What if Spain never joined the 7 Years War/French & Indian War?

[raharris1973]

What if Spain never made its ill-fated and ill-timed commitment to the 1761 Pact de Famille that led to its joining 7 Years War just in time (1762) for the final two years sealing defeat?

For the divergence making this happen, I would say it has to be a "survival cascade". Queen Barbara's health and life holds out four years longer, to August 1762 instead of the historic August 1758, and that leaves the subdued and somewhat depressive King Ferdinand from having a broken heart, totally letting himself go, suffering from accelerated mental illness, requiring secluded confinement, abandoning self-care and dying in August 1759. Instead, he remains a minimally adequate King for a peacetime, conservative country through the death of his wife in 1762 before losing his mind, going into seclusion and a death spiral, that leaves him dead by summer of 1763 and his half-brother Charles as the new Spanish King.

As a result, while Ferdinand remains active King, 1758-1762, for longer than OTL, he gets to continue his peace and neutrality peace, and it continues while he is absent King, and Charles is in no position to do any reversing of course or alignment with France until after 1763.

Consequently, Britain and France have plenty of time from 1759-1763 to end their war on their own, without Spain becoming involved, by no later than the historic 1763 historic date, and possibly earlier, in 1762, without the Spanish complication.

What consequences flow from this?

Well, in the overseas colonial theaters of Anglo-French warfare, the British gained a strong advantage in the annus mirabalus of 1759 in seizing Quebec, victories in India, and naval victories. Prussia won victories on land enabling it to fight another day. Campaigning 1759-1761 would see British forces in North America clean up French opposition in Canada and the Ohio country, and seize French Caribbean islands one by one, and take over bigger stretches of India, taking more French outposts and defeating French clients. In 1762, Prussia, once again endangered by exhaustion and enemy mass, especially Russian, would be be saved by the timely death of Russian Empress Elizabeth, the succession of Peter, and Russian withdrawal from the enemy coalition.

Without Spain making preparations for war and hostile moves towards Britain and pro-French moves like the Pacte de Famille, Britain, whose King and some politicians (though not Prime Minister Pitt) were starting to fret about war expenses, would not assault Spain preemptively in January 1762.

So, the lack of war with Spain would remove several fleet engagements with the Spanish Navy and the British invasions of Spanish Cuba and the Philippines.

The French would start looking for exits from the war, trying to retain as much dignity, and property, as they can. And the British Crown would similarly seek to walk away from the table with healthy winnings, not necessarily retaining each and every occupied French piece of real estate. If Mr. Pitt stands in the way of making peace, out of greed to either make continued prospective gains from France, or to hold tightly on to all occupied lands and islands, he would be dropped sooner or later for the Earl of Bute as the King's Prime Minister.

However, by middle and later 1762, with British forces on sea and land successful in all colonial endeavors so far and underemployed, and the continental situation of Hanover and Prussia at least adequate with subsidies, and not something Crown or Parliament wants to increase direct manpower commitment to, Pitt might be able to get support for another major anti-French colonial campaign or two. Perhaps targeting the Gulf Coast ports of French Louisiana, namely New Orleans, and its lesser satellites, Baton Rouge, Biloxi, and Mobile? Attacking Guiana and Saint-Domingue might be options as well, but Louisiana would seem most vulnerable.

In any case, how do you see the war, and then the peace treaty, finishing off?

Would there be a British campaign to seize French New Orleans (or other Caribbean targets) in 1762, out of British boredom, not having Cuba and the Philippines to attack?
Would the Treaty of Paris ending the war see the British seizing from France, in the Americas, like OTL, Canada and Louisiana territory east of the Mississippi (but not to the west), and some (but not all) of the captured French Caribbean sugar islands?

Or would Britain seize Canada and *all* of the Louisiana territory, east and west of the Mississippi? It could be motivated to do so to eliminate the French from the continent, compensate itself for the effort of campaigning to take it, and compensating itself for continued war.

Presuming the second alternative occurs, and Britain annexes all of French mainland North America, I would presume exiled Acadians would never choose the southern Louisiana area as a focus of resettlement to constitute the local 'Cajun' population and augment the French-speaking Creoles of the area.

The alternate Treaty of Paris would be signed in either 1763 or 1762.

As a non-involved party, Spain would lose no territory, and retain Florida, and none of its settlers from St. Augustine, Pensacola, San Marco or its missions or rural ranches (in a diminished state compared with their pre-1710 status, but still present) evacuated to Cuba.

While certainly butterfly effects could occur from alterations in territorial distribution, some broad outlines should remain similar to history:
a) France will feel vengeful about defeat
b) Britain will be indebted, and arrogant and complacent
c) The American Colonists will feel freed of imminent threat of destruction by French supported Amerindians. Spain and Spanish backed Indians or runaway slaves out of Florida would be a fairly minor concern by comparison, and of concern only really to some in Georgia and South Carolina.
d) There is no particular reason for Pontiac to not lead a revolt against Britain and the encroachment of unscrupulous British traders, speculators, and settlers

So, we are likely on track for a brewing Anglo-Colonial conflict over the next dozen years.

