue that comes to mind is if Mexico isn't attacked does the US try war over the Columbia/Oregon region instead?  The expansionists will be looking for somewhere.  - Which could actually be an alternative path to the aims of the OP.  The south won't be happy about new conquests and hence future states in the 'distant' north which won't be open to slavery so they would oppose such a war.  Apart from the economic damage that would result as a result of the blockade.  Note I'm not saying the US would win as that's very unlikely but the south might fear it would, or be opposed to paying the debts/reparations after the war.

Some politicians could lead the US there. Lewis Cass perhaps. Although he wanted to expand in the southwest in addition to the northwest.

I tend to think that the US would not be so dumb as to force things to war with Britain, if it can get the same historical share of Oregon as historical, without war.

As blood-curdling as American rhetoric could be at times, and as murderous as Americans could be against certain enemies, the pre-world wars, pre-Cold War United States was overall pretty logical and pragmatic about picking enemies of a size it could handle, and when fighting with bigger enemies, fighting them when they could only devote a fraction of their attention in the direction of the USA. American cocky rhetoric, when voiced by American politicians with power to actually control events, was more a tactic to win the esteem of their countrymen at home, or to keep their foreign negotiating partners on edge and feeling some urgency to resolve matters with a favorable to America compromise.

I think the bolded part misrepresents the US as having some inherent bloodlust for a large-scale fight that had to be released *somewhere*, if not against Mexico, against Britain. I don't think the US policy was really that emotional. Polk knew what he was doing, and his likely replacements, like Henry Clay, would likely have been rational people too.

[miletus12]

Jun 28, 2023 0:56:27 GMT raharris1973 said:

Jun 27, 2023 13:46:10 GMT stevep said:

At this period god did seem to look out for the American empire.

Which is the actual ending to the original quote from Bismarck.

I was being "ironic". 

[stevep]

Jun 27, 2023 23:13:44 GMT miletus12 said:

Jun 27, 2023 21:19:06 GMT stevep said:

  You can perceive Lincoln's back-down however you like but it was still a back-down.

Lincoln did not "back down", for the Laird Rams were not delivered, nor did the British interfere.    

  The US apologised and released the civilians illegally seized.  Fact.

[miletus12]

Jun 28, 2023 19:05:28 GMT stevep said:

Jun 27, 2023 23:13:44 GMT miletus12 said:

Lincoln did not "back down", for the Laird Rams were not delivered, nor did the British interfere.    

  The US apologised and released the civilians illegally seized.  Fact.

The Trent Affair: Diplomacy, Britain, and the American Civil War

We never apologized. 

In 1861, as the Civil War was beginning at home, U.S. diplomats faced a unique dilemma. The United States needed to maintain relationships abroad. At the same time, the self-proclaimed Confederate States of America sought foreign recognition as an independent nation. Domestic politics and international relations became intertwined when Confederate diplomats were taken prisoner from a British ship, starting the Trent Affair.

The resulting negotiations affected both the result of the Civil War and the special nature of the Anglo-American relationship.

The Trent Affair Arises

How did the Trent Affair begin? In 1861, Charles Francis Adams served as the U.S. Minister (today’s version of an Ambassador) to the United Kingdom. On November 12th, Adams received a surprising request for a private meeting from the British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston.

94 Piccadilly, 12 Nov., 1861

My Dear Sir,

I should be very glad to have a few minutes conversation with you; could you without inconvenience call upon me here today at any time between one and two.

Yrs faithfully
Palmerston

Adams usually met with his British counterpart, Foreign Secretary Earl Russell. A summons from the Prime Minister himself was out of the ordinary–and worrisome.

When Adams arrived at the meeting, the Prime Minister got straight to business.

Prime Minister Palmsteron told Adams that an American captain had gotten “gloriously drunk on brandy” in Southampton, England. He was bragging about his plans to capture some diplomats coming to represent the Confederate States of America.

The British government knew what the Confederates wanted–formal recognition of the Confederate states as free and independent from the United States.

Adams later noted in his diary that Palmerston had been “cordial” and did not say whether this interception was legal. But, he did warn Adams to let the U.S. government know that any interception would probably not “lead to any good.”


Charles Francis Adams, U.S. Minister to the United Kingdom 1861-1868. His father, John Quincy Adams, and grandfather, John Adams, had also served as U.S. ministers to England. Charles Francis had worked as his father’s personal secretary for several years during his long diplomatic career. As such, Charles Francis Adams had significant subject matter diplomatic expertise and was well equipped to handle the duties of his diplomatic post during this turbulent time.




