American politics, economics & society in a no-WWI world, plus US & global demography?
Nov 15, 2024 1:58:45 GMT
Post by raharris1973 on Nov 15, 2024 1:58:45 GMT
Imagine there is no World War One, no Great War, even no Great Power bilateral war on the scale of the Russo-Japanese War or anything larger, between 1914 and 1924.
[The world does not have to be entirely peaceful, that is a bit too much to ask. Wars of colonial suppression or acquisition could happen. Wars on the scale of the Balkan wars, or great powers picking on littler ones, like the Italo-Ottoman could happen- as long as contained and short, revolutions (like ongoing in Mexico) or civil wars could happen, or warlordism (like in China, or possibly Ethiopia), coups d'etat, or major internal disturbance of whatever magnitude (Irish question? (Ausgleich renegotiation drama and crisis)]
1. What would be the consequences for American politics (including the 1916, 1920, and 1924 elections, midterm election, major legislative acts, Constitutional Amendments), economics (presence or absence of a major Depression/Recession/consumer boom, breadth of participation in stock/bond/securities markets, infrastructure and technology deployments, role of foreign vs. Wall Street finance, national debtor vs. creditor status), and society (traditionalism in social, gender, racial, class roles, vs. libertinism, permissiveness to buck tradition, class consciousness & energy for economic & social reform) in this American world over this decade?
2. What would be the consequences for US, and global, demography in this world? Volume and sources of immigration from 1914 to 1924, adoption or non-adoption of immigration of restrictionist legislation, and timing and manner (in terms of discriminatory criteria) of restrictions, movement between American regions (south to north, midwest and west), year of shift from majority rural to majority urban, entertainment, sport, consumption habits, perceptions of vice and virtue?
...I was already thinking along these lines, but perhaps I had partial inspiration from a recent similar thread, www.alternatehistory.com/fo...er-increasing-their-conscription-term.557736/, and before hitting the keyboard with a new thread, I reviewed this other recent one: www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/economic-impacts-of-no-wwi.557193/.
Fleshing out my initial questions with some preliminary answers, or, as the case may be, more detailed, granular questions:
On the plus side for Wilson's reelection in 1916 - the legislative successes and reforms of his first term, gaining him credibility in progressive circles.
Also on the plus side, incumbency.
Also (provisionally) on the plus side, a figure the long-disempowered Democrats can be proud of, unless embarrassments accumulate and would have a stake in, and with southern cultural connections, that southerners would identify with even more than Grover Cleveland. (this is provisional only, because it can easily be ruined by a bad recession/depression, a serious scandal, a foreign policy setback humiliation).
No alienation of Irish and German voters won in 1912 through perceived pro-Entente policies in a no-WWI scenario. [If there is a major Irish-related disturbance, Wilson could probably do OK with condemning British oppression/repression, calling for peace, freedom, reform, welcoming refugees and dissidents, but still enforcing neutrality acts pretty much to the letter of the law, and not attempting anything actually coercive, diplomatically or economically, against the UK. Why? Pre-American superpowerdom, strong rhetoric was enough to please lobbying groups of support. Rhetoric without coercive action was more respected for its own sake. Only after American Cold War super-powerdom, the achievement of unconditional surrenders in WWII, and globalized hyper-interventions and coup-making did Americans come to believe that Americans did not *enforce* their verbal preferences on foreigners, they were not *serious*. That expectation is very much a post-WWII, Cold War, post-Cold War thing, reinforced by American 'wins' that gradually came easier up through the beginning of the 1990s 'unipolar moment'].
On the minus side for Wilson's reelection in 1916 - no GOP split in 1916, that is one less advantage for him he had in 1912. By itself, I do not think it is deal-closing, put a fork in him, he is done, disadvantage. Every election is unique despite what looks like party ascendant 'eras'.
Also, on the minus side, Wilson cannot use the 'he kept us out of war' campaign line, when there is no war he kept us out of.
