What if no US oil embargo/financial freeze on Japan starting in August 1941? Probable WWII outlook f

[raharris1973]

In OTL, after the late July 1941 Japanese occupation of the Vichy French central and southern Indochina colonies, the United States froze all Japanese assets in US banks, essentially halting all remaining Japanese-American commerce. This 1 August executive order freezing Japanese dollar assets (and thus means of payment) theoretically left a door open to limited managed barter trade, but that option wasn't exercised, and the immediate halt to trade and commodity transactions for imports and American exports, including all petroleum products, remained in force for the remaining months of peace between Japan and the United States, and obviously into the period of war between the two countries.

This was not the first instance of US economic sanctions again Japan. In early October, 1940 the United States imposed an embargo on the export of steel and iron scrap to Japan, in response to Japan's late September of the Vichy French northern Indochina colonies, and likely also Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

While the October 1940 embargoes were the most significant up to that time, the US had been considering whether to use one form or another of economic sanctions to protest or impede the Japanese war effort in China for multiple years beforehand, but had been slow to undertake economic sanctions, especially, legally binding and broadly scoped embargoes or boycotts.

Nevertheless, to gain freedom of action to take economic sanctions, even if just in the form of higher tariff rates, against Japan, the US served its required six-months notice of intent to withdraw from the 1911 US-Japanese Commercial Treaty (regulating trade & tariffs) in July 1939. So from January 1940 onward, the US was free to pursue embargoes or boycotts or discriminatory tariffs against Japan without violating any ongoing treaty commitments. The US obviously did not instantly use that freedom to embargo considerable Japanese raw material purchases of American metals and petroleum products (hence why the later 1940 and '41 embargo actions were required) but did in early 1940 ban exports of high octane aviation gasoline to Japan and formally ban export of aircraft equipment.

Prior to the announced termination of US-Japanese Commercial Treaty, at some point in 1938 or 1939, President Roosevelt had asked US manufacturers to observe a 'moral embargo' by not selling aircraft, aircraft parts, and aircraft munitions such as bombs to nations, including Japan (but also Germany and Italy) that bombed civilian populations. The manufacturers largely complied and this eliminated the one small niche of the arms market where Japan, largely self-sufficient in weapons manufacture purchased military equipment from the US during Tokyo's war on China. It obvious did not control Japanese purchases of American raw-materials (petroleum, metals, fibers) however which surged in 1937 and 1938 to feed Japan's ongoing operations and military industries dedicated against China and its fleet reserve supplies.

To summarize the incremental increases of American economic pressure on Japan over its China and then broader East Asian (Indochina) aggression, they were:

1938-39 - Non-binding "moral embargo" on aircraft, aircraft parts, and aircraft munitions/bombs

1939 (July) - Notice of intent to terminate US-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911

1940 (Jan) - US-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911 terminated, US free to impose sanction, US bans export of high-octane/aviation gasoline [Japan can adapt at cost by purchasing lower grades and refining to higher grades domestically]

1940 (Oct) - US Embargo of steel and iron scrap exports to Japan

1941 (Aug) - US Freeze of Japanese financial assets and total embargo of oil (and all trade generally)


The August 1941 freeze/embargo put enormous pressure on Japan and time-sensitivity on its ambitions. By confronting the Japanese Empire with a fuel shortage in months, it made acquisition of dependable fuel sources closer at hand, in the East Indies, more imperative and more urgent from a Japanese point of view. Japan was less able to consider the possibility of striking north, striking south, or striking nowhere and seeing how the European war and China war played out, at its own leisure, now that it could not maintain or replenish its oil reserves internally, or now externally, by purchases in the Anglo-American monopolized trading and financial settlement system.

Japan broke out of the trap with its great southern offensive in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific and the strike on Pearl Harbor. A doomed effort at self-sufficiency from the start, the Japanese were forced to admit defeat only in August 1945.

Before that time, from December 1941- through June 1942, Japanese forces made for quite a bright flash in the pan throughout greater East Asia, sweeping away hundreds of thousands of Allied garrison forces either long used to soft garrison duty or only hastily emplaced in the months preceding the attack. The Allied forces in the region leading up to December 1941 had been getting some reinforcement with men and machines, with many more scheduled on the way for subsequent months, whose transfer was interrupted by the onset of the Japanese attack. This trend was most pronounced for the American forces and possessions, with the 'Pensacola Convoy' intended to deliver more and better equipped US Army forces forces to the Philippines, and the raising of larger native forces within the Commonwealth of the Philippines itself. But some build-up, reinforcement or enhancement of equipment was slated to occur in some of the British Imperial possessions and Dominions as well, even if on a smaller scale.


Here is where I want to stop and introduce a what if. I contend that what he saw happen in Greater East Asia, 1941-1942 in OTL, was the western powers, led by the US, advancing its containment policy against Japan with multiple instruments, economic siege, military fortification of bases in the region like Singapore, and the Philippines with reinforcements of men, ships, defensive aircraft, and B-17 bombers, and, for the longer run, the American two-ocean Navy build-up, liable to produce a strong naval lead against Japan only starting by late 1943.

With the imposition of the total financial freeze/oil embargo, I would contend that the western economic warfare instrument took, a big, bold stride, out ahead of the much more slowly advancing and hardening military instruments of containment. By striding out ahead against Japan's economic jugular, the economic instrument got Japan's attention, but also exposed a vulnerability in doing so before the military protective aspects to contain the backlash were in place. Having stepped out front, with the soldiers and sailors behind, the west was overextended in an overwide stance, leaving it vulnerable to the hard Japanese kicks in thein the groin that were the series of defeats at Pearl Harbor, Wake, Guam, Manila, Bataan, Corregidor, Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, the Java Sea, Burma, Rabaul, Java and the like.