British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston. Palmerston remained Prime Minister through the entirety of the American Civil War. While an opponent of enslavement and the slave trade, he believed that a divided United States could strengthen Britain’s economic and strategic military power in North America.

Unbeknownst to Palmerston and Adams, a different U.S. captain had already seized the two Confederate diplomats four days earlier.

On November 8th, Captain Charles Wilkes of the USS San Jacinto captured James Murray Mason and John Slidell, taking them from the British mail steamer Trent, off the coast of Cuba.


Map of Cuba showing the Bahama Channel. Captain Charles Wilkes of the USS San Jacinto intercepted the British mail steamer, the Trent, in the Bahama Channel, taking Mason and Slidell prisoner before allowing the Trent to continue sailing to England. Photo courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

And indeed, as Palmerston had predicted, what became known as the Trent Affair did not lead to any good.

Britain Declares Neutrality in the U.S. Civil War

Charles Francis Adams arrived at his post in London in May 1861 in an uncomfortable situation. He came one day after Queen Victoria issued Britain’s Declaration of Neutrality. This declaration, written in response to President Lincoln’s order to block Southern ports with the U.S. Navy, declared Britain would remain neutral in the U.S. Civil War.


Queen Victoria [ruled 1837-1901] was Great Britain’s head of state in a constitutional monarchy governed by a prime minister and Parliament. Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Declaring both the North and South “belligerents” allowed the British to trade with both sides, selling military equipment and importing corn and cotton. However, the Declaration did not go as far as recognizing the independence of the Confederacy. Northerners, including Secretary of State William H. Seward, saw the declaration as a betrayal of Britain’s alliance with the United States and its international opposition to slavery. Confederates, however, rejoiced in the news. The declaration was an opening to lobby European powers for full recognition. Recognition would allow the Confederates to borrow from international lenders to fund the war. Because of this, sending diplomatic envoys to Britain and France became a top priority for southern ambitions.


James Mason (left) and John Slidell (right). The United States considered Slidell and Mason persuasive and skilled negotiators, therefore dangerous to the cause of preserving the Union. Slidell had been U.S. Minister to Mexico in the 1840s before the outbreak of the Mexican-American War and a U.S. Senator from Louisiana at the time of secession. Mason was also a former U.S. Senator from Virginia and had resigned from Congress when Virginia seceded from the United States. Slidell and Mason were also ardently pro-slavery and particularly odious to many prominent abolitionist policymakers and political influencers–such as Senator Charles Sumner and Frederick Douglass. Photos courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Diplomacy Before the Telegram

In 1861, the laying of the transatlantic telegraph cable was still five years away. Diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic relied on ships to relay communications. Letters could take four weeks or more to arrive, often requiring diplomats to use their best judgment during conflicts.

As a result, Charles Francis Adams didn’t learn about Mason and Slidell’s seizure until late November when the Trent arrived in England.

Even though the Trent was clearly a British ship, the USS San Jacinto had fired two shots across the bow. Under the command of U.S. Captain Charles Wilkes, the Americans boarded the Trent and captured Mason and Slidell before allowing the vessel to continue its journey.


Drawing of the San Jacinto intercepting the Trent.

Captain Wilkes then took Mason and Slidell to Fort Warren in Boston Harbor, where he was given a hero’s welcome. Wilkes was the guest of honor at many celebratory dinners, where he regaled guests with stories of the capture. The British envoy to Washington, D.C., Lord Richard Lyons, reported these celebrations back to Britain. He also repeated a rumor that Wilkes acted under orders from Secretary Seward to seize the diplomats without President Lincoln’s knowledge.

Tensions Rise in Britain; War Rumors Spread

The British were furious at the United States for blatantly disrespecting their sovereignty. Prime Minister Palmerston and Foreign Secretary Earl Russell erupted in a fury at a cabinet meeting. Palmerston shouted, “I don’t know whether you are going to stand this, but I’ll be damned if I do!”

All Charles Francis Adams could do was send letters to Secretary Seward, letting him know of the hot temperature in London. Unable to speak on behalf of the U.S. government without instructions from Seward, Adams could only wait, watch, and avoid meetings with Lord Russell.

