What if Sultan Abdulaziz yielded a territory instead of the Khedival title to Ismail of Egypt in ret

[raharris1973]

What if Sultan Abdulaziz yielded a territory instead of the Khedival title to Ismail of Egypt in return for crushing the Cretan revolt and increased tribute?

From the wikipedia page on Ismail Pasha of Egypt:

After the death of Sa'id, Isma'il was proclaimed Khedive on 19 January 1863, though the Ottoman Empire and the other Great Powers recognized him only as Wāli. Like all Egyptian and Sudanese rulers since his grandfather Muhammad Ali Pasha, he claimed the higher title of Khedive, which the Sublime Porte had consistently refused to sanction. Finally, in 1867, Isma'il succeeded in persuading the Ottoman SultanAbdülaziz to grant a firman finally recognizing him as Khedive in exchange for an increase in the tribute, because of the Khedive's help in the Cretan Revolt between 1866 and 1869. Another firman changed the law of succession to direct descent from father to son rather than brother to brother, and a further decree in 1873 confirmed the virtual independence of the Khedivate of Egypt from the Porte.

What if the Ottoman Sultan, Abdulaziz, pridefully refused to give in on recognizing the Egyptian ruler's title promotion from Wali to Khedive, but instead offered the Egyptian Wali hereditary governance of some additional territory in return for his military support and tribute money to the Ottoman budget?

Or alternatively,

What if Egyptian Khedive Ismail Pasha, seeking to leverage military support for the Sultan in Crete, and his willingness to pay a higher regular tribute [from his his Civil War era cotton sales windfall, and expected Suez Canal dues] decided what he wanted most from the Sultan was additional territory for his dynasty's domain, regardless of whether the Sultan called him Wali or Khedive or Charlie, or Bill, or late for dinner?

Possible territories in question might be:

a) Libya - It is adjacent to Egypt in Africa, and certainly closer to the Egyptian center of power than the Turkish one at the straits. It actually consists of three provinces - Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripoli. It helps Ismail Pasha 'round out' his large northeast African domain. It is not worth all that much by itself, but looks good on a map, and for the Sultan, seems hardly a sacrifice.

b) Palestine - more specifically, Sinai/ aka Governorate of Arish & Akaba, Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem, Sanjak of Acre, Sanjak of Beirut (actually south of Beirut city) - It is a coastal strip with a string of ports and olive and citrus growing areas coastal connected to Egyptian Sinai and the Nile delta, fairly naturally divided off from the other Ottoman domains by the Jordan river and Gulf of Aqaba. It has the assets and liabilities of attracting global including western tourist revenue (and consular representation/presence) and *interest* as shown in the lead up to the late Crimean war Russo-French wrestling match over the keys to the Holy Places.

c) Hijaz, Asir, Yemen - It is right across the Red Sea from Egypt and easily could be drawn to have a land connection with Egypt via Sinai. It would make a semi-coherent geographic set, enclosing Ismail Pasha's Red Sea empire that has enclaves on the African Red Sea coast. This area is far from the straits and Anatolia, and difficult to administer. However, its religious significance makes it a substantial sacrifice to the Sultan and the Ulema in the capital, and because of pilgrimage, its revenue and revenue potential is nontrivial.

Also, to give a sense of the Ottoman domain around the time of the proposed territorial reassignment, here is a link to a map of Ottoman provinces, 1875:

upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6a/Ottomans_1875.png

By 1899 there was an apparent degree of simplification of internal boundaries: upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/59/Ottoman_Empire_Administrative_Divisions.png

What would have happened differently in the remainder of the 19th century, if any of these three territories, Libya, western Arabia (Hijaz-Yemen), or Palestine, had been transferred from direct Ottoman control to Egyptian vassal control in 1867? Especially when, as a consequence of poor Egyptian finances and internal disorders, Britain occupies Egypt in 1882, and thus occupies, or disposes of, the recently acquired Egyptian territory.

[raharris1973]

Here's an idea for scenario A) Egyptian Libya, from the 1860s onward:

The geopolitical effects of Egyptian rule over Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripoli, Libya's three provinces, should be relatively undramatic at first. These provinces add little revenue to the Egyptian budget, just some additional caravan routes with some of the interior Sahara and Sahel oasis polities, and customs revenues from ports like Tobruk, Benghazi, Misrata, Tripoli, where European, Italians, Greeks, French, British do some merchandise trade.