I would imagine that New Orleans, within a British North America colony, while it would attract merchant and soldier migrants from Britain and the 13 Colonies, would still be a pretty new colony. By the early/mid-1770s probably still majority Francophone and Catholic, and it may be granted something like the Quebec Act, or perhaps not. I think it is a more than even chance as new colony, not a decades long established Anglo-American colony, and also geographically separated without connecting land infrastructure, that it would not be "ripe" for participation in Continental Congresses and would stay a loyal Colony to Britain during an alternate American revolution. However, we cannot rule out 100% the possibility that disaffection with British rule, by Anglo newcomers and local Francophones and small numbers of Spanish speakers alike, might not result in New Orleans/southern Louisiana being a rebelling "14th colony" along with the 13 on the eastern seaboard. It would have to fight any indepdence war largely autonomously from the others, but its terrain really is not very good for much control/penetration, or tax collection into the interior if there is on the ground support for rebellion.

If, as is likely, it breaks out into open warfare, Britain is likely to be diplomatically isolated, and France will be likely to supply at least covert or deniable aid to the rebel Colonists and can eventually decide to go to war with Britain and jump into the struggle with both feet.

But without a revenge motive from fighting in the 7 Years War and losing, seeing Cuba and the Philippines invaded, occupied, and ransomed by the British, and being forced to give up Florida in the Treaty, would Spain be inclined to join France and the Americans in war against Britain in the 1770s, or not?

The lack of revenge motive, and the bad precedent for its own colonies, speaks against it.

But in favor of getting involved on the Franco-American side are other arguments: 1. King Charles was always more balance of power and Bourbon-coalition oriented than his predecessor Ferdinand. 2. Spain's revenge motives ran broader than just Florida, and deeper in history than just the 7 Years War....Spain wanted other things back from Britain, that it took in earlier wars, like Minorca and Gibraltar (since War of Spanish Succession), and possibly some coastal areas in Central America, like British Honduras (aka Belize) or Nicaragua's Moskito coast (taken at a random time), or Jamaica (taken at Cromwell's command in the 1650s), and 3. It is possible there may have been Anglo-Spanish confrontation/tension short of war before the American War of Independence, even without Spain in the 7 Years War, over British and Spanish contrary claims to the Malvinas/Falklands earlier in the 1770s - and *that* might provide the Spanish something to avenge.

If Spain *does* join the Franco-American side in war against the British, its starting point in Florida is even *more* helpful toward the alliance than its OTL starting position in Louisiana, although it is a crapshoot, and unlikely, it has a Governor with the military and civil talent of Galvez. But from St. Augustine and Cuba, Spanish forces could intervene to greatly complicate andy British southern campaign against Savannah, and from Pensacola, Spanish forces could threaten a British controlled or occupied New Orleans or provide support to a rebelling New Orleans.

[stevep]

  raharris1973 ,

   An interesting set of ideas.  Would agree that Britain will do better without having Spain to worry about and with more French territories to hunt down.  Also with less threat from France at sea/colonial you could see larger spending on the war in Germany, both subsidizing Prussia and also the coalition in western Germany to keep the French at bay.   Or less productively more of Pitts armed descents in raids on the French coasts.

  Not sure its reliable that Empress Elizabeth will die at the exact date, rescuing Prussia but it might be earlier or the better allied position might mean the war ends earlier.  Therefore likely that Prussia survives.

  My thinking is that once Canada is cleared and without a threat from Spain further island possessions in the Caribbean might be an higher priority than the relatively unknown and low value seeming Louisiana.  However given that France would value the sugar islands more and Britain's own plantation owners were unhappy with the idea of competition from them then I suspect your right that the islands go back.  In which case Britain gets all Louisiana as well as Canada - since with Spain neutral it doesn't lose territory nor need compensation for the loss of Florida.  Otherwise similar to OTL with Britain also getting back Minorca and reducing the French in India to unfortified trading posts.  Possibly Britain doesn't give Saint Pierre and Miquelon to France and instead bans them from a share of the Grand Banks fisheries.  This would be logical economically as it gives the Britain pretty much a monopoly of a rich resource and also the fishermen were seen as a good source for sailors in wartime so it would be seen as reducing French capacity to rebuild a skilled seamanship core to its fleet.

  Also agree that your likely to see British complacency and arrogance as OTL after such a stunning victory.  Although Pitt will lose power once George II dies his ideas for economic warfare and Britain's lack of need for allies tended to carry over into the following government.  Plus your likely to see the tension between pressure for reform as OTL and George III's desires to restore royal power in government which distracts from the growing issues in the American colonies and also misleads many radicals in Britain about their basis.

  As such you are very likely to see an isolated Britain fighting a solely colonial war against a reformed France under Choiseul coupled with a colonial revolt.  Spanish Florida is going to be a potential issue if Spain joins this war.  Without its losses and humiliation in the 7YW TTL Spain would probably be in better economic condition and possibly better militarily as well although without the OTL occupation of Havana the defences there might not be upgraded.  How its forces are prepared compared to OTL I wouldn't know.  This has problems for the rebels as well as revolt was late coming to the south and an hostile Spain could be seen as a threat to the Georgians especially meaning they might stay even more loyal.

  If there is an additional colonial based around New Orleans which I suspect would be likely there is of course a 3rd option for it, i.e. for France to regain control, which could easily be a favoured option for the colonists if they think the rebels would win.  Which is going to be an issue for any dependent colonies if they still win as this would control the entrance to the Mississippi basin even if its only that region rather than more extensive French claims.

