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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 22, 2023 0:51:15 GMT
My personal interpretation, or "take" on the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, is that it was a solution to a problem that was more apparent than real.
What was the apparent problem? That without arms control, unlimited warship building would consume national budgets and lead to mutual Anglo-American-Japanese hostility and probably naval war.
Why was the problem more apparent, than "real"? Because it was a "self-solving" problem. 1. None of the three powers could have afforded an unlimited battleship race. All three had a somewhat popularly responsive representative government that would have restrained spending before it crowded out too many other private sector and public sector priorities even without a treaty. For at least one of the powers,Japan, the Navy's 'wants' for its expansion program was likely beyond the capacity of its industrial base in a physical sense. That is even before we count the surprise reconstruction bill imposed by the Great Kanto earthquake. 2. Internationally unregulated battleship building need not cause war nor hostility at all. To paraphrase the NRA, 'battleships don't kill people, political leaders deploying navies offensively kill people'. Anglo-American tensions in the post-WWI decades centered on how much access they would grant to each other's markets. They never rose to a level of hostility where military force was threatened or contemplated to resolve that problem. Both countries having unlimited numbers of battleships would not have conjured up a military/naval confrontation or war between the two. Tariff wars and naval wars operated on a separate plane by the twentieth century, at least where great powers capable of defending themselves (as opposed to small banana republics) were concerned.
I challenge anybody to come a scenario where lack of naval arms control turns the peaceful Anglo-American naval equation on its head, and we end up suspending our disbelief and calling it plausible.
People may have bought into the idea at the time, but they were shallow, not systematic thinkers, allowing the extremely vague equation of competition/disagreement over markets + competition in #s of warships = naval war. That equation is completely unproved without doing the homework of defining several intermediate variables.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 22, 2023 11:59:18 GMT
My personal interpretation, or "take" on the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, is that it was a solution to a problem that was more apparent than real. What was the apparent problem? That without arms control, unlimited warship building would consume national budgets and lead to mutual Anglo-American-Japanese hostility and probably naval war. Why was the problem more apparent, than "real"? Because it was a "self-solving" problem. 1. None of the three powers could have afforded an unlimited battleship race. All three had a somewhat popularly responsive representative government that would have restrained spending before it crowded out too many other private sector and public sector priorities even without a treaty. For at least one of the powers,Japan, the Navy's 'wants' for its expansion program was likely beyond the capacity of its industrial base in a physical sense. That is even before we count the surprise reconstruction bill imposed by the Great Kanto earthquake. 2. Internationally unregulated battleship building need not cause war nor hostility at all. To paraphrase the NRA, 'battleships don't kill people, political leaders deploying navies offensively kill people'. Anglo-American tensions in the post-WWI decades centered on how much access they would grant to each other's markets. They never rose to a level of hostility where military force was threatened or contemplated to resolve that problem. Both countries having unlimited numbers of battleships would not have conjured up a military/naval confrontation or war between the two. Tariff wars and naval wars operated on a separate plane by the twentieth century, at least where great powers capable of defending themselves (as opposed to small banana republics) were concerned. I challenge anybody to come a scenario where lack of naval arms control turns the peaceful Anglo-American naval equation on its head, and we end up suspending our disbelief and calling it plausible. People may have bought into the idea at the time, but they were shallow, not systematic thinkers, allowing the extremely vague equation of competition/disagreement over markets + competition in #s of warships = naval war. That equation is completely unproved without doing the homework of defining several intermediate variables.
Very true. You would need something in the great depression with either the UK or US falling into some sort of populist dictatorship for any real likelihood of war between the two nations.
Tariff issues only really came into play from 1930 when the Smoot-Hawley Act massively increased the already large US tariffs, prompting another contraction in world trade and a year or two later the UK finally introduced its own tariffs. Even then tariffs were a relatively minor factor in relations between the two countries.
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 22, 2023 16:22:33 GMT
There is a great analogy with the phrase, 'general refighting the last war' here.
