stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 24, 2023 15:54:38 GMT
Can I ask you a question? How dumb would the US have been willing to be over matters of this sort? Over what sort of questions internationally, would it rouse itself from its precious normalcy, five-cent cigars, model-T's, sock-hops, movie palaces, Gatsby parties, and so forth, to go around the world torturing the British Empire? Post WWII raharris1973 . What happened to the British Empire? They "won" WWII, did they not? The British do not like to read this. It was American policy to destroy the British Empire. On the Washington naval treaty: Ending the Anglo Japanese alliance was a mirage for American security*. It was an illusionary threat. It was only perceived as a threat by people who didn’t understand the terms of the treaty, but forcing the end of the treaty, simply made Japan angrier by forcing Britain to show it did not value Japan as much as the United States. And to this point, the USG forced the issue to make the British show their preference by action, not their words. If Britain chose Japan, then the American Hawks were right and there would be a naval arms race. If the British chose the Americans, then a treaty was possible. No decoupling, no treaty.
It was the policy of stupid and short-sighted idiots in the US to attack and weaken Britain whenever they could and they - quite possibly foolishly - saw the British empire as a source of strength for Britain. If they had had any brains they wouldn't have done this but they didn't. The empire would have passed anyway because of social changes in both Britain and the empire but then again fanatics aren't known for their intellectual abilities. Unfortunately you see clear evidence that such stupidity is still present in the US mis-leadership and general population at times. 
The 2nd bit is basically BS. There are plenty of reasons for Britain to desire good relations with Japan, as well as the US and it was primarily the morons in the US that couldn't see beyond their nose who didn't realise this. Provided those idiots didn't get enough power to trigger the war they were so desperate for its likely it would be far better for the world for the treaty to have collapsed and the alliance to continue.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jul 24, 2023 16:11:56 GMT
The reason why those ratios were so heated an issue was that both navies were dominated by particularly dogmatic versions of Mahan's ideas and they believed that a 10:7 ratio wouldn't be enough for a US attack against Japan to succeed but a 10:6 one was. As such the view of the USN was that they must have the capacity to be able to attack and defeat the IJN from a standing start even without any additional build-up. That this view was simplistic didn't matter. The Japanese navy was deeply opposed to this ratio for the same reason but they were overruled by other elements in their government that realised without a treaty if the US found the will it could massively out-build Japan anyway so it was best to accept what they saw as a dangerous ratio rather than have a continued race and the tensions it would cause which might make such a war more likely. It was absent, good game theory, a simple firepower ratio conclusion developed from simplistic and incomplete understanding of artillery effects in a WWI land warfare setting. This actually was used by navies as early as 1890. As it turned out, the true ratio involved was the logistics ratio of 10% fleet loss for every 1000 nautical miles traveled; which did not become apparent until the fleet problems gamed it out. 10/6 Lanchester became 6/6 after 4,000 nautical miles. Now MAHAN did predict that one. |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jul 24, 2023 16:14:42 GMT
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 24, 2023 18:19:55 GMT
You mean stupidity, corruption, greed etc. Or are you suggesting he was a tool of a nation seeking harm to the US. Not likely as he could have simply screwed up the US economy even more in 1933 onward than it already was.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 24, 2023 18:21:33 GMT
The reason why those ratios were so heated an issue was that both navies were dominated by particularly dogmatic versions of Mahan's ideas and they believed that a 10:7 ratio wouldn't be enough for a US attack against Japan to succeed but a 10:6 one was. As such the view of the USN was that they must have the capacity to be able to attack and defeat the IJN from a standing start even without any additional build-up. That this view was simplistic didn't matter. The Japanese navy was deeply opposed to this ratio for the same reason but they were overruled by other elements in their government that realised without a treaty if the US found the will it could massively out-build Japan anyway so it was best to accept what they saw as a dangerous ratio rather than have a continued race and the tensions it would cause which might make such a war more likely. It was absent, good game theory, a simple firepower ratio conclusion developed from simplistic and incomplete understanding of artillery effects in a WWI land warfare setting. This actually was used by navies as early as 1890. As it turned out, the true ratio involved was the logistics ratio of 10% fleet loss for every 1000 nautical miles traveled; which did not become apparent until the fleet problems gamed it out. 10/6 Lanchester became 6/6 after 4,000 nautical miles. Now MAHAN did predict that one.
