Many in 1930s thought US sanctions on Japan would lead to war, how did they expect that to work?
Jul 31, 2023 3:24:15 GMT
stevep likes this
Post by raharris1973 on Jul 31, 2023 3:24:15 GMT
In OTL, America completely embargoed oil/petroleum exports to Japan as part of its total financial freeze of Japan at the beginning of August, 1941.
This put enormous pressure on the Japanese, and they had a self-imposed deadline to resolve matters diplomatically with the USA by early November (in such a way that would restore oil exports) or go to war with the USA (and British and Dutch) and seize the oil resources of the Dutch East Indies and British Borneo as a substitute for lost oil imports from America. A settlement didn't work and Japan went to war on December 7th.
US sanctions on Japan* led Japan to war on the US.
Although when Americans imposed the sanctions, and the British and Dutch joined them, they calculated and hoped the Japanese would *not* attack as a result, the thought did cross their minds. The 'idea' of sanctioning Japan, including the embargo of oil, had been voiced multiple times in American policy circles since the early 30s and the initial Japanese invasion and occupation of China's northeastern provinces of Manchuria.
When the idea was discussed within the State Department and between Cabinet members and Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt at intervals including 1932, 1937 and 1938 or 1939, one corollary brought up, and seemingly assumed at one point President Hoover and another point by Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew was there being a high chance of American sanctions and oil embargo in particular leading to a Japanese-American War.
So what ended up happening OTL 1941, and its broad cause and effect, was predicted with some degree of accuracy as early as 1932, some nine years before.
However, in OTL 1941, a unique set of global circumstances, never predicted in precise detail earlier, converged to make the Japanese response to the American embargo, a war, a logical counter-move by Japan that could neutralize the oil embargo and handle the side effects.
The following Japanese "theory of victory", or logical train of thought, led to the war against the US (and Dutch, and British) being considered to the best solution: problem=Japan needs a secure oil supply------->Japan can secure at least a substantial oil supply by occupying the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya------>occupying these oil-producing territories is feasible because of Japan's naval power projection capable in late 1941, and the weakness and distraction of Dutch and British forces in the Far East because of WWII in Europe------ >however, the American owned Philippines sits right alongside all the direct shipping routes for DEI or Malayan oil to Japan and its empire, and the US could interdict the oil flow, at least with a bit more enforcement and fleet build-up------>solution=attack all of Dutch, British and American Southeast Asia and the western Pacific both to capture oil supplies while it is feasible and also destroy adversary forces that could interfere with regional naval supremacy and unhindered shipping from the newly occupied territories to Japan.
This was the logic. There were serious flaws and limitations to the logic, it did not take into account Japan's long-term inability to sustain its initial naval victory over time, and the Japanese plan ultimately failed, but that is not the point. War to gain the Dutch East Indies and its oil and against its perceived protectors [like the US] was in a limited sense a straightforward logical Japanese solution to the Japanese problem of the Americans and other westerners embargoing the sale of oil.
But would any of this limited logic have applied in the case of a US oil embargo on Japan in 1932 over Manchuria? Or over the Japanese invasion China in 1937? Or in 1939?
The record indicates some important people thought that it would be likely that:
US sanctions on Japan -----------> Japan goes to war with the USA , US economic, especially oil, sanctions on Japan would like cause Japanese war on America
But none of these earlier discussions had the same intervening variables or global factors that were affecting the situation in 1941. The Dutch East Indies factor was never mentioned in any of these cases. If the US had embargoed Japan in 1932, 1937, or 1939 over Japan's actions in China, before either WWII started in Europe, or the fall of France, Japan attacking the U.S. is not a solution, because defeating the US fleet in the western Pacific and seizing the US western Pacific territories, on its own, cannot force the U.S. to either send oil to Japan or unfreeze Japanese financial assets, and the territories conquered from America, notably the Philippines, have a few oilfields but nothing like the quantity Japan needs. Operations to defeat to defeat the U.S. fleet and seize American Pacific possessions, also do nothing to make the Dutch or British or others sell the oil under their control, or provide Japan foreign exchange for payment.
As you can see, the intermediate steps in Japan's "theory of victory" are missing. Attacking the U.S. can get a degree of revenge on America, but is not part of a plan to solve Japan's oil problem, and thus is entirely illogical. It leaves Japan's oil "itch", "unscratched".
So what were people who were worried about this: US sanctions on Japan -----------> Japan goes to war with the USA
really worried about?
"How" and "why" do they think embargo would have Japan to attack America. What could they have imagined the Japanese theory of victory would be?
a) Did they imagine the Japanese would *not* have a theory of victory or solution to their oil problem, they would simply be lashing out to take revenge?
b) Did they imagine the Japanese were intending to hold US Pacific territories under occupation as "hostages" to secure the delivery of American and other raw materials?
c) Did they imagine the Japanese would seek to eliminate the US fleet and seize American western Pacific possessions to establish dominance in the Pacific, and then as an adjunct, having taken the Philippines, they would invade and occupy the Dutch East Indies, held by the relatively weaker Dutch next door. ---and this part was in mind but simply never spoken out loud or written down?
d) Did they imagine the Japanese would seek to eliminate the US fleet and seize American western Pacific possessions to establish dominance in the Pacific, then consecutively destroy the British fleet in the Pacific, and having taken the Philippines and Malaya-Singapore next door, occupy the Dutch East Indies also. ----but all the non-American target were simply assumed and never spoken out loud or written down?
