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Post by raharris1973 on Jun 22, 2023 12:25:14 GMT
About how many months in advance, did the US anticipate the June 1944 Marianas campaign and Oct 1944 Philippines campaign, and associated naval battles, including the battle of the Philippine Sea/Marianas 'Turkey Shoot' in the summer and Leyte Gulf in the fall?
I ask because those invasions and battles pretty much opened a path all the way across the Pacific from the US to the South China Sea, and sort of rendered the extremely slow moving Burma campaign, which only started to show progress late in 1944, irrelevant.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jun 22, 2023 14:10:18 GMT
About how many months in advance, did the US anticipate the June 1944 Marianas campaign and Oct 1944 Philippines campaign, and associated naval battles, including the battle of the Philippine Sea/Marianas 'Turkey Shoot' in the summer and Leyte Gulf in the fall? I ask because those invasions and battles pretty much opened a path all the way across the Pacific from the US to the South China Sea, and sort of rendered the extremely slow moving Burma campaign, which only started to show progress late in 1944, irrelevant. Plan Orange 1935. What was not understood clearly until about 1940 was how central the aircraft carriers would be to the actual fighting of the battles. That article was written by an amateur who does not know it was the GENERAL BOARD and not the nincompoop, Stark, who shaped the material composition of the fleet. |
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1bigrich
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Post by 1bigrich on Jun 22, 2023 16:32:04 GMT
About how many months in advance, did the US anticipate the June 1944 Marianas campaign and Oct 1944 Philippines campaign, and associated naval battles, including the battle of the Philippine Sea/Marianas 'Turkey Shoot' in the summer and Leyte Gulf in the fall? I ask because those invasions and battles pretty much opened a path all the way across the Pacific from the US to the South China Sea, and sort of rendered the extremely slow moving Burma campaign, which only started to show progress late in 1944, irrelevant. Highly recommend you read Trent Hone's article for Naval War College Review: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1668&context=nwc-reviewHe makes the point while the focus shifted from the battleship to the carrier, the strategy remained the same. Regards, |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jun 25, 2023 2:08:30 GMT
Thanks for the article, very interesting an informative. Discussing this topic on another board, a user helpfully offered more info on the evolution of Allied planning for the anti-Japanese fronts: My takeaway from this: The JCS failed to apply the full implications of the shift in Pacific strategy by March 12, 1944 to the full global anti-Japanese war strategy. From March 12, 1944, the Burma liberation strategy, intended mainly as a way to more efficiently supply China, had become obsolete. It had already been too slow moving, and its future prospects were slow enough, with all the engineering work through the Burmese jungle and mountains, while the prospects for victory in the Marianas, and then destruction of Japanese fleet strength beyond and liberation of the Philippines and establishment of trans-Pacific sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to the China coast were swift enough, that the Burma approach should have been abandoned. Or at least it should have been given no new injections of investment by the Chinese and Americans from their main forces and homeland production centers. The British could press on at their preferred pace as they wished considering its their colony. From late March, April, May through summer 1944 it would have indeed been more sensible to disengage the substantial Chinese forces, American-trained and otherwise, from the Burma Road reopening passion project of Stilwell and his supporters, and reengaged them in directly opposing the Japanese ICHIGO offensives against southeastern and south central China that were devastating other Chinese Nationalist forces and a wide productive swath of what had remained unoccupied Nationalist Chinese territory for most of the second Sino-Japanese war. The success of the ICHIGO offensives forced the abandonment and destruction of several US B-29 bases and aviation supplies. Any ability to either hold on to these bases and maintain continuity of operations, or even delay their fall and extend operations, would not only have been better for China's 'home game' but better for the Allied air effort, especially as the far more secure Marianas B-29 air bases more thoroughly took over the bulk of the sorties. By this point in the war, with the US naval forces cutting a swathe across the Pacific to the South China Sea by no later than the turn of 1944-45, investing Chinese efforts and forces in denying Japanese takeover of additional Chinese coastal territory or major railways for north-south strategic movement, if at all possible, has more overall strategic value than pushing the relatively isolated Japanese forces in Burma backward. |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jun 25, 2023 17:37:37 GMT