To a some extent, the urgency felt to get the treaty done, was 'the diplomats renegotiating to prevent the last arms race (the Anglo-German one, and Anglo-French before that) to prevent the last war (WWI)'
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jul 22, 2023 23:48:03 GMT
My personal interpretation, or "take" on the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, is that it was a solution to a problem that was more apparent than real. What was the apparent problem? That without arms control, unlimited warship building would consume national budgets and lead to mutual Anglo-American-Japanese hostility and probably naval war. Why was the problem more apparent, than "real"? Because it was a "self-solving" problem. 1. None of the three powers could have afforded an unlimited battleship race. All three had a somewhat popularly responsive representative government that would have restrained spending before it crowded out too many other private sector and public sector priorities even without a treaty. For at least one of the powers,Japan, the Navy's 'wants' for its expansion program was likely beyond the capacity of its industrial base in a physical sense. That is even before we count the surprise reconstruction bill imposed by the Great Kanto earthquake. 2. Internationally unregulated battleship building need not cause war nor hostility at all. To paraphrase the NRA, 'battleships don't kill people, political leaders deploying navies offensively kill people'. Anglo-American tensions in the post-WWI decades centered on how much access they would grant to each other's markets. They never rose to a level of hostility where military force was threatened or contemplated to resolve that problem. Both countries having unlimited numbers of battleships would not have conjured up a military/naval confrontation or war between the two. Tariff wars and naval wars operated on a separate plane by the twentieth century, at least where great powers capable of defending themselves (as opposed to small banana republics) were concerned. I challenge anybody to come a scenario where lack of naval arms control turns the peaceful Anglo-American naval equation on its head, and we end up suspending our disbelief and calling it plausible.People may have bought into the idea at the time, but they were shallow, not systematic thinkers, allowing the extremely vague equation of competition/disagreement over markets + competition in #s of warships = naval war. That equation is completely unproved without doing the homework of defining several intermediate variables. Read my latest post in the Washington Naval Treaty thread about this subject. The "Naval Treaty" was not the only thing being addressed, or not even the most important thing being addressed as part of the conference. In effect, there are two naval treaty clues that show what Washington 1922 was really about: -- decoupling the Anglo-Japanese alliance. -- the non-fortifications clauses. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 23, 2023 11:54:32 GMT
My personal interpretation, or "take" on the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, is that it was a solution to a problem that was more apparent than real. What was the apparent problem? That without arms control, unlimited warship building would consume national budgets and lead to mutual Anglo-American-Japanese hostility and probably naval war. Why was the problem more apparent, than "real"? Because it was a "self-solving" problem. 1. None of the three powers could have afforded an unlimited battleship race. All three had a somewhat popularly responsive representative government that would have restrained spending before it crowded out too many other private sector and public sector priorities even without a treaty. For at least one of the powers,Japan, the Navy's 'wants' for its expansion program was likely beyond the capacity of its industrial base in a physical sense. That is even before we count the surprise reconstruction bill imposed by the Great Kanto earthquake. 2. Internationally unregulated battleship building need not cause war nor hostility at all. To paraphrase the NRA, 'battleships don't kill people, political leaders deploying navies offensively kill people'. Anglo-American tensions in the post-WWI decades centered on how much access they would grant to each other's markets. They never rose to a level of hostility where military force was threatened or contemplated to resolve that problem. Both countries having unlimited numbers of battleships would not have conjured up a military/naval confrontation or war between the two. Tariff wars and naval wars operated on a separate plane by the twentieth century, at least where great powers capable of defending themselves (as opposed to small banana republics) were concerned. I challenge anybody to come a scenario where lack of naval arms control turns the peaceful Anglo-American naval equation on its head, and we end up suspending our disbelief and calling it plausible.People may have bought into the idea at the time, but they were shallow, not systematic thinkers, allowing the extremely vague equation of competition/disagreement over markets + competition in #s of warships = naval war. That equation is completely unproved without doing the homework of defining several intermediate variables. Read my latest post in the Washington Naval Treaty thread about this subject. The "Naval Treaty" was not the only thing being addressed, or not even the most important thing being addressed as part of the conference. In effect, there are two naval treaty clues that show what Washington 1922 was really about: -- decoupling the Anglo-Japanese alliance. -- the non-fortifications clauses.
