Kaiserschlacht: Imperial Germany's Last Chance

[ewellholmes]

Following the failure of peace overtures in the Winter of 1917-1918 and the removal of Russia from the war as a result of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, it was clear that the mother of all battles in the Great War was approaching in the West. The entire purpose of the ill-fated Hindenburg Programme had been to amass the material necessary to launch a grand, decisive offensive and now this effort was being coupled with the transfer of dozens of divisions from the East. German (and indeed Austro-Hungarian) morale was high among both the forces and on the home front, despite the food shortages of recent times, as it appeared victory was in sight. The German Army had defeated Russia, had nearly done the same to Italy in the Fall of 1917 and had successfully defended against the Anglo-French all throughout 1917, with the latter of that duo having suffered mass mutiny in her Army too. It was thus reasonable for the Central Powers to expect victory was at hand, but ultimately this (obviously) failed to pan out.

It did not have to be that way, however, and the German Army very nearly did achieve the decisive victory it expected and desired. German forces came within seven miles of Amiens and four miles of Hazebrouck, the two key choke points in the British logistics network. The loss of either would cripple the British logistics network, rendering the BEF incapable of offensive operations, but the loss of Amiens would in particular be especially disastrous. It's loss would mean the separation of the Anglo-French armies as well as the loss of the daily 45 trainloads of coal from the Bethune coal mines to the French munition factories to the south in Paris. If both Amiens and Hazebrouck were lost, however, the result would be unquestionably fatal according to Haig's Q Staff. As the German offensive developed in late March, they began drawing up contingency planning in this regard and by April had come to the conclusion that in this eventuality the BEF would destroy 85% of its supplies in place and evacuate from the continent.

In other words,  a "1918 Dunkirk" that would leave France alone to face the German armies, with an exposed flank and collapsing industrial production. As David T. Zabecki notes in his magisterial The German 1918 Offensives:

In mid-January 1918, General Sir Henry Wilson, the British representative to the Allied Supreme War Council at Versailles, had used his staff to wargame a 100-division German attack at the British–French juncture, driving toward Amiens.90 Rejecting the results of Wilson’s wargame, Haig continued to deploy the main weight of his forces behind his center and northern wing.91 Nonetheless, the British did understand just how fragile their transportation network was, and once Operation MICHAEL started, they were quicker than the Germans to recognize the critical vulnerability at Amiens. So was Marshal Ferdinand Foch, who wrote in his memoirs: “From the outset all were unanimous in recognizing that Amiens had to be saved at all costs, and that the fate of the war depended on it.”92 After he took command of the Fifth (re-designated as the Fourth) Army, General Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote to Wilson: “There can be no question but that the Amiens area is the only one in which the enemy can hope to gain such a success as to force the Allies to discuss terms of peace.”93 

So, what went wrong for the Germans? In short: Ludendorff was extremely indecisive and repeatedly disrupted operational planning by switching goals throughout the course of Operation Michael. Had he stuck consistently with one operational plan and committed to it, it is likely the German 2nd Army could've taken Amiens in late March:

By 26 March the three-pronged attack had given way to a two-pronged attack against the British and the French. But in deciding to launch the two MARS attacks and WALKÜRENRITT in the north two days hence, Ludendorff seemed to be trying to return to the original operational concept he abandoned late on 21 March. Those additional attacks in the north only further dissipated the main effort, and expended resources for no gain. Operationally they made no sense at all. MARS originally was supposed to facilitate the pivot of the Seventeenth Army. But the Seventeenth Army's direction of advance already had been changed from northwest to west, and its main effort was now supposed to be on its left wing. So just what was MARS supposed to accomplish? MARS was launched without forces sufficient for even a chance of its success. But what if the Germans had committed that nine division and 1,250-gun force against Amiens?

In the south, the Eighteenth Army was given no direct role in the capture of Amiens, other than pivoting to block off the French--a movement away from Amiens itself. But directly in front of Amiens was a solid defensive position of wire systems and concrete bunkers. Built by the French in 1915, the Amiens Line ran eight miles from Demuin on the Luce River to Sailly le Sec on the Somme 319 The Eighteenth Army was supposed to pass just to the south of the Amiens defenses, and could have made a flanking attack against the British positions. Instead, the Second Army was given the mission of making a frontal attack, something that was supposed to be anathema to German tactical doctrine.