  Of course there are so many variables as you could see some settlement between the colonists and the king - although probably unlikely given how far they are apart or Britain does better and defeats the rebels earlier decisively enough that France decides there's no basis for intervention.  In which case you could see a long period of intermittent low level violence and unless until either it settles down or some wider conflict allows it to explode again. 

  However if they do intervene, where Spain joins the war would be a big factor.  Without them there's no threat to Gibraltar and possibly less to Minorca or need to fear the Spanish fleet.

[Max Sinister]

Well, you mention the family pact in the first sentence. Would that be OK for the Bourbons to stay out of such an important war? Louis XV wasn't exactly the strongest French king; what will people think if even his relatives - who own the French Bourbons their throne - won't listen to him?

Maybe an even earlier revolution in France? Not that I wouldn't mind.

[raharris1973]

Jul 23, 2024 22:42:12 GMT Max Sinister said:

Well, you mention the family pact in the first sentence. Would that be OK for the Bourbons to stay out of such an important war? Louis XV wasn't exactly the strongest French king; what will people think if even his relatives - who own the French Bourbons their throne - won't listen to him?

Maybe an even earlier revolution in France? Not that I wouldn't mind.

Well, Louis XV survived as King with Bourbon Spain going to war with his Bourbon France, in the War of the Quadruple Alliance. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Quadruple_Alliance

But maybe he gets a pass for that, because he was only five years old at the time, and it was his regents the Spanish Bourbon King was ignoring.

Indeed, Bourbon France and Bourbon Spain stayed in opposing alliances for another few years after this, with France signing on to the British-led Treaty of Hanover in 1725 and Spain signing on to the Austrian-led Treaty of Vienna that year.  

Indeed it wasn't until 1733, when Louis XV reached 18, that he signed the first of three Pactes de Famille with Spain, this one right in time to fight the War of Polish Succession.

[raharris1973]

Let's build off the discussion so far!

1. Spain stays out of the war because my original PoD, Barbara and then Ferdinand living longer. Spain loses nothing to Britain in war or peace, and also gains nothing from France in compensation.
2. France peaces out of the war as the loser, having suffered an additional British campaign that seizes New Orleans in 1762, and adds all of Louisiana to the winnings Britain walks away with in 1763. [Although the settlement might come some months earlier than OTL, because of no need to cajole Spain to also quit].
3. Pontiac's rebellion happens in the Ohio Country/Great Lakes west and inspires the Proclamation line to limit and control Colonial western settlement in Indian western lands. British soldiers, merchants and administrators take up residence in Quebec and Montreal occupied province. They also arrive in New Orleans, Lower Louisiana, but in smaller numbers, to keep guard on the Francophone population, profit from such Mississippi commerce as there is, and ensure there's no political hanky-panky between the Francophone Creoles of New Orleans/Basse-Louisiane and Santo-Domingo. One consequence of the existence of a British occupation regime in western Louisiana is that Acadiens expelled or dispersed from Nova Scotia during and immediately after the 7 Years War do *not* choose to reassemble in these years in Louisiana to become the 'Cajun' people, instead, they mostly remain in France where they sojourned in between or take part in other colonization projects, some of which failed disastrously, like the Guiana effort of 1764.
4. With the Westminster Parliament insisting on its right to tax the English Colonies, and the English North American Colonies free of the fear of being overcome by French and Indian alliances, and none too worried by Spanish Florida, just merely inconvenienced by it.......Anglo-American versus British tensions worsen over the decade 1763-1773.
5. By 1774 in the aftermath of the Boston Tea Party and moves to punish Boston Harbor and Massachusetts Bay Colony, the continent-wide "Committees of Correspondence", the "Association" organizing an effective boycott on British imports in protest at Parliamentary policies on taxation and punitive policies, and the Continental Congress movement are in full swing, asserting the right of the 13, and other English Colonies to the full rights of Englishmen. The Continental Congress invites more than just representatives from the 13 (of those 13, Georgia is the last, most reluctant participant, as a young frontier colony), but also invites delegates to attend from Nova Scotia, from Quebec/Canada (in French and English), and Louisiana (in French and English). The Canadians and Louisianans and Nova Scotians are unresponsive, the former two, mainly because of cultural gaps/differences, the latter because Halifax is such a naval dominated town in a younger colony.
6. After the "shots heard round the world" at Lexington and Concord, or so the combatants flattered themselves, armed conflict broke out between Continental Militia "Minutemen" and British Regulars in 1775. Soon the Continentals raised a regular Army and put Boston to siege. Now *that* got the world's attention, and the war of American rebellion was on. France began to provide covert aid.
7. France openly joined the war on the American side after the American victory at Saratoga, within a year, Spain under King Charles joined the war as well, providing assistance to the Continentals and French through Cuba and Spanish Florida.
8. France's motive was above all, vengeance and humbling Britain. Spain sought, more concretely, to recover Menorca and Gibraltar. Recovery of "frozen Canada" was not important to France, and France disclaimed intent to recover it when negotiating alliance with the Americans, who actually had launched a failed invasion/occupation of it early in the war. Louisiana, or at least western Louisiana (west of the Mississippi) was at the time of the Franco-American Treaty (1778) so far from the focus of the action in the northern colonies that it was not covered or mentioned in the treaty, and the British garrison seemed both distant and unassailable, and the local population, quiescent. The Americans made it well understood they were set on absorbing the lands east of the Mississippi they had been kept from, the Kentucky and Tennessee country being settled, and Ohio country.
9. While Canada remained solidly held by the British garrison and river flotillas ever since the American retreat of 1775, the British position in southern Louisiana was a different story. The British fleet ended up hard-pressed by 1780 dealing with both the French and Spanish fleets and Colonial privateers, trying to manage support for troops ashore, blockade of the Americans, and superiority at sea, while protecting their Caribbean positions. In these circumstances, French formations coming out of Toulon, and further staging out of Port Au-Prince Saint-Domingue, joined Spanish forces from Florida and Texas in a pincer attack on New Orleans and Baton Rouge. This was a fine supplement to French operations in direct support of the Continentals on the Atlantic seaboard. The Franco-Spanish compelled surrender of British fortresses in lower Louisiana, proceeded the Franco-American victory at Yorktown by about three months, and revived France's claim western Louisiana and the port towns of Biloxi and Mobile east of the river. Peace talks began, and the remainder of the war was haggling, which saw Bourbon attempts to weaken Britain further, British naval recovery, and British punishment of the Dutch.
10. In the 1783 Treaty of Paris ending the war, the United States was recognized as an independent state, controlling all 13 Colonies,and controlling all formerly British designated Indian Country between the Ohio river, Mississippi, districts of Bilkoxi and Mobile, and Spanish Florida. It also received the land that had been designated between 1774 and 1783 as part of the province of Quebec that was located between the Great Lakes, Lake of the Woods, Mississippi river, and Ohio river. Spain retained Spanish Florida, marked by St. Augustine in the east and Pensacola in the west. There was a degree of ambiguity left open as to how much of a "bulge" "dome", or "triangle" extended north of the west Florida panhandle and west of Georgia and the Apalachicola River, with an agreement for Spain and the USA to survey and demarcate the frontier in greater detail later. France recovered from Britain all of the Louisiana territory west of the Mississippi river, and to the east of the river the "Isle of New Orleans" to control the full port and river mouth, and the parishes and ports immediately to the east of Biloxi and Mobile bay. Britain was left with Upper and Lower Canada, north of the Great Lakes, New York State, and the Maine counties of of Massachusetts.

