What if Japan kept insisting on the full set of 21 Demands (upon China) in 1915? Results in Sino-Jap
Jul 2, 2024 18:42:33 GMT
stevep likes this
Post by raharris1973 on Jul 2, 2024 18:42:33 GMT
What if Japan kept insisting on all "21 Demands" of the infamous 21 Demands against China, including the particularly incendiary "Group 5" demands, that Japan first communicated (privately) to China on January 18,1915, that China rejected (in their original form) after publicly circulating to other powers to rally opposition, on April 26, 1915, and that Japan ultimately imposed on China, with a two-day ultimatum issued on May 7th, 1915, in a moderated, reduced form of "13 Demands" that President Yuan Shikai of China did finally accept? The reduced "13 Demands" notably omitted the Group 5 demands.
One thing to note about the 21 Demands is that there was among Japanese politicians and governing elites a pretty broad, almost universal, consensus, about a need to "coordinate" Japanese and Chinese policy more, and in effect make China more subordinate to Japanese guidance. Also, although, Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu's 21 Demands, from a Chinese and western power subjective lense, and one can reasonably say, an objective third party lense, were rather domineering and "demanding", they were actually one of the more "moderate" sets of proposals being floated in Japan at the time, according to scholars like Frederick Dickinson. Indeed, a year later Japan flirted with, but ended up not pursuing, a plot to work with Manchu royalist restorationists, and Mongol princes to form breakaway states in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.
I feel like if we are to consider alternative Japanese foreign policy courses of action in the WWI era [and it's not a mandatory exercise, just a voluntary hobby], some sort of escalation of the 21 Demands crisis/tension is the most plausible area to look. After all, China does seem to be what Japan cared about the most from 1894 to 1944. If Japan was going to be more forceful, take more risks, be willing to put more on the line, or sacrifice more for anything between 1914-1919, China seems a fit object, and more plausible than, for example, a) taking the huge gamble of switching allegiances in WWI to side with Germany and against the Entente powers and the Royal Navy, or b) Making a major expeditionary commitment to significant, costly armed combat operations in any of the European or Middle Eastern theaters in support of its historic British/Entente allies, beyond its real-world high-reward, low-risk efforts to capture German Asia-Pacific colonies and assist naval convoys in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, without any prospect of strategic territorial acquisition, by intervening in Europe/West Asia.
Here is the reference link: Twenty-One Demands - Wikipedia. The text of the demands is below:
Here is what I will say happens differently in this timeframe. The Prime Minister and Genro (senior statesmen) decision process about whether and how much Japan should "water down" the original demands after China's rejection on April 26th, is slowed down by a couple weeks, possibly a month, compared to our timeline. Among the Genro, reactionary senior military statesman Yamagata Aritomo, who was already formulating beliefs about the need to unite Asia under Japanese guidance, and an inevitable long-term clash of White and Asian races, emphasizes emphasize the costs and risk to Japan's national interests, strength, autonomy, prestige, and "face" of accepting and being seen to accept China's April 26 "no" for an answer, and its backing down in the face of voiced concerns by American, British, and even Russian diplomatic officials.
He expresses the view, and it carries weight especially with military (Army) elements in the leadership and some Naval, that backing down will invite further challenges and disrespect from China and the westerners. Others do point out the risks of diplomatic or economic rupture with the US or UK in particular, but Yamagata emphasizes the imperative of unifying the east, and of seizing the opportunity of the internecine conflict between the white powers in Europe. He insists the moment must be taken *now* to compel Chinese obedience because Japan's organizational and industrial advantage is still overwhelming, and the powers of Europe will not stay divided and at each other's throats forever.
Backing down risks the US and UK respectively underestimating or taking Japan for granted. Backing down, and being seen backing down, to Chinese refusals and Russian "concerns" is even worse, threatening to "morally" and "psychologically" roll back hard-won victories from Japan's previous two major wars.