Argue with the sources not me.
I notice your also suggestion time travel was involved.
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 25, 2023 0:52:31 GMT
Can I ask you a question? How dumb would the US have been willing to be over matters of this sort? Over what sort of questions internationally, would it rouse itself from its precious normalcy, five-cent cigars, model-T's, sock-hops, movie palaces, Gatsby parties, and so forth, to go around the world torturing the British Empire? Post WWII raharris1973 . What happened to the British Empire? They "won" WWII, did they not? The British do not like to read this. It was American policy to destroy the British Empire.**On the Washington naval treaty: Ending the Anglo Japanese alliance was a mirage for American security*. It was an illusionary threat. It was only perceived as a threat by people who didn’t understand the terms of the treaty, but forcing the end of the treaty, simply made Japan angrier by forcing Britain to show it did not value Japan as much as the United States. And to this point, the USG forced the issue to make the British show their preference by action, not their words. If Britain chose Japan, then the American Hawks were right and there would be a naval arms race. If the British chose the Americans, then a treaty was possible. No decoupling, no treaty. You know miletus12 - if Britain ultimately makes all the same foreign policy orientations and alliances that it did historically, and sets the same priorities it did, and swallows its pride, the "threat" of a naval arms race turns out to be an empty one. In the end Britain's policy was resistance to Germany and Italy and appeasement of America, so America's Navy is just a bigger rescue force. Maybe Britain gets to specialize more in a ground and Air Force. **We can stretch metaphors all we want about changes in the global economic order and the security structure being the 'American policy of destroying the British Empire' ...mwahahahaha evil laugh, evil laugh. www.tcm.com/video/1075287/matter-of-life-and-death-a-1947-court-of-appeal/Once WWII started, the type of "destruction" of the Empire the US inflicted on Britain was something Britain walked into with eyes wide open, and Britain simply did not see any other arrangements as possible. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 25, 2023 1:05:39 GMT
but they were overruled by other elements in their government that realised without a treaty if the US found the will it could massively out-build Japan anyway so it was best to accept what they saw as a dangerous ratio rather than have a continued race and the tensions it would cause which might make such a war more likely. ....and those elements in Japan were right! Unfortunately for them, and for the world, in the medium term, the people with responsible and rational views were, as quite often happens, punished by politics and the passions of their opponents in the medium term [Much like the ruling parties of the Weimar Republic]. The US side was allegedly able to bargain hard, with confidence, because Herbert Yardley's Black Chamber Code Breakers knew the Japanese moderates would accept a 10:6 bottom line. That intel-enabled 'victory' for America was a short-lived and incomplete one, because the boomerang reaction against it in lower Japanese Navy echelons was the beginning of Navy crazy and coup attempts in the 30s, culminating with Pearl Harbor and the Java Sea. Maybe a a 10:7 ratio on paper wouldn't have been so bad if the Japanese had, as a result, been a little psychologically more stable. Especially if things like the '23 earthquake and '27 financial crisis prevented them from fulfilling the whole program. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 25, 2023 1:18:50 GMT
I got to hand it to you for finding in the article at this link, what just might be the *one* article by a dude with an Indian name who thinks FDR's gentle chiding and teasing of Churchill about how Britain should give up India [which was all talk, no action/coercion] was at all meaningful. I can assure that is not a common Indian view. Judging by typical third world politics and trends, the former brown and black subjects of the British Empire, from India, to the Arab world, to Sub-Saharan Africa, do not think America had much at all to do with dismantling the British Empire. To them, the British and Americans seemed like two peas in a pod. That's one reason so many third world countries always started off with more of a trust deficit with the USA throughout the Cold War and tended to give the Soviet Union and Communist China more of the benefit of the doubt. America only enjoyed the automatic benefit of the doubt in countries that had been stomped on by the Nazis or Soviets first. If a western colonial power did it first, no benefit of the doubt for the USA in the Cold War. |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jul 25, 2023 7:43:55 GMT
Mahan had NOTHING to do with it. It was absent, good game theory, a simple firepower ratio conclusion developed from simplistic and incomplete understanding of artillery effects in a WWI land warfare setting. This actually was used by navies as early as 1890. As it turned out, the true ratio involved was the logistics ratio of 10% fleet loss for every 1000 nautical miles traveled; which did not become apparent until the fleet problems gamed it out. 10/6 Lanchester became 6/6 after 4,000 nautical miles. Now MAHAN did predict that one.