France did not start off the war with super-grand ambitions for Louisiana, but, since it was on operationally achievable objective and was won in battle, the victory there generated great enthusiasm at home, and French troops were received with warmth by the local Creoles and Catholic clergy. This made the French insistent on holding on to the territory as an additional token of victory in the peace, and the Americans preferred, all things being equal, that the territory go with its weaker French ally than its stronger, nearer, British erstwhile enemy. That didn't stop the inveterate Ben Franklin from once suggesting that the United States could resolve the dispute by taking on that territory. He said it with smile and a half laugh but was answered with frowns. The British, and especially Bourbon powers, already thought the Americans were doing far too well in the settlement. The reach was par for the course for Franklin, who had earlier suggested to the British gifting Canada to the United States, "for assuring future Anglo-American friendship". Nice try, Ben.

Louisiana was France's largest token from winning the war, but in economic terms, the sugar islands of Tobago and Dominica were probably far more valuable.

Spain got only part of what it wanted. It got Menorca back, but not Gibraltar, which held on throughout the war.

The young United States went on through its early development.

Soon enough, the colonial and naval ministers of Louis XVI found their use for the Louisiana territory in the strategies of France. It would be developed to be the breadbasket and meat larder for the Caribbean sugar colonies like Saint-Domingue, Guadalupe, Martinique, Dominica, Tobago. Some more Frenchmen than before were interested in colonizing due to increased urban and rural poverty and the rising price of food in France between 1784 and 1791. Also, some Canadiens from Quebec, a bit miffed or upset that London had broken its territorial promises of a very large Quebec province and had begun allocating lands of Upper Canada to Anglo-American loyalists, chose to migrate to Louisiana, becoming know there as the "Canajun" population among the less literate types. And even some Acadiens who not settled or fit in well in France or Caribbean colonies moved on to French Louisiana, becoming the more obscure, "Cajun" group.

Debt from the war with Britain, and other long-standing structural problems and inequities with tax collection, causes the French Revolution to break out over 1789-91. Furthermore, it leads to war with neighbors in 1792, and the execution of King, proclamation of the Republic and war with *all* neighbors, including Britain and Spain, in 1793.

The young, weak United States under the second Washington Administration stays neutral in Anglo-French war, besides residual pro-French feelings of some.

Despite the so-called "common border" between French Louisiana, and British North American Upper Canada and Ruperts Land, the war of the first Coalition in the 1790s barely affects their mutual colonial border given the great distance of that prairie land from centers of power and army deports. Occasional raids by trappers, rangers, mountain men and allied Amerindian tribes, burning stockades and stealing horses and livestock are about all the "war" amounts to. Things are similar on the mountain and prairie frontiers of French Louisiana with Spain's Nuevo Mexico colony and Texas colony. For many stretches of the border, bodies of French or Spanish troops or adventurers cannot get to the opposing side without being captured and skinned alive by Comanche first. Things get a little bit "spicier" in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and shores of New Orleans, Biloxi, Mobile, with occasional British naval bombardments and French privateering, and in the years 1793-1796, mutual raids across the Louisiana-Florida border between French and Spanish forces. After the defeat of Spain in the mainland, and Godoy's policy of subservience to and alliance with France from 1796, the Franco-Spanish New World skirmishing ceases, and indeed, Spain yields eastern Santo Domingo to France.

