Post by raharris1973 on Oct 31, 2024 13:19:03 GMT
Could any of these scenarios have minimized domestic rancor over ‘Who lost China?' or made establishing US-PRC relations easier earlier?
1. Tom Dewey gets elected in 1944 . Thus, Tom Dewey and his likely Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles *own* US foreign policy in the years 1945-1948, and 1949-1952, presuming reelection in 1948, the years in which the Chinese mainland would fall under the Communist Party. With them facing the same demobilization pressures and geopolitical priorities Truman faced, and objective circumstances, their policy toward China may differ very little, at least for a long while, from the policy of the Truman Administration. In any case, even if they were to lean to a more pro-Nationalist, pro-Chiang Kai-shek policy than Truman......of the kind that Chiang and the China Lobby was asking for at the time and would have been viable with Congress and American public opinion, budgetary, mobilization, and geopolitical realities the outcome would not change - Communist victory. Generously conceding impact of more decided pro-Chiang policy, at best, timing might change with a one or two year life extension of the Nationalist regime on the mainland gained.
Rationale for why it detoxifies "who lost China?": In OTL, the loss of China, which to some degree the anti-Japanese war was fought for, happened all under the watch of Democratic Administrations, and Republicans were embittered by being out of power politically since 1933 and 'on the run' since 1930 on the economy and foreign policy since late 1940. The loss of China after the high of winning WWII defied superficial common sense to American audiences and for Republicans it was political gold. It was a failure it could lay at the Truman Administration's feet, because the Truman Administration had been involved in postwar aid programs, limiting aid programs, Nationalist-Communist negotiations. It was like the charges of sellout at Yalta, only better, because Communist domination wasn't a military fait accompli of the Red Army, Republicans could more directly and plausibly blame the opposing Party's Administration for the outcome, based on how things looked at the end of WWII. But in this ATL, the fall of China's mainland at least happens under a Republican Administration, so it can't be a Republican cudgel against Democrats.
Now could the Democrats use "who lost China?" as a cudgel against Republicans? And would they? Possibly. We cannot absolutely rule it out. It might turn the partisan critique into a mirror opposite image of what we had in OTL. But - the Democrats may not be interested. Democrats may testify to troubles and tensions in teh wartime relationship with Chiang. Democrats, with less time out of power, and more WWII foreign policy street cred, may feel less defensive/aggressive about cutting the GOP reputation on national security down to size, rather than late 1940s/50s Republicans who were getting payback for being called 'isolationists' for much of a decade.
Without "who lost China?" being a domestically rancorous and partisan issue, Presidents of either Party feel a freedom to open diplomatic recognition to Communist China, whenever the PRC is receptive, which might be at the outset of the regime, or might be a bit later, possibly the middle 50s. Much of the timing depends on Mao's domestic political wants and needs, and much also depends on the complicating factor of Taiwan and if the US is or is not actively doing something to prevent Communist takeover of the island.
2. Nationalist China collapses during WWII, not after, leading to Communist China being established immediately at the end of the WWII at the same time or just prior to most of the East European satellite states and not in 1949 after a prolonged Civil War. I don't want to spend too much time on the how, but I think this can be done, and I don't want to stick on debating it, and I do want to get past it to consequences. A relatively simple model of the 'how' is that the Japanese simply start their full-scale war in China about two years early, in 1935 instead of 1937. This wears on both sides, but over time, wears more on the weaker, poorer, Chinese side, particularly in terms of prolonged denial to Nationalist China of its major coastal and riverine cities and earlier increase to and longer exposure to inflation.
Spoiler: the details of getting to how, if you're interested
Japan occupies Guangzhou and the Wuhan cities by the end of 1936 (vice OTL 1938), and has a pretty thorough coastal blockade and occupation of Hainan by spring 1937 (vice OTL 1939).