Even with this fatal diversion and unfavorable attack plan, the 2nd Army's advance came close to taking Amiens, so reinforced with nine divisions and over 1,000 artillery guns, it's almost certain they would've taken it:

The Second Army's left wing, south of the Somme, was too weak to advance the attack on Amiens. Even though Ludendorff had designated it as the main effort, Marwitz had only three front-line and three second-line divisions on that axis. As Crown Prince Wilhelm later wrote, "the left wing for this very preferable undertaking was not strong enough. " 215 From 25 to 27 March the front of the Second Army had fanned out from 25 to almost 40 kilometers. 216 Although the Second didn't capture Amiens, it did get close enough to put the rail center under fire with 150mm guns. 21​

The loss of Amiens would result in roughly 40% of the BEF's logistics being cut, meaning that the follow on defense of Hazebrouck during Operation Georgette would be seriously complicated by a lack of supplies. In April of 1918, the British moved over 700 ammunition trains along their rail system in order to fight off the Germans, so the loss of a significant chunk of these supplies would be a heavy blow, especially in the context of the Germans IOTL advancing to within four miles of the city. I thus think it is likely the British fail, and the Germans take Hazebrouck too. This would mean, as stated earlier, the evacuation of the BEF off the continent by sometime in May, with 85% of their supplies destroyed in place to prevent their capture by the Germans:

During Operation MICHAEL the British were very worried about losing Amiens. On 27 March the town came under German artillery fire. The day before, Haig’s Quartermaster-General, Major-General Travers Clarke, convened a meeting to consider the possible courses of action if the Germans succeeded in separating the British and the French, thereby cutting the BEF off from its southern LOCs. On 31 March the Q-Staff issued Scheme X. That quickly evolved into Scheme Y, which had options for evacuating (a) Calais and Dunkirk in the north, or (b) Abbeville, Albancourt, and Dieppe in the south. By April, the Q-Staff issued Scheme Z, a plan for abandoning the entire area north of the Somme. The evacuation plan would require twenty-eight days to execute, with 85 percent of the existing supplies north of the Somme being destroyed in place.89 British contingency planning for losing key segments of their rail network continued through mid-July because Amiens and Hazebrouck both remained subject to German interdicting fire. 

With the British removed from the picture, the Germans could then turn their focus fully onto the French. Foch's planning, in the event of the loss of Amiens and the rupture of Allied communications, was to fall back on Paris. With the British withdrawing from the continent, this would be impossible to avoid, less the French Army be caught over-extended, outnumbered and with an exposed flank for the Germans to hit. Withdrawing on Paris would allow Foch to create a cohesive line again, but it would come at the cost of surrendering Northern France to the Germans, which has obvious morale complications, particularly in light of the BEF being defeated. France didn't survive this in 1940 IOTL, and here is far more exhausted after four years of war.

Even if they do survive the short term, in the medium term they definitely won't. As mentioned before, 45 coal trains daily moved south to the munition works of Paris through Amiens. Haig's Diary reveals the depths of the looming crisis here:

"I reached Doullens at noon, and spent 3/4 hour with M Clemenceau in his train - - Clemenceau was anxious about our covering the Bruay coal mines effectively. - - - There are only 5 days reserve [of coal] now at the French munition factories and as 70% of their coal comes from the Bruay district, it is of very great importance to cover the mines as long as possible. I assured him on this point."

Meaning that, just five days after the fall of Amiens, French war production begins to collapse. A.M. Henniker's Transportation on the Western Front also reveals there was no solution to this either; the capacity to source a replacement simply did not exist.

"Great Quantities of coal were being shipped from the United Kingdom to both France and Italy, but the output of the mines at home and the shipping situation were such that if the vital needs of France and Italy were to be met the output of the mines in the north of France was indispensable".

At this point, the war is over. The only question is if the Entente sue for peace before the French can be fully defeated or not; the French gave up in 1940 before Paris could be reached, so that's the most likely outcome and preserving their Army would give them more bargaining power at the peace table. IF they attempt to hold out, they'll be crushed in the Second Battle of the Marne and Paris either besieged or taken as in 1870 due to ammunition shortages and being outnumbered by the German Army. At that point, the only Entente member still in the field in significant numbers is Italy so it's beyond obvious the war is lost and the Americans will not arrive in time. The Kaiser's Germany would stand victorious as the dominant power on the continent with an unassailable position. 