Britain enjoys naval superiority over France but is dispersing its activity among enough anti-French activities with European and Mediterranean allies that it is not making a concentrated effort to *wipe out* the French position in Louisiana or the Caribbean. Not that it counts for much of anything, but the Federalist governments of Washington and Adams make it known they would be displeased with alterations in the territorial status quo of North America, among the big three European powers. This is for simple balance of power reasons. In the Caribbean, the British have a rising awareness that disease is a big price of doing the business of sieges and invasions in the region.

Meanwhile the French in New Orleans are enjoying a decent revenue and supply situation as commerce down the Mississippi from American trans-Allegheny settlement grows and producers spend in the city's warehouses and wharves, while New England and other shippers come to dock.

During the Adams Administration, especially second half, the vulnerabilities of the Louisiana position are used to convince both French privateers, and foreign affairs officials of the French Directory to tone down their obnoxiousness to avoid the level of scandal and confrontation that we saw in OTL's "XYZ Affair" and the Franco-American Quasi War. Anti-French, pro-British, militaristic rumblings by Federalists like Alexander Hamilton, about potential raising an Army to conquer Louisiana, filter through to French authorities in Lousiana, causing them to make defensive preparations to be sure, but also to communicate cautionary warning through the grapevine to French Caribbean skippers, privateers, and ports, and ultimately to French ports and Directory officials.

Thus, actual Franco-American War, or Anglo-American versus French war, culminating in a campaign to seize Louisiana, is avoided.

The Jefferson Administration even more hopes to avoid Franco-American war, but cannot completely relax, and feels increasingly uncomfortable with any foreign hands controlling New Orleans.

Opportunity finally comes when, Napoleon finally realizes two things. He is unable to suppress the Saint-Domingue/Haiti revolt, after foolishly trying to reinstate slavery on the island, and the Peace of Amiens is about to fall apart, bringing about renewed war with Britain, with his Navy weaker than ever.

As a result, in 1803, Napoleon sells the entirety of the Louisiana territory to the United States, bequeathing the United States the territory it received in OTL, despite a "bonus" additional 20 years of French investment in the territory, and a surplus perhaps 20 to 40,000 additional Francophone resident inhabitants of the land than we saw in OTL.


Like in OTL, Jefferson proceeds to have Lewis and Clark survey the territory, and beyond, into the Pacific. And Napoleon goes on to proceed with his European martial triumphs, and follies, including Trafalgar, the Peninsular War, the invasion of Russia.

The Peninsular War and the destablization of Spain lasting into the post-Napoleonic period puts the Spanish American empire in the coffin and nails the lid shut, but an interesting question is what exactly stays as part of the remnant.

In OTL it was, after the 1820s, Cuba and Puerto Rico. In this ATL, Florida might end up as a surprise, sleeper adjunct and remnant to the Spanish empire, lasting at least a few decades beyond the early-mid-1820s.

On the one hand, it was quite proximate to the USA, boding ill for its survival. But, quite importantly, it never faces the OTL 20 years loss in Spanish control, evacuation of Spanish-loyal population, and all accompanying discontinuities, between 1763 and 1783. Also, its sailing distance to Spain and Cuba is comparatively short, contrasted with South and Central America. Like Cuba, it is "on the way" to all the other colonies, so would probably be a support base for Spanish revolutionary suppression forces. While a continuous colony, it is relatively small, dependent, and aware of its vulnerability to the Yankee colossus, so unlikely to have a local Creole independence movement.

While planters in the southern United States were irritated with Florida's existence as a refuge for renegade Indians and runaway slaves, employed as soldiers even by Spanish officials, and this would only worsen as the cotton south developed. And of course the southerners like the idea of getting cotton usable land for themselves, in the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic period, Spanish imperialism was transforming to become more "congenial" to the southern "way of life". While successfully rebelling Spanish colonies generally abandoned and abolished slavery, slavery had a rebound and renaissance in Cuba and Puerto Rico in the early 1800s, fueled partly by the in-migration of refugee planters fleeing the Haitian revolution and perhaps the weakening of some sugar competitors. Spanish Florida could easily get more "plantation-y" and cooperative with cross-border slave patrols in the teens, twenties and thirties of the nineteenth century, much like Cuba was.

[stevep]

   Interesting developments. A few questions.

a) Didn't realise the Cajuns had been deported to France and then had moved to Louisiana.  As you say this isn't an option here so any such movement would wait until Louisiana is back in French hands.

b)  I see the US still gets the very generous peace of OTL but wonder whether than would still be the case as the French are doing even more fighting here?  Also that would need two French armies operating in N America, the one involved in the capture of Yorktown and the other for New Orleans.  I wonder if at least some of southern Quebec/Canada would stay British here?  Assuming that Britain starts regaining naval superiority with the OTL relief of Gibraltar and victory at the Battle of the Saintes you could see France, having humbled Britain, played a big part in the loss of the American colonies and France have regained Louisiana being less than happy with American demands for additional lands they have no control at all over and possibly even threatening to make a separate peace.

c)  The big issue is when the French revolution occurs would Louisiana be supportive of the rebels or stay royalist?  After all it owns its status as French to the crown's determination to regain it from Britain - as many would see it anyway and the people there have avoided the worst of the poverty in France by 1789 as well as being a lot more isolated from the revolutionary pamphlets and the like.  Plus with its exposed position between Spanish possessions in Florida and Texas - the former being a lot more dangerous to Louisiana - and British forces in the north and by sea.  Not sure what the Spanish fleet could do in Europe during the period that its hostile to revolutionary France but in the Caribbean and N America it could be pretty active against French trade from its colonies and especially the nearly land-locked Louisiana.  As such both for political reasons and for their own security the Louisianans could well decide continued loyalty to the crown is in their best interests.