The Chinese settle in for a long, brave, admirable resistance. The Japanese for a war of siege. But repeated annual winter Chinese offensives fail to dislodge the Japanese from major terrain objectives or to destroy any major Japanese formations, and Japanese bombing of unoccupied China worsens. The US eventually does a 'moral embargo' of weapons and aviation specific exports, but not the basic raw materials that are the main things Japan needs. Japan supports its war effort mainly through domestic austerity and off the backs of the occupied mainland's people and resources. Japan in 1937, 38, 39 and most of 40 is not trying to seize new territory but bomb, blockade the Chinese Nationalists into submission while promoting puppet governments. The Nationalist-Communist front is also breaking down as the Communists expand their base areas behind Japanese occupied rail lines.
Only after the defeat of France in Europe is the time "ripe" for Japan to try occupations south of China, bullying its way into occupation of northern French Indochina. This leads to the step-by-step spiral of metals sanctions by the USA, then the later Japanese occupation of all Indochina and the Franco-Thai war, and then the American freezing of assets and oil embargo on Japan. That asset freeze/embargo sets the clock on schedule for the 1941-42 Japanese South Seas campaign and attack on Pearl Harbor which seizes Western Pacific and Southeast Asian targets, and helpfully for the China War, seizes Burma and the Burma Road supply line.
The difference in this ATL is that two years further into the war, and war-induced inflation, but now cut off from the ground supply line, with no immediate air reinforcement, no next season Burma offensive, and a year plus to wait before offensive Allied action affects the fringes of the western Pacific, China's morale is lower and more fragile.
Here in early summer 1942, Japan can launch the equivalent of the Ichi-go offensive with success, and by March 1943, establish solid ground lines of communication between Manchuria and Indochina, and turn off the Americans to the idea of ever making China a solid air/bomber base in the anti-Japanese war. Although Japan faces nasty naval setbacks at Midway and a grinding disaster at Guadalcanal in the Solomons over the late summer of 1942 through early 1943, US forces on the map are not moving much closer too Japan, and mainly attriting Japanese platforms around the Gilberts, New Guinea, and Bismarcks through 1943. The Japanese however, in post-spring 1943 campaigns in China, are conducting mass campaigns which destroy Chinese Nationalist Armies and occupy key cities like Chongqing (taken December 1943) and Chengdu (taken Mar 1944) and adjacent food producing areas of the Sichuan valley, and split Nationalist territories and forces into separate pockets. The Japanese, not facing serious ground threats yet to their 'inner island chain' from American amphibious forces, nor from the Soviet Union, engaged in the great battles of Kursk and the follow up expulsion of all Axis forces from east of the Dnepr river, nor from British India, are able to assume risk and focus on knocking the Chinese Nationalists out of the war.
The Japanese can even begin sponsoring some Tibetan secessionist factions in Chamdo/Sikang/Kham and Amdo/Qinghai provinces to prevent Chinese Nationalist re-stablization there. Later in 1944, the Japanese can seize more Chinese provincial capitals like Kunming in Yunnan province. Behind their lines, whereever they and puppet troops are more thinly garrisoned, Communist guerrillas spread their operations, and work in competition with KMT guerrillas and remnants.
Chiang Kai-shek by this point may either be dead, in an isolated mountain guerrilla base, deep in Tibet or Xinjiang, or fled through them to safely Allied territory in India, united with Chinese troops caught in the retreat from Burma to there back in spring 1942, hoping to make a comeback through a US supported invasion.
The other world fronts by late 1943 are performing as per OTL, the US fleet train and combat units for the Pacific are built. Grand US offensives onto the European mainland and the central Pacific surge forth in summer 1944, as does Soviet Operation Bagration and its surge into the Balkans. By late 1944 in the Pacific, the initial US invasions of the smaller Philippines islands are underway. Some of the main Pacific fronts or European fronts might actually be proceeding a few weeks faster than OTL because of raw materials and inputs being available and pushed to provide support on the scene that in this ATL cannot be pushed forward to usefully assist in any CBI front ground or air effort.