In the remainder of the 1860s and into the 1870s, the Ottoman Sultan and his officialdom insists on calling the ruler of Egypt the Wali, or Governor, but Ismail is enforcincing the title Khedive on his subjects internally, and that's what the Europeans are pretty much calling him as well. Especially by the time he is doing the grand opening ceremonies for the Suez Canal in 1869.

Between 1865-1882 the Egyptian government may need to deal with some local unrest in Libya, particularly from members of the Senussi order in Cyrenaica, if and when they feel their prerogatives are menaced. I honestly don't know enough about the Libyan internal situation at that time. But Egyptian forces should be able to handle it with Bedouin escorted regular forces and sea-mobility along the coast.

Nothing about Egypt possessing Libya through Tripoli should prevent the French acquisition of Tunisia in 1881, or the Egyptian internal disorder, leading to British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Only now, the British occupation regime is extended to encompass Libya. In practical terms at first, this means British residents and garrisons at Tripoli and Benghazi.
And just like that, as 1883 dawns, the Ottoman Empire is completely bereft, in a practical sense, even if not a formal, suzerain sense, of all its African territories.

All of the North African coast, save Morocco, is spoken for by colonial powers, and Italy will not see any opportunity to seize the Libyan 'box of sand' for itself.

The clear and obvious preemption of any Italian interest, not only in Tunisia (like OTL), but also in Tripoli/Libya (unlike OTL) will encourage the Italian interest in East Africa (which happened OTL anyway).

There is no reason though to expect Italy will be any more successful than OTL in conquering Abyssinia.

Then in the 1902 timeframe, I would not expect Delcasse of France to be able to use colonial horsetrading and the prospect of supporting French claims to Libya to gain Italian support for French claims to Morocco. However, Italy may still follow its historic trend of always taking its irredentist claims against Austria more *seriously* than those against France.

The only practical difference this might make is that in the 1906 Algeciras conference, Germany *might* get one more vote in its favor, from Italy. But it may not, if Italy is still consumed with oppositionalism to Austria. Either way, France would have majority support at the conference.

I would expect the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina to still come about in 1908, and still piss of Russia and the Entente, and Italy.

The *big* difference comes in 1911, when there is simply no basis for Italy to make an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire over Libya, and subsequently, launch a war upon the Ottoman Empire. The absence of this war saves both Italy, and the Ottoman Empire's 'Young Turk' regime, a boatload of money.

It also prevents a vivid demonstration of Ottoman naval weakness and diplomatic isolation from the Great Powers of Europe, thus preventing the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.

The greater likelihood from there, is less Austro-Hungarian paranoia in general about the growth of Serbian power and ambition, and less resolve in Austria-Hungary to resolve the question of the Serbian menace by war, along with lesser confidence in Serbian nationalist secret societies, and simply a great chance of butterflying away the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne in 1914, and consequently WWI.

From there the speculative consequences are really huge. Sort of too huge, and they overwhelm the difference of territorial change in northern Africa.

-- to keep things familiar, let's say Serbian hotheads still succeed in assassinating the heir to the Habsburg throne in 1914, and Austria-Hungary is still keen to go to war over it, and it brings in the competing European alliances. It's not a crazy or impossible idea, even if less likely than the alternative - irritation and foreboding in Vienna over the Karageorgovic coup of 1903, the hog war of 1906 (fought over trade and railway rights), and the Bosnia crisis of 1908-1909, *could* be enough to leave Franz-Joseph thinking that even a smaller than OTL Serbia should be crushed, and Germany could be in the same mood to duke it out before Russia gets too strong.

-A difference in WWI is that Italy would be fiscally healthier, with a less tired army, for not having fought the war with the Ottomans. It will have a little bit less practice, and will not have gotten its OTL practice in aerial bombardment (which it invented in Libya), but it should be in better shape than OTL in terms of national resources. Italy should have the option of actually joining the war *earlier* than OTL, in the autumn of 1914, or earlier in the spring of 1915, if they can internally push aside pro-neutrality political forces. Any such earlier Italian entry into WWI should be helpful to the Entente.

-Ottoman neutrality in the European War is also much more likely. Without the sustained beatings and territorial thefts it experienced in OTL 1911-1912 from Italy and the Balkan states, the OE will be less desperate to definitely acquire a European great power ally for protection. In OTL it felt that neutrality offered no safety and just invited *all* powers to pick at its territories, so alliance with *anybody*, Britain, France, Germany, even Russia! the 'fox in the henhouse' was preferable to going it alone. In this TL they are not so pressured. The last piece of territory they lost was Crete, to rebellion in 1897-98, and international occupation with a Greek Prince as High Commissioner, with the fig leaf of the Ottoman flag, but no actual Muslims, remaining.