Here is something I suspect people will bring up as a "minus" that I do not think, in the context of 1916 American politics, is a minus: Wilson's racism and resegregation of federal employment. I think this is 'pundit's fallacy' of 21st century pundits/observers. Sure, where they can vote, mainly in the north and some border states, blacks who voted in 1912 for Wilson are likely in high proportion to 'come home' to the Republican nominee. Their votes in most jurisdiction will be outweighed by the numbers of white votes that Wilson probably gains, both on race specifically, and for other reasons. Additionally, since politics is not in isolation from demography, I suspect a lesser absolute and proportional migration of southern blacks northward will diminish the impact of the black vote in the 1916 and 1920 and 1924 elections in northern, midwestern, western states where blacks can vote, and by the time of the 1924 and 1920 vote, increase the total impact of the the naturalized immigrant 'ethnic' but white vote in those same states.
A provisional/potential minus for Wilson in 1916 - if there is a Depression or bad recession, affecting the latter years of his first term, without Entente war-related demand for American commodities and other industrial production.
I'll hold my judgment on immigration related laws until part 3, demography. Constitutional Amendments, I would say, female suffrage, unaffected, yes, even without men off to war and more women in factories. Prohibition - without the anti-German factor? I honestly don't know. My guess, and it is no more than a pure coin toss, is that it is a coin toss. The temperance to teetotaler movement was still a big social peer pressure movement posing a big bluff that might have worked, even without the 'oomph' of fitting with anti-Germanism, anti-Irishism and their whiskey, and wartime conservationism, but maybe not. I am purely guessing. Income tax, I think it still passes. Obviously, rates are never set at wartime highs.
- I haven't a clue, a coin toss. I am eager for your thoughts and speculations on that one. My limited background knowledge suggests that the outbreak of war OTL pulled the economy in a couple opposing directions: It initially caused a financial crash/panic liquidity crunch from Entente (and possibly CP?) pulling their money back home. But America controlled this with a bank holiday. As the war proceeded, exports to the Entente were ever growing, and continually added revenue for multiple lines of American business. Somewhat offsetting this, but not negating this by any means, firms exporting to the CPs were harmed by the blockade of the CPs, and this hurt notably cotton exporters [Britain had more of its own cotton sources I guess than Germany and Austria-Hungary]. The war also bid up the price of labor as belligerent nations reached full employment by conscription and industrial mobilization, and commandeering of shipping for high value cargo, which all constricted emigration. This was only partly offset by increased industrial labor recruitment from the southern USA.
Take away the war, the opposing trends on all these continue. More foreign investment, more diverse export markets for Americans, but lower total volume, more immigrant labor available at a relatively low wage.
There is no way there won't be notable recessions/contractions. Chances will be north of 50/50 that at least on one occasion, if not two, recession or depression quarters will close enough to election years/quarters to unseat the incumbent. When? I have no idea. Railroad growth and raw steel production growth may be a bit tapped out. Automotive and passenger and airmail deployment may be expansion areas. Radio and telephone deployment and household electrical deployment will probably be expansion sectors, as well as the cinema industry.
The base of investors/speculators in stock/bond/securities markets will probably be smaller, because of government authority/propaganda not aggressively pushing war bonds. More people will deposit savings they have in more mundane accounts when they have money to save. The US will probably remain a net debtor nation through 1924, but its debtor/creditor status will all be relative to particular sub-markets and sectors, Wall Street and American banking will continue to grow in sophistication. A borrower from many and a lender to many.
Both would coexist urban and cosmopolitan culture, pop culture and a taste for the exotic would grow, but so would reaction and a market opportunity for the old-fashioned and traditional in aesthetic and morality and religion. I don't think WWI is necessary for the alt-1920s to have many societal parallels to the real-world 1920s. Many Victorian norms will erode in various urban enclaves.
The way I see it, there is no reason in this ATL for immigration laws to get as restricted and discriminatory any *earlier* than they did, by stages in 1917 (against Asians), then 1921 and 1924 (against varieties of European and further against Asians). The most plausible 'range of motion' compared with OTL would restrictions coming *later and/or lesser* or about on time/on schedule with OTL's legislation. This would also be combined with greater than OTL net immigration from countries, mainly European, from which immigration is not limited, every year there is not a bad recession going on in the USA between 1914 and 1921, and to some extent, 1921-24.