  This of course would change a good amount of the dynamics as Louisiana would be a British/Spanish ally, possibly also gathering some refugees from European France and also influencing some of the French Caribbean colonies to take a similar stance.  Assuming that Napoleon still gains power, makes himself emperor and then make the temporary peace with Britain he's probably more than willing to sell the 'disloyal' colony to the US than OTL so that still goes ahead.  As such it could be a temporary difference although it might mean there is a long standing claim to Louisiana by France after the monarchy is presumably restored.

[Max Sinister]

Aug 6, 2024 11:30:48 GMT stevep said:

c)  The big issue is when the French revolution occurs would Louisiana be supportive of the rebels or stay royalist?

I think they'd stay Royalist, and the French republic would have a hard time projecting power. Especially if they have to fight Britain.

[raharris1973]

Aug 6, 2024 11:30:48 GMT stevep said:

c)  The big issue is when the French revolution occurs would Louisiana be supportive of the rebels or stay royalist?

Aug 6, 2024 12:08:11 GMT Max Sinister said:

I think they'd stay Royalist, and the French republic would have a hard time projecting power.

What was our real world experience with the real-world French colonies that existed under French sovereignty at the beginning of the Revolution? Saint-Domingue, Guiana, St. Pierre, Guadalupe, the Grenadines, Tobago, St. Croix, St. Pierre, Miquelon, Senegal.

As France was taken over by the National Assembly, and emigres uncomfortable with the changes fled abroad and bad-mouthed the revolution, and further when France arrested the King, and then later proclaimed a Republic, and ultimately executed the King, did colonials in any of these territories defy Paris and assert their support for the Ancien Regime in exile?

If they did not, why should Louisiana be any different? But perhaps, historically some colonies did make some such declarations.

Aug 6, 2024 11:30:48 GMT stevep said:

and the people there have avoided the worst of the poverty in France by 1789 as well as being a lot more isolated from the revolutionary pamphlets and the like.

Although that would vary depending how much late emigration there is to French Louisiana in the 1780s to beginning, pre-war years of 1790s. Newer immigrants would be more exposed to harsh and poor conditions at home, but see Louisiana as a welcome chance at escape, yet also be in touch with some of the more recent philosophical ideas and expressions and discontent, and may be less religiously/socially conservative than older colonial populations or founder populations of Canada.

[stevep]

Aug 27, 2024 0:44:39 GMT raharris1973 said:

Aug 6, 2024 11:30:48 GMT stevep said:

c)  The big issue is when the French revolution occurs would Louisiana be supportive of the rebels or stay royalist?

Aug 6, 2024 12:08:11 GMT Max Sinister said:

I think they'd stay Royalist, and the French republic would have a hard time projecting power.

What was our real world experience with the real-world French colonies that existed under French sovereignty at the beginning of the Revolution? Saint-Domingue, Guiana, St. Pierre, Guadalupe, the Grenadines, Tobago, St. Croix, St. Pierre, Miquelon, Senegal.

As France was taken over by the National Assembly, and emigres uncomfortable with the changes fled abroad and bad-mouthed the revolution, and further when France arrested the King, and then later proclaimed a Republic, and ultimately executed the King, did colonials in any of these territories defy Paris and assert their support for the Ancien Regime in exile?

If they did not, why should Louisiana be any different? But perhaps, historically some colonies did make some such declarations.

Aug 6, 2024 11:30:48 GMT stevep said:

and the people there have avoided the worst of the poverty in France by 1789 as well as being a lot more isolated from the revolutionary pamphlets and the like.

Although that would vary depending how much late emigration there is to French Louisiana in the 1780s to beginning, pre-war years of 1790s. Newer immigrants would be more exposed to harsh and poor conditions at home, but see Louisiana as a welcome chance at escape, yet also be in touch with some of the more recent philosophical ideas and expressions and discontent, and may be less religiously/socially conservative than older colonial populations or founder populations of Canada.

  You raise some points but I think that like those in Canada the settlers, at least those who moved over prior to the PoD were more socially conservative and also they might think their safer staying loyalist given the exposed position of the colony. 

  In the Caribbean settlements, since you has a tiny French population with a mass of slaves they had to consider  how to maintain their internal security and possibly thought that this would be better achieved by staying with mainland France.  Also it could be that having committed to supporting the early changes they felt they couldn't easily change ship when things got more extreme.  This might be less of an occurrence for a much larger and homogeneous - at least in terms of the ruling population - French colony.

  It could go either way but you could well have loyalist elements unhappy with the revolution, especially after the execution of the royal family even if some of the leaders are willing to go along with the excesses.

[raharris1973]

Aug 27, 2024 14:34:37 GMT stevep said:

Aug 27, 2024 0:44:39 GMT raharris1973 said:

What was our real world experience with the real-world French colonies that existed under French sovereignty at the beginning of the Revolution? Saint-Domingue, Guiana, St. Pierre, Guadalupe, the Grenadines, Tobago, St. Croix, St. Pierre, Miquelon, Senegal.