Ottoman neutrality would also be another highly positive development for the Entente because of the straits being open, at least to commercial traffic of civilian goods. On the other side of the ledger, the geography of the Serbian and Montenegrin fronts is poorer for them. They have less depth and smaller recruiting grounds and population. The Austro-Hungarians do not need to march as far to reach the neutral Ottoman border, and the Serbs have much less chance to escape to the Adriatic for later use. If they can escape Central Powers internment at all, they have to be interned in the neutral OE or Romania.

On yet another hand, the Ottoman Empire joining the war is not impossible - the Cretan experience, and their generally positive experience with German advisors and investors could encourage them to lean that way, in which case the Ottomans would start the war much less run down that how they started the war in OTL 1914. They would start the war, auspiciously, even with a thin territorial corridor of continuity with Austria via the Sanjak of Novi-Pazar. Their extended territory in Europe however, would give them extended lines to defend both in Europe from Balkan neighbors (augmented by whatever Entente/Russian forces can be spared) and in Asia, by Entente forces. Ottoman entry into the Great War unless it is coincident with complete and total military successes by the Turks and CPs, would be temptation for the Bulgarians and Greeks to declare war and join the Entente that would almost certainly be too great for them to ignore, and would also likely spur Christian revolts in Macedonia and Thrace/Rumelia.

However exactly WWI resolves, and the outcome could be in doubt, since Libya is never Italian, if a *second round* in any form occurs, we will never have a Libya-Egypt 'western desert' war like we saw in WWII.

Libya will likely remain after WWI a part of Britain's Egyptian protectorate, and not face the intense insurgency and then Italian counterinsurgency that devolved into near genocidal and use of chemical warfare. Alternatively, if Britain somehow lost badly enough and the Ottomans were on the opposite, winning side, Ottoman rule over Egypt and Libya would be restored, probably also avoiding anything of the severity of the Italian counterinsurgency campaign.

I suppose Libya being broken off as a separate administrative unit from Egypt isn't *impossible*, but once Egypt is independent, and there is a hint of oil discovery, independent Egypt would probably want to hold on really tight, and its population outnumbers the Libyan about 12 to 1.

[raharris1973]

By the way, I surprised myself with there being more dramatic divergences from reassigning Libya than I expected. In many ways, the differences for history of WWI and beyond were even more potentially dramatic than the differences for the next variation I will explore -

Here's an idea for scenario B) Egyptian Palestine, from the 1860s onward. It is not the *only* possible scenario, but the most likely:

The geopolitical effects of Egyptian rule over the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem, Sanjak of Acre, Sanjak of Beirut (actually south of Beirut city), the governing units comprising 'Palestine', should be relatively undramatic at first. These provinces add some net revenue to the Egyptian budget, from Christian, Jewish and Muslim pilgrimage tourism and the citrus and olive trades.

In the remainder of the 1860s and into the 1870s, the Ottoman Sultan and his officialdom insists on calling the ruler of Egypt the Wali, or Governor, but Ismail is enforcing the title Khedive on his subjects internally, and that's what the Europeans are pretty much calling him as well. Especially by the time he is doing the grand opening ceremonies for the Suez Canal in 1869.

Between 1865-1882 the Egyptian government may need to deal with some local unrest in Palestine, mostly from local Muslim provincial elites, Druze and Bedouin, the best armed part of the population, if and when they feel their prerogatives are menaced. But Egyptian forces should be able to handle it with sea-mobility along the coast and not terrible land mobility from Lower Egypt and the regime's power center in the Nile Delta. Oppositional elements taking advantage of the border with the Ottoman Empire can be one of the bigger problems whenever the Ottomans are lax about enforcement of border controls or security. The proudly modernizing, glitzier, Suez Canal-promoting regime of Khedive Ismail exercising rule over Palestine, instead of the less ambitious and self-promoting Ottomans, in the late 1860s through 1870s, will likely encourage more European immigration into the cities of Palestine, by European Jews, and European Christians, than we saw in OTL. This would be much like we saw in cities in lower Egypt like Alexandria, with prominent Jewish, Greek, Italian, and pan-European neighborhoods. Khedive Ismail will mostly see these foreigners as welcome additions to the tax and skill base, and there might even be some rudimentary, simple textile manufacturing operations set up in Alexandria and Palestine taking advantage of Egypt's cotton supplies.