My takeaway from this: The JCS failed to apply the full implications of the shift in Pacific strategy by March 12, 1944 to the full global anti-Japanese war strategy. From March 12, 1944, the Burma liberation strategy, intended mainly as a way to more efficiently supply China, had become obsolete. It had already been too slow moving, and its future prospects were slow enough, with all the engineering work through the Burmese jungle and mountains, while the prospects for victory in the Marianas, and then destruction of Japanese fleet strength beyond and liberation of the Philippines and establishment of trans-Pacific sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to the China coast were swift enough, that the Burma approach should have been abandoned. Or at least it should have been given no new injections of investment by the Chinese and Americans from their main forces and homeland production centers. The British could press on at their preferred pace as they wished considering its their colony. From late March, April, May through summer 1944 it would have indeed been more sensible to disengage the substantial Chinese forces, American-trained and otherwise, from the Burma Road reopening passion project of Stilwell and his supporters, and reengaged them in directly opposing the Japanese ICHIGO offensives against southeastern and south central China that were devastating other Chinese Nationalist forces and a wide productive swath of what had remained unoccupied Nationalist Chinese territory for most of the second Sino-Japanese war. The success of the ICHIGO offensives forced the abandonment and destruction of several US B-29 bases and aviation supplies. Any ability to either hold on to these bases and maintain continuity of operations, or even delay their fall and extend operations, would not only have been better for China's 'home game' but better for the Allied air effort, especially as the far more secure Marianas B-29 air bases more thoroughly took over the bulk of the sorties. By this point in the war, with the US naval forces cutting a swathe across the Pacific to the South China Sea by no later than the turn of 1944-45, investing Chinese efforts and forces in denying Japanese takeover of additional Chinese coastal territory or major railways for north-south strategic movement, if at all possible, has more overall strategic value than pushing the relatively isolated Japanese forces in Burma backward. More or less what the Wedemeyer Mission argued, as well as the firings of Stilwell and Chennault for their roles in bungling the Allied response to Ichi Go. I would point out that Spruance wanted to go for the jugular in June 1944 and force battle for Iwo Jima bypassing the Marianas Islands for the moment. THAT would have brought on the kind of stand and die final fight with the IJN the USN wanted. Was it doable? You tell me. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jun 25, 2023 18:16:01 GMT
I would point out that Spruance wanted to go for the jugular in June 1944 and force battle for Iwo Jima bypassing the Marianas Islands for the moment. THAT would have brought on the kind of stand and die final fight with the IJN the USN wanted. Was it doable? You tell me. I have no idea if it was doable from a ground and air and naval and logistics perspective. Would have been quite the shocker for the Japanese though if both Iwo Jima were seized and the IJN stood, and died, in a fight in June 1944 around the Bonins (the Iwo Jima island chain) like that. Iwo Jima from summer 1944 would have been a great advance base, but I think for the purposes of supplying advanced airfields for supporting massed, continuous air raids on Japan, it would have been insufficient because of its relatively small size for airfield development, so US Marines or Army forces would have still needed to capture some additional real estate inside the Japanese perimeter, either in the Bonins, or within the bypassed Marianas, to stage mass bomber forces, much less ultimately mass ground forces for an eventual invasion. |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jun 25, 2023 18:57:50 GMT
I would point out that Spruance wanted to go for the jugular in June 1944 and force battle for Iwo Jima bypassing the Marianas Islands for the moment. THAT would have brought on the kind of stand and die final fight with the IJN the USN wanted. Was it doable? You tell me. I have no idea if it was doable from a ground and air and naval and logistics perspective. Would have been quite the shocker for the Japanese though if both Iwo Jima were seized and the IJN stood, and died, in a fight in June 1944 around the Bonins (the Iwo Jima island chain) like that. Iwo Jima from summer 1944 would have been a great advance base, but I think for the purposes of supplying advanced airfields for supporting massed, continuous air raids on Japan, it would have been insufficient because of its relatively small size for airfield development, so US Marines or Army forces would have still needed to capture some additional real estate inside the Japanese perimeter, either in the Bonins, or within the bypassed Marianas, to stage mass bomber forces, much less ultimately mass ground forces for an eventual invasion. That is a fair statement. What Spruance wanted to do was force the fight, so that the Japanese: a. would have no navy to oppose a later Forager and King II. b. plonk in an interdiction base to prevent a flydown of Japanese aircraft to the Marianas and the Philippines when those were attacked. c. Seize the Bonims before the Japanese fortified and garrisoned. In June 1944, the Japanese had barely started to dig in. It was the kind of audacity and craziness that Spruance was famous for after Midway. Post hoc 80 years later, I give the odds as 70% that it would have worked. Nimitz, who wanted certainty, nixed the idea. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jun 25, 2023 21:41:19 GMT