Why? No WWI = no or lesser Red Scare from Bolshevik revolution, just usual routine background Anarchist and Socialist phobia
No WWI = Business and industrial concerns do not get used to being put on a strict 'slimfast' diet of frequently replenished low-wage foreign labor on a seasonal or permanently added basis. They do not gain nearly as much experience or comfort seeking possibly higher priced southern black and white labor as a closer substitute source for their factories, mines and other operations.
No WWI = European chain migrations on the demand side are much less interrupted by people being conscripted for military service, war production industries, field work. Passenger fare rates remain lower and sea travel remains faster and safer for multiple classes of passengers. The number of people content to stay home because they are not draft-evading or made refugees in no way offsets the higher number of people made available by these bigger trends to emigrate.
No WWI = Less of a patriotic propaganda industry focused on 100% Americanism that riffs off of convenient-for-war propaganda stigmatization of ethnic groups reluctant to join the war on behalf of the Entente, Germans (because of Germany being the enemy) and Irish (because of Britain being the ally), and then spilling over into condemnation of 'hyphenated-Americans', dual loyalty, and immigrants writ large.
So, I believe even in minimal, most conservative estimated change scenarios, there would be quite a great deal of demographic alteration in the United States, and other 'New World' countries of immigration, and it goes without saying Europe's demography would be hugely affected.
To take a *very* conservative estimate, I could say that the ATL immigration scenario might:
1. Match changes in American immigration law *exactly* in one respect, towards Asian immigration - So, there would still be the 1917 creation of the Asiatic Barred Zone, which strangely, did not exclude the Japanese Empire, nor coastal China. Then in 1924 there would be the definitive Asian exclusion provisions enacted that excluded natives of Imperial Japan and further tightened the Chinese exclusion act.
2. An emergency, temporary system might be implemented in 1921 that applied to European immigrants and seek to establish emergency quotas to not have immigrants come to the USA out of their current proportion of people of their home country's heritage to the USA. At some point this would be lifted or relaxed, and mass immigration would resume, leading by 1924, to a permanent national origins quota system, with quotas by 1924 or 1926 possibly not just set to freeze white ethnic European arrivals to proportions representative of Americans of particular ethnic-country heritages as of 1920 or 1926, but possibly attempting to reverse engineer or steer ethnographic proportions back to 'old stock' by using the 1910 or 1890 census as the basis of quota calculation. [If this sounds arcane, weird or complex, this is almost exactly what was done in OTL, with minor errors at most, and I am happy to take any corrections onboard].
3. So, what *would* be different in a major way from OTL? Well, instead of instead of the OTL 1914-1921 immigration figures from Europe to America and other destinations were depressed for 4-5 years, 1914-18 by the, and then liberated from war, but still depressed by mass death of young, able-bodied immigration-prone cohorts not alive in the 3 years 1919-1921, a more plausible estimate of ATL emigration from Europe to the USA and other non-European destinations would be derived from assuming average immigration/emigration rates 1914-1921 basically matching the level the level of the, quite high, 1906-1913 annual average emigration/immigration from Europe to the USA and New Worlds. The alterations would *not* stop in 1921, additional surges of migrants would come over between 1921-24 in numbers almost certainly exceeding OTL.
The realistic, plausible alternatives to this are *not* somehow earlier American immigration restrictions, or market driven or source-country drastic drop-offs in rates of emigration [although please, if you have a country-specific case, please make it], they are for high levels of emigration to continue for *longer* into the 1920s.
The demographic effects on the urban, industrial areas of the USA, and the mining areas, and eventually, with air conditioning, even the sunbelt, are dramatic, in terms of accumulation of religious diversity of non-Protestant groups - more Catholics, Jews, Orthodox Christians, and, while small in number, increasing in proportion to their low base, Muslims.