So the what if is this: What if, without changing the pace and circumstances of any other actors in World War Two, and without slowing down one bit the US fleet program and defensive preparations in the Pacific and consultation with potential Allies, we slow down the timeline of one variable, the variable of US (and Allied) economic sanctions on Japan?

The altered sanctions timeline starts diverges back in 1939, but has important results for WWII only in 1941 and 1942, here is how I imagine the new sanctions timeline:


1938-39 - Non-binding "moral embargo" on aircraft, aircraft parts, and aircraft munitions/bombs

1939 (July) - Nothing special happens in US-Japanese relations and there is no announced termination of US-Japanese Commercial Treaty.

1940 (Jan) - Nothing special happens in US-Japanese relations; the grind of the Sino-Japanese war is actually rather 'back-burner' news compared to the war in Europe

1940 (Oct) - Notice of intent to terminate US-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911 [in response to Japanese occupation of Northern Indochina & signing of Tripartite Pact]

1941 (Mar) - US-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911 terminated, US free to impose sanction, US bans export of high-octane/aviation gasoline [Japan can adapt at cost by purchasing lower grades and refining to higher grades domestically]

1941 (Aug) - Embargo of steel and iron scrap exports to Japan [in response to Japanese occupation of southern Indochina]; United States petroleum exports to Japan continue

Under these circumstances, the "idea" of a US Freeze of Japanese financial assets, or an embargo of oil exists, but only as a hypothetical "arrow" in the American policy quiver to use in the event of some future Japanese provocation matching or exceeding previous.

Japan is not on a raw materials-based, oil deprivation doomsday clock, from August 1941 onward. Where do things go from here?

Navy racing?

The Japanese are not in an entirely unpressured situation, by late 1941/early 1942 they will reach the point where from a combined quantitive and qualitative point of view, the American Fleet's margin of superiority over Japan's will be at its smallest in the foreseeable future. Current building trends would suggest that by late 1942 and 1942, the American fleet would *widen* its margin of superiority once more.

If Japanese leadership collectively, even before the embargo, had a sense that naval war with America at *some point* in the 1940s was inevitable, the optimal point was arriving fairly soon. But fuel shortages would not command it, and this pressure does not exist if courses of action other than war with America are considered equally valid.

For Japanese leaders more willing to wait on events, despite the ups and downs of naval ratios and specific regional balances, time can allow more developments to unfold from the winter of 1942 on that could make warring with the US and Allies look more risky, and betting on Hitler look more attractive.

For example, Soviet counter-offensives running from late December 1941 through March 1942 would likely be taken as sign of Soviet, and broader Allied, resiliency, and poorer long-term prospects for Hitler. So probably would British successes in the western desert front in North Africa around the same time.

The US-Nazi war potential?

However, how long beyond December 11th, 1941 would the United States and Germany remain in a state of limited, undeclared war at sea? Could the United States and Germany have persisted through the entirety of 1942, or even half of that year, in such a twilight state of naval cat and mouse and occasional death? Or would the USA or Germany have ultimately decided to declare war on the other, leading to, on the American side, a full mobilization and commitment of ground and air forces to fight against the Axis in Europe and Africa (not just the Navy fighting in the Atlantic) - and on the German side, an all-out submarine assault on American East Coast and Caribbean shipping?

The twilight naval war situation was growing increasingly intolerable for Hitler and US behavior increasingly provocative since the US in October had achieved Congressional consent to arm the merchant ships and to abolish the restrictive 'combat zones'. So the summer 1941 status quo where the US escorted convoys only as far as Iceland had eroded by the time October was over, and US lend-lease ships could journey all the way to Liverpool to drop off supplies.

Roosevelt had no guarantee of getting, and may not have even sought, a Congressional declaration of war over additional maritime clashes in the eastern Atlantic like the Greer, Kearny, and Reuben James had they happened in late December 1941 or early 1942. Congress, the public, or the President might have considered incidents like those 'the cost of doing business' in terms of aiding the Allies and not 'unprovoked German aggression. However, a change in German ROE and operational areas to do a campaign of repeated, unwarned sinkings right of US shores in the Atlantic and Caribbean like the historic operation Drumbeat would have been considered an escalation, a challenge to be matched by a US escalation, and a declaration of war.

And if, at any time, despite the maintenance of a tenuous Allied-Japanese peace in the Pacific, American-German, all-out, declared war begins, the Pacific situation can become immediately more complicated.

On the one hand Japan can try to use American embroilment as a diplomatic opportunity to test American flexibility on the status of China and other matters. The Americans, newly at all-out war with Germany, would not be pushovers for Japan in Far East talks, but may see wisdom in not forcing near-term confrontation on every possible point of disagreement.

On the other hand, in an all-out, declared war on Germany, involving the preparation of American cross-Atlantic invasion forces, American petroleum demand will skyrocket, calling in to question whether any American, or even western hemispheric petroleum production will be left over for export to Japan, or anyone else. Wartime pressures of a Euro-Atlantic war alone on America could lead America into a de facto oil embargo on Japan, even if it isn't meant to be "personal" or "malicious", and then Japan is forced back into its OTL dilemma. Additionally, aside from practical considerations, one should expect a degree of domestic political outcry if in a time of all-out war, mobilization and gas-rationing, it is still legal to export petroleum products to a non-Allied, non-friendly, suspicious and unpopular power like Japan, even if it is not a designated enemy.

Incremental Japanese offensive moves? And their effects

The Japanese, free of OTL's all-consuming concern of the American freeze/embargo, and their deadline to resolve it diplomatically by November or go to war, have freedom to take different actions of their own in this ATL where they are less sanctioned, not all of them benign.