As France was taken over by the National Assembly, and emigres uncomfortable with the changes fled abroad and bad-mouthed the revolution, and further when France arrested the King, and then later proclaimed a Republic, and ultimately executed the King, did colonials in any of these territories defy Paris and assert their support for the Ancien Regime in exile?

If they did not, why should Louisiana be any different? But perhaps, historically some colonies did make some such declarations.


Although that would vary depending how much late emigration there is to French Louisiana in the 1780s to beginning, pre-war years of 1790s. Newer immigrants would be more exposed to harsh and poor conditions at home, but see Louisiana as a welcome chance at escape, yet also be in touch with some of the more recent philosophical ideas and expressions and discontent, and may be less religiously/socially conservative than older colonial populations or founder populations of Canada.

  You raise some points but I think that like those in Canada the settlers, at least those who moved over prior to the PoD were more socially conservative and also they might think their safer staying loyalist given the exposed position of the colony. 

  In the Caribbean settlements, since you has a tiny French population with a mass of slaves they had to consider  how to maintain their internal security and possibly thought that this would be better achieved by staying with mainland France.  Also it could be that having committed to supporting the early changes they felt they couldn't easily change ship when things got more extreme.  This might be less of an occurrence for a much larger and homogeneous - at least in terms of the ruling population - French colony.

  It could go either way but you could well have loyalist elements unhappy with the revolution, especially after the execution of the royal family even if some of the leaders are willing to go along with the excesses.

I doubt that many, maybe even any, high-level ranking nobility among French emigres would choose Louisiana colony as a place of exile and refuge during the revolution and empire. Especially not royal relatives or people with some dynastic claim to the throne, however distant. Louisiana, even in Nouvelle Orleans, Baton Rouge, or its nicest nearby country “villas” (read: sticky, swampy, gator and moskeeter infested plantations) would be way too rustic for their tastes. French emigres of any means would be way more attracted to “civilized” life in the courts and cities of London, Vienna, Berlin, Madrid, Lisbon, Naples, Palermo or even St. Petersburg than rude, rugged Louisiana.

As mainland locations became unsafe for emigres and Bourbons, Palermo, London, St. Petersburg would still be preferred as more congenial to comfortable, aristocratic life, and closer to political action and intrigue aimed at restoration than a colony in another hemisphere. Taking a page from the Portuguese-Brazilian book does not work I think, because Louisiana was not nearly developed or populated as Brazil, and not even Spanish royal claimants did it in their impressive New World Vice royalties.

Now, this would not rule out an Ancien Regime monarchist loyal group ruling Louisiana “in the name” of absentee Bourbons, and impoverished, persecuted members of the French lower nobility and lower clergy, having trouble paying the rent in London or other expensive European cities, or unable to get hooked up with military, civil, or Church subsidies, allowances or military positions or salaries in Europe/Britain, might swallow their pride enough to try their luck in Louisiana.

[Max Sinister]

New Orleans is a nice place IMO... but then, I'm no French nobleman.

Haiti had a revolution, although this might have been caused by special circumstances.

[stevep]

Aug 29, 2024 1:09:30 GMT Max Sinister said:

New Orleans is a nice place IMO... but then, I'm no French nobleman.

Haiti had a revolution, although this might have been caused by special circumstances.

  In terms of Louisiana I was thinking more of the Francophone population there staying loyal to the monarchy/being revolted by the execution/murder of the royal family rather than it being inspired by French nobles coming over from Europe. 

  In terms of Haiti I think that was basically with the collapse of French external power the tiny minority of white Europeans simply lacked the numbers to hold down the mass of black slaves.  Plus some French and other inspired by ideas of liberty and equality supported the rebellion.  

  That's a totally different situation in Louisiana where the number of black slaves are few and while the local population was probably still largely the majority they had no real reason to support a radical revolution in France.  Both the Indians and Whites knew that the primary threat to their interests were the massively greater population of British colonists to their east.  As such, especially once war started between Revolutionary France and its neighbours, including Britain its primary interest would be to avoiding British/colonist invasion.  This I would argue is far better served by being a pro-royalist ally compared to a support of the reviled French revolutionaries.

[raharris1973]

Aug 29, 2024 16:59:51 GMT stevep said:

Aug 29, 2024 1:09:30 GMT Max Sinister said:

New Orleans is a nice place IMO... but then, I'm no French nobleman.

Haiti had a revolution, although this might have been caused by special circumstances.

  In terms of Louisiana I was thinking more of the Francophone population there staying loyal to the monarchy/being revolted by the execution/murder of the royal family rather than it being inspired by French nobles coming over from Europe. 

  In terms of Haiti I think that was basically with the collapse of French external power the tiny minority of white Europeans simply lacked the numbers to hold down the mass of black slaves.  Plus some French and other inspired by ideas of liberty and equality supported the rebellion.  

  That's a totally different situation in Louisiana where the number of black slaves are few and while the local population was probably still largely the majority they had no real reason to support a radical revolution in France.  Both the Indians and Whites knew that the primary threat to their interests were the massively greater population of British colonists to their east.  As such, especially once war started between Revolutionary France and its neighbours, including Britain its primary interest would be to avoiding British/colonist invasion.  This I would argue is far better served by being a pro-royalist ally compared to a support of the reviled French revolutionaries.