Haven't been reading that as it has little relevance to the real world.
Agree the ending of the AJA was a bad thing for everybody.
The non-fortification clause could have prevented a war - issue being would the US listen to Japanese warnings about it making the Philippines a major naval and military base, which would have threatened Japan's independence. In OTL it ended up fairly irrelevant because Japan was able to fortify its islands anyway and the US failed to do likewise in time with its possessions. Probably at least partly because they were less relevant to US needs than the Japanese ones were for them.
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 23, 2023 15:23:37 GMT
Agree the ending of the AJA was a bad thing for everybody. [/div][/quote] Genuinely, open-mindedly curious about why do you think so? What interwar problems could keeping the AJA have solved? What interwar problems did ending it create? During the period of the alliance, through at least WWI, there was significant British export of finish British naval hardware and technology to the Japanese. This wasn’t happening by the 30s I think. Was this stopping if tech transfer a result of the end of the AJA? Would IJN have more Brit tech with an ongoing alliance? |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jul 23, 2023 17:01:55 GMT
During the period of the alliance, through at least WWI, there was significant British export of finish British naval hardware and technology to the Japanese. This wasn’t happening by the 30s, I think. Was this stopping if tech transfer a result of the end of the AJA? Would IJN have more Brit tech with an ongoing alliance? . With or without official sanction, the British tolerated and helped the Japanese extensively. The Americans should have dealt with this nonsense, when they found out in 1942. Vacation time at Leavenworth would have been appropriate for those involved. Call it a penance, necessary to make amends for PEARL HARBOR.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 23, 2023 21:50:38 GMT
Agree the ending of the AJA was a bad thing for everybody. [/div][/quote] Genuinely, open-mindedly curious about why do you think so? What interwar problems could keeping the AJA have solved? What interwar problems did ending it create? During the period of the alliance, through at least WWI, there was significant British export of finish British naval hardware and technology to the Japanese. This wasn’t happening by the 30s I think. Was this stopping if tech transfer a result of the end of the AJA? Would IJN have more Brit tech with an ongoing alliance? [/quote][/div]
The basis thing was that it provided some influence on Japan and also possibly helped reassure them about the perceived threat from the US. Its scrapping was a major loss of face for moderate elements in the Japanese leadership, strengthening the military and extremists.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jul 23, 2023 23:48:31 GMT
The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was organically an anti-Russian alliance, which was used as an excuse by the partners to stomp what was left of Germany in the Pacific in 1914. Now, if it had remained in effect, after, there was only ONE reason that it would have remained in such effect. I think the answer to the question as to what would have been the result of continuance would not have been in Britain's interest, because if there was one thing which would prodded the USG into more international activism than shown, it would have been that "mistake". |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 24, 2023 3:25:38 GMT
Now the leader of another country, actually with a longer Pacific coastline than the US and closer to Japan, didn't think a continued AJA had to be a bad thing, and that it could be a good thing. His WWI experience, and American homeward withdrawal afterwards, had also shown him the USN was all sizzle and no steak in the western Pacific. Billy Hughes: I think the answer to the question as to what would have been the result of continuance would not have been in Britain's interest, because if there was one thing which would prodded the USG into more international activism than shown, it would have been that "mistake". I think the answer to the question as to what would have been the result of continuance would not have been in Britain's interest, because if there was one thing which would prodded the USG into more international activism than shown, it would have been that "mistake". Can I ask you a question? How dumb would the US have been willing to be over matters of this sort? Over what sort of questions internationally, would it rouse itself from its precious normalcy, five-cent cigars, model-T's, sock-hops, movie palaces, Gatsby parties, and so forth, to go around the world torturing