[ewellholmes]

Victorious, what would be the kind of peace Germany would seek?

Complicating this is that there was never a complete set of German war goals consistently held. The September Programme of 1914 is generally recognized by modern historians as more of a "shopping list" of possible aims to inform negotiations, rather than a firm set of demands. Even if it was, by April of 1917 even the notoriously expansionist "Third OHL" of Hindenburg-Ludendorff held considerably less grandiose aims than that espoused in 1914, with their full list consisting of Poland, Courland and Lithuania in the East on the one hand, and on the other hand Briey-Longwy, Luxemburg and a puppet Belgium in the West. The initial German demands at Brest-Litovsk were in line with this and only become more expansive once the Bolsheviks initially refused, resulting in renewed German offensive operations that utterly crushed the Russians and enabled greater demands politically as a form of punishment on Lenin's new government.

With all that said, two demands did consistently exist from 1914 into 1918, and so we can safely assume they happen here. Said demands being the aforementioned annexation of Briey-Longwy and Luxemburg. The former had been consistently occupied since early August of 1914, and had been integrated into the German economy by 1918 with its mineral wealth serving a dual strategic purpose of enhancing Germany's own production as well as undercutting France's ability to re-emerge as a threat once again later.

Dr. Schlenker proceeds to remark that there is no need of further argument to show that Sweden was not, and could not be, in a position to make good the deficiency arising thereby of 23.55 per cent; and continues: "It must therefore be described as a special stroke of good fortune that at the very commencement of the war Germany came into possession of the Briey ore basin, as without the French iron-ores it would have been impossible for the German iron industry to cover our own and our Allies' enormous requirements of munitions. Further, the great advantages which come to us from the occupation of the ore basin mean the reverse for France." As already shown above, the share with which the Department of Meurtheet-Moselle participated in the total extraction of iron-ores in France in 1913 was no less than 19,813,572 tons, whereof again the greater part came from the Briey basin, where the extraction of ores in 1913 soared up to 15,023,740 tons.​
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Seeing that even the iron mines in the districts of the Department still held by France, and which are situated chiefly in the neighborhood of Nancy, are scarcely likely to have remained at work, France has lost, through the occupation, no less than roughly 90 per cent of her normal output of ironore, or, if we make allowance for the higher percentage of metal contained in the other French iron-ore, fully 85 per cent.​
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According to a report submitted by Dr. Schroder, of Diisseldorf, on January 31, 1915, to the general meeting of the Association of German Metallurgists (Verein Deutscher Eisenhuttenleute) no less than 95 of the roughly 127 blast furnaces which were in blast at the commencement of 1913 out of the 170 altogether existing in France, are situated in the war zone, and even the furnaces situated behind the trenches are scarcely likely to have been kept in blast in view of the shortage of ores and the existing conditions in general, so that only some 30 blast furnaces remain which could continue to work uninterruptedly. As the later number includes some small furnaces of 30 to 60 tons daily output, while the large furnaces are situated mainly in the East of France, at least 80 per cent of the entire pig-iron production of France is likely to have been stopped by the war, and more especially by the rapid thrust forward beyond the Briey ore basin.

Of the roughly 21.6 million tons of iron ore mined in 1913, France exported 9.7 million tons so this would remove a significant source of revenue from France that could utilized to aid in rebuilding their military in the future. As for Luxemburg, it was regarded as a bit of a "hold out" in German unification, in that it was a former member of the HRE and German Confederation that had not joined the fold in 1871; Imperial Germany consistently saw rectifying that in it's views as a primary war aim. Outside of those two, things are more murky and harder to pin down.