For Haiti, yes, French whites were far outnumbered by black slaves, slave escapee populations of black or mixed race “maroons” in remote interior hills and mullatoes, both free and slave. The French whites largely remained loyal to France through its fast moving revolutionary changes. Very importantly, one of the Governors, sonthonax (you should look him up), took jacobin revolutionary rhetoric as a mandate to officially announce a policy of emancipation in the Haiti/sainte-Domingue colony.

Now *emancipation*/slavery abolition did not have undivided support among white French colonists, nor as much support as loyalty to revolutionary France. It was probably unpopular among a majority of French whites, and was not universally supported by mullattoes or the island’s free people of color.

As for the contrast with a continued French Louisiana colony, it is not quite fair to say that black slaves were or would have been only a small part of the population. Actually, among the non-Amerindian settlers (Amerindians were difficult to count and generally uncounted in the territory) 50% or a little more in colonial times were likely black slaves. Population statistics of Louisiana territory were heavily skewed by demographics of the greater New Orleans and gulf coast area, which were very plantation-heavy.

Also, while the British would be a threat in wartime to a French Louisiana government loyal to the revolutionary republic (as they would be a threat to any of the French Revolutionary island colonies in the western hemisphere, or Guiana), it is not quite correct to say Louisiana would be greatly outnumbered by *British* colonists right next door.

The far north, barely white settled regions of Louisiana would have borders with British Hudson Bay Company land, lightly populated with mostly transient fur traders, and perhaps a short border with the far west of the newly developing Upper Canada colony of Britain. The greatest length of French Louisiana’s eastern border, mostly along the Mississippi would be with the United States. In the 1790s, this would mean mostly with Amerindians formally under USA protection and sovereignty, and increasing numbers of Anglo- American, not British colonists. The white Americans probably won’t start matching the French in numbers along the Mississippi until 1800, though the pop between the Alleghenies and Mississippi might by 1796. The Anglo-Americans would be on trend to outnumber French Louisianians over time, but this won’t be by a multiple of two or more in the border area until around 1810-ish and get steeper beyond.

[stevep]

Sept 1, 2024 19:36:57 GMT raharris1973 said:

Aug 29, 2024 16:59:51 GMT stevep said:

  In terms of Louisiana I was thinking more of the Francophone population there staying loyal to the monarchy/being revolted by the execution/murder of the royal family rather than it being inspired by French nobles coming over from Europe. 

  In terms of Haiti I think that was basically with the collapse of French external power the tiny minority of white Europeans simply lacked the numbers to hold down the mass of black slaves.  Plus some French and other inspired by ideas of liberty and equality supported the rebellion.  

  That's a totally different situation in Louisiana where the number of black slaves are few and while the local population was probably still largely the majority they had no real reason to support a radical revolution in France.  Both the Indians and Whites knew that the primary threat to their interests were the massively greater population of British colonists to their east.  As such, especially once war started between Revolutionary France and its neighbours, including Britain its primary interest would be to avoiding British/colonist invasion.  This I would argue is far better served by being a pro-royalist ally compared to a support of the reviled French revolutionaries.

For Haiti, yes, French whites were far outnumbered by black slaves, slave escapee populations of black or mixed race “maroons” in remote interior hills and mullatoes, both free and slave. The French whites largely remained loyal to France through its fast moving revolutionary changes. Very importantly, one of the Governors, sonthonax (you should look him up), took jacobin revolutionary rhetoric as a mandate to officially announce a policy of emancipation in the Haiti/sainte-Domingue colony.

Now *emancipation*/slavery abolition did not have undivided support among white French colonists, nor as much support as loyalty to revolutionary France. It was probably unpopular among a majority of French whites, and was not universally supported by mullattoes or the island’s free people of color.

As for the contrast with a continued French Louisiana colony, it is not quite fair to say that black slaves were or would have been only a small part of the population. Actually, among the non-Amerindian settlers (Amerindians were difficult to count and generally uncounted in the territory) 50% or a little more in colonial times were likely black slaves. Population statistics of Louisiana territory were heavily skewed by demographics of the greater New Orleans and gulf coast area, which were very plantation-heavy.

Also, while the British would be a threat in wartime to a French Louisiana government loyal to the revolutionary republic (as they would be a threat to any of the French Revolutionary island colonies in the western hemisphere, or Guiana), it is not quite correct to say Louisiana would be greatly outnumbered by *British* colonists right next door.

The far north, barely white settled regions of Louisiana would have borders with British Hudson Bay Company land, lightly populated with mostly transient fur traders, and perhaps a short border with the far west of the newly developing Upper Canada colony of Britain. The greatest length of French Louisiana’s eastern border, mostly along the Mississippi would be with the United States. In the 1790s, this would mean mostly with Amerindians formally under USA protection and sovereignty, and increasing numbers of Anglo- American, not British colonists. The white Americans probably won’t start matching the French in numbers along the Mississippi until 1800, though the pop between the Alleghenies and Mississippi might by 1796. The Anglo-Americans would be on trend to outnumber French Louisianians over time, but this won’t be by a multiple of two or more in the border area until around 1810-ish and get steeper beyond.

  Thanks for the reply.  I hadn't realised that slavery was already significant in the lower parts of Louisiana.

  In terms of the ratio of French to British colonists yes its far less of an imbalance in the far north but the decisive situation would be in the south where there was the only significant French/allied population and even more importantly the access to the entire colony via the Mississippi delta and New Orleans.  If there were small groups holding out further north their importance would be minimal I suspect as they would be totally isolated.