Nothing about Egypt possessing Palestine should prevent the Egyptian internal disorder, leading to British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Only now, the British occupation regime is extended to encompass Palestine. In practical terms at first, this means British resident officials and garrisons at Rafah, Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa, Acre, and some places in between.

Britain will administer Palestine as another subdivision of Egypt, It will probably be even more uniformly administered with the rest of Egypt compared to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, because it won't spend 17 years under the rule of the breakaway Mahdi's regime, and because Palestine has such relatively close and secure communications with Cairo, Alexandria and Lower Egypt.
Formally, the Ottoman Empire will remain suzerain over Egypt and Palestine.

Like in the case of OTL Egypt after 1882, British ruled Egyptian Palestine will be administered primarily with keeping a balanced budget and servicing western loans in mind. To the degree law and order, public health, and educational minimums help with that, they'll be supported or permitted, but not sponsored with any great generosity or altruism or notable cost to the British electoral class.

Already middle-class or elite types, or ethnic or religious minorities, resident Europeans, and people in urban settings, will generally be better enabled to take advantage of opportunities in the British imperial system than fellahin peasants, manual laborers, and bedouin.

The quest for revenue in the 1880s and 1890s will probably lead to some substantial auctions of state lands Jewish capitalist purchasers and other, Christian and non-religious European purchasers in Palestine. Some of the Jewish purchasers, motivated by the 1882 Russian pogroms and their aftermath, will have mind using at least some of this land as refuges and settlements for Russian and Romanian Jews. As this scales up, this will provoke a degree of local protest. So the Jewish population of Palestine under British administration will be somewhat higher by some thousands by 1900, although this represents no British government commitment to political Zionism....its routine colonial business, pounds and pence. And America, the other countries of the Americas, Britain, France, and the Antipodes are by far the favored destinations of Jewish, and other, emigrants from the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires in the late 19th century decades.

By the late 1890s, Theodor Herzl will organize political Zionism as an international political movement. He will focus his lobbying more squarely on the British government, the Egyptian royal government, and the British administrators in Egypt, with just nominal minimal attention to the Sultan. He will promise Jewish immigration provided great tax receipts of the long-term and great shorter term tax receipts from land sales transactions. The Egyptian interlocutors will all be cold and hostile to the idea, as will the Sultan. The London British will defer to the "men on the spot" in Cairo. The British in Cairo will have a harder time objecting to settlement projects across Palestine, especially in the north, like they were able to object to the El-Arish, Sinai settlement plan of circa 1900-1903, because of lack of nearby water. Northern Palestine has more groundwater and more rainfall. However, already experiencing larger immigrant Jewish and Christian European populations in their midst, Muslim and Christian Palestinian opposition, demonstrations, and petitions against large settlement schemes will be more mobilized than OTL, and will have sympathetic echoes throughout Egypt, and at least adjacent parts of the Ottoman Empire. Substantial European non-Jewish immigrants, in some senses a little higher than Jews in the social hierarchy, or aspiring to be, may join in the agitation to object to mass settlement or special exclusive territorial reservations for the Jews.

The greatest likelihood is the British will come down rejecting Herzl's proposals and Zionist ideas in general pretty definitively by 1905, simply judging it far more trouble that it is worth. It discourages Zionists a bit. A trickle of Jews continue to move in. The thin reed of hope remains for diehards, it's enough to cause rejection of the Uganda (Kenya) option when offered. Development in Palestine, as in Egypt, also encourages increase in Arabic-speaking Christian and Muslim populations, both natural (increase of birth over death rate ratio) and immigration from other parts of Egypt and adjoining parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Then we get to WWI. The Ottoman Empire is still likely to join the Central Powers, because the British are likely to hold back and dreadnought orders in progress, Ottoman anti-Russian feeling in particular, and the fact that it's been Entente powers doing the preponderance of nibbling at and annexing Ottoman territory over the last century or two, and Germany hasn't.

Although it cannot threaten the Suez Canal, an early in the war Ottoman offensive on British Egyptian Palestine fits in perfectly with the global anti-Entente Jihad the three Pashas had the Sultan declare, and they could easily call it Operation Saladin to liberate Al-Quds/Al-Aqsa/Jerusalem. Besides, it is a necessary preemption for strategic depth for the empire's own Greater Syrian and Arabian territories.

