What if the US had Micronesia instead of Japan (or Germany) does it help defense of the Philippines,

[raharris1973]

What if the US obtained Micronesia, or most of it, instead of Germany or Japan obtaining it, prior to WWII? Does that meaningfully make defending SLOCs between the USA and Philippines easier for the USN and scattered US forces, and make reliable, sustained interdiction of those SLOCs by an attacker more difficult? Or does it not make a difference, if the attacker has the initiative and superior forces at the points of contact?

Here's an illustrative map showing the swathe of Pacific island chains under US control under this circumstance:



Alternatively, what if the US, post-1919, obtained a string of British Empire South Pacific island chains, the Phoenix, Ellice, Gilberts, Solomons, and Bismarcks, and the smallest Dutch islands off the northeastern fringe of Dutch New Guinea and Dutch East Indies (Biak, Yapen, Waigeo, Morotai, and the Talaud islands) while the Japanese still obtained its Micronesian mandate, like OTL? Same set of questions once again.

Does that meaningfully make defending SLOCs between the USA and Philippines easier for the USN and scattered US forces, and make reliable, sustained interdiction of those SLOCs by an attacker more difficult? Or does it not make a difference, if the attacker has the initiative and superior forces at the points of contact?

Here's an illustrative map showing the swathe of Pacific island chains under US control under this circumstance:



I'm primarily interested in the military/naval questions and implications for War Plan Orange and Kantai Kessen on the US and Japanese side, rather than how the US could plausibly augment its territory in either of these ways. But nonetheless, I welcome your speculative thoughts of all sorts.

[miletus12]

Jul 17, 2023 0:29:44 GMT raharris1973 said:

I'm primarily interested in the military/naval questions and implications for War Plan Orange and Kantai Kessen on the US and Japanese side, rather than how the US could plausibly augment its territory in either of these ways. But nonetheless, I welcome your speculative thoughts of all sorts.

If you want to bring British, German and JAPANESE imperialism to a screeching halt in the Pacific, make that key terrain American in 1898.  The Philippine Islands could become a client like Cuba, which would still be disgraceful, but it would not involve the criminality, nor the direct dishonor of imperialist misgoverning.

The blue outlined region by contrast was a more manageable administrative and defense problem. 

Better map.

[raharris1973]

Jul 17, 2023 3:34:02 GMT miletus12 said:

Jul 17, 2023 0:29:44 GMT raharris1973 said:

I'm primarily interested in the military/naval questions and implications for War Plan Orange and Kantai Kessen on the US and Japanese side, rather than how the US could plausibly augment its territory in either of these ways. But nonetheless, I welcome your speculative thoughts of all sorts.

If you want to bring British, German and JAPANESE imperialism to a screeching halt in the Pacific, make that key terrain American in 1898.  The Philippine Islands could become a client like Cuba, which would still be disgraceful, but it would not involve the criminality, nor the direct dishonor of imperialist misgoverning.

The blue outlined region by contrast was a more manageable administrative and defense problem. 

Better map.

Interesting idea miletus12 !

What is the essential part of your proposal - everything within that parallelogram box, or everything within the blue shading?

[stevep]

Jul 17, 2023 0:29:44 GMT raharris1973 said:

What if the US obtained Micronesia, or most of it, instead of Germany or Japan obtaining it, prior to WWII? Does that meaningfully make defending SLOCs between the USA and Philippines easier for the USN and scattered US forces, and make reliable, sustained interdiction of those SLOCs by an attacker more difficult? Or does it not make a difference, if the attacker has the initiative and superior forces at the points of contact?

Here's an illustrative map showing the swathe of Pacific island chains under US control under this circumstance:



Alternatively, what if the US, post-1919, obtained a string of British Empire South Pacific island chains, the Phoenix, Ellice, Gilberts, Solomons, and Bismarcks, and the smallest Dutch islands off the northeastern fringe of Dutch New Guinea and Dutch East Indies (Biak, Yapen, Waigeo, Morotai, and the Talaud islands) while the Japanese still obtained its Micronesian mandate, like OTL? Same set of questions once again.

Does that meaningfully make defending SLOCs between the USA and Philippines easier for the USN and scattered US forces, and make reliable, sustained interdiction of those SLOCs by an attacker more difficult? Or does it not make a difference, if the attacker has the initiative and superior forces at the points of contact?

Here's an illustrative map showing the swathe of Pacific island chains under US control under this circumstance:



I'm primarily interested in the military/naval questions and implications for War Plan Orange and Kantai Kessen on the US and Japanese side, rather than how the US could plausibly augment its territory in either of these ways. But nonetheless, I welcome your speculative thoughts of all sorts.

  raharris1973,

  My initial thoughts is that the former especially could complicate the problem for the US.  Prior to the break-down of the treaty regime - assuming that still exists but if it doesn't a lot else is likely to change - the regions can't be fortified and there was a reluctance to fortify the regions the US held OTL so would they be willing to garrison strongly all this region.  Especially since given the vital importance of the region to Japan that would cause bad feeling there.