With the darkening of visible embers of Chinese Nationalist pockets in 1944 and early 1945, although not all of them go dark, there is an increasing sense among Allied planners by late 1944, and definitely in 1945, that there is no "China" worth pushing through to from Burma. Maybe there is a China and Chinese resistance to be resuscitated by invading the mainland via the Pacific Ocean route, via the Philippines, Taiwan (Formosa) or the Ryukyus. Navy people bring it up, Air force people bring it up from time to time as part of blockade strategy against Japan.
To MacArthur from the beginning of 1945 at USAFFE any and all of this mainland talk is just 'playing with your food' when it is time to prepare the main course, the invasion of Japan. He is focused strictly on the route Luzon to Okinawa to Kyushu. by summer and fall, Marshall is agreeing with him. MacArthur is also saying, the sooner the Soviets get in to 'tie down' Japanese forces on the mainland, the better, and starts mentioning it more and more as the victory in Europe is completed.
Because of accelerated operations on other fronts, VE Day is advanced about a month, and the USSR war declaration on Japan is also advanced about a month, coming a few weeks ahead of atomic bomb readiness and use. The Soviet and Mongolian forces make rapid progress in Manchuria, northeast Korean, inner Mongolia, and north central China, while also making a supporting avenue of approach through Xinjiang through China's northwest provinces. The Chinese guerrilla forces, especially Communists, use this as a signal to make a series of offensives and uprisings across the nation. In the weeks ahead in different locales they have varying degrees of successful and failure, but certainly expand their visibility and reach, and inconvenience Japanese forces and inflict casualties. By the time of the atomic bombs being dropped and the Japanese discussing surrender with the Allies, Soviet vanguards assisted by local Communists have bypassed and encircled Beijing and some have reached much further south, just a three days combat drive to the major cities of the Yangtze valley.
In rural and urban regions liberated by the Soviets from the Japanese, the Chinese Communists, and self-identified, handpicked figures from other parties, including people with nominal KMT titles (according to themselves and the Communists, regardless of what Chiang says) establish 'all-party coalition governments' under Communist control.
In this manner, Communist control spreads throughout the Chinese mainland, surrounding any limited pockets of true KMT guerrilla or independent warlord control as the Japanese surrender once the Emperor orders it. Only on Taiwan might the Japanese garrison surrender to Chiang Kai-shek and a group of Chinese Nationalist troops air or sea lifted over from the Ramgarh training facility in India where they had been spending the war.
By no later than early 1946, Mao is proclaiming a People's Republic of China and moving the capital to Beijing.
In this ATL, the Communist takeover of China appears to be basically a baked-in consequence of Soviet participation at the end of the war with Japan. And Soviet participation at the end of the war with Japan appears pretty baked-in considering defeat of our other mainland ally holding up a front, had been unfolding in front of American eyes pretty clearly since 1943, arguably in some ways since 1942. Further Communist takeover and loss of KMT/Chiang's shot at authority is just a little more nasty sauce on the crap sandwich presented to American public opinion. It is not the result of any new mistakes by Truman and his team, not construable as result of failure of US-sponsored Communist-Nationalist negotiation. Possibly construable as a result of involving the Soviets in the Japanese war, but despite even the atom bomb giving grounds to second-guess that, Soviet entry look a bit less superfluous, because Soviet entry in this OTL starts a few weeks before A-Bomb use, and has results plastered on maps on the front pages of US newspapers, and because Americans had heard themselves talk about hoping/wanting a helpful second front in Asia since the collapse of China had accelerated in 1943.
So here again, I think the Truman Administration should have an easier time recognizing the PRC on the mainland. Much of the timing depends on the complicating factor of Taiwan and if the US is or is not actively doing something to prevent Communist takeover of the island. Unlike the other variant, I do not think it depends as much on Mao's domestic political wants and needs, because in his fast-track, Soviet abetted rise to be, he could well have less personal power over the revolutionary process, possibly none at all. The Soviets would likely not support or indulge him in deliberately making diplomatic difficulties or problems or provocations with the Americans just as part of mobilizing domestic Chinese revolutionary feeling. It is not because the Soviets *like* the USA, but because they would want to tread a bit cautiously on all matters affecting the other superpower's interests, even while pretty strongly asserting their own interests.