And the demographic effects in Europe, and particular parts of Europe, are huge. Notably Sicily and the Mezzogiorno of Italy. Austria-Hungary, probably more so among non-dominant ethnic groups than among Germans and Magyars. The Russian Empire, especially among Jews, but really among *all* nationalities of the western fringe of the Russian Empire, like Poles, Balts, Ukrainians, increasingly Caucasian groups. Likely Romanians, especially Jews from Romania. Greeks from Greece and Albania and Bulgaria. Serbians, and especially peoples who are minorities within Serbia. Portuguese to New England communities and Hawaii. Spaniards to disparate locations in the United States and the Hispanophone world.
Much less effected in terms of emigration differences in these years: Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Germany, Switzerland, France. -- Even the 1920s quota systems hardly effected ability to immigrate to the USA in OTL.
Now of course among these countries, Britain (including Ireland), Germany, France, Belgium are drastically affected by the *absence of war* just not so much in terms of *emigrants sent to the USA*.
Any serious escalation of Irish troubles of course, would affect the movement one way or another of many Irish individuals and families.
The absence of war would only positively affect Belgium in terms of population, birth rates, economic growth, technical contributions, standards of living, compared to OTL. It might become notable country of immigration despite its already dense development
In the Russian Empire, while its total population will be growing by leaps and bounds, could it be in situation where by 1930 it has 'exported' a good bit more than fifty percent of the Jewish population born in the country over the prior 50 years? Could figures start to approach that for some other Russian Empire ethnic groups like Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and at half that rate or so, Russian Poles?
What was the OTL transition year for the bolded? 1920? 1924? I can only guess it would be about the same. Greater immigration plussing it up negates lack of industrial growth in urban centers related to war demands holding it back. But this is just a wild guess. The country will still love sports, cinema, radio. If it has prohibition, it will defy it.
[The world does not have to be entirely peaceful, that is a bit too much to ask. Wars of colonial suppression or acquisition could happen. Wars on the scale of the Balkan wars, or great powers picking on littler ones, like the Italo-Ottoman could happen- as long as contained and short, revolutions (like ongoing in Mexico) or civil wars could happen, or warlordism (like in China, or possibly Ethiopia), coups d'etat, or major internal disturbance of whatever magnitude (Irish question? (Ausgleich renegotiation drama and crisis)]
1. What would be the consequences for American politics (including the 1916, 1920, and 1924 elections, midterm election, major legislative acts, Constitutional Amendments), economics (presence or absence of a major Depression/Recession/consumer boom, breadth of participation in stock/bond/securities markets, infrastructure and technology deployments, role of foreign vs. Wall Street finance, national debtor vs. creditor status), and society (traditionalism in social, gender, racial, class roles, vs. libertinism, permissiveness to buck tradition, class consciousness & energy for economic & social reform) in this American world over this decade?
2. What would be the consequences for US, and global, demography in this world? Volume and sources of immigration from 1914 to 1924, adoption or non-adoption of immigration of restrictionist legislation, and timing and manner (in terms of discriminatory criteria) of restrictions, movement between American regions (south to north, midwest and west), year of shift from majority rural to majority urban, entertainment, sport, consumption habits, perceptions of vice and virtue?
...I was already thinking along these lines, but perhaps I had partial inspiration from a recent similar thread, www.alternatehistory.com/fo...er-increasing-their-conscription-term.557736/, and before hitting the keyboard with a new thread, I reviewed this other recent one: www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/economic-impacts-of-no-wwi.557193/.
Fleshing out my initial questions with some preliminary answers, or, as the case may be, more detailed, granular questions:
What would be the consequences for American politics (including the 1916, 1920, and 1924 elections, midterm election
On the plus side for Wilson's reelection in 1916 - the legislative successes and reforms of his first term, gaining him credibility in progressive circles.
Also on the plus side, incumbency.
Also (provisionally) on the plus side, a figure the long-disempowered Democrats can be proud of, unless embarrassments accumulate and would have a stake in, and with southern cultural connections, that southerners would identify with even more than Grover Cleveland. (this is provisional only, because it can easily be ruined by a bad recession/depression, a serious scandal, a foreign policy setback humiliation).