This line of argument isn't only appealing to active-duty military, but to several politicians, most of whom are retired military, including Prime Minister Okuma. For him it is nice to hear justifications for not having to sacrifice goals or lose face. The stretching of internal Japanese debate beyond May 7th allows Yamagata, Okuma, and a growing number of people who support continuing to press China as much as possible, to take note of, appreciate, and exploit on-going real-world developments in favor of their argument that China cannot really refuse Japan's demands, and that the other powers are highly unlikely, and mostly cannot afford, to concretely interfere with Japan's plans for China or abet Chinese resistance to Japan.
Among these developments coming into focus are:
a) From May 2nd to May 10th and onward, the turnabout in the European War's eastern front from a respectable Russian position occupying a large chunk of Austro-Hungarian Galicia, to a route of the Russian armies from that province by the Austro-German Gorlice-Tarnow offensive, which was battering the Russians and sending them on a "Great Retreat", and certainly leaving them with no credibility to assert diplomatic demands in East Asia.
b) The May 7th German sinking of Lusitania, causing a furor and outrage in the United States directed against Germany. The Japanese can reason that this will divert the attention of the currently least encumbered and most Sinophilic power, the USA, from the Far East, for a crucial, near-term period. That is in addition to the deadly U-Boat phenomenon it illustrates, keeping Japan's own British ally and its Navy on its toes.
c) The cumulative evidence from the western front in Europe, the German 2nd Ypres attack introducing poison gas there, the failure of the March-May British offensives in the direction of Neuve-Chappelle in Artois, the failure of the French offensive toward Vimy, the failure of the French attacks in Champagne in Feb-March, and at St. Mihiel in April to make progress, all indicating that the Germans are not getting ousted from occupied France or Belgium anytime soon.
d) By the middle weeks of May, a demonstration that, even if the Gallipoli-Dardanelles landings were not doomed or might not succeed, the Ottomans were not melting at first contact, were fighting, and would take some time to beat.
Japanese hardliners can martial these wartime and strategic facts to support their argument that the Entente powers fighting Germany and its allies for the mastery of Europe, will be stuck doing so for the next year or more and simply cannot afford to confront Japan, and that even America will not be concentrating exclusively or even primarily on Far Eastern and Sino-Japanese affairs.
To which they can add convenient data from recent months to further bolster their case. The increasingly rapid rate at which Japan was retiring its external debt by May 1915. The increase in Japanese overseas market share, and the rapid increase in orders of raw and light manufactured materials by Entente powers for war-related purposes since August 1914, and again since January 1915.
With the shift in the internal debate, and decision process stretched out, the Japanese go back to the Yuan Shikai government with a 48-hour ultimatum (phrased as an ultimatum, to make it easier for him to accept/justify its acceptance) but with *all* of the original 21 Demands, unaltered, instead of any watered down version.
China and third parties are stung by this. In our timeline they were relieved the 13 Demands were as mild as they were compared to what they expected. In this TL, they are surprised. not 100% surprised, but still surprised and stung, by being confronted by the same demands as rejected earlier, without a word altered, in the form of an ultimatum.
How does the Yuan Shikai regime in China respond to this? Does it back down completely, and accept not only all the territorial, mining and industrial leases the Japanese demand, but the Japanese demand for exclusive contracts with Japanese advisors for its government, especially in sensitive areas like the policy, military, and finances?
Or do the Chinese refuse, leaving the Japanese to declare war on them, a war they hope/expect will be a "splendid, little war"?
How do the foreign powers react? The Entente, the Americans, the Germans? I have sketched out multiple permutations of possible reactions in the poll below. Please consider them and vote for poll options you deem plausible (your choices are unlimited, but on your honor, please select logically compatible answers), but also discuss them in the thread as well.
How would a Sino-Japanese War, 1915, go? Especially in comparison to the Sino-Japanese War that started in 1937? The technological situations are quite different, and the societal situations are different. On the one hand, according to one internal estimate within Yuan Shikai's Beiyang government, the Chinese estimated they would be defeated by Japan in one week. That's dramatically bad. And much worse than the 8-9 months of engagements in which Japan was deepening China's defeat in the 1894-95 war.