1. Tom Dewey gets elected in 1944 . Thus, Tom Dewey and his likely Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles *own* US foreign policy in the years 1945-1948, and 1949-1952, presuming reelection in 1948, the years in which the Chinese mainland would fall under the Communist Party. With them facing the same demobilization pressures and geopolitical priorities Truman faced, and objective circumstances, their policy toward China may differ very little, at least for a long while, from the policy of the Truman Administration. In any case, even if they were to lean to a more pro-Nationalist, pro-Chiang Kai-shek policy than Truman......of the kind that Chiang and the China Lobby was asking for at the time and would have been viable with Congress and American public opinion, budgetary, mobilization, and geopolitical realities the outcome would not change - Communist victory. Generously conceding impact of more decided pro-Chiang policy, at best, timing might change with a one or two year life extension of the Nationalist regime on the mainland gained.
Rationale for why it detoxifies "who lost China?": In OTL, the loss of China, which to some degree the anti-Japanese war was fought for, happened all under the watch of Democratic Administrations, and Republicans were embittered by being out of power politically since 1933 and 'on the run' since 1930 on the economy and foreign policy since late 1940. The loss of China after the high of winning WWII defied superficial common sense to American audiences and for Republicans it was political gold. It was a failure it could lay at the Truman Administration's feet, because the Truman Administration had been involved in postwar aid programs, limiting aid programs, Nationalist-Communist negotiations. It was like the charges of sellout at Yalta, only better, because Communist domination wasn't a military fait accompli of the Red Army, Republicans could more directly and plausibly blame the opposing Party's Administration for the outcome, based on how things looked at the end of WWII. But in this ATL, the fall of China's mainland at least happens under a Republican Administration, so it can't be a Republican cudgel against Democrats.
Now could the Democrats use "who lost China?" as a cudgel against Republicans? And would they? Possibly. We cannot absolutely rule it out. It might turn the partisan critique into a mirror opposite image of what we had in OTL. But - the Democrats may not be interested. Democrats may testify to troubles and tensions in teh wartime relationship with Chiang. Democrats, with less time out of power, and more WWII foreign policy street cred, may feel less defensive/aggressive about cutting the GOP reputation on national security down to size, rather than late 1940s/50s Republicans who were getting payback for being called 'isolationists' for much of a decade.
Without "who lost China?" being a domestically rancorous and partisan issue, Presidents of either Party feel a freedom to open diplomatic recognition to Communist China, whenever the PRC is receptive, which might be at the outset of the regime, or might be a bit later, possibly the middle 50s. Much of the timing depends on Mao's domestic political wants and needs, and much also depends on the complicating factor of Taiwan and if the US is or is not actively doing something to prevent Communist takeover of the island.
2. Nationalist China collapses during WWII, not after, leading to Communist China being established immediately at the end of the WWII at the same time or just prior to most of the East European satellite states and not in 1949 after a prolonged Civil War. I don't want to spend too much time on the how, but I think this can be done, and I don't want to stick on debating it, and I do want to get past it to consequences. A relatively simple model of the 'how' is that the Japanese simply start their full-scale war in China about two years early, in 1935 instead of 1937. This wears on both sides, but over time, wears more on the weaker, poorer, Chinese side, particularly in terms of prolonged denial to Nationalist China of its major coastal and riverine cities and earlier increase to and longer exposure to inflation.
Spoiler: the details of getting to how, if you're interested
Japan occupies Guangzhou and the Wuhan cities by the end of 1936 (vice OTL 1938), and has a pretty thorough coastal blockade and occupation of Hainan by spring 1937 (vice OTL 1939).