Argue with the sources not me.
I notice your also suggestion time travel was involved.
I suppose I have to ILLUSTRATE why the reply made was in error. First... as usual, the British got the mathematics of naval warfare, wrong. Notice the mention of BRADLEY FISKE. Bayesian interference is the proper game mathematics. Now as to TIME TRAVEL, has the reader heard of this man? Pascual Cervera y Topete. He was probably Spain's finest admiral of the 19th Century. He wrote a letter to his idiotic government to his incompetent navy minister, a fool by the name of Sigismundo Bermejo. The importance of that letter was his use of the quadratic equations supposedly claimed to be used by Lanchester to predict the outcomes of WWI land battles on the basis of computed firepower ratios. I cited it once, but I will give it to you again. That is a pretty MAHANIC view of how seapower as a use / deny military operation. But at the same time, it is a mathematical treatment using the (scoff) Lanchester system. That may be the time travel you complained about? If so, where did CERVERA get his time machine? Miletus PS. If the sources are not credible, do not expect me to accept their errors. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 25, 2023 8:48:35 GMT
but they were overruled by other elements in their government that realised without a treaty if the US found the will it could massively out-build Japan anyway so it was best to accept what they saw as a dangerous ratio rather than have a continued race and the tensions it would cause which might make such a war more likely. ....and those elements in Japan were right! Unfortunately for them, and for the world, in the medium term, the people with responsible and rational views were, as quite often happens, punished by politics and the passions of their opponents in the medium term [Much like the ruling parties of the Weimar Republic]. The US side was allegedly able to bargain hard, with confidence, because Herbert Yardley's Black Chamber Code Breakers knew the Japanese moderates would accept a 10:6 bottom line. That intel-enabled 'victory' for America was a short-lived and incomplete one, because the boomerang reaction against it in lower Japanese Navy echelons was the beginning of Navy crazy and coup attempts in the 30s, culminating with Pearl Harbor and the Java Sea. Maybe a a 10:7 ratio on paper wouldn't have been so bad if the Japanese had, as a result, been a little psychologically more stable. Especially if things like the '23 earthquake and '27 financial crisis prevented them from fulfilling the whole program.
I can't see Japan being able to complete their 8:8 programme on anything like the time schedule, especially after the 23 quake. The interesting and probably most important thing assuming that the US completes significantly more than the historical 3 of their ships - is how assorted nations react to the two nation arms race. a)As I've said I think Britain will be reasonably relaxed, especially if the AJA continue although concerns will prompt a steady rate of construction.
b) What state is the USN in, both physically and in terms of public and governmental support when they 'win' the race and what significant construction do they do in the following years. Do the hawks do anything of a red flag type such as plan for a major fleet base in the Philippines or does calmer heads win out.
c) Ditto for Japan. The failure of the Japanese programme and the resultant economic stress probably undermines the status of the navy but does that mean the army is even more powerful or civilian government is strengthened.
d) Similarly with both navies how much does all that investment both economic and political in a new generation of very large capital ships restrict their carrier development compared to OTL? Its unlikely having committed so many resources into big gun ships that the view "we need those new carrier thingies in large numbers" will go down well with either the gun admirals or the politicians so I would expect their development to be retarded somewhat.