For example, one 'productive' possible use of Japanese time and energy under these circumstances could be try a more definitive campaign to break Chinese resistance. It may not have much likelihood of succeeding. But if it does seem to be verging on success after some months, is the US policy on sanctions likely to remain constant, or would the US judge it needs to take all-out sanctions arrow and employ it to prevent China's final demise? Perhaps.

Or, the Japanese at some point in late 1941 or early 1942 could press one step further than French Indochina, and occupy Thailand, to acquire more direct control over its food and commodity resources, and to establish a more advantageous tactical position to threaten and pressure the British in Malaya, Singapore and Burma. Pressure could be desired to reduce or halt deliveries to China via the Burma road to increase incidents of 'banditry' affecting it. Thailand could be desirable to Japan from that point of view, and occupying it might not seem too crazy a risk given the limited scope of American embargoes so far. However, this creeping advance towards strategic territories of the British Empire, a linchpin member of anti-Hitler coalition, will demand some form of US counter-escalation whenever it occurs, possibly the full financial freeze/oil embargo.

A third option, one I consider quite unlikely, would be this less encumbered Japan striking north to attack the Soviet Union. I think it not likely because even lacking the pressures of the oil embargo, the Japanese were looking for conditions of greater superiority on the mutual border and greater proof of overall Soviet collapse than ever historically occurred. However, if the Japanese had precociously struck the Soviets in the back in 1941 or 1942 in this delayed American sanctions ATL, the USA would have almost immediately counter-escalated with a full financial freeze/oil embargo. This wouldn't be because FDR loving Communism or being controlled by it, but by his geopolitical calculation that Soviet Russia was a linchpin member of the anti-Hitler coalition, and Japan's attack is a highly unwelcome disruption to Roosevelt's global anti-Hitler strategy, so the Japanese disruptors would need to have *their* moves disrupted. Then the Japanese would have to figure if, and how, they can shift or divide their focus, or sequentially win, on the northern Soviet fronts and the southern Pacific fronts.

So with all the factors laid out here, if US sanctions was delayed a full step as described above, what do *you* think is the most likely outcome as we get to 1943?

The least impact would be the Japanese attacking the western powers at about the same time as OTL, just with having a few additional months worth of American petroleum products.

The most impact would be Japan and the USA still not at war by 1943, US Pacific defenses built up more strongly, and no further developments that caused full American sanctions on Japan; in Europe and the Atlantic it would be the US in a twilight naval war with Germans in the Atlantic, but not a declared war risking its ground troops and airmen on or over Europe and Africa, serving as the Arsenal and Quartermaster of British Empire and Soviet forces containing Nazi forces.

..and there's any number of impact levels in between.

[stevep]

  raharris1973 ,

  Very interesting idea and great analysis of some of the potential options and paths.  Some points come to mind.

a)  How long could both China and Japan continue the war in its current state without either showing serious signs of problems.  Either or both could have increasing difficulties with the strain of the war.

b)  Without the Japanese attack in Dec 42 I can't see Britain committing much more forces and possibly even less than OTL given that tensions are less but you could see some slow improvements.  However without the crisis in the Far East and the disastrous losses there, of men and resources and the serious threat to traffic in the Indian Ocean what will Britain do with those additional resources?  Could the defeats of early 42 in the western desert be avoided which might mean an earlier ending to the N African campaign?  This is whether or not the US-German tensions move into open warfare.  If it doesn't then the British and allies especially also avoids the heavy losses of ships and materials in the 2nd Happy time.  - Such losses might be inflicted later but possibly in a less crucial position.

c)  If war with Japan is avoided for a while then how might US production plans change once their at war with Germany.  I suspect at least for the USN the accent will be more on escort units rather than heavy BBs and CV.  Still a lot of those which will fairly rapidly change the balance with the IJN but probably significantly more resources for the Atlantic battles and elsewhere in the war against the Nazis.

d)  if Japan decided to move against Thailand then a lot would depend on the attitude of Washington but I think it would be likely to be a casus belli for Britain as it puts Japanese forces on the borders of Malaya and Burma.  It might be for the US as well since Thailand isn't a western colony but an independent nation.  This probably wouldn't save Thailand or a fair chunk of the western colonies but especially if it knows the US were hostile to the move Thailand might possibly fight rather than submit.  Which could make the invasion of Burma at least markedly more difficult.

e)  If say a war with Japan occurs 8 months or more later then the US will have more resources for fighting in the Pacific and also Guam and Wake as well as the Philippines will be much tougher challenges.  Which could be a serious problem for Japan.  However it does mean that the US will be under pressure to relieve at least Wake I would think and that could impose challenges on a USN already heavily committed in the Atlantic/European theatre.  You could see some nasty losses in the early stages as a more numerous and over-confident US could find out how experienced elements of the IJN especially are although they will learn fairly quickly and win eventually.

  Steve

[raharris1973]

Jul 31, 2023 18:57:54 GMT stevep said:

a)  How long could both China and Japan continue the war in its current state without either showing serious signs of problems.  Either or both could have increasing difficulties with the strain of the war.

Honestly, it seems to me several more years, definitely two, probably three or more, taking them into 1945, if no additional factors like embargoes or new operational breakthroughs or third party direct interventions are added in that time. And that is despite the Chinese Nationalists in Chongqing probably pleading their imminent collapse or separate peace with Japan in an attempt to extract more aid or, better yet, intervention, from the western powers.

Chinese material import needs to keep holding out in their western mountain headquarters and to keep up rural and guerrilla resistance are fairly modest. Leading the resistance coalition is Chiang's principal source of domestic legitimacy, and only reason for getting western aid. He gets pretty much nothing for making peace with the Japanese, because the Japanese are unable to define, much less restrain, their political appetites. The type of material handover of weapons, puppet troops, and control of vast provincial territories Chiang would require from the Japanese to make it worth his while to consider a deal that officially recognizes Manchukuo and other special Japanese enclaves would be so great the IJA would consider it seppeku-worthy humiliating.