The Chinese settle in for a long, brave, admirable resistance. The Japanese for a war of siege. But repeated annual winter Chinese offensives fail to dislodge the Japanese from major terrain objectives or to destroy any major Japanese formations, and Japanese bombing of unoccupied China worsens. The US eventually does a 'moral embargo' of weapons and aviation specific exports, but not the basic raw materials that are the main things Japan needs. Japan supports its war effort mainly through domestic austerity and off the backs of the occupied mainland's people and resources. Japan in 1937, 38, 39 and most of 40 is not trying to seize new territory but bomb, blockade the Chinese Nationalists into submission while promoting puppet governments. The Nationalist-Communist front is also breaking down as the Communists expand their base areas behind Japanese occupied rail lines.
Only after the defeat of France in Europe is the time "ripe" for Japan to try occupations south of China, bullying its way into occupation of northern French Indochina. This leads to the step-by-step spiral of metals sanctions by the USA, then the later Japanese occupation of all Indochina and the Franco-Thai war, and then the American freezing of assets and oil embargo on Japan. That asset freeze/embargo sets the clock on schedule for the 1941-42 Japanese South Seas campaign and attack on Pearl Harbor which seizes Western Pacific and Southeast Asian targets, and helpfully for the China War, seizes Burma and the Burma Road supply line.
The difference in this ATL is that two years further into the war, and war-induced inflation, but now cut off from the ground supply line, with no immediate air reinforcement, no next season Burma offensive, and a year plus to wait before offensive Allied action affects the fringes of the western Pacific, China's morale is lower and more fragile.
Here in early summer 1942, Japan can launch the equivalent of the Ichi-go offensive with success, and by March 1943, establish solid ground lines of communication between Manchuria and Indochina, and turn off the Americans to the idea of ever making China a solid air/bomber base in the anti-Japanese war. Although Japan faces nasty naval setbacks at Midway and a grinding disaster at Guadalcanal in the Solomons over the late summer of 1942 through early 1943, US forces on the map are not moving much closer too Japan, and mainly attriting Japanese platforms around the Gilberts, New Guinea, and Bismarcks through 1943. The Japanese however, in post-spring 1943 campaigns in China, are conducting mass campaigns which destroy Chinese Nationalist Armies and occupy key cities like Chongqing (taken December 1943) and Chengdu (taken Mar 1944) and adjacent food producing areas of the Sichuan valley, and split Nationalist territories and forces into separate pockets. The Japanese, not facing serious ground threats yet to their 'inner island chain' from American amphibious forces, nor from the Soviet Union, engaged in the great battles of Kursk and the follow up expulsion of all Axis forces from east of the Dnepr river, nor from British India, are able to assume risk and focus on knocking the Chinese Nationalists out of the war.
The Japanese can even begin sponsoring some Tibetan secessionist factions in Chamdo/Sikang/Kham and Amdo/Qinghai provinces to prevent Chinese Nationalist re-stablization there. Later in 1944, the Japanese can seize more Chinese provincial capitals like Kunming in Yunnan province. Behind their lines, whereever they and puppet troops are more thinly garrisoned, Communist guerrillas spread their operations, and work in competition with KMT guerrillas and remnants.
Chiang Kai-shek by this point may either be dead, in an isolated mountain guerrilla base, deep in Tibet or Xinjiang, or fled through them to safely Allied territory in India, united with Chinese troops caught in the retreat from Burma to there back in spring 1942, hoping to make a comeback through a US supported invasion.
The other world fronts by late 1943 are performing as per OTL, the US fleet train and combat units for the Pacific are built. Grand US offensives onto the European mainland and the central Pacific surge forth in summer 1944, as does Soviet Operation Bagration and its surge into the Balkans. By late 1944 in the Pacific, the initial US invasions of the smaller Philippines islands are underway. Some of the main Pacific fronts or European fronts might actually be proceeding a few weeks faster than OTL because of raw materials and inputs being available and pushed to provide support on the scene that in this ATL cannot be pushed forward to usefully assist in any CBI front ground or air effort.
With the darkening of visible embers of Chinese Nationalist pockets in 1944 and early 1945, although not all of them go dark, there is an increasing sense among Allied planners by late 1944, and definitely in 1945, that there is no "China" worth pushing through to from Burma. Maybe there is a China and Chinese resistance to be resuscitated by invading the mainland via the Pacific Ocean route, via the Philippines, Taiwan (Formosa) or the Ryukyus. Navy people bring it up, Air force people bring it up from time to time as part of blockade strategy against Japan.