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 26, 2023 2:27:03 GMT
The non-fortification clause could have prevented a war - issue being would the US listen to Japanese warnings about it making the Philippines a major naval and military base, which would have threatened Japan's independence. Do the hawks do anything of a red flag type such as plan for a major fleet base in the Philippines or does calmer heads win out. I've detected from your two consecutive mentions of it that you lean strongly to the view that the US fortifying its position in the western Pacific puts a lot of pressure on Japan to attack first and could make a Japanese war inevitable. Really think the fortification of the Philippines issue would be such an independent driver of conflict, even in the absence of other major rifts like economic warfare and embargoes, or of a brutally controversial China War? Because the anti-fortification provisions of the WNT is yet another provision I criticize. I consider it the US shirking any honorable obligations of an imperial protector to a subject nation (despite the reality that empire is a dishonorable business. The one non-dubious benefit an imperial protectorate (ie victim of conquest) is supposed to get from being imperialized is to at least not get assaulted by any *other* power than the original conquering protecting power. That was the justification for taking the Philippines in 1898-99 that eased ambivalent American consciences the most and made it easiest for them to sleep at night. Yet when the chips were down, they couldn't do that imperial protection job right. And it is not like the Americans didn't have plenty of warning. They signed a treaty disallowing themselves from doing it! Colonialism fail! But you're pretty convinced Japan would have seen a fully capable Manila or Subic fleet base building in the.teens or 20s as a Death Star that had to be smashed, huh? Would or could the Japanese have been any less alarmed if the US was restrained like it was in OTL in terms of avoiding a major fortified fleet base, but had invested more seriously in the interwar decades in a much more serious, sizable and equipped Filipino Commonwealth Field Force? |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jul 26, 2023 5:20:42 GMT
The non-fortification clause could have prevented a war - issue being would the US listen to Japanese warnings about it making the Philippines a major naval and military base, which would have threatened Japan's independence. Do the hawks do anything of a red flag type such as plan for a major fleet base in the Philippines or does calmer heads win out. I've detected from your two consecutive mentions of it that you lean strongly to the view that the US fortifying its position in the western Pacific puts a lot of pressure on Japan to attack first and could make a Japanese war inevitable. Really think the fortification of the Philippines issue would be such an independent driver of conflict, even in the absence of other major rifts like economic warfare and embargoes, or of a brutally controversial China War? Because the anti-fortification provisions of the WNT is yet another provision I criticize. I consider it the US shirking any honorable obligations of an imperial protector to a subject nation (despite the reality that empire is a dishonorable business. The one non-dubious benefit an imperial protectorate (ie victim of conquest) is supposed to get from being imperialized is to at least not get assaulted by any *other* power than the original conquering protecting power. That was the justification for taking the Philippines in 1898-99 that eased ambivalent American consciences the most and made it easiest for them to sleep at night. Yet when the chips were down, they couldn't do that imperial protection job right. And it is not like the Americans didn't have plenty of warning. They signed a treaty disallowing themselves from doing it! Colonialism fail! But you're pretty convinced Japan would have seen a fully capable Manila or Subic fleet base building in the.teens or 20s as a Death Star that had to be smashed, huh? Would or could the Japanese have been any less alarmed if the US was restrained like it was in OTL in terms of avoiding a major fortified fleet base, but had invested more seriously in the interwar decades in a much more serious, sizable and equipped Filipino Commonwealth Field Force? The Philippines, at least on Luzon, was more fortified than Oahu from 1905 forward. The whole question of additional fortification was not readily relevant. What was "relevant" was the effective manning of the "defenses" in place and implementation of appropriate effectors. There was a REASON the Japanese felt they had to act;  The idiot who prepared that little map had the scale of range way off, but he did get one thing correct. An effective anti-ship land based capacity out of Clark Field and other bases on the Lingayen plain, puts a stop to any Japanese ambitions towards Indonesian Oil or Malay rubber and tin. It was effectors and incompetent leadership that was the problem, not naval guns and poured concrete.  You did not even need poured concrete runways, just hardy willing people who were willing to clear runways and hardpack earth and build berms and a man who knew how to use airpower.  George Kenney instead of a bunch of expletive deleteds...  Richard Sutherland (political weasel)  Lewis Brereton (paranoid glad-hander)  Jonathan Wainwright (drunk)  Douglas MacArthur (Mama's boy, stage actor, and sometimes actually capable, as long as he let other people carry out the mission.) |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 26, 2023 15:20:37 GMT