No alienation of Irish and German voters won in 1912 through perceived pro-Entente policies in a no-WWI scenario. [If there is a major Irish-related disturbance, Wilson could probably do OK with condemning British oppression/repression, calling for peace, freedom, reform, welcoming refugees and dissidents, but still enforcing neutrality acts pretty much to the letter of the law, and not attempting anything actually coercive, diplomatically or economically, against the UK. Why? Pre-American superpowerdom, strong rhetoric was enough to please lobbying groups of support. Rhetoric without coercive action was more respected for its own sake. Only after American Cold War super-powerdom, the achievement of unconditional surrenders in WWII, and globalized hyper-interventions and coup-making did Americans come to believe that Americans did not *enforce* their verbal preferences on foreigners, they were not *serious*. That expectation is very much a post-WWII, Cold War, post-Cold War thing, reinforced by American 'wins' that gradually came easier up through the beginning of the 1990s 'unipolar moment'].
On the minus side for Wilson's reelection in 1916 - no GOP split in 1916, that is one less advantage for him he had in 1912. By itself, I do not think it is deal-closing, put a fork in him, he is done, disadvantage. Every election is unique despite what looks like party ascendant 'eras'.
Also, on the minus side, Wilson cannot use the 'he kept us out of war' campaign line, when there is no war he kept us out of.
Here is something I suspect people will bring up as a "minus" that I do not think, in the context of 1916 American politics, is a minus: Wilson's racism and resegregation of federal employment. I think this is 'pundit's fallacy' of 21st century pundits/observers. Sure, where they can vote, mainly in the north and some border states, blacks who voted in 1912 for Wilson are likely in high proportion to 'come home' to the Republican nominee. Their votes in most jurisdiction will be outweighed by the numbers of white votes that Wilson probably gains, both on race specifically, and for other reasons. Additionally, since politics is not in isolation from demography, I suspect a lesser absolute and proportional migration of southern blacks northward will diminish the impact of the black vote in the 1916 and 1920 and 1924 elections in northern, midwestern, western states where blacks can vote, and by the time of the 1924 and 1920 vote, increase the total impact of the the naturalized immigrant 'ethnic' but white vote in those same states.
A provisional/potential minus for Wilson in 1916 - if there is a Depression or bad recession, affecting the latter years of his first term, without Entente war-related demand for American commodities and other industrial production.
major legislative acts, Constitutional Amendments)
I'll hold my judgment on immigration related laws until part 3, demography. Constitutional Amendments, I would say, female suffrage, unaffected, yes, even without men off to war and more women in factories. Prohibition - without the anti-German factor? I honestly don't know. My guess, and it is no more than a pure coin toss, is that it is a coin toss. The temperance to teetotaler movement was still a big social peer pressure movement posing a big bluff that might have worked, even without the 'oomph' of fitting with anti-Germanism, anti-Irishism and their whiskey, and wartime conservationism, but maybe not. I am purely guessing. Income tax, I think it still passes. Obviously, rates are never set at wartime highs.
economics (presence or absence of a major Depression/Recession/consumer boom, breadth of participation in stock/bond/securities markets, infrastructure and technology deployments, role of foreign vs. Wall Street finance, national debtor vs. creditor status),
Presence or absence of a major Depression or Recession in 1914-1916
Presence or absence of a major Depression or Recession in 1914-1916
- I haven't a clue, a coin toss. I am eager for your thoughts and speculations on that one. My limited background knowledge suggests that the outbreak of war OTL pulled the economy in a couple opposing directions: It initially caused a financial crash/panic liquidity crunch from Entente (and possibly CP?) pulling their money back home. But America controlled this with a bank holiday. As the war proceeded, exports to the Entente were ever growing, and continually added revenue for multiple lines of American business. Somewhat offsetting this, but not negating this by any means, firms exporting to the CPs were harmed by the blockade of the CPs, and this hurt notably cotton exporters [Britain had more of its own cotton sources I guess than Germany and Austria-Hungary]. The war also bid up the price of labor as belligerent nations reached full employment by conscription and industrial mobilization, and commandeering of shipping for high value cargo, which all constricted emigration. This was only partly offset by increased industrial labor recruitment from the southern USA.