China would suffer by being hit with Japan's concentrated attention, but Japan's Navy (at least its ships and sailors) can't operate on land. China could suffer from heavier, more sustained air attack, but Chinese Nationalists and Communists in the headquarters and factories were used to cave-dwelling by this point. Even in OTL, China faced the majority of Japan's infantry throughout the Pacific War, the sweep south into the Pacific only diverted 11 IJA Divisions from China operations.

In some aspects, China's supply situation would be *better* without the wider Pacific War, because the Burma Road (and railroad from Rangoon to Mandalay to the road) would not be closed for years like it was in OTL), in the months of 1941 prior to December 7th, and 1942 before the Japanese seized Burma, China was far more generously supplied than during most subsequent wartime months.

Meanwhile, the Japanese could persist in fighting China, provided they are importing a bare minimum of outside raw material supplies. Other than air operations, their ground effort in China was not terribly mechanized and was far more dependent on animal and coal locomotion than gasoline locomotion. While the Japanese conquests of OTL in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia including oil wells in the East Indies, Philippines, Malaya and Burma yielded some looted supplies and petroleum production, after months of repairs, it was not spectacular, and the Japanese, even while fighting the US and UK navies at the ends of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, still held, and extended, their lines in China. If freed from the burden of active war fronts and active fleet maneuvers against the western navies, that would have to conserve some resources and certainly leave more skilled pilots alive.

Jul 31, 2023 18:57:54 GMT stevep said:

b)  Without the Japanese attack in Dec 42 I can't see Britain committing much more forces and possibly even less than OTL given that tensions are less but you could see some slow improvements.  However without the crisis in the Far East and the disastrous losses there, of men and resources and the serious threat to traffic in the Indian Ocean what will Britain do with those additional resources?  Could the defeats of early 42 in the western desert be avoided which might mean an earlier ending to the N African campaign?.

Well, the center of gravity Axis of the struggle could certainly move westward. As far as its definitive end is concerned, that is tricky. When Rommel and the Italians have no 'running room' left in Libya what do they do and what happens to them? Do they evacuate? Do they surrender? Well that would end the N African campaign. Or do the Axis powers prolong the theater like they did in OTL by occupying Vichy Tunisia and forcing the battle to continue there?

Jul 31, 2023 18:57:54 GMT stevep said:

d)  if Japan decided to move against Thailand then a lot would depend on the attitude of Washington but I think it would be likely to be a casus belli for Britain as it puts Japanese forces on the borders of Malaya and Burma. 

Japanese occupation of Thailand up to its Malay and Burmese borders would be most distressing to Britain. It would ruin the 'Matador' counter-landing plan and forward defence plan for Malaya at a stroke.
However, I have a hard time seeing the British government openly declaring and prosecuting war on Japan unilaterally on Japan without the United States pledging to join the war against Japan forthwith.
Britain while out of the 'Battle of Britain' still has so much going on that it would, in all sanity, want to even the odds of taking on any new enemy, by adding a new ally, at least as big and at least as committed, and Thailand alone would not measure up - Uncle Sam is needed.

The USA, depending on the state of its preparations in the Philippines, Guam, the Atlantic, elsewhere, may or may not be able to make a war pledge over Thailand. Likely not if the Japanese move is on or around the time of OTL Pearl Harbor or earlier. Certainly any occupation of Thailand would move Washington to launch a total financial freeze and oil embargo on Japan.

However, despite reluctance on the part of Britain, and especially America, to openly declare war and all-out prosecute over the simply a Japanese invasion of the obscure Asian Kingdom of Thailand, both countries would find it in their interest to have Thailand stand up and fight against Japan, to slow Japanese progress and impose costs on them, and would be willing to run risks to support and arm fighting Thai.

To serve the end of getting the Thai to fight, the British in Simla and Americans in Washington and Manila would try to funnel weapons to the Thai as rumors of war emerged and would probable be quite willing to lie to the Thai and promise they would fight alongside them against the Japanese. The British and Americans would happily divert any useful China-bound supplies from Burma Road that the Thai could use if the Thai are willing to fight, for as long as they fight. In OTL, the Thai fought hard for about 12 to 24 hours, before suing for peace and switching to the Japanese side, but that was in the context of them hearing all about British and American defeats all over the map. It may be possible to convince the Thai to fight on longer in a situation where the Japanese are just taking them on, but haven't shown the boldness and skill to be smashing the British and Americans. Nevertheless, even with indirect or covert western support, I would expect coherent Thai resistance to the Japanese to last more than a week or so.

The aftermath of a Japanese conquest of Thailand would see total western sanctions in place against Japan, Japanese forces tactically emplaced along the Malay and Burmese borders, and ready to support subversive elements, and should also be a wake up call to local commanders charged with defense of those areas. Hopefully they do something useful with their warning of landward vulnerability.

Jul 31, 2023 18:57:54 GMT stevep said:

e)  If say a war with Japan occurs 8 months or more later then the US will have more resources for fighting in the Pacific and also Guam and Wake as well as the Philippines will be much tougher challenges.  Which could be a serious problem for Japan.  However it does mean that the US will be under pressure to relieve at least Wake I would think and that could impose challenges on a USN already heavily committed in the Atlantic/European theatre.  You could see some nasty losses in the early stages as a more numerous and over-confident US could find out how experienced elements of the IJN especially are although they will learn fairly quickly and win eventually.

Agreed

[stevep]

Aug 1, 2023 1:51:19 GMT raharris1973 said:

Jul 31, 2023 18:57:54 GMT stevep said:

a)  How long could both China and Japan continue the war in its current state without either showing serious signs of problems.  Either or both could have increasing difficulties with the strain of the war.

