If the Triple Entente lost WWI, it is likely that Britain, not France, would have been the most reva

[raharris1973]

There is a what I think is a "trope" in popular alternate history imaginings and speculations, written into a few different novels, and games or game settings like GURPS alternate earths, where if Germany wins WWI, it inverts Germany and France in the postwar years, France instead of Germany, becomes a right-wing, maybe Fascist, Revanchist power (maybe under DeGaulle, maybe under somebody who was a Fascist/quasi-Fascist politician in real-life), come up with a military doctrinal equivalent of blitzkrieg, I once read it as guerre eclair (yum!) and starts the timeline's alternate WWII.

I guess the thinking behind this is that France and Germany are easily mirror-image inversions of each other other's politics taking turns at revenge, Russia is doing its own weird thing with Socialism/Communism, and Britain is just too democratic, level-headed and cool as a cucumber to ever get reckless and revanchist.

I don't buy it.

Even as an exercise in mirroring France and Germany, Germany quit after losing two wars in a row. Here, France would have lost two wars in a row (Franco-Prussian and WWI), and if you're counting only ones that had a German/Prussian front, three in a row (the Napoleonic Wars, at least the final one).

And only a funhouse mirror can make France as big as Germany in the economy, industry, population, coal energy reserves.

Germany's revanchist drive in OTL (our timeline, real history) came from two sources, yes, rage at being cut down to size, but also confidence it really had been winning, certainly was at the edge of winning, a feeling of power. After a WWI defeat, either early in the war, 1914-ish, the middle, or late, after exhaustion, France may have the rage, but not the underlying confidence and sense of power for a comeback.

Going into the war in 1914 indeed the least was expected out of France out of the Triple Entente powers, both the Russian Empire and Britain were considered more formidable, and both of them could have more plausibly felt the sense of power and entitlement, in addition to anger about defeat, to lead to support for revanchist policies.

But the Russians had internal social divisions a mile long, and followed their WWI losses with a Civil War and famine equally bad. They had a harder time bouncing back and were highly unlikely to produce a Hitler-ish revanchist by the 30s or 40s.

Notably, it was the strongest, and relatively most intact, of the defeat Central Powers, Germany, that had the strongest revanchism and led the revanchist pack.

Britain would have been Germany's opposite number in Entente camp. The most industrial, the most technological, the strongest, the one most accustomed to success and least accustomed to failure abroad. It's true even in a "lost" Great War, Britain would not have been invaded, would not have lost any home island territories at all, and quite probably not lost any colonial territories or protectorates to any of its Central Powers foes. Nor would it be disarmed or compelled to pay indemnities (except perhaps in a disguised form of "payment for upkeep and support of British Empire PoWs until their safe return home"). In that respect Britain would be more fortunate than Germany and have less to rage about.

A German/CP victory in Europe would be recognized as Britain's defeat nonetheless, with defeat measured in other ways. Defeat measured in loss of allies, loss of status, loss of military formidability for having tried to intervene on the continent at great cost and been defeated anyway, loss of naval formidability or the ability of surface seapower or blockade to be decisively war-winning. Defeat measured possibly in having to return some captured German colonies back to Germany. The scale and sense of Britain's defeat would defend on the scale of total battle deaths before the fighting is over, whether the final battles include any actual outs or overrunning of British lines or big pockets of batches of British troops as PoWs out of proportion to the #s of Germans the British hold.

This kind of defeat would lead to questioning the old older, social and class tension, colonial tension, including defiance by oppressed-feeling colonial groups, but also an angry feeling of loss of status among the upper and middle classes and patriots - productive soil for reactionary and revanchist politics.

A drive to compete with, get even with and show up Germany and arrange for harm to Germany would be part and parcel of this reactionary politics in all likelihood, in addition to whomever is labelled "the enemy within". In large countries, there is room for both kinds of enemies, internal and external, and use in having both. Britain can also rebuild its military, naval and industrial capabilities at home and in imperial territories with far less risk of quick German preemption or smothering than Brest-Litovsk'ed Russia, or certainly France, could.

The ability of a victorious WWI Germany to quickly smother a France trying to make a militant revanchist comeback in the decades after French defeat is the least realistic aspect of that concept. Germany, with almost twice the population of France, and the leader in any coalition it is in, not a highly dependent* partner like France, is free, ready, willing and able to stomp on France as soon as it has any "remilitarize the Rhineland" equivalent moment. It won't have to look to an ally, or its budget, like France did to Britain and its credit rating, for a "mother may I?" before acting - and then not act.

*dependent on Britain certainly and any of the USA, Russia, or other eastern allies

[stevep]

   Interesting idea and its a possibility. Suspect that any German victory terms would be harsher than your suggesting as Germany would want to make its victory stick, at least while it stays a militaristic empire.  Britain will lose a lot of colonial land as that was the German intent in Africa at least and quite probably Germany will push for strict restrictions on the RN so that Britain will be vulnerable to future attacks if not some bases in Germany.  There's at least a chance as well they might insist on an 'independent' Irish republic although whether the Protestant Prussians dominating the government would have accepted forcing their fellow Protestants in the north into such a state.  This could be an alternative to actual bases in Britain itself with Germany have at least naval base in the Irish republic to be able to attack British supply lines in the event of a new war.

  A lot would also depend on what happens in Germany itself as how long the empire could last in its present form, especially with huge new lands to control - thinking mainly in the east as OTL but probably also the status of occupied/annexed Belgium and parts of France - and the political and economic problems it would involve.  You could see a collapse - or at least a temporary breaking of the power of the military in Germany due to internal unrest.  Otherwise a revanchist Britain, while its likely to be angry would have serious difficulty getting off the ground.