Although some Nationalists wanted to annex Belgium, this was definitely a minority view with the consensus opinion being to reshape it into a satellite state in the Post-War era. What exact form that would take, however, was likewise unclear. As of April of 1917, OHL wanted to annex Belgian territory up to the Meuse River, thus bringing the immense fortifications of Liege within Germany, granting a very defensible border anchored along a river line. In compensation, French Flanders (Effectively the departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais) would be given to the Belgians which would serve multiple purposes outside the direct one of compensation; by bringing the Channel Ports into a friendly state, Germany could secure naval basing there from which to counter Britain in any future conflicts being the most prominent. Equally important, it would increase the amount of Flemmish in Belgium, who were generally a Pro-German group within Belgium. Coupled with a decrease in the amount of ethnic Walloons in the state thanks to German annexations in the East, the political composition of Belgium would be changed by the Flemmish becoming the majority population. This was reflected in some German planning which seems to also suggest a desire to enforce a more loose governmental structure in Belgium indicated in the possible renaming of it to "Flanders-Wallonia". 

Note, the above is what OHL wanted; civilian authorities were rather less decided on the matter and Chancellor Bethmann Holloweg repeatedly made it clear he did not feel bound to their desires on this, so it could go other ways. Another area the military seemed to have designs was on bringing the remainder of the Vosges mountain chain under Germany's control to establish a more defensive border for Alsace-Lorraine; France in 1914 still controlled a smart part of the mountain chain. Further afield, Tirpitz and the Naval Lobby very much desired African colonies and a desire to establish MittelAfrika-a territorially continuous colonial empire stretching across Africa from the Atlantic to the Pacific comes up a lot. The obvious check on this, however, being Great Britain and it's undefeated Royal Navy; if Germany wants to regain and even expand her colonial empire, she'll have to cut a deal on the fate of Belgium, which is one reason why the civilian administration always wanted to use flexibility in their war aims so as to not be tied down on anything so they could achieve the best deal possible. 

In the East, Germany by 1918 had not committed to any direct annexations although debate on the Polish Border Strip (Itself never codified on a definitive vision, with multiple different proposals extant) remained. German opinion was unanimous in that they would deal with the Bolsheviks permanently at some point in favor of establish a more favorable Government; Ludendorff, interestingly enough, even planned to trade Ukraine back to them in the future once the dust had settled in exchange for economic concessions. 

So, to sum this all up, what do I think the Germans would do?

First, they'd definitely annex Briey-Longwy and Luxemburg. They'd also probably demand an indemnity from France as well as military limitations of a size depending on how badly the French Army gets beat before the Entente seek peace. Such limitations would also likely include the destruction or German occupation (Say for...15 years lol?) of the fortresses at Epinal, Toul and Verdun. Belgium would depend on factional infighting within Germany itself and what line the Anglo-Americans press; if they refuse to play ball, then it's likely something in line with OHL's vision is carried out, but if they do, it's likely you get a restored Belgium on neutralized basis in exchange for Germany getting its African empire. In the East, you would get a German intervention at some point against the Bolsheviks, and then at some point they restore White Ruthenia (OTL Belarus) and Ukraine to the new(er) Russia in exchange for economic concessions and other deals. 

In the long run, this sets up a Cold War between the Anglo-Americans on the one hand and Imperial Germany and its allies on the other, but we are unlikely to see another World War at least in the ATL 20th Century. Russia is likely neutralized, while France is not in a position to recover sufficiently to be able to challenge Germany again; likewise, IOTL Germany gave up its efforts after two consecutive losses, and the loss in the Great War would be the second loss France has taken to Germany, with the first being 1870. At this point, the German position is too strong and their own too weak, so it's likely France accepts its position in the same way Germany has since WWII IOTL.

What exact shape this Cold War takes is much harder to predict; Great Britain struggled a lot even in victory in the 1920s and 1930s, so the added strain here makes the future hard to predict. Germany meanwhile has achieved the necessary commercial and raw materials base to challenge the United States on equal footing over the course of the century. It'll thus be a close contest, with the potential for an early upset on the part of Germany if Britain is unable to get past her defeat in the Great War upsetting the balance. Japan will be the wild card here; she could, in the long run, align with either camp and thus give either an advantage. If Japan is able to maintain its traditional ties with the UK and bridge the gap between themselves and the Americans, the Anglo-Americans will be able to focus on and thus contain the Germans much more easily than otherwise. If Japan, just as she did IOTL, aligns with Germany over the following decades, the reverse is also true, in that it will force a division of focus that harms the Anglo-American effort.