It was the kind of audacity and craziness that Spruance was famous for after Midway. Post hoc 80 years later, I give the odds as 70% that it would have worked. That makes it sound like a not bad, decent, plan, I could be persuaded of. That said, 30% chance of failing is still a non-trivial risk. And, trying something as audacious any earlier, before the June '44 margin of material superiority had been built up, and the successes of Tarawa, Eniwetok, and the Truk (Chuck) raid achieved, would have been irresponsibly risky, much like the premature audacious Bonins strike that Hector Bywater wrote into his 'Great Pacific War' which he had fail badly, to show that the Americans had to make due with a more methodical, step-by-step advance. Assuming success at Iwo Jima in June 1944, Spruance could have achieved probable success on three of his four expected follow-on goals: a. would have no navy to oppose a later Forager and King II. Could be achieved to a large degree b. plonk in an interdiction base to prevent a flydown of Japanese aircraft to the MarianasCould be achieved to a large degree b. plonk in an interdiction base to prevent a flydown of Japanese aircraft to the Philippines when those were attacked. Just would not work that way- the Japanese could and would easily ferry aircraft down to the Philippines from Japan, Korea and Manchuria by way of the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and China coast, regardless of the situation in the Bonins c. Seize the Bonims before the Japanese fortified and garrisoned. In June 1944, the Japanese had barely started to dig in. Could be achieved to a large degree |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jun 25, 2023 22:56:00 GMT
Just would not work that way- the Japanese could and would easily ferry aircraft down to the Philippines from Japan, Korea and Manchuria by way of the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and China coast, regardless of the situation in the Bonins Not when they have to round robin. SEE MAP.  |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jun 26, 2023 1:44:54 GMT
Just would not work that way- the Japanese could and would easily ferry aircraft down to the Philippines from Japan, Korea and Manchuria by way of the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and China coast, regardless of the situation in the Bonins Not when they have to round robin. SEE MAP. Iwo Jima (and other Bonins) give you the blue patrol circle on the right, so yeah a perfect interdiction position against direct air routes between Japan and Micronesia and New Guinea. Japanese aircraft that don't go a really long, roundabout way would have to brave Iwo Jima based patrols. But the the blue patrol circle on the left, the one that covers southernmost Japan, Okinawa and the other Ryukyus, Shanghai and easternmost China, Taiwan and the northern tip of Luzon, that would force Japan to Philippines flights to take big roundabouts through central China to miss patrols....well, that patrol circle isn't centered on Iwo Jima or the Bonins. That patrol circle is centered on Okinawa. So the capture of Okinawa is necessary to establish that big left interdiction circle. |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jun 26, 2023 1:51:50 GMT
Not when they have to round robin. SEE MAP. Iwo Jima (and other Bonins) give you the blue patrol circle on the right, so yeah a perfect interdiction position against direct air routes between Japan and Micronesia and New Guinea. Japanese aircraft that don't go a really long, roundabout way would have to brave Iwo Jima based patrols. But the the blue patrol circle on the left, the one that covers southernmost Japan, Okinawa and the other Ryukyus, Shanghai and easternmost China, Taiwan and the northern tip of Luzon, that would force Japan to Philippines flights to take big roundabouts through central China to miss patrols....well, that patrol circle isn't centered on Iwo Jima or the Bonins. That patrol circle is centered on Okinawa. So the capture of Okinawa is necessary to establish that big left interdiction circle. This was the part where I told you, that if you can take the Bonims; in June 1944, then you head for OKINAWA next. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jun 26, 2023 13:18:56 GMT
Iwo Jima (and other Bonins) give you the blue patrol circle on the right, so yeah a perfect interdiction position against direct air routes between Japan and Micronesia and New Guinea. Japanese aircraft that don't go a really long, roundabout way would have to brave Iwo Jima based patrols. But the the blue patrol circle on the left, the one that covers southernmost Japan, Okinawa and the other Ryukyus, Shanghai and easternmost China, Taiwan and the northern tip of Luzon, that would force Japan to Philippines flights to take big roundabouts through central China to miss patrols....well, that patrol circle isn't centered on Iwo Jima or the Bonins. That patrol circle is centered on Okinawa. So the capture of Okinawa is necessary to establish that big left interdiction circle. This was the part where I told you, that if you can take the Bonims; in June 1944, then you head for OKINAWA next. Was Iwo Jima the primary forward staging base for the OTL invasion of Okinawa in OTL? Would it have been adequate on its own? In OTL, I believe US Army and Army Air Corps forces could also flow to Okinawa in substantial #s to Okinawa by the Philippines, which would not be possible to do much earlier without somehow accelerating liberation ops there and its precursors. |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jun 26, 2023 14:30:18 GMT
This was the part where I told you, that if you can take the Bonims; in June 1944, then you head for OKINAWA next. Was Iwo Jima the primary forward staging base for the OTL invasion of Okinawa in OTL? Would it have been adequate on its own? In OTL, I believe US Army and Army Air Corps forces could also flow to Okinawa in substantial #s to Okinawa by the Philippines, which would not be possible to do much earlier without somehow accelerating liberation ops there and its precursors. The forces for King II were staged out of the Marshalls.  In for the snout, go for the hog. Okinawa was as unprepared as the Bonims. |
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