To MacArthur from the beginning of 1945 at USAFFE any and all of this mainland talk is just 'playing with your food' when it is time to prepare the main course, the invasion of Japan. He is focused strictly on the route Luzon to Okinawa to Kyushu. by summer and fall, Marshall is agreeing with him. MacArthur is also saying, the sooner the Soviets get in to 'tie down' Japanese forces on the mainland, the better, and starts mentioning it more and more as the victory in Europe is completed.
Because of accelerated operations on other fronts, VE Day is advanced about a month, and the USSR war declaration on Japan is also advanced about a month, coming a few weeks ahead of atomic bomb readiness and use. The Soviet and Mongolian forces make rapid progress in Manchuria, northeast Korean, inner Mongolia, and north central China, while also making a supporting avenue of approach through Xinjiang through China's northwest provinces. The Chinese guerrilla forces, especially Communists, use this as a signal to make a series of offensives and uprisings across the nation. In the weeks ahead in different locales they have varying degrees of successful and failure, but certainly expand their visibility and reach, and inconvenience Japanese forces and inflict casualties. By the time of the atomic bombs being dropped and the Japanese discussing surrender with the Allies, Soviet vanguards assisted by local Communists have bypassed and encircled Beijing and some have reached much further south, just a three days combat drive to the major cities of the Yangtze valley.
In rural and urban regions liberated by the Soviets from the Japanese, the Chinese Communists, and self-identified, handpicked figures from other parties, including people with nominal KMT titles (according to themselves and the Communists, regardless of what Chiang says) establish 'all-party coalition governments' under Communist control.
In this manner, Communist control spreads throughout the Chinese mainland, surrounding any limited pockets of true KMT guerrilla or independent warlord control as the Japanese surrender once the Emperor orders it. Only on Taiwan might the Japanese garrison surrender to Chiang Kai-shek and a group of Chinese Nationalist troops air or sea lifted over from the Ramgarh training facility in India where they had been spending the war.
By no later than early 1946, Mao is proclaiming a People's Republic of China and moving the capital to Beijing.
In this ATL, the Communist takeover of China appears to be basically a baked-in consequence of Soviet participation at the end of the war with Japan. And Soviet participation at the end of the war with Japan appears pretty baked-in considering defeat of our other mainland ally holding up a front, had been unfolding in front of American eyes pretty clearly since 1943, arguably in some ways since 1942. Further Communist takeover and loss of KMT/Chiang's shot at authority is just a little more nasty sauce on the crap sandwich presented to American public opinion. It is not the result of any new mistakes by Truman and his team, not construable as result of failure of US-sponsored Communist-Nationalist negotiation. Possibly construable as a result of involving the Soviets in the Japanese war, but despite even the atom bomb giving grounds to second-guess that, Soviet entry look a bit less superfluous, because Soviet entry in this OTL starts a few weeks before A-Bomb use, and has results plastered on maps on the front pages of US newspapers, and because Americans had heard themselves talk about hoping/wanting a helpful second front in Asia since the collapse of China had accelerated in 1943.
So here again, I think the Truman Administration should have an easier time recognizing the PRC on the mainland. Much of the timing depends on the complicating factor of Taiwan and if the US is or is not actively doing something to prevent Communist takeover of the island. Unlike the other variant, I do not think it depends as much on Mao's domestic political wants and needs, because in his fast-track, Soviet abetted rise to be, he could well have less personal power over the revolutionary process, possibly none at all. The Soviets would likely not support or indulge him in deliberately making diplomatic difficulties or problems or provocations with the Americans just as part of mobilizing domestic Chinese revolutionary feeling. It is not because the Soviets *like* the USA, but because they would want to tread a bit cautiously on all matters affecting the other superpower's interests, even while pretty strongly asserting their own interests.