Adams’s son, Henry (who served as his father’s secretary), described the situation:

“I wonder what Seward supposes a Minister can do or is put here for, if he isn’t to know what to do or what to say. It makes papa’s position here very embarrassing, and if he were to see Lord Russell coming along the street, I believe he’d run as fast as he could down the nearest alley.”

– Henry Adams

Photo of Henry Adams. Photo courtesy of the Harvard Art Museums/Fogg Museum, Transfer from the Carpenter Center for the Visual Arts, Gift of Arthur S. Eldredge.

In Britain, there was even talk of going to war with the United States. The news was so alarming that Prince Albert, Queen Victoria’s husband, who was deathly ill from typhoid, rose from his bed to help write diplomatic instructions to Lord Lyons.


Photo of Prince Albert. Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, Queen Victoria’s husband, did not have the authority to craft or implement domestic and foreign policy. But, the British government often relied on his judicious advice. Palmerston and Russell’s original note to the United States contained fiery language; yet Albert persuaded them to soften the tone, giving Lincoln and Seward a chance to rectify the situation. Albert reminded them that Charles Francis Adams had assured the British that Wilkes had acted without official orders from the U.S. government. Albert died on December 14, 1861, without knowing the outcome of the crisis he had helped diffuse. Photo courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery.

Once the instructions arrived in mid-December, Lyons told Seward that the United States owed Great Britain a formal apology. They were to release Mason and Slidell at once into British custody. Lyons’ demands aligned with the tensions Adams had described in his letters, noting that the British had already sent thousands of troops to Halifax, Canada.

The threat of military action worried President Lincoln and Secretary Seward, but perhaps more worrisome was its economic impact. U.S. bond values were dropping, and British investment firms were halting their American operations. In response, Americans began to cash out their U.S. bonds, jeopardizing the government’s ability to fund the war effort.

The U.S. leaders needed to defuse this diplomatic crisis quickly. They needed to appease the British without admitting their capture of the Confederates on foreign ships was illegal.

Lyons had given Seward seven days to respond to their demands. As the days ticked by in December, Seward stalled Lyons as long as possible.

On December 25, Christmas Day, President Lincoln called an emergency Cabinet meeting. Secretary Seward presented his 26-page response to the British for the cabinet’s approval. In his response, Seward was careful not to apologize. Instead, he carefully laid out the United States’ position:

1. Wilkes did not act under official orders from the U.S. government.
2. Wilkes had the legal right to stop the Trent and search it.
3. What Wilkes did wrong was fail to escort Mason and Slidell and the Trent to a neutral port for arbitration.

As for the Confederate agents, Seward cleverly downplayed their importance almost with a casual shrug. He called them “pretend” diplomats dispatched by a “pretend” President Jefferson Davis. The United States, he concluded, would “cheerfully” turn them over.


President Abraham Lincoln's 1861 Cabinet

Lincoln’s 1861 Cabinet from left to right: President Abraham Lincoln, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of State William H. Seward, Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton; Secretary of the Interior Caleb Smith, Attorney General Edward Bates. Photo courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution.

Lyons accepted the diplomatic overture on behalf of the British government. On January 3, 1862, Mason and Slidell departed for England.

Diplomacy, pragmatic leadership, and lengthy communication periods helped avert the crisis. A week later, Adams learned about the outcome, but he was only slightly relieved. As the Minister, he would continue to advocate for the United States and discourage the British from recognizing the Confederacy.

Still, Adams was disappointed that Britain had remained neutral and felt personally betrayed. Adams wrote mournfully to a friend, “She has deliberately preferred to sit as a cold spectator, ready to make the best of our calamity, the moment there is a sufficient excuse to interfere.”

For Further Reading

Joseph Fry, Lincoln, Seward, and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2019).
Howard Jones, Blue and Grey Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
Charles Francis Adams, “The Trent Affair,” The American Historical Review, Apr., 1912, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Apr., 1912), pp. 540-562.
Ferris, Norman B. The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977).
U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian
Charles Francis Adams to Richard Henry Dana; From the MHS Dana Family Papers Online

www.masshist.org

It was exactly as I wrote. You were not our friends. And as for your leadership, the only one on the British side of the equation; who had an ounce of brains, was Prince Albert.  He knew the true situation and made a correct estimate and took correct action.  

[diamondstorm]

I think I've read a TL somewhere online where without the acquisition of Mexico's northernmost territory, the southern states secede even sooner and I think Kentucky and Missouri were included in this as well.