Some overactive thinkers among the German diplomats and advisors to the Ottoman Empire, or advising them from Berlin, may be proposing making promises to the local Jewish community of Palestine of some kind of state to win them over out of some exaggerated sense of their power and importance, and their influence over 'Global Jewry' and the Jews of Russia and other important countries. Any of these people will quickly be told by the Ottomans, and German and Austrian colleagues more intimately knowledgeable about the Ottomans, to GTFO and STFU.

They may have counterparts in Britain, but the smart money in Britain, and British administration Cairo and Palestine will decide no, it is time to definitively reiterate Britain's opposition to Zionist projects in Palestine, reiterate that Palestine, Al-Quds, and Al-Aqsa are now and forever Egyptian. Egypt and the canal are just too important to not mollify potential Egyptian unrest. The Muslim population of India, and its outsize representation of the Indian Army is too important to not mollify. As for rallying the local Jews and European communities resident in Palestine and Alexandria, the British figure they have no choice but to rally to the Union Jack, in fear of their lives and property in the event of Turkish conquest.

So, from 1914, Britain further boxes itself out of making any Balfour declaration.

The Ottomans will certainly advance across the shallow Jordan and into the Galilee and some distance into the Negev and quite possibly temporarily occupy Jerusalem, the hills of the west bank and perhaps reach the Palestine coast in some places at best, but it should not take long for the British to recover their position. No later than some point in 1915.

After trial and error, through WWI, eventually the efforts of the Arab revolt out of the Hijaz and the Mesopotamian campaign should succeed.

Since Egyptian administration was already there, present in the Palestine portion of the Levant, the British may give consideration to extending Egyptian administration to the rest of greater Syria and all the Levant. The Egyptian Khedive or King, or certainly one or more of his advisors or courtiers will propose something like this, an "Anglo-Egyptian Syria". But it is not likely to be adopted.

The mandate system is likely to be adopted as OTL, and Britain will likely have to make compromises with the French in the region.

Egypt will be seething with independence desires postwar.

If you're thnking this course of WWI is all running too convergently with OTL, and think something would really have to change, a suppose a pretty plausible change on the Ottoman-Palestine front could be any of the following:
A) Commitment of the Indian Army force that OTL went to Basra, Mesoptamia/Iraq, to Aqaba, southern Palestine instead, to protect existing imperial assets in Palestine. This early injection of forces defend, becomes a sufficient force for an early counterattack, leading, mid-war, in 1916, or possibly if lucky as early as late 1915, to a British-Indian advance up through the Levant to Taurus mountains, converging with southwest marching Russians, somewhere in Kurdistan or Greater Armenia.
B) No change to OTL's Mesopotamia line of advance, but the required defensive effort in Palestine leads to a larger deployment, based off of Palestinian ports closer to targets in the Turkish Levant - no need to lay out water and fuel pipelines across the Sinai. As a result, instead deploying forces to force the straits and invade Gallipolli in 1914, the Allies just pour more resources into the Levant campaign to take Syria and Lebanon and Cilicia, through a frontal and coastal push, or they get fanc and supplement it with a landing operation at Alexandretta/Antioch. Unlike Gallipolli, the Allies meet success here, the Allies take the Levant basically three years early, and the Ottomans in Arabia and Iraq are cut off, preventing the embarassing British surrender at Kut. Again the Allies converge with the Russians in the eastern Turkey area that is mostly Kurdish or Armenian inhabited.
C) A more slight change - no change to Mesopotamia (and the Kut failure), Gallipolli (and its failure), but the alternate version of the Allenby Palestine campaign of 1917-18 has at least a one year head start, starting from Galilee and getting to Damascus and up to the Taurus mountains long before Lawrence's pals can even catch up.

Egypt later on - post-WWI, it will be formally independent and a League of Nations member, but actually a British protectorate (called an ally), hosting British troops. Britain will reoccupy it for WWII assuming that happens. The royal government will extract a commitment for eventual total evacuation of all Egypt, including Palestine, and the canal zone by the end of the 40s or the 50s.

European refugees in WWII (Jews and Gentiles, like Greeks and Poles) may once more take refuge in Egypt, but not in overwhelming numbers.