On the one hand, a poor Chinese performance is suggested by Japan's superior organization, cohesion, command, industry, navy, and operational experience against first-class opponents. Plus, China was just a little over a year from devolving into high warlordism after Yuan's death.
On the other hand, in terms purely of numbers under arms, and even modern equipment on hand, the gap was not as vast as one might expect in 1915. It was less than it was in the 1930s in those physical terms. The industrial production gap was probably less between China and Japan in 1915 than in the 1930s. The naval gap was almost certainly less in 1915, because China was still trying to have a surface fleet in 1915 and it would play a moderate role in the small civil war, the National Protection War, that was to break out in late 1915.
If Yuan is leading a resistance war to Japan, does that keep most Chinese political factions and the military united behind him? Or do they still splinter? Does he still adopt, or avoid, his campaign to make himself an Emperor? If Yuan is leading resistance as President, how does the resistance government deal with his rapid decline in health from uremia in 1916 and death, and matters of succession?
Alternatively, if Yuan capitulates to all Japan's demands, how far can he, and his successors, carry the country with him in compliance to the Japanese dominated regime?
Is there a possibility of partial compliance, or mainly going with the flow, until WWI is resolved, and then China getting more resistant when the war is over and other powers, the USA and European ones, can be more likely and inclined to push back against Japanese unilateral claims? Or would Japan's infiltration of a compliant Chinese government be too thorough for a Chinese internal reverse of course?
One thing to note about the 21 Demands is that there was among Japanese politicians and governing elites a pretty broad, almost universal, consensus, about a need to "coordinate" Japanese and Chinese policy more, and in effect make China more subordinate to Japanese guidance. Also, although, Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu's 21 Demands, from a Chinese and western power subjective lense, and one can reasonably say, an objective third party lense, were rather domineering and "demanding", they were actually one of the more "moderate" sets of proposals being floated in Japan at the time, according to scholars like Frederick Dickinson. Indeed, a year later Japan flirted with, but ended up not pursuing, a plot to work with Manchu royalist restorationists, and Mongol princes to form breakaway states in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.
I feel like if we are to consider alternative Japanese foreign policy courses of action in the WWI era [and it's not a mandatory exercise, just a voluntary hobby], some sort of escalation of the 21 Demands crisis/tension is the most plausible area to look. After all, China does seem to be what Japan cared about the most from 1894 to 1944. If Japan was going to be more forceful, take more risks, be willing to put more on the line, or sacrifice more for anything between 1914-1919, China seems a fit object, and more plausible than, for example, a) taking the huge gamble of switching allegiances in WWI to side with Germany and against the Entente powers and the Royal Navy, or b) Making a major expeditionary commitment to significant, costly armed combat operations in any of the European or Middle Eastern theaters in support of its historic British/Entente allies, beyond its real-world high-reward, low-risk efforts to capture German Asia-Pacific colonies and assist naval convoys in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, without any prospect of strategic territorial acquisition, by intervening in Europe/West Asia.
Here is the reference link: Twenty-One Demands - Wikipedia. The text of the demands is below:
Group 1 (four demands) confirmed Japan's recent seizure of German ports and operations in Shandong Province, and expanded Japan's sphere of influence over the railways, coasts and major cities of the province.
Group 2 (seven demands) pertained to Japan's South Manchuria Railway Zone, extending the leasehold over the territory for 99 years, and expanding Japan's sphere of influence in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, to include rights of settlement and extraterritoriality, appointment of financial and administrative officials to the government and priority for Japanese investments in those areas. Japan demanded access to Inner Mongolia for raw materials, as a manufacturing site, and as a strategic buffer against Russian encroachment in Korea.[9]
Group 3 (two demands) gave Japan control of the Han-Ye-Ping (Hanyang, Daye, and Pingxiang) mining and metallurgical complex in central China; it was deep in debt to Japan.
Group 4 (one demand) barred China from giving any further coastal or island concessions to foreign powers.
Group 5 (seven demands) was the most aggressive. China was to hire Japanese advisors who could take effective control of China's finance and police. Japan would be empowered to build three major railways, and also Buddhist temples and schools. Japan would gain effective control of Fujian, across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan, which had been ceded to Japan in 1895.