the British Empire? Is Uncle Sam going to start a correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi recommending he abandon that whole non-violence thing and start running guns to an Indian continental army? Maybe spring some dudes from the Hindu-German conspiracy from jail to stir up trouble? Send over Marcus Garvey and Paul Robeson as government agents to 'set British Africa ablaze'? Lend a battleship task force to help the Irish Free State bombard Belfast and Derry, to unify Ireland? Annex Jamaica, British Honduras, the Bahamas, Trinidad, and Guyana as States from the really, really Deep (and dark) South? Gun-run to Arab rebels in the Middle East? Start gun-battles with a self-governing Dominion and major US trade partner that put US citizens in several northern states in a crossfire, because they share a monarch with one half of the Anglo-Japanese alliance? The absurdity of the answers suggests the absurdity of the very question. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 24, 2023 3:35:50 GMT
On the Washington naval treaty: Ending the Anglo Japanese alliance was a mirage for American security*. It was an illusionary threat. It was only perceived as a threat by people who didn’t understand the terms of the treaty, but forcing the end of the treaty, simply made Japan angrier by forcing Britain to show it did not value Japan as much as the United States. We all know Britain did not value Japan as much as the United States. Breaking the treaty did not bring that reality into being. Forcing the end of the treaty simply publicly wounded Japan’s pride. Likewise, the naval ratios of 5:5:3 {and the Japanese would’ve preferred 10:10:7 or for reasons of honor, equal ratios or no ratios at all). This had a logic matching each country's strategic needs, more or less. However, each of these countries could not produce naval arms at matching rates, when working at full capacity. The United Kingdom and United States were roughly in the same league. Japan was nowhere in the same league industrially in natural unregulated competition. The United Kingdom and United States would beat them every time unless they chose not to play. Here again fixed ratios may have been more trouble than they were worth. They did not change the reality that the US and UK had bigger navies than Japan, they simply wounded Japanese pride and stoked resentment by forcing Japan to sign a document, saying it would leave its navy inferior to that of the two leading white powers in the world.
*especially since the AJA Treaty wasn't even needed for Sempill to do his espionage-related damage.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on Jul 24, 2023 4:01:25 GMT
Can I ask you a question? How dumb would the US have been willing to be over matters of this sort? Over what sort of questions internationally, would it rouse itself from its precious normalcy, five-cent cigars, model-T's, sock-hops, movie palaces, Gatsby parties, and so forth, to go around the world torturing the British Empire? Post WWII raharris1973 . What happened to the British Empire? They "won" WWII, did they not? The British do not like to read this. It was American policy to destroy the British Empire. On the Washington naval treaty: Ending the Anglo Japanese alliance was a mirage for American security*. It was an illusionary threat. It was only perceived as a threat by people who didn’t understand the terms of the treaty, but forcing the end of the treaty, simply made Japan angrier by forcing Britain to show it did not value Japan as much as the United States. And to this point, the USG forced the issue to make the British show their preference by action, not their words. If Britain chose Japan, then the American Hawks were right and there would be a naval arms race. If the British chose the Americans, then a treaty was possible. No decoupling, no treaty. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 24, 2023 15:35:14 GMT
The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was organically an anti-Russian alliance, which was used as an excuse by the partners to stomp what was left of Germany in the Pacific in 1914. Now, if it had remained in effect, after, there was only ONE reason that it would have remained in such effect. I think the answer to the question as to what would have been the result of continuance would not have been in Britain's interest, because if there was one thing which would prodded the USG into more international activism than shown, it would have been that "mistake".
For the USN and their business and political connections it was an excuse for arguing for ever increasing amounts of cash from Congress. As anyone who knew the details of the alliance and the political background also knew this was a pile of BS being pushed by those groups for their own interests.
