Post-Cold War Russian Revanchism With an Isolationist U.S.

[futurist]

My title here might be a little confusing; however, here goes:



Let's have French general Maurice Gamelin (in 1940) take general Andre Pretelat's warnings about the Ardennes sector more seriously; thus, rather than sending France's strategic reserve to the Low Counties, Gamelin keeps all of it at Rheims as per France's original plan. Thus, the Manstein Plan fails due to the fact that the French strategic reserve is quickly sent to the Ardennes from Rheims (which is pretty close to the Ardennes). Afterwards, Britain and France slowly begin to counterattack and gradually begin pushing the Germans more and more to the east. Eventually (probably sometime in 1941), the Schwarze Kapelle decides that it's now time to act and launches a coup to try overthrowing Hitler and the Nazis. While this coup is mostly successful, the SK's amateur planning for this coup (similar to the situation in 1944, as per Ian Kershaw's research) allows pockets of Nazi resistance to develop in various parts of Germany which causes the SK to divert some German troops from the Western Front in order to crush this Nazi resistance. Meanwhile, Britain and France fully exploit this German troop diversion to push further and further (as well as faster and faster) into Germany and eventually reach the Rhine River in 1942 (the SK and Britain/France were unable to agree to a compromise peace (yet, at least); thus, the war continues). Soon afterwards, the Schwarze Kapelle realize that Germany is doomed and offer to agree to Britain's and France's compromise peace terms; however, Britain's and France's success in crossing the Rhine River and in capturing the heavily industrial Ruhr makes them more confident and unwilling to accept anything less than a *conditional* surrender. Afterwards, the SK reluctantly surrenders to Britain and France and gets a relatively decent peace treaty afterwards (you can try figuring out the details; it doesn't really matter too much, though).



In the meantime, Stalin is busy consolidating his Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gains. In addition to this, it is possible that Stalin expands the Soviet sphere of influence further while Britain and France are busy fighting with Germany--for instance, by partitioning Romania together with Hungary (who wanted Transylvania). However, the Soviet sphere of influence at the end of this TL's World War II is certainly *much* less than it was at the end of our TL's World War II (which *isn't* helped by the fact that the Soviet Union *never* entered World War II in this TL).



(As for Japan, Japan is a bit of a wild card; however, I suspect that Japan *wouldn't* go to war with Britain, France, and the U.S. in this TL due to the fact that France wasn't defeated by Germany in this TL, which in turn would have probably made a war with the Western Powers less appealing for Japan than it was in our TL.)



Anyway, for the next several decades, things in Europe don't change too much. Democracy is restored in Germany, Mussolini's Fascist regime survives until his death in the 1950s or 1960s but then quickly collapses afterwards (just like the Spanish and Portuguese Fascist regimes). The Soviet Union survives but its economic weaknesses gradually become more and more apparent over the decades. Relations between Britain, France, and Germany significantly improve--as do German-Polish relations. The U.S. continues to be *relatively* isolationist (due to the lack of U.S. participation in World War II and due to the lack of a Cold War in this TL).



After several decades, though (specifically either near the end of the 20th century or in the early 21st century), the Soviet Union collapses in this TL due to both its economic weaknesses and the rising nationalism inside of it. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia clearly exhibits revanchist tendencies and inclinations in this TL (just like Russia did in our TL).



However, there is a crucial difference between the geopolitical situation in Europe in the early 21st century in this TL in comparison to our TL--to elaborate on this, in this TL, the U.S. continues to be *relatively* isolationist whereas in our TL the U.S. was certainly *extremely* involved and engaged in Europe (as well as in other parts of the world). Thus, while Russia certainly (and thankfully) *wasn't* able to play off different European powers against each other (in order to try advancing its own expansionist ambitions, of course) in our TL, this might *not* be the case in this TL. After all, without NATO, without large-scale U.S. involvement in Europe, and with less economic integration in Europe (in comparison to our TL), it would probably be easier for various European countries to speak with different voices and to express different views in regards to (post-Soviet) Russian revanchism (in contrast to our TL, where the U.S. and the E.U. essentially speak with one voice in response to Russian revanchism).



Thus, what I am wondering is this--do you think that (post-Soviet) Russia would have been more aggressive (indeed, perhaps *much* more aggressive) against its neighbors in the early 21st century (and beyond, of course) in this TL (in comparison to our TL, of course)?



Any thoughts on this?

[stevep]

Futurist

I think in this case, because the Russia is in a relatively stronger position with no US in the opposing bloc, it could well be more aggressive. On the other hand:
a) With a smaller Soviet empire in eastern Europe and no WWII involvement there is more chance that any such revanchment will be associated by its opponents with the Soviet period, which will be more discredited without the horrors of the OTL Nazi invasion giving an excuse for its extremes and 'successes'.

b) Probably more importantly I'm doubtful you won't see greater European co-operation. Probably not anything like the EU I agree, or even perhaps the EEC. But after the grueling, albeit shortly and less costly than OTL, WWII the European powers will face a very large and deeply mistrusted Soviet empire that has clearly shown expansionist signs. As such its likely to see the rising of a NATO type organisation, just one excluding the US. Likely however to be wider in extent, say including Australia and New Zealand and possibly other powers concerned about world instability in general and the Soviets in particular. This won't have the same power without the US but with a less costly WWII and including most of eastern Europe from the start its likely to be pretty powerful and have a long experience of co-operation against the threat from the east. This may falter somewhat once the Soviet empire collapses but is likely to strengthen again when Russia starts looking expansionist. Also in TTL it may well include the Ukraine as well as the Baltic states and Finland.

c) I suspect that in TTL the Soviet empire is going to collapse earlier than OTL. Possibly in a decade or so after Stalin's death. While it will have avoided the terrible losses of WWII it won't have the legitimacy that conflict gave to the regime so there is likely to be deeper mistrust of the dictatorship. Also with a much smaller empire in eastern Europe it will have less resources, including lesser access to European technology.

A lot would depend on many possible butterflies of course. Without WWII how easily or not do the European colonial empires disappear? It could be better but could well be far bloodier and also give the Soviets a useful propaganda arm which Russia might still be able to exploit later. What happens with Japan and China as either/both could be either broken powers or major nations by ~2000 or anywhere in between. Who develops nukes 1st and in what order. May well be the western Europeans with some early work during WWII then completed due to the Soviet threat. [With an unspoken also concern about keeping what will probably be a larger Germany 'down' as well as the Soviets 'out'.]

Steve