  Anyway got to go to work so will add more thoughts later.

  Resuming thoughts

If the CP's win and Germany stays basically a militaristic state and imposes harsh terms on the defeated allies then a revanchist movement in Britain is likely along with considerable social and economic change which could take one of three routes.

a)  Britain going right wing and militaristic itself.  Albeit because of German power and possible basing in the short term, i.e. the 1st decade it would take time for this to become significant rearmament.  Unlike the western powers OTL Germany, at least while under the old regime is unlikely to take its boot off the necks of the defeated powers. 

b)  Britain going left, which could either mean a basically socialist state possibly not too similar in nature to OTL Britain 1945-1979 period or going into full communism. 

c)  Britain decided it wants to restore full independence and regenerate it political, economic and military power so it can stand up to Germany, at least to some degree.

With:

 a) This is a parallel to Germany OTL but probably less likely because, due to its difference social history and also that it was defeated by a militaristic state so that option might be less attractive to Britain and also more likely to prompt a quick response by Germany to break any resurgence of British military power.

b) i - A socialist Britain may seem less threatening to Germany and hence less likely to prompt a military intervention.  If it concentrated on social and economic reform and infrastructure spending, especially human infrastructure in terms of better education, health, housing etc its also likely to build up its longer term strength.  Also such a government is also likely to get on better in terms of relations with the dominions and managing the empire than a more extreme regime.

b) ii - A fully communist Britain is likely to suffer badly from bitter internal conflict and as a result is even more likely to become harsh and repressive.  Also its more likely to incite a German intervention, both to try and restore a right wing government which if successful is likely to both be pretty repressive itself and also be seen as a collaborating regime as a result.  Also as mentioned above such a regime is unlikely to have good relations with the dominions and is going to have issues with what's left of the empire.

c)  A more liberal regime but with an intent to put right the flaws shown during the war is likely to be the most dangerous to9 a militaristic Germany.  It would have to concentrate on rebuilding and reinvigorating the economy and society, basically the b) i option but with more capitalism.  This would be seen, initially at least as less threatening to Germany but by boosting the broader economy could make for a more developed and powerful economy but with the desire to rebuild Britain's strategic strength its likely to emphasis technology and education as well as a hidden military capacity.  Its also likely to have the best relationship option with the dominions, the empire and possibly also other powers such as the US.  [Although the latter will probably be making demands for repayments of debts that won't be practical in the short term at least].

  Given the markedly greater population and industrial base of Germany compared to the UK Britain needs good relations with the dominions and a stable relationship with the empire as well as assorted neutral.  That's why I think options c) or b) i are the best options for a power that would be in a position to challenge a German empire that doesn't collapse at some stage from the burden of its own empire.  [Assuming this is required else Britain could be pushing against an at least partially open door rather than one firmly shut and bolted.]

  The other thing to say is that if you want a militarised state that can challenge a victorious Germany within the same sort of time scale as OTL, i.e. late 30's or early 40's the best option is probably a Russia that doesn't go communist and after some unrest becomes a fairly stable state.  Its still going to have a large population and massive resources along with the capacity for a very powerful industrial base that can after a period be turned into military capacity.  Also assuming a continuation of the German military attitude that was seen in WWI [and to a lesser degree after it] then its going to be in a decent position to look inviting to the vast areas of eastern Europe that Germany now directly or indirectly rules and to be a suitable ally for a Britain/France/ANOther in western or possibly southern Europe who wants to escape from German domination..

[Max Sinister]

Would the CP victory so decisive that the balance of power on the continent was broken? If yes, there'd be the question how to defeat them in a realistic way. Unless the Brits went so crazy about their defeat that they stopped being pragmatic. But is that realistic?

[stevep]

May 1, 2024 22:03:00 GMT Max Sinister said:

Would the CP victory so decisive that the balance of power on the continent was broken? If yes, there'd be the question how to defeat them in a realistic way. Unless the Brits went so crazy about their defeat that they stopped being pragmatic. But is that realistic?

  That is the likelihood as Germany desired to not just win but win big, as demonstrated by the border changes they imposed in the east - albeit if the Bolsheviks hadn't been so stupid they could have gotten better terms - and also discussed plans for annexations in western Europe and elsewhere.Even without any occupation of part of Britain or hiving off a good chunk of Ireland a Germany that has clearly won and knocked out both France and Russia as independent states and directly or indirectly controls the bulk of the continent is way too powerful for Britain, even with considerable reforms and the full weight of its empire behind it to challenge on its own.  Britain could stop being pragmatic, you could argue we did exactly that in the 2nd half of 1940 onward, but winning without powerful allies, other than some tech fix like getting nukes, a way to deliver them and the will to use them before Germany is pretty much impossible.

  At least unless that German empire is a faltering mess on the verge of collapse, which might be the case, albeit probably more in the 1920's than the 1930 perhaps.  For one thing in a longer war, say to 1917-18 which is really necessary for a CP victory once the initial attacks on France fails Germany is itself going to be strained and a lot of those troops and their families are likely to want social and economic change so there could be internal unrest.  Especially if what is by that time pretty much a military dictatorship seeks to maintain its dominance, or even at the level of 1914.  Couple in heavy bills, in both money and possibly blood in holding on to those territorial gains.  Add to that at the least several million French, Belgians and possibly others are going to be added to the Reich who will have at least some rights and will be sources of unrest.  Its quite possibly that the German empire could implode, possibly violently sometime in the early 20's without a fairly drastic level of reform which would mean what sort of Germany and Europe emerges from that would be important issues.