Honestly, it seems to me several more years, definitely two, probably three or more, taking them into 1945, if no additional factors like embargoes or new operational breakthroughs or third party direct interventions are added in that time. And that is despite the Chinese Nationalists in Chongqing probably pleading their imminent collapse or separate peace with Japan in an attempt to extract more aid or, better yet, intervention, from the western powers.

Chinese material import needs to keep holding out in their western mountain headquarters and to keep up rural and guerrilla resistance are fairly modest. Leading the resistance coalition is Chiang's principal source of domestic legitimacy, and only reason for getting western aid. He gets pretty much nothing for making peace with the Japanese, because the Japanese are unable to define, much less restrain, their political appetites. The type of material handover of weapons, puppet troops, and control of vast provincial territories Chiang would require from the Japanese to make it worth his while to consider a deal that officially recognizes Manchukuo and other special Japanese enclaves would be so great the IJA would consider it seppeku-worthy humiliating.

China would suffer by being hit with Japan's concentrated attention, but Japan's Navy (at least its ships and sailors) can't operate on land. China could suffer from heavier, more sustained air attack, but Chinese Nationalists and Communists in the headquarters and factories were used to cave-dwelling by this point. Even in OTL, China faced the majority of Japan's infantry throughout the Pacific War, the sweep south into the Pacific only diverted 11 IJA Divisions from China operations.

In some aspects, China's supply situation would be *better* without the wider Pacific War, because the Burma Road (and railroad from Rangoon to Mandalay to the road) would not be closed for years like it was in OTL), in the months of 1941 prior to December 7th, and 1942 before the Japanese seized Burma, China was far more generously supplied than during most subsequent wartime months.

Meanwhile, the Japanese could persist in fighting China, provided they are importing a bare minimum of outside raw material supplies. Other than air operations, their ground effort in China was not terribly mechanized and was far more dependent on animal and coal locomotion than gasoline locomotion. While the Japanese conquests of OTL in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia including oil wells in the East Indies, Philippines, Malaya and Burma yielded some looted supplies and petroleum production, after months of repairs, it was not spectacular, and the Japanese, even while fighting the US and UK navies at the ends of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, still held, and extended, their lines in China. If freed from the burden of active war fronts and active fleet maneuvers against the western navies, that would have to conserve some resources and certainly leave more skilled pilots alive.

Jul 31, 2023 18:57:54 GMT stevep said:

b)  Without the Japanese attack in Dec 42 I can't see Britain committing much more forces and possibly even less than OTL given that tensions are less but you could see some slow improvements.  However without the crisis in the Far East and the disastrous losses there, of men and resources and the serious threat to traffic in the Indian Ocean what will Britain do with those additional resources?  Could the defeats of early 42 in the western desert be avoided which might mean an earlier ending to the N African campaign?.

Well, the center of gravity Axis of the struggle could certainly move westward. As far as its definitive end is concerned, that is tricky. When Rommel and the Italians have no 'running room' left in Libya what do they do and what happens to them? Do they evacuate? Do they surrender? Well that would end the N African campaign. Or do the Axis powers prolong the theater like they did in OTL by occupying Vichy Tunisia and forcing the battle to continue there?

Jul 31, 2023 18:57:54 GMT stevep said:

d)  if Japan decided to move against Thailand then a lot would depend on the attitude of Washington but I think it would be likely to be a casus belli for Britain as it puts Japanese forces on the borders of Malaya and Burma. 

Japanese occupation of Thailand up to its Malay and Burmese borders would be most distressing to Britain. It would ruin the 'Matador' counter-landing plan and forward defence plan for Malaya at a stroke.
However, I have a hard time seeing the British government openly declaring and prosecuting war on Japan unilaterally on Japan without the United States pledging to join the war against Japan forthwith.
Britain while out of the 'Battle of Britain' still has so much going on that it would, in all sanity, want to even the odds of taking on any new enemy, by adding a new ally, at least as big and at least as committed, and Thailand alone would not measure up - Uncle Sam is needed.

The USA, depending on the state of its preparations in the Philippines, Guam, the Atlantic, elsewhere, may or may not be able to make a war pledge over Thailand. Likely not if the Japanese move is on or around the time of OTL Pearl Harbor or earlier. Certainly any occupation of Thailand would move Washington to launch a total financial freeze and oil embargo on Japan.

However, despite reluctance on the part of Britain, and especially America, to openly declare war and all-out prosecute over the simply a Japanese invasion of the obscure Asian Kingdom of Thailand, both countries would find it in their interest to have Thailand stand up and fight against Japan, to slow Japanese progress and impose costs on them, and would be willing to run risks to support and arm fighting Thai.

To serve the end of getting the Thai to fight, the British in Simla and Americans in Washington and Manila would try to funnel weapons to the Thai as rumors of war emerged and would probable be quite willing to lie to the Thai and promise they would fight alongside them against the Japanese. The British and Americans would happily divert any useful China-bound supplies from Burma Road that the Thai could use if the Thai are willing to fight, for as long as they fight. In OTL, the Thai fought hard for about 12 to 24 hours, before suing for peace and switching to the Japanese side, but that was in the context of them hearing all about British and American defeats all over the map. It may be possible to convince the Thai to fight on longer in a situation where the Japanese are just taking them on, but haven't shown the boldness and skill to be smashing the British and Americans. Nevertheless, even with indirect or covert western support, I would expect coherent Thai resistance to the Japanese to last more than a week or so.

The aftermath of a Japanese conquest of Thailand would see total western sanctions in place against Japan, Japanese forces tactically emplaced along the Malay and Burmese borders, and ready to support subversive elements, and should also be a wake up call to local commanders charged with defense of those areas. Hopefully they do something useful with their warning of landward vulnerability.