[stevep]

Jul 7, 2023 3:08:08 GMT diamondstorm said:

I think I've read a TL somewhere online where without the acquisition of Mexico's northernmost territory, the southern states secede even sooner and I think Kentucky and Missouri were included in this as well.

  Its a possibility, as they would be denied the hoped for expansion into California and other points in the conquered territory - and of course be unaware that those areas would be free anyway.  As such they would feel threatened by the danger of being outnumbered by slave states in the longer term.  Although this is probably most likely to come later than OTL because it really needed at least one of:

a)  Someone like Lincoln, clearly hostile to slavery becoming president, which also needs a split in the opposition to such a policy that occurred OTL in 1860.

&

b)  The balance of the free v slave states getting to the point where the latter fear their going to be forced to abandon slavery by the growing northern majority.  Without California bei9ng American and then going free and opposition to the expansion of slavery elsewhere that might probably occur a bit later.  Ditto if the expansion into the Oregon region is also blocked as that delays the growing anti-slavery majority developing.

[miletus12]

Jul 7, 2023 13:55:42 GMT stevep said:

Jul 7, 2023 3:08:08 GMT diamondstorm said:

I think I've read a TL somewhere online where without the acquisition of Mexico's northernmost territory, the southern states secede even sooner and I think Kentucky and Missouri were included in this as well.

  Its a possibility, as they would be denied the hoped for expansion into California and other points in the conquered territory - and of course be unaware that those areas would be free anyway.  As such they would feel threatened by the danger of being outnumbered by slave states in the longer term.  Although this is probably most likely to come later than OTL because it really needed at least one of:

a)  Someone like Lincoln, clearly hostile to slavery becoming president, which also needs a split in the opposition to such a policy that occurred OTL in 1860.

&

b)  The balance of the free v slave states getting to the point where the latter fear their going to be forced to abandon slavery by the growing northern majority.  Without California bei9ng American and then going free and opposition to the expansion of slavery elsewhere that might probably occur a bit later.  Ditto if the expansion into the Oregon region is also blocked as that delays the growing anti-slavery majority developing.

How much do you know about California? 

The place had to be garrisoned by MORMONs just to keep those 20%ers heads down.

[stevep]

Jul 7, 2023 14:19:14 GMT miletus12 said:

Jul 7, 2023 13:55:42 GMT stevep said:

  Its a possibility, as they would be denied the hoped for expansion into California and other points in the conquered territory - and of course be unaware that those areas would be free anyway.  As such they would feel threatened by the danger of being outnumbered by slave states in the longer term.  Although this is probably most likely to come later than OTL because it really needed at least one of:

a)  Someone like Lincoln, clearly hostile to slavery becoming president, which also needs a split in the opposition to such a policy that occurred OTL in 1860.

&

b)  The balance of the free v slave states getting to the point where the latter fear their going to be forced to abandon slavery by the growing northern majority.  Without California bei9ng American and then going free and opposition to the expansion of slavery elsewhere that might probably occur a bit later.  Ditto if the expansion into the Oregon region is also blocked as that delays the growing anti-slavery majority developing.

How much do you know about California? 

The place had to be garrisoned by MORMONs just to keep those 20%ers heads down.

  I know there was some support for the south in California.  Whether the estimated 20% is accurate or not I don't know but that is still a number heavily outnumbered by the loyalists, even without the additional troops sent as things became more secure in the east.  I note that the only violence reported in the article was by unionists who attacked suspected pro-confederates and their homes and that as in the east people could be imprisoned for their political views. As such the primary role for the garrison seems to have been protecting the minority from abuse.

  Yet again your making statements then providing evidence that disagrees with what you say!  Its also noticeable that your comment is nothing to do with the subject of the thread.

[lordroel]

Stepping in here with the most likable color on the forum, lets play it nice, agree to disagree and focus on the topic of the thread.

[miletus12]

Article.

Article.

Article.

Article

Half of America's gold and silver, which financed the Union War Effort, was at hazard. There were other valuable commodities (SILK for one.) which passed through California to the eastern armies.    

I do believe that an American knows American history, better than a non-American.

[lordroel]

Jul 7, 2023 16:41:00 GMT miletus12 said:

I do believe that an American knows American history, better than a non-American.

Lets not go that route miletus12, i am Dutch and that does not mean i know Dutch history better than a none dutch person.