Take away the war, the opposing trends on all these continue. More foreign investment, more diverse export markets for Americans, but lower total volume, more immigrant labor available at a relatively low wage.
Presence or absence of a major Depression or Recession over the longer period 1914-1924.
There is no way there won't be notable recessions/contractions. Chances will be north of 50/50 that at least on one occasion, if not two, recession or depression quarters will close enough to election years/quarters to unseat the incumbent. When? I have no idea. Railroad growth and raw steel production growth may be a bit tapped out. Automotive and passenger and airmail deployment may be expansion areas. Radio and telephone deployment and household electrical deployment will probably be expansion sectors, as well as the cinema industry.
The base of investors/speculators in stock/bond/securities markets will probably be smaller, because of government authority/propaganda not aggressively pushing war bonds. More people will deposit savings they have in more mundane accounts when they have money to save. The US will probably remain a net debtor nation through 1924, but its debtor/creditor status will all be relative to particular sub-markets and sectors, Wall Street and American banking will continue to grow in sophistication. A borrower from many and a lender to many.
society (traditionalism in social, gender, racial, class roles, vs. libertinism, permissiveness to buck tradition, class consciousness & energy for economic & social reform)
Both would coexist urban and cosmopolitan culture, pop culture and a taste for the exotic would grow, but so would reaction and a market opportunity for the old-fashioned and traditional in aesthetic and morality and religion. I don't think WWI is necessary for the alt-1920s to have many societal parallels to the real-world 1920s. Many Victorian norms will erode in various urban enclaves.
2. What would be the consequences for US, and global, demography in this world? Volume and sources of immigration from 1914 to 1924, adoption or non-adoption of immigration of restrictionist legislation, and timing and manner (in terms of discriminatory criteria) of restrictions, movement between American regions (south to north, midwest and west),
The way I see it, there is no reason in this ATL for immigration laws to get as restricted and discriminatory any *earlier* than they did, by stages in 1917 (against Asians), then 1921 and 1924 (against varieties of European and further against Asians). The most plausible 'range of motion' compared with OTL would restrictions coming *later and/or lesser* or about on time/on schedule with OTL's legislation. This would also be combined with greater than OTL net immigration from countries, mainly European, from which immigration is not limited, every year there is not a bad recession going on in the USA between 1914 and 1921, and to some extent, 1921-24.
Why? No WWI = no or lesser Red Scare from Bolshevik revolution, just usual routine background Anarchist and Socialist phobia
No WWI = Business and industrial concerns do not get used to being put on a strict 'slimfast' diet of frequently replenished low-wage foreign labor on a seasonal or permanently added basis. They do not gain nearly as much experience or comfort seeking possibly higher priced southern black and white labor as a closer substitute source for their factories, mines and other operations.
No WWI = European chain migrations on the demand side are much less interrupted by people being conscripted for military service, war production industries, field work. Passenger fare rates remain lower and sea travel remains faster and safer for multiple classes of passengers. The number of people content to stay home because they are not draft-evading or made refugees in no way offsets the higher number of people made available by these bigger trends to emigrate.
No WWI = Less of a patriotic propaganda industry focused on 100% Americanism that riffs off of convenient-for-war propaganda stigmatization of ethnic groups reluctant to join the war on behalf of the Entente, Germans (because of Germany being the enemy) and Irish (because of Britain being the ally), and then spilling over into condemnation of 'hyphenated-Americans', dual loyalty, and immigrants writ large.
So, I believe even in minimal, most conservative estimated change scenarios, there would be quite a great deal of demographic alteration in the United States, and other 'New World' countries of immigration, and it goes without saying Europe's demography would be hugely affected.
To take a *very* conservative estimate, I could say that the ATL immigration scenario might:
1. Match changes in American immigration law *exactly* in one respect, towards Asian immigration - So, there would still be the 1917 creation of the Asiatic Barred Zone, which strangely, did not exclude the Japanese Empire, nor coastal China. Then in 1924 there would be the definitive Asian exclusion provisions enacted that excluded natives of Imperial Japan and further tightened the Chinese exclusion act.