Jul 31, 2023 18:57:54 GMT stevep said:

e)  If say a war with Japan occurs 8 months or more later then the US will have more resources for fighting in the Pacific and also Guam and Wake as well as the Philippines will be much tougher challenges.  Which could be a serious problem for Japan.  However it does mean that the US will be under pressure to relieve at least Wake I would think and that could impose challenges on a USN already heavily committed in the Atlantic/European theatre.  You could see some nasty losses in the early stages as a more numerous and over-confident US could find out how experienced elements of the IJN especially are although they will learn fairly quickly and win eventually.

Agreed

  In general agreement but uncertain that Britain would leave Thailand to its fate.  Such a move by Japan could only really be aimed at British - and probably Dutch - colonies so I suspect there would be a strong opinion to fight in Thailand, alongside the Thais rather than wait possibly only a few months before fighting alone.  Also it would be a way of possibly shaming some elements of a reluctant US by pointing out Britain is fighting to protect Thailand when the US is unwilling.

  A lot would depend on the exact circumstances at the time but given how over-confident the western powers seem to have been about fighting Japan in late 41 and that there would be clear advantages to doing so unless things were really dire in Europe/N Africa I suspect there would be a pressure to act in London and Malaya.

  You reminded me that the Chinese are likely to be a lot better supplied than OTL here with the Burma road staying open for a while longer and no doubt the US ramping up supplies via that route.

[Max Sinister]

Did FDR, Stimson & co expect that the Japanese would never do something as crazy as they did IOTL? Because I'm wondering.

Also, I recall that when the US told Japan to "retreat from China" the Japanese took this as "including Manchuria", which may not have been the intention.

[stevep]

Aug 2, 2023 17:12:22 GMT Max Sinister said:

Did FDR, Stimson & co expect that the Japanese would never do something as crazy as they did IOTL? Because I'm wondering.

Also, I recall that when the US told Japan to "retreat from China" the Japanese took this as "including Manchuria", which may not have been the intention.

  On the 1st part I'm not sure.  There are some suggestions that war was expected and think it definitely was by late 1941, albeit for many people in the west with reluctance but I suspect others refused to accept that Japan would risk the destruction that war with the US would almost certainly mean.

  On the 2nd do remember reading, albeit ~4 decades back, a suggestion that Japan was willing to withdraw from China but not Manchuria and one of the US officials deliberately misleading either/both sides on what the US was demanding to prevent an agreement being achieved.  However whether that is another one of the conspiracy theories that argue that one or more people in the Roosevelt administration were determined to trigger a conflict to bring the US into the European war.  Plus while some of the more rational Japanese leaders would realise they were suffering hugely in terms of the human and economic costs of the war in China I fear that many of the fanatics would never have agreed to a withdrawal from China both because they saw the conquest of China as vital for their plans to 'secure' Japan's future and also a withdrawal would mean a loss of face they would find unacceptable.

[oscssw]

Great concept for an ATL raharris1973! As a catalyst to discussion your post works very well. The right questions were asked. Have you thought about fleshing this ATL out? IMO, it has the basis for a really interesting strategic  WW II what if. 

FWIW, IMO, war between the Japanese Empire and the USA is inevitable. Aside from "Two toughest kids on the block; they gonna fight" Power's Booth's Lieutenant Colonel Andrew 'Andy' Tanner

I've lived in Japan both as a USN Blue Jacket and a Venture capital Senior Financial analyst. I tell you the Japanese of the late 60's displayed a thin veneer of civility to the USA but down deep the older generation hated us. The younger folks liked our music and fun loving life style.

By the late 80's these folks were the Salary men and leadership of Japanese Industry. I got to know them as I did "Due Diligence" for various deals in Japan. They no longer felt they had to play up to the US after the phoenix like rebirth of Japan as a major economic and technology power. Down deep the Japanese Psyche is based on the belief they are FAR superior to anyone else. In short, we will always be "Gaijin" literally "outsider" but down deep we are nothing but barbarians. We Americans are also considered mongrels; I know I have had it explained to me by Salary men in after work drinking binges. I learned a long time ago I could learn a hell of a lot about prospective acquisitions by getting their upper middle level management drunk while I drank one shot to their three early on and a lot less after they were feeling their liquor. They could not wait to vent their pent up anger on the "Gaijin".

They also, like the ChiComm mother humpers, have a deep seated grievance about we whites because of what we did in the 17th, 18th, 19th and the early years of the 20th century. In truth they have no reason to love us and they don't. So be it but the point is they were going to dominate the western Pacific and the early 40 time frame was their very best chance.   So IMO, the US and colonial powers had to be defeated with the IJN to break open the doors and  the Imperial Army as the " Bailiff's Men".

A Bailiff and an attorney--a match for the Devil

[mostlyharmless]

Coming to this rather late but, whilst I agree with oscssw about the general xenophobia of the Japanese leadership, I am not so sure that the clash would be between the Empire and the USA. The IJA did not have the USA anywhere near the top of its list of enemies. I have no respectable source but could the Oil Embargo have been pushed through to prevent a Japanese attack on the USSR?

If Japan does not become directly involved in WW2 over 1941-2 and America joins the war against Germany, Japan will realise that they will soon have problems. Their likeliest response would be to try to conquer China whilst their potential enemies are busy elsewhere. OTL Japan never tried that as they moved troops to oppose the USSR over 1938-9 and then prepared to strike south from 1941. The the 1944 Ichi-Go offensive en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ichi-Go was the largest OTL attack but without a war with the USA and the British Empire, stronger attacks would be possible over 1943-4.