  Whether they do fortify or not - and the former would require a fair amount of forces - how well can they then defend them against a Japanese offensive similar to OTL?  Japan would have a lot of regions to attack or isolate but, especially if there's been a set-back [as it appeared at the time] like Pearl Harbour how much can the US afford to and be willing to defend against Japanese attacks and what is the likelihood of a major fleet clash in this region.

  True such operations might draw some Japanese forces from the vital SE Asia region but how much and whether that would make a vital difference there would depend on the circumstances.

[miletus12]

Jul 17, 2023 13:04:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

Jul 17, 2023 3:34:02 GMT miletus12 said:

If you want to bring British, German and JAPANESE imperialism to a screeching halt in the Pacific, make that key terrain American in 1898.  The Philippine Islands could become a client like Cuba, which would still be disgraceful, but it would not involve the criminality, nor the direct dishonor of imperialist misgoverning.

The blue outlined region by contrast was a more manageable administrative and defense problem. 

Better map.

Interesting idea, miletus12 !

What is the essential part of your proposal - everything within that parallelogram box, or everything within the blue shading?

The parallelogram is vital. The subsequent blue area of domination is the inevitable spillover where outside interlopers would be neutralized as a result; since they have neither the  basing,  nor the logistics to operate in those waters; once  the parallelogram is under positive control. Note that the Japanese, once they had that parallelogram, were extremely difficult to dislodge? It was only due to their sheer naval incompetence that the Americans were able to wrest the region from them.  

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To add into that mapping overlay the factors I suggest that make that naval geography, key terrain; I submit the following criteria.  



When I use the term "dominate" I mean in the strictly Mahanic sense, which is to allow or deny use of the sea /air for transit. It does have a political component, since access is a political decision. However, the right of self-determination within those waters can and should be a guarantee by the naval power that dominates those waters.  The only possible power in that era that would make that decision is an anti-imperialist one. That leaves out the Japanese, Germans and the British. The only ones who begin to qualify as possible respecters of the international law right to self determine, would be the Americans. 

And even the Americans are only defensible in that their historical political behavior actually matches what I described. Every other imperialist colonizer had to be kicked out by force.  Too bad Vietnam spoiled that record. 
  

[stevep]

Jul 17, 2023 18:06:24 GMT miletus12 said:

Jul 17, 2023 13:04:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

Interesting idea, miletus12 !

What is the essential part of your proposal - everything within that parallelogram box, or everything within the blue shading?

The parallelogram is vital. The subsequent blue area of domination is the inevitable spillover where outside interlopers would be neutralized as a result; since they have neither the  basing,  nor the logistics to operate in those waters; once  the parallelogram is under positive control. Note that the Japanese, once they had that parallelogram, were extremely difficult to dislodge? It was only due to their sheer naval incompetence that the Americans were able to wrest the region from them.  

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To add into that mapping overlay the factors I suggest that make that naval geography, key terrain; I submit the following criteria.  



When I use the term "dominate" I mean in the strictly Mahanic sense, which is to allow or deny use of the sea /air for transit. It does have a political component, since access is a political decision. However, the right of self-determination within those waters can and should be a guarantee by the naval power that dominates those waters.  The only possible power in that era that would make that decision is an anti-imperialist one. That leaves out the Japanese, Germans and the British. The only ones who begin to qualify as possible respecters of the international law right to self determine, would be the Americans. 

And even the Americans are only defensible in that their historical political behavior actually matches what I described. Every other imperialist colonizer had to be kicked out by force.  Too bad Vietnam spoiled that record. 
  

  On your parallelogram that only controls a small section of the ocean, chiefly important for trade between E Asia and N America.  For other nations actually based in E Asia or elsewhere its largely irrelevant unless an hostile power based there seeks to expand military power outside that region.

[miletus12]

You should look at terrain and land communications. There is a REASON in 1930-1950 that most of Asia's commerce (90%) traveled on about 60,000 coastal junks or why the USN sank 40,000 of them.

[575]

Jul 17, 2023 22:18:17 GMT miletus12 said:

You should look at terrain and land communications. There is a REASON in 1930-1950 that most of Asia's commerce (90%) traveled on about 60,000 coastal junks or why the USN sank 40,000 of them.

He-he I see clearly now the rain has gone..

[stevep]

Jul 17, 2023 22:18:17 GMT miletus12 said:

You should look at terrain and land communications. There is a REASON in 1930-1950 that most of Asia's commerce (90%) traveled on about 60,000 coastal junks or why the USN sank 40,000 of them.

  If that's meant to be a reply to my post then just note it has nothing to do with the subject previously under discussion.

  Yes an undeveloped China was very dependent on water traffic, which was also the case for most of the world still in that period, albeit to a lesser degree in the more developed areas.  That gave a reason for the massive destruction of China's transport infrastructure during 1941-45 despite the huge costs to the Chinese population and economy.