*These sanctions were neither unprovoked, nor out of the blue, nor frivolous - they were motivated by prior Japanese aggressive and threatening behavior, concretely demonstrated for years in China, more recently in Indochina, and more recently posing plausible threats to locales like the Philippines and Singapore.
This put enormous pressure on the Japanese, and they had a self-imposed deadline to resolve matters diplomatically with the USA by early November (in such a way that would restore oil exports) or go to war with the USA (and British and Dutch) and seize the oil resources of the Dutch East Indies and British Borneo as a substitute for lost oil imports from America. A settlement didn't work and Japan went to war on December 7th.
US sanctions on Japan* led Japan to war on the US.
Although when Americans imposed the sanctions, and the British and Dutch joined them, they calculated and hoped the Japanese would *not* attack as a result, the thought did cross their minds. The 'idea' of sanctioning Japan, including the embargo of oil, had been voiced multiple times in American policy circles since the early 30s and the initial Japanese invasion and occupation of China's northeastern provinces of Manchuria.
When the idea was discussed within the State Department and between Cabinet members and Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt at intervals including 1932, 1937 and 1938 or 1939, one corollary brought up, and seemingly assumed at one point President Hoover and another point by Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew was there being a high chance of American sanctions and oil embargo in particular leading to a Japanese-American War.
So what ended up happening OTL 1941, and its broad cause and effect, was predicted with some degree of accuracy as early as 1932, some nine years before.
However, in OTL 1941, a unique set of global circumstances, never predicted in precise detail earlier, converged to make the Japanese response to the American embargo, a war, a logical counter-move by Japan that could neutralize the oil embargo and handle the side effects.
The following Japanese "theory of victory", or logical train of thought, led to the war against the US (and Dutch, and British) being considered to the best solution: problem=Japan needs a secure oil supply------->Japan can secure at least a substantial oil supply by occupying the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya------>occupying these oil-producing territories is feasible because of Japan's naval power projection capable in late 1941, and the weakness and distraction of Dutch and British forces in the Far East because of WWII in Europe------ >however, the American owned Philippines sits right alongside all the direct shipping routes for DEI or Malayan oil to Japan and its empire, and the US could interdict the oil flow, at least with a bit more enforcement and fleet build-up------>solution=attack all of Dutch, British and American Southeast Asia and the western Pacific both to capture oil supplies while it is feasible and also destroy adversary forces that could interfere with regional naval supremacy and unhindered shipping from the newly occupied territories to Japan.
This was the logic. There were serious flaws and limitations to the logic, it did not take into account Japan's long-term inability to sustain its initial naval victory over time, and the Japanese plan ultimately failed, but that is not the point. War to gain the Dutch East Indies and its oil and against its perceived protectors [like the US] was in a limited sense a straightforward logical Japanese solution to the Japanese problem of the Americans and other westerners embargoing the sale of oil.
But would any of this limited logic have applied in the case of a US oil embargo on Japan in 1932 over Manchuria? Or over the Japanese invasion China in 1937? Or in 1939?
The record indicates some important people thought that it would be likely that:
US sanctions on Japan -----------> Japan goes to war with the USA , US economic, especially oil, sanctions on Japan would like cause Japanese war on America
But none of these earlier discussions had the same intervening variables or global factors that were affecting the situation in 1941. The Dutch East Indies factor was never mentioned in any of these cases. If the US had embargoed Japan in 1932, 1937, or 1939 over Japan's actions in China, before either WWII started in Europe, or the fall of France, Japan attacking the U.S. is not a solution, because defeating the US fleet in the western Pacific and seizing the US western Pacific territories, on its own, cannot force the U.S. to either send oil to Japan or unfreeze Japanese financial assets, and the territories conquered from America, notably the Philippines, have a few oilfields but nothing like the quantity Japan needs. Operations to defeat to defeat the U.S. fleet and seize American Pacific possessions, also do nothing to make the Dutch or British or others sell the oil under their control, or provide Japan foreign exchange for payment.
As you can see, the intermediate steps in Japan's "theory of victory" are missing. Attacking the U.S. can get a degree of revenge on America, but is not part of a plan to solve Japan's oil problem, and thus is entirely illogical. It leaves Japan's oil "itch", "unscratched".
So what were people who were worried about this: US sanctions on Japan -----------> Japan goes to war with the USA
really worried about?
"How" and "why" do they think embargo would have Japan to attack America. What could they have imagined the Japanese theory of victory would be?
a) Did they imagine the Japanese would *not* have a theory of victory or solution to their oil problem, they would simply be lashing out to take revenge?
b) Did they imagine the Japanese were intending to hold US Pacific territories under occupation as "hostages" to secure the delivery of American and other raw materials?
c) Did they imagine the Japanese would seek to eliminate the US fleet and seize American western Pacific possessions to establish dominance in the Pacific, and then as an adjunct, having taken the Philippines, they would invade and occupy the Dutch East Indies, held by the relatively weaker Dutch next door. ---and this part was in mind but simply never spoken out loud or written down?
d) Did they imagine the Japanese would seek to eliminate the US fleet and seize American western Pacific possessions to establish dominance in the Pacific, then consecutively destroy the British fleet in the Pacific, and having taken the Philippines and Malaya-Singapore next door, occupy the Dutch East Indies also. ----but all the non-American target were simply assumed and never spoken out loud or written down?
*These sanctions were neither unprovoked, nor out of the blue, nor frivolous - they were motivated by prior Japanese aggressive and threatening behavior, concretely demonstrated for years in China, more recently in Indochina, and more recently posing plausible threats to locales like the Philippines and Singapore.
