WI no Gallipoli or substitute, Ottomans attacked from edges only from beginning of WWI?

[raharris1973]

What if the Entente never executed an amphibious invasion scheme against the interior of the Ottoman Empire, neither forcing the straits of the Dardanelles, nor the Gallipoli landing, nor a landing at Alexandretta?

The reason they do not do the Alexandretta operation is, similarly to OTL, that it is the British contemplating a move and with the spare resources in the winter of 1914-1915, but the French consider that part of Syria/Asia Minor exclusively their own, so they warn off Britain. But the difference in the ATL is that the Russians also voice the same proprietary objection to any British-led expedition to capture the straits. They certainly object to any British led operation on the Dardanelles, at the very, very least, until they feel they have gotten their own Black Sea fleet and armies ready for an amphibious desant to seize Istanbul/Tsargrad and the Bosporus for themselves, and they really prefer all the straits including the Dardanelles as well. The conditions allowing this in any case, are unlikely to occur during the war.

This does not mean that Britain and British easterners need to be idle against the Ottoman Empire. From the very beginning of the declared war, after all, they grabbed Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf, and began an upriver advance up the Tigris and Euphrates, to gradually seize Ottoman Mesopotamia. The British also were compelled to defend Egyptian Sinai and the Suez Canal from Ottoman assault. In the absence of offensive initiatives elsewhere, the British could have completed their Sinai counteroffensive earlier, and then gone on to launch their Palestine offensive earlier than historical. An earlier launch of a Palestine offensive would depend not only on earlier commitment of resources, but also on a necessary minimum of logistical preparations in terms of road preparations, supply depots, water and fuel pipelines being established in the recovered Sinai before much of an advance in Palestine could be attempted. Attempts to collude with, and support rebellion by the Sharif of Mecca could also probably begin earlier.

What would be the effects of no Gallipoli operation in 1915? Might this, at first, benefit the CP, by enabling the Ottomans to better respond to the Russians in northeast Anatolia, and the British in southern Mesopotamia? And with the British not displaying such boldness, aggression, and apparent strength by striking at the Dardanelles, might the Bulgarians join the CP earlier than OTL, dooming the Serbs earlier than OTL, and the Italians join the war perhaps later than OTL, within 1915?

By what point in time could the British have recovered all Sinai? By what point in time could they launch an offensive into the Negev and Palestine, and capture such initial targets as Gaza and Beersheba? Could a lack of distraction with straits operations encourage the British and British Indian forces in Mesopotamia to operate more cautiously and professionally there, and avoid getting overextended and cut-off, like they did in OTL?

How would the rest of the Ottoman and Balkan theaters and WWI at large proceed without Gallipoli or other such fancy footwork leading to debacles, just a continued slog on the main European fronts, like OTL, plus the Ottoman Empire's southern and northeastern peripheries?

[stevep]

Nov 20, 2023 19:04:55 GMT raharris1973 said:

What if the Entente never executed an amphibious invasion scheme against the interior of the Ottoman Empire, neither forcing the straits of the Dardanelles, nor the Gallipoli landing, nor a landing at Alexandretta?

The reason they do not do the Alexandretta operation is, similarly to OTL, that it is the British contemplating a move and with the spare resources in the winter of 1914-1915, but the French consider that part of Syria/Asia Minor exclusively their own, so they warn off Britain. But the difference in the ATL is that the Russians also voice the same proprietary objection to any British-led expedition to capture the straits. They certainly object to any British led operation on the Dardanelles, at the very, very least, until they feel they have gotten their own Black Sea fleet and armies ready for an amphibious desant to seize Istanbul/Tsargrad and the Bosporus for themselves, and they really prefer all the straits including the Dardanelles as well. The conditions allowing this in any case, are unlikely to occur during the war.

This does not mean that Britain and British easterners need to be idle against the Ottoman Empire. From the very beginning of the declared war, after all, they grabbed Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf, and began an upriver advance up the Tigris and Euphrates, to gradually seize Ottoman Mesopotamia. The British also were compelled to defend Egyptian Sinai and the Suez Canal from Ottoman assault. In the absence of offensive initiatives elsewhere, the British could have completed their Sinai counteroffensive earlier, and then gone on to launch their Palestine offensive earlier than historical. An earlier launch of a Palestine offensive would depend not only on earlier commitment of resources, but also on a necessary minimum of logistical preparations in terms of road preparations, supply depots, water and fuel pipelines being established in the recovered Sinai before much of an advance in Palestine could be attempted. Attempts to collude with, and support rebellion by the Sharif of Mecca could also probably begin earlier.

What would be the effects of no Gallipoli operation in 1915? Might this, at first, benefit the CP, by enabling the Ottomans to better respond to the Russians in northeast Anatolia, and the British in southern Mesopotamia? And with the British not displaying such boldness, aggression, and apparent strength by striking at the Dardanelles, might the Bulgarians join the CP earlier than OTL, dooming the Serbs earlier than OTL, and the Italians join the war perhaps later than OTL, within 1915?

By what point in time could the British have recovered all Sinai? By what point in time could they launch an offensive into the Negev and Palestine, and capture such initial targets as Gaza and Beersheba? Could a lack of distraction with straits operations encourage the British and British Indian forces in Mesopotamia to operate more cautiously and professionally there, and avoid getting overextended and cut-off, like they did in OTL?

How would the rest of the Ottoman and Balkan theaters and WWI at large proceed without Gallipoli or other such fancy footwork leading to debacles, just a continued slog on the main European fronts, like OTL, plus the Ottoman Empire's southern and northeastern peripheries?

  I'm not sure that the POD works as IIRC part of the reason for the campaigns was because Russia was pleading for western aid given the apparent threat in the winter of 14/15 in eastern Anatolia.  Albeit that this was largely ended by Envar Pasha destroying his own army but it took some time for the Russians to realise that.  A better one might be that the westerners manage to suppress the idea of any substantial forces go immediately to the western front.

  Agree with your points about it generally being good for the Turks and it being likely that Bulgaria joins the CPs earlier, prompting an earlier fall of Serbia.  In terms of success in Sinai/Palestine and Mesopotamia its likely to be slower than OTL because of the better Turkish/CP position.  Although it does seem there were errors made that delayed the capture of the Gaza region which was the important key step in gaining a secure foothold east of the desert that enable forces to be built up for an advance further north.  As such its likely that the Ottoman empire survives a bit longer and possibly it might cause enough butterflies that the CPs end up with a victory of exhaustion.  Although always possible that butterflies of some sort counter this.

  Are you presuming no naval attempt to force the straits either or just no military landings in Gallipoli?

  One big impact might be on Australia and its relations with Britain as it was a crucial point in their development and might not have the same impact if ANZAC forces are simply dying on the western front as part of the main British effort.