2. An emergency, temporary system might be implemented in 1921 that applied to European immigrants and seek to establish emergency quotas to not have immigrants come to the USA out of their current proportion of people of their home country's heritage to the USA. At some point this would be lifted or relaxed, and mass immigration would resume, leading by 1924, to a permanent national origins quota system, with quotas by 1924 or 1926 possibly not just set to freeze white ethnic European arrivals to proportions representative of Americans of particular ethnic-country heritages as of 1920 or 1926, but possibly attempting to reverse engineer or steer ethnographic proportions back to 'old stock' by using the 1910 or 1890 census as the basis of quota calculation. [If this sounds arcane, weird or complex, this is almost exactly what was done in OTL, with minor errors at most, and I am happy to take any corrections onboard].
3. So, what *would* be different in a major way from OTL? Well, instead of instead of the OTL 1914-1921 immigration figures from Europe to America and other destinations were depressed for 4-5 years, 1914-18 by the, and then liberated from war, but still depressed by mass death of young, able-bodied immigration-prone cohorts not alive in the 3 years 1919-1921, a more plausible estimate of ATL emigration from Europe to the USA and other non-European destinations would be derived from assuming average immigration/emigration rates 1914-1921 basically matching the level the level of the, quite high, 1906-1913 annual average emigration/immigration from Europe to the USA and New Worlds. The alterations would *not* stop in 1921, additional surges of migrants would come over between 1921-24 in numbers almost certainly exceeding OTL.
The realistic, plausible alternatives to this are *not* somehow earlier American immigration restrictions, or market driven or source-country drastic drop-offs in rates of emigration [although please, if you have a country-specific case, please make it], they are for high levels of emigration to continue for *longer* into the 1920s.
The demographic effects on the urban, industrial areas of the USA, and the mining areas, and eventually, with air conditioning, even the sunbelt, are dramatic, in terms of accumulation of religious diversity of non-Protestant groups - more Catholics, Jews, Orthodox Christians, and, while small in number, increasing in proportion to their low base, Muslims.
And the demographic effects in Europe, and particular parts of Europe, are huge. Notably Sicily and the Mezzogiorno of Italy. Austria-Hungary, probably more so among non-dominant ethnic groups than among Germans and Magyars. The Russian Empire, especially among Jews, but really among *all* nationalities of the western fringe of the Russian Empire, like Poles, Balts, Ukrainians, increasingly Caucasian groups. Likely Romanians, especially Jews from Romania. Greeks from Greece and Albania and Bulgaria. Serbians, and especially peoples who are minorities within Serbia. Portuguese to New England communities and Hawaii. Spaniards to disparate locations in the United States and the Hispanophone world.
Much less effected in terms of emigration differences in these years: Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Germany, Switzerland, France. -- Even the 1920s quota systems hardly effected ability to immigrate to the USA in OTL.
Now of course among these countries, Britain (including Ireland), Germany, France, Belgium are drastically affected by the *absence of war* just not so much in terms of *emigrants sent to the USA*.
Any serious escalation of Irish troubles of course, would affect the movement one way or another of many Irish individuals and families.
The absence of war would only positively affect Belgium in terms of population, birth rates, economic growth, technical contributions, standards of living, compared to OTL. It might become notable country of immigration despite its already dense development
In the Russian Empire, while its total population will be growing by leaps and bounds, could it be in situation where by 1930 it has 'exported' a good bit more than fifty percent of the Jewish population born in the country over the prior 50 years? Could figures start to approach that for some other Russian Empire ethnic groups like Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and at half that rate or so, Russian Poles?
year of shift from majority rural to majority urban, entertainment, sport, consumption habits, perceptions of vice and virtue?
What was the OTL transition year for the bolded? 1920? 1924? I can only guess it would be about the same. Greater immigration plussing it up negates lack of industrial growth in urban centers related to war demands holding it back. But this is just a wild guess. The country will still love sports, cinema, radio. If it has prohibition, it will defy it.