Group 2 (seven demands) pertained to Japan's South Manchuria Railway Zone, extending the leasehold over the territory for 99 years, and expanding Japan's sphere of influence in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, to include rights of settlement and extraterritoriality, appointment of financial and administrative officials to the government and priority for Japanese investments in those areas. Japan demanded access to Inner Mongolia for raw materials, as a manufacturing site, and as a strategic buffer against Russian encroachment in Korea.[9]
Group 3 (two demands) gave Japan control of the Han-Ye-Ping (Hanyang, Daye, and Pingxiang) mining and metallurgical complex in central China; it was deep in debt to Japan.
Group 4 (one demand) barred China from giving any further coastal or island concessions to foreign powers.
Group 5 (seven demands) was the most aggressive. China was to hire Japanese advisors who could take effective control of China's finance and police. Japan would be empowered to build three major railways, and also Buddhist temples and schools. Japan would gain effective control of Fujian, across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan, which had been ceded to Japan in 1895.
Here is what I will say happens differently in this timeframe. The Prime Minister and Genro (senior statesmen) decision process about whether and how much Japan should "water down" the original demands after China's rejection on April 26th, is slowed down by a couple weeks, possibly a month, compared to our timeline. Among the Genro, reactionary senior military statesman Yamagata Aritomo, who was already formulating beliefs about the need to unite Asia under Japanese guidance, and an inevitable long-term clash of White and Asian races, emphasizes emphasize the costs and risk to Japan's national interests, strength, autonomy, prestige, and "face" of accepting and being seen to accept China's April 26 "no" for an answer, and its backing down in the face of voiced concerns by American, British, and even Russian diplomatic officials.
He expresses the view, and it carries weight especially with military (Army) elements in the leadership and some Naval, that backing down will invite further challenges and disrespect from China and the westerners. Others do point out the risks of diplomatic or economic rupture with the US or UK in particular, but Yamagata emphasizes the imperative of unifying the east, and of seizing the opportunity of the internecine conflict between the white powers in Europe. He insists the moment must be taken *now* to compel Chinese obedience because Japan's organizational and industrial advantage is still overwhelming, and the powers of Europe will not stay divided and at each other's throats forever.
Backing down risks the US and UK respectively underestimating or taking Japan for granted. Backing down, and being seen backing down, to Chinese refusals and Russian "concerns" is even worse, threatening to "morally" and "psychologically" roll back hard-won victories from Japan's previous two major wars.
This line of argument isn't only appealing to active-duty military, but to several politicians, most of whom are retired military, including Prime Minister Okuma. For him it is nice to hear justifications for not having to sacrifice goals or lose face. The stretching of internal Japanese debate beyond May 7th allows Yamagata, Okuma, and a growing number of people who support continuing to press China as much as possible, to take note of, appreciate, and exploit on-going real-world developments in favor of their argument that China cannot really refuse Japan's demands, and that the other powers are highly unlikely, and mostly cannot afford, to concretely interfere with Japan's plans for China or abet Chinese resistance to Japan.
Among these developments coming into focus are:
a) From May 2nd to May 10th and onward, the turnabout in the European War's eastern front from a respectable Russian position occupying a large chunk of Austro-Hungarian Galicia, to a route of the Russian armies from that province by the Austro-German Gorlice-Tarnow offensive, which was battering the Russians and sending them on a "Great Retreat", and certainly leaving them with no credibility to assert diplomatic demands in East Asia.
b) The May 7th German sinking of Lusitania, causing a furor and outrage in the United States directed against Germany. The Japanese can reason that this will divert the attention of the currently least encumbered and most Sinophilic power, the USA, from the Far East, for a crucial, near-term period. That is in addition to the deadly U-Boat phenomenon it illustrates, keeping Japan's own British ally and its Navy on its toes.
c) The cumulative evidence from the western front in Europe, the German 2nd Ypres attack introducing poison gas there, the failure of the March-May British offensives in the direction of Neuve-Chappelle in Artois, the failure of the French offensive toward Vimy, the failure of the French attacks in Champagne in Feb-March, and at St. Mihiel in April to make progress, all indicating that the Germans are not getting ousted from occupied France or Belgium anytime soon.
d) By the middle weeks of May, a demonstration that, even if the Gallipoli-Dardanelles landings were not doomed or might not succeed, the Ottomans were not melting at first contact, were fighting, and would take some time to beat.