After the fall of Germany, Japan might find itself under threat from both the USA and the USSR but the politics will be complicated by the incipient Cold War in Europe. The starting point will also depend on what has happened in China over 1941-5. If the CCP is the main force left opposing Japan in China in 1945, the USSR might be more interested in intervening but the USA might feel less interested.

[stevep]

Aug 26, 2023 18:35:46 GMT mostlyharmless said:

Coming to this rather late but, whilst I agree with oscssw about the general xenophobia of the Japanese leadership, I am not so sure that the clash would be between the Empire and the USA. The IJA did not have the USA anywhere near the top of its list of enemies. I have no respectable source but could the Oil Embargo have been pushed through to prevent a Japanese attack on the USSR?

If Japan does not become directly involved in WW2 over 1941-2 and America joins the war against Germany, Japan will realise that they will soon have problems. Their likeliest response would be to try to conquer China whilst their potential enemies are busy elsewhere. OTL Japan never tried that as they moved troops to oppose the USSR over 1938-9 and then prepared to strike south from 1941. The the 1944 Ichi-Go offensive en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ichi-Go was the largest OTL attack but without a war with the USA and the British Empire, stronger attacks would be possible over 1943-4.

After the fall of Germany, Japan might find itself under threat from both the USA and the USSR but the politics will be complicated by the incipient Cold War in Europe. The starting point will also depend on what has happened in China over 1941-5. If the CCP is the main force left opposing Japan in China in 1945, the USSR might be more interested in intervening but the USA might feel less interested.

  I'm not sure about that 1st statement.  For the IJN the US was definitely the top priority and also it was seen as the power most threatening to Japan and most hostile to the latter's actions in China.  [Albeit that Britain's hostility towards the Japanese invasion was constrained by the growing crisis in Europe, especially after the war with Germany started].  For the IJA the USSR and China were far more important, partly because of the fact that it fitted their role but also because of their hostility towards communism.  However continued and growing US support for China and also economic action against Japanese operations made war between the two increasingly likely.

  Yes if no wider war develops in the FE in 1941/42 because of factors like the lack of an economic embargo by the US and other western powers and with the USSR engaged in a battle for its survival then an attempt to finish off China is more likely.  However even before 1942 the war in China had stalled, with minimal movement for a couple of years, partly due to logistical issues and partly to fierce Chinese resistance.  One of the big factors for the Japanese success in Inhi-Go was that for the last couple of years China had been largely cut off from foreign aid.  In this proposed scenario the Burma road at least is still likely to be open and a lot of US supplies and equipment will reach the KMT forces that didn't OTL.  As such it could be that a Japanese attack would largely finish off open resistance from Chinese forces but its likely to be significantly more difficult than the Japanese expected.

  Agree that after Germany is defeated then Japan might find itself under threat from both sides but a lot would depend on the circumstances.  If the KMT is still a significant source I suspect that the US and probably Britain would seek to support them based on both personal beliefs and that they would see a Soviet-Japanese alliance as very unlikely - although they might be wrong here.  The western allies have just fought a long war to preserve democracy.  The other factor could be how long before the cold war actually opens up as it did take some time before the post-war honeymoon was over so you might see combined threats and economic activity against Japan prior to that point.

[oscssw]

This is a bit off topic but what the hell. I was born in 1948 and the COLD WAR was always in the back ground and some few times the fore ground. Cuban Missile crisis and Nam very significant occurrences in my life.

So it begs the question when did the COLD WAR actually begin? A strong case can be made for March 12, 1947 – December 26, 1991.

However, although most historians trace the start of the COLD WAR to soon after WW II, some argue that it began with the 1917 October Revolution in the Russian Republic when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Russian Provisional Government. IMNSHO, we missed the chance to strangle the beast in its crib by not taking an active part in defeating Lenin and his gang of genocidal maniacs in 1918. But that's me and my 20/20 hindsight.


Here is what PBS L;EARNING MEDIA's. AMERICAN EXPERIENCE has to say about the start of the COLD WAR.
The Start of the Cold War
Courtesy: National Archives
On July 25, 1945, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and American President Harry Truman met in the German town of Potsdam to discuss the fate of Germany. The meeting underlined the differences between the Allied powers, and set the stage for a post-war "cold" war that would be waged in the coming decades between two global superpowers.

Communism vs. Capitalism
The United States and the Soviet Union each wanted their own economic and political systems to prevail in the areas their soldiers occupied -- not only in Germany, but also in Eastern Europe and in Asia. While at Potsdam, Truman heard that Americans had detonated the first successful atomic weapon in New Mexico. "We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world," the president would write in his diary. "It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb," he added. "It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful."

Soviet Containment
At once, the balance of power shifted. Truman acted aggressively to secure territories from Soviet control. As U.S.-Soviet relations soured, the military divisions in Germany became de facto country boundaries, creating West and East Germany and the divided city of Berlin. In 1946, a Russian-based U.S. foreign service officer, George Kennan, sent Washington a message later known as the "long telegram," explaining Soviet hostility toward the West. According to Kennan, Stalin needed to believe in the triumph of communism over capitalism to legitimize his bloody dictatorship. He would do everything possible to undermine the major Western powers, but would not risk major war. Kennan's observations led to the American policy of Soviet containment, which was formalized in Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947. Truman supplied aid to Greece and Turkey and set in motion a worldwide fight against Soviet Communism.

The Iron Curtain
For his part, Stalin began creating what Winston Churchill would call the "Iron Curtain." "From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic," said Churchill, "an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and Eastern Europe: Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength and nothing for which they have less respect than military weakness." The Soviets sought to create a buffer zone between their country and Germany.