There were imperialistic and expansionist elements in the US political system but how much money are they going to waste before Congress or the people cut the funds on this immense waste of resources. Unless your arguing that the USG/USN will do an imperial Germany and launch an attack on both countries to hide their corruption.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 24, 2023 15:41:14 GMT
Now the leader of another country, actually with a longer Pacific coastline than the US and closer to Japan, didn't think a continued AJA had to be a bad thing, and that it could be a good thing. His WWI experience, and American homeward withdrawal afterwards, had also shown him the USN was all sizzle and no steak in the western Pacific. Billy Hughes: I think the answer to the question as to what would have been the result of continuance would not have been in Britain's interest, because if there was one thing which would prodded the USG into more international activism than shown, it would have been that "mistake". I think the answer to the question as to what would have been the result of continuance would not have been in Britain's interest, because if there was one thing which would prodded the USG into more international activism than shown, it would have been that "mistake". Can I ask you a question? How dumb would the US have been willing to be over matters of this sort? Over what sort of questions internationally, would it rouse itself from its precious normalcy, five-cent cigars, model-T's, sock-hops, movie palaces, Gatsby parties, and so forth, to go around the world torturing the British Empire? Is Uncle Sam going to start a correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi recommending he abandon that whole non-violence thing and start running guns to an Indian continental army? Maybe spring some dudes from the Hindu-German conspiracy from jail to stir up trouble? Send over Marcus Garvey and Paul Robeson as government agents to 'set British Africa ablaze'? Lend a battleship task force to help the Irish Free State bombard Belfast and Derry, to unify Ireland? Annex Jamaica, British Honduras, the Bahamas, Trinidad, and Guyana as States from the really, really Deep (and dark) South? Gun-run to Arab rebels in the Middle East? Start gun-battles with a self-governing Dominion and major US trade partner that put US citizens in several northern states in a crossfire, because they share a monarch with one half of the Anglo-Japanese alliance? The absurdity of the answers suggests the absurdity of the very question.
Very good description of the sort of stupidity that the USG would need to get involved into for them to do anything more than throw insults and make wild - and knowingly dishonest - statements about the purpose of the alliance. You would have hot-heads and rabidly Anglo-phobic elements who would support such actions simply because they refuse to accept reality but their likely to quickly be shot down by the rational majority of the population. Its not like 1812 when the government can argue for imperial expansion as a good thing in itself and commit a lot of money and men to it.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 24, 2023 15:47:41 GMT
On the Washington naval treaty: Ending the Anglo Japanese alliance was a mirage for American security*. It was an illusionary threat. It was only perceived as a threat by people who didn’t understand the terms of the treaty, but forcing the end of the treaty, simply made Japan angrier by forcing Britain to show it did not value Japan as much as the United States. We all know Britain did not value Japan as much as the United States. Breaking the treaty did not bring that reality into being. Forcing the end of the treaty simply publicly wounded Japan’s pride. Likewise, the naval ratios of 5:5:3 {and the Japanese would’ve preferred 10:10:7 or for reasons of honor, equal ratios or no ratios at all). This had a logic matching each country is strategic needs more or less. However, each of these countries could not produce naval arms at matching rates working at full capacity. The United Kingdom and United States were roughly in the same league. Japan was nowhere in the same league industrially in natural unregulated competition, the United Kingdom and United States would beat them every time unless they chose not to play. Here again six ratios fixed ratios may have been more trouble than they were worth. They did not change the reality that the US and UK had bigger navies than Japan, they simply wounded Japanese pride and stoked resentment by forcing Japan, to sign a document, saying it would leave its navy inferior to that of the two leading white powers in the world. *especially since the Treaty wasn't even needed for Sempill to do his espionage-related damage.
The reason why those ratios were so heated an issue was that both navies were dominated by particularly dogmatic versions of Mahan's ideas and they believed that a 10:7 ratio wouldn't be enough for a US attack against Japan to succeed but a 10:6 one was. As such the view of the USN was that they must have the capacity to be able to attack and defeat the IJN from a standing start even without any additional build-up. That this view was simplistic didn't matter. The Japanese navy was deeply opposed to this ratio for the same reason but they were overruled by other elements in their government that realised without a treaty if the US found the will it could massively out-build Japan anyway so it was best to accept what they saw as a dangerous ratio rather than have a continued race and the tensions it would cause which might make such a war more likely.
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