Japanese hardliners can martial these wartime and strategic facts to support their argument that the Entente powers fighting Germany and its allies for the mastery of Europe, will be stuck doing so for the next year or more and simply cannot afford to confront Japan, and that even America will not be concentrating exclusively or even primarily on Far Eastern and Sino-Japanese affairs.
To which they can add convenient data from recent months to further bolster their case. The increasingly rapid rate at which Japan was retiring its external debt by May 1915. The increase in Japanese overseas market share, and the rapid increase in orders of raw and light manufactured materials by Entente powers for war-related purposes since August 1914, and again since January 1915.
With the shift in the internal debate, and decision process stretched out, the Japanese go back to the Yuan Shikai government with a 48-hour ultimatum (phrased as an ultimatum, to make it easier for him to accept/justify its acceptance) but with *all* of the original 21 Demands, unaltered, instead of any watered down version.
China and third parties are stung by this. In our timeline they were relieved the 13 Demands were as mild as they were compared to what they expected. In this TL, they are surprised. not 100% surprised, but still surprised and stung, by being confronted by the same demands as rejected earlier, without a word altered, in the form of an ultimatum.
How does the Yuan Shikai regime in China respond to this? Does it back down completely, and accept not only all the territorial, mining and industrial leases the Japanese demand, but the Japanese demand for exclusive contracts with Japanese advisors for its government, especially in sensitive areas like the policy, military, and finances?
Or do the Chinese refuse, leaving the Japanese to declare war on them, a war they hope/expect will be a "splendid, little war"?
How do the foreign powers react? The Entente, the Americans, the Germans? I have sketched out multiple permutations of possible reactions in the poll below. Please consider them and vote for poll options you deem plausible (your choices are unlimited, but on your honor, please select logically compatible answers), but also discuss them in the thread as well.
How would a Sino-Japanese War, 1915, go? Especially in comparison to the Sino-Japanese War that started in 1937? The technological situations are quite different, and the societal situations are different. On the one hand, according to one internal estimate within Yuan Shikai's Beiyang government, the Chinese estimated they would be defeated by Japan in one week. That's dramatically bad. And much worse than the 8-9 months of engagements in which Japan was deepening China's defeat in the 1894-95 war.
On the one hand, a poor Chinese performance is suggested by Japan's superior organization, cohesion, command, industry, navy, and operational experience against first-class opponents. Plus, China was just a little over a year from devolving into high warlordism after Yuan's death.
On the other hand, in terms purely of numbers under arms, and even modern equipment on hand, the gap was not as vast as one might expect in 1915. It was less than it was in the 1930s in those physical terms. The industrial production gap was probably less between China and Japan in 1915 than in the 1930s. The naval gap was almost certainly less in 1915, because China was still trying to have a surface fleet in 1915 and it would play a moderate role in the small civil war, the National Protection War, that was to break out in late 1915.
If Yuan is leading a resistance war to Japan, does that keep most Chinese political factions and the military united behind him? Or do they still splinter? Does he still adopt, or avoid, his campaign to make himself an Emperor? If Yuan is leading resistance as President, how does the resistance government deal with his rapid decline in health from uremia in 1916 and death, and matters of succession?
Alternatively, if Yuan capitulates to all Japan's demands, how far can he, and his successors, carry the country with him in compliance to the Japanese dominated regime?
Is there a possibility of partial compliance, or mainly going with the flow, until WWI is resolved, and then China getting more resistant when the war is over and other powers, the USA and European ones, can be more likely and inclined to push back against Japanese unilateral claims? Or would Japan's infiltration of a compliant Chinese government be too thorough for a Chinese internal reverse of course?