Without the Arab-Israeli war, the Egyptian monarchy has a greater chance of surviving, especially the more it leans into popular anti-British feeling. However. eventual overthrow by nationalist military officers in the 1950s is still likely in any case, I do not quite believe the conservative Arab monarchist viewpoint that ascribes *all* Mideast popular support for radical republicanism and socialism in the region to the humiliating surprise defeat at Israeli hands. Republicanism and Socialism were also by the 1950s simply much more 'trendy' and 'sexy' ideas than monarchy to the educated classes. Land reform was a popular cause.
There may be a somewhat greater chance for Egypt to keep its parliamentary system, post-coup. But even here, militarist populists may associate parliamentarians too much with the landed and anti-land reform wealthy elite.

The more avant garde, lefty socialist and antagonistic to Britain (and by extension Britain's allies) Greater Egypt gets, the more friendly it will be with the Soviet Union. By the year 2000, Egypt will likely still be ruling Palestine and Sinai, but their regional senses of identity, and regional discontentments will have grown much stronger, probably with some activists separatist movements fighting under Islamist or other ideological guise.

[stevep]

   raharris1973 ,

   I think the Libyan option is the most likely of the three as its fairly irrelevant to the Ottomans.  Not sure there won't be more butterflies but some of the things you mention could well have some interesting affects on world development.

  Wondering if, seeing no option in Libya being shut off a generation or two earlier might Italy try and make a stronger bid for Tunisia?  IIRC I did read that the bulk of the European settlers there were from Italy and its so close to Sicily.  Whether they could get agreement from France - say in return for support for an earlier protective over Morocco?  If they can't they might try something more aggressive somewhere else as they get desperate for some colonial possessions of some sort.

  I can't see the Ottomans being willing to give up either of the other options in large part because of the Sultan's claim to the Caliphate.  That would make conceding the Hijaz region politically very difficult given the possession of the two holiest locations in Sunni Islam.

  Palestine for similar reasons because it means conceding Jerusalem and probably more important effective Turkish access to the Hijaz, which would very much be dependent on Egyptian permission.  Also some of the Ottomans will be concerned about the parallel with Egyptian moves in the 1830's and 40's when Egypt advanced through Palestine and Syria and looked close to displacing the Ottomans across most of their Asian empire.  Given the repeated weaknesses of the empire in the 19thC and that Egypt might be seen as more welcoming to the Arabs of the wider region that their current Turkish overlords.

  Steve

[raharris1973]

Nov 10, 2023 23:52:27 GMT stevep said:

I think the Libyan option is the most likely of the three as its fairly irrelevant to the Ottomans.  Not sure there won't be more butterflies but some of the things you mention could well have some interesting affects on world development.

Sure!

Nov 10, 2023 23:52:27 GMT stevep said:

Wondering if, seeing no option in Libya being shut off a generation or two earlier might Italy try and make a stronger bid for Tunisia?  IIRC I did read that the bulk of the European settlers there were from Italy and its so close to Sicily.  Whether they could get agreement from France - say in return for support for an earlier protective over Morocco?

Maybe, but Italy's problem in the 1878 timeframe (Congress of Berlin), 1881 (French move on Tunis), 1882 (British move in Egypt) was just its governments overall slowness and cautiousness in general. Italy likely didn't conceive of a desire for Libya by the 1860s. It did have the bulk of colonists/traders by 1881. Some say the British didn't like the same power on both sides of the straits, and so preferred France to Italy, I don't know, seems like they'd still be OK with Italy as the weaker. I first heard of Italy even wanting Libya in 1878. So more contestation over Tunis in 1881 could be a real thing. If you want a big butterfly, that could lead to a Franco-Italian war that proceeds and France pummels Italy, and defeated Italy slinks into alliance with Germany. Or, Bismarck issues an ultimatum to prevent France from going to war to contest Italy, and Italy also joins an alliance with Germany. Or the biggest of all, the Tunis crisis is a spark for an Italo-German war against France in 1881, with Russia and Britain neutral unless Belgium is violated or the Germans (or French) try to win 'too big'.
On resolving a Tunis for support in Morocco trade - maybe, but France may be too concerned about Spanish, and potential British, objections to that.

Nov 10, 2023 23:52:27 GMT stevep said:

If they can't they might try something more aggressive somewhere else as they get desperate for some colonial possessions of some sort.

Their difficulty is they are running out of places to do it in. There's Abyssinia, but whether they do that early, or as schedule, unless they do a better job of preparation, reinforcement, supply and so on, they will lose.

I get what you're saying on Hijaz

Palestine also has its importance because of Jerusalem. I would say Palestine, west of the Jordan, and reassigned it to Egypt, does not actually obstruct Ottoman access to the Hijaz, but yes, it does make it more exposed to a foreigners/vassals border.