The non-fortification clause could have prevented a war - issue being would the US listen to Japanese warnings about it making the Philippines a major naval and military base, which would have threatened Japan's independence. Do the hawks do anything of a red flag type such as plan for a major fleet base in the Philippines or does calmer heads win out. I've detected from your two consecutive mentions of it that you lean strongly to the view that the US fortifying its position in the western Pacific puts a lot of pressure on Japan to attack first and could make a Japanese war inevitable. Really think the fortification of the Philippines issue would be such an independent driver of conflict, even in the absence of other major rifts like economic warfare and embargoes, or of a brutally controversial China War? Because the anti-fortification provisions of the WNT is yet another provision I criticize. I consider it the US shirking any honorable obligations of an imperial protector to a subject nation (despite the reality that empire is a dishonorable business. The one non-dubious benefit an imperial protectorate (ie victim of conquest) is supposed to get from being imperialized is to at least not get assaulted by any *other* power than the original conquering protecting power. That was the justification for taking the Philippines in 1898-99 that eased ambivalent American consciences the most and made it easiest for them to sleep at night. Yet when the chips were down, they couldn't do that imperial protection job right. And it is not like the Americans didn't have plenty of warning. They signed a treaty disallowing themselves from doing it! Colonialism fail! But you're pretty convinced Japan would have seen a fully capable Manila or Subic fleet base building in the.teens or 20s as a Death Star that had to be smashed, huh? Would or could the Japanese have been any less alarmed if the US was restrained like it was in OTL in terms of avoiding a major fortified fleet base, but had invested more seriously in the interwar decades in a much more serious, sizable and equipped Filipino Commonwealth Field Force?
I have read that Japan after WWI was signalling to the US that if the latter carried out reported plans to establish a major fleet base there it would be considered a casus belli for them. Think at one stage Japan made approaches to Mexico to establish a base on their Pacific coast and when Washington complained the response was something like "ah you understand how we feel".
An hostile US with a secured base in the Philippines, i.e. with the strength to both hold out against Japanese attack and block Japanese supply lines would be crippling to Japan's economy and war machine. Given the nature of the Japanese regime by the late 30's and their actions in China then US hostility - albeit possibly not to actually starting a shooting war - could be considered a certainty. If Europe had avoided WWII then this is a possible way of prompting a clash between the two. In that case the UK would be at least a friendly neutral and quite possibly a fellow belligerent for the US as it was also deeply opposed to Japanese actions in China but the growing problems in Europe greatly restricted British actions.
In terms of the 20's a lot of Japanese would feel understandably threatened by such a move so although less certain a war could well develop - although they would try diplomatic options 1st and probably would have sought mediation from 3rd parties, very likely the UK. How a US-Japan war would have gone in the short term would depend on a wide range of developments including the strength and developments of both sides, especially at sea, their level of fortifications in their colonies and other issues. In the longer term as long as public opinion supported such a war in the US it would win but it could be at least as bloody as the OTL fighting between the two nations.
In general I would agree that an imperial power should protect its possessions and their inhabitants but in this case arguably, in the 20's when Japan was a far more rational actor, the US protected the Philippines best by not heavily fortifying it and establishing large bases there. - Similar to how you argued that the Japanese moderates were right to accept an inferiority in naval terms with regard to the US despite them considering this dangerous, rather than rejecting the US proposals/demands and having a naval race that one way or another they would lose.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jul 26, 2023 16:13:23 GMT
Do you have any sources for these claims? I mean, I would be interested in reading them. The Japanese base in Mexico, especially. I will tell you why when I read your citations. I will give you a hint. It involves ports, drafts and logistics and how each navy developed a CONCEPT of power projection based on technical means. Insofar as they developed their doctrines and plans, nether the Japanese, nor the American either contemplated or intended for non-sovereign territorial basing of their fleets. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 26, 2023 20:57:57 GMT
Do you have any sources for these claims? I mean, I would be interested in reading them. The Japanese base in Mexico, especially. I will tell you why when I read your citations. I will give you a hint. It involves ports, drafts and logistics and how each navy developed a CONCEPT of power projection based on technical means. Insofar as they developed their doctrines and plans, nether the Japanese, nor the American either contemplated or intended for non-sovereign territorial basing of their fleets.
It was a long while ago, possibly as long as 50 years so I can't tell you the source.
During what period did that ban on non-sovereign basing apply for the USN? Obviously not in use for many years and in earlier years they didn't have many bases of their own so tended to need to operate from friendly ports.
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