The Marshall Plan
The U.S.S.R. also demanded that Germany pay war reparations to rebuild the devastated Soviet infrastructure. In a different approach, the U.S. secretary of state, George Marshall, proposed a "European Recovery Program," known as the Marshall Plan, which allocated billions of dollars to European nations "to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which institutions can exist." As the U.S. pumped billions of dollars into Europe, West Germany's economic recovery triggered a broader European recovery. The Soviets viewed this development as a capitalist plot to draw the nations of Eastern European into the American sphere of influence. Further evidence to the Soviets of cooperation to keep them out of Eastern Europe was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949 "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."

The U.S. in Europe
Four United States army divisions were stationed in Europe to serve as the nucleus of NATO forces. NATO signified that the United States could no longer remain isolated from European affairs. European affairs were conducted under an American "nuclear umbrella" that acted as a deterrent against any Soviet temptation to attack. One by one, Communist governments loyal to Moscow seized power in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Soviet Communism soon dominated Eastern Europe. The Cold War had begun.

[stevep]

Sept 14, 2023 9:56:58 GMT oscssw said:

This is a bit off topic but what the hell. I was born in 1948 and the COLD WAR was always in the back ground and some few times the fore ground. Cuban Missile crisis and Nam very significant occurrences in my life.

So it begs the question when did the COLD WAR actually begin? A strong case can be made for March 12, 1947 – December 26, 1991.

However, although most historians trace the start of the COLD WAR to soon after WW II, some argue that it began with the 1917 October Revolution in the Russian Republic when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Russian Provisional Government. IMNSHO, we missed the chance to strangle the beast in its crib by not taking an active part in defeating Lenin and his gang of genocidal maniacs in 1918. But that's me and my 20/20 hindsight.


Here is what PBS L;EARNING MEDIA's. AMERICAN EXPERIENCE has to say about the start of the COLD WAR.
The Start of the Cold War
Courtesy: National Archives
On July 25, 1945, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and American President Harry Truman met in the German town of Potsdam to discuss the fate of Germany. The meeting underlined the differences between the Allied powers, and set the stage for a post-war "cold" war that would be waged in the coming decades between two global superpowers.

Communism vs. Capitalism
The United States and the Soviet Union each wanted their own economic and political systems to prevail in the areas their soldiers occupied -- not only in Germany, but also in Eastern Europe and in Asia. While at Potsdam, Truman heard that Americans had detonated the first successful atomic weapon in New Mexico. "We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world," the president would write in his diary. "It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb," he added. "It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful."

Soviet Containment
At once, the balance of power shifted. Truman acted aggressively to secure territories from Soviet control. As U.S.-Soviet relations soured, the military divisions in Germany became de facto country boundaries, creating West and East Germany and the divided city of Berlin. In 1946, a Russian-based U.S. foreign service officer, George Kennan, sent Washington a message later known as the "long telegram," explaining Soviet hostility toward the West. According to Kennan, Stalin needed to believe in the triumph of communism over capitalism to legitimize his bloody dictatorship. He would do everything possible to undermine the major Western powers, but would not risk major war. Kennan's observations led to the American policy of Soviet containment, which was formalized in Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947. Truman supplied aid to Greece and Turkey and set in motion a worldwide fight against Soviet Communism.

The Iron Curtain
For his part, Stalin began creating what Winston Churchill would call the "Iron Curtain." "From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic," said Churchill, "an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and Eastern Europe: Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength and nothing for which they have less respect than military weakness." The Soviets sought to create a buffer zone between their country and Germany.

The Marshall Plan
The U.S.S.R. also demanded that Germany pay war reparations to rebuild the devastated Soviet infrastructure. In a different approach, the U.S. secretary of state, George Marshall, proposed a "European Recovery Program," known as the Marshall Plan, which allocated billions of dollars to European nations "to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which institutions can exist." As the U.S. pumped billions of dollars into Europe, West Germany's economic recovery triggered a broader European recovery. The Soviets viewed this development as a capitalist plot to draw the nations of Eastern European into the American sphere of influence. Further evidence to the Soviets of cooperation to keep them out of Eastern Europe was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949 "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."

The U.S. in Europe
Four United States army divisions were stationed in Europe to serve as the nucleus of NATO forces. NATO signified that the United States could no longer remain isolated from European affairs. European affairs were conducted under an American "nuclear umbrella" that acted as a deterrent against any Soviet temptation to attack. One by one, Communist governments loyal to Moscow seized power in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Soviet Communism soon dominated Eastern Europe. The Cold War had begun.

  Its a difficult question especially since there is the issue of what you define as the start.  When one side either takes steps that trigger the state of continued tension or decide that a state of 'cold war' exists, when the other side recognizes either of those steps has been taken or some point in between.  Especially since for both sides but especially the west what is meant by one side is rather vague.  While the overwhelming centre of power, even in 1945 for the west was the US it needed to take allies with it and also it was a broad spectrum of interests in itself with broadly differing views on the issue.

  Agree its a pity that the Soviet empire came into existence but after the bitter bloodshed of WWI none of the allied powers were willing to take on the additional costs of trying to suppress it with significant force - apart from Japan which was however in the wrong position to do so, as well as falling foul of US suspicions.  Plus since the primary external threat to the Bolsheviks for the 1st year or so of their existence were the CPs with Germany and Turkey both seeking to gain territory and resources at times the western powers were sometimes in uneasy alliance with the Soviets, at least locally for that period.  Furthermore, apart from concern in the western powers of public opinion in their own countries large scale intervention could have boosted the Soviet status inside the former empire as the 'defenders' against foreign intervention.  It wasn't helped either by the fractured and often fractious nature of the opposition to the Bolsheviks.  Until too late the main white leaders were too tied to the former Czarist regime and its autocratic nature, which meant that they were unable to win over the majority of the population who might have opposed the Bolsheviks.