[miletus12]

Sea was to land as 9 to 1 as far as movement costs; Steve.

It still is.

Hence, why China is currently dying as a nation state.

Miletus

[lordroel]

Jul 18, 2023 17:50:09 GMT miletus12 said:

Hence, why China is currently dying as a nation state.

Miletus

Reminder, lets keep current politics out of this thread.

[miletus12]

Jul 18, 2023 17:53:50 GMT lordroel said:

Jul 18, 2023 17:50:09 GMT miletus12 said:

Hence, why China is currently dying as a nation state.

Miletus

Reminder, lets keep current politics out of this thread.

The point was that what happens in the past can be seen in the present. 

You will see sea-trade versus land trade in the Russia-Ukraine thread posted there, but in the 1930s in the PACIFIC that sea to land ratio advantage still operated. The only economic region for imperialist exploitation still in dispute in that part of the Earth was China. All of the naval competition and effort among the 1930s big four within the region, that would be the British, French, Japanese and the Americans, was aimed at China.        

Britain did not matter, France did not matter. Neither nation had the basing, investment, or technical capacity to operate within the Pacific at the scales needed to control that area of world ocean. In the 1930s, there were only two nation-states with the logistics and technical means to dominate sea air access to China. That was Japan and the United States. 

In the Pacific Ocean area, with its island distributions and terrain, there was a critical quadrangle that would either allow or deny access from the United States to China. 
 
Japan knew this, which is why they went after that area during WWI.  

Commentary that seeks to dispute this historical and current state of naval geography, how it worked, actually is applicable to the OP. 

What if the US obtained Micronesia, or most of it, instead of Germany or Japan obtaining it, prior to WWII? Does that meaningfully make defending SLOCs between the USA and Philippines easier for the USN and scattered US forces, and make reliable, sustained interdiction of those SLOCs by an attacker more difficult? Or does it not make a difference, if the attacker has the initiative and superior forces at the points of contact?

  
 

[lordroel]

Jul 18, 2023 18:38:04 GMT miletus12 said:

Jul 18, 2023 17:53:50 GMT lordroel said:

Reminder, lets keep current politics out of this thread.

The point was that what happens in the past can be seen in the present. 

You will see sea-trade versus land trade in the Russia-Ukraine thread posted there, but in the 1930s in the PACIFIC that sea to land ratio advantage still operated. The only economic region for imperialist exploitation still in dispute in that part of the Earth was China. All of the naval competition and effort among the 1930s big four within the region, that would be the British, French, Japanese and the Americans, was aimed at China.        

Britain did not matter, France did not matter. Neither nation had the basing, investment, or technical capacity to operate within the Pacific at the scales needed to control that area of world ocean. In the 1930s, there were only two nation-states with the logistics and technical means to dominate sea air access to China. That was Japan and the United States. 

In the Pacific Ocean area, with its island distributions and terrain, there was a critical quadrangle that would either allow or deny access from the United States to China. 
 
Japan knew this, which is why they went after that area during WWI.  

Commentary that seeks to dispute this historical and current state of naval geography, how it worked, actually is applicable to the OP. 

What if the US obtained Micronesia, or most of it, instead of Germany or Japan obtaining it, prior to WWII? Does that meaningfully make defending SLOCs between the USA and Philippines easier for the USN and scattered US forces, and make reliable, sustained interdiction of those SLOCs by an attacker more difficult? Or does it not make a difference, if the attacker has the initiative and superior forces at the points of contact?

  
 

I understand, but still lets keep current events ore politics out of this thread.

[stevep]

Jul 18, 2023 17:50:09 GMT miletus12 said:

Sea was to land as 9 to 1 as far as movement costs; Steve.

It still is.

Hence, why China is currently dying as a nation state.

Miletus

  That's an odd reversal of your stance on another thread when you were insisting that a ramshackled railway route through the Balkans was a better option than sea travel. 

  Plus the advantages of sea travel is well known as we're already said but that has little/nothing to do with the idea that occupying a region several hundred miles to the east controls the entire Pacific.

[miletus12]

Jul 18, 2023 20:10:47 GMT stevep said:

Jul 18, 2023 17:50:09 GMT miletus12 said:

Sea was to land as 9 to 1 as far as movement costs; Steve.

It still is.

Hence, why China is currently dying as a nation state.

Miletus

  That's an odd reversal of your stance on another thread when you were insisting that a ramshackled railway route through the Balkans was a better option than sea travel. 

  Plus the advantages of sea travel is well known as we're already said but that has little/nothing to do with the idea that occupying a region several hundred miles to the east controls the entire Pacific.

Not the same. The Dardenelles and Bosporus could be mined and blocked by small forces and were. The southwest route into Bulgaria presented a horrible mountain terrain problem, but was still militarily easier than trying to force the straits. The stupid Entente idiots in charge were just barely capable of that evolution. 

And what has that orange got to do with this apple?