Soviet Domination - A Red Dawn story

[James G]

Feb 15, 2018 19:40:40 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 15, 2018 19:18:08 GMT James G said:

So Castro has manged to cheat death again.

Yep. That man was very lucky; others haven't been.

[James G]

(20)

July 1979:

President Al-Bakr was deposed by his vice president in a non-violent, peaceful manner. Saddam took power from his aging mentor and had Al-Bakr moved into a comfortable retirement. There was no opposition to this inside Iraq: it happened seamlessly and without any form of protest. Saddam was now the president of his country and he intended to remain so until the day he died too, however many long years off that was. This change in leadership had been done for several reasons. Saddam had his ambition and his ego. Both had been stoked by recent events in neighbouring countries. With Iran, Saddam had assisted the Soviets in bringing about a change of government there and promised much in return for doing so. As to the other neighbour, Syria, Al-Bakr had been talking with his fellow Ba’ath Party president in form of Assad about a union between the two Arab countries. Assad would be president of whatever name Iraq-Syria took with Al-Bakr as vice president… and Saddam being nothing. Nope, Saddam had not been willing to accept that and, with support from friends and allies inside Iraq and also abroad, he took what everyone was telling him was the mark of a strong and powerful man: seize power.

Saddam’s first move after packing off Al-Bakr peacefully and meeting no resistance from elsewhere was to begin a purge. It would be a bloody purge too. Saddam had found traitors within the highest ranks of the Ba’ath Party and they would meet the fate that traitors deserved. A purge made him look strong too, he was certain of that. What he wasn’t so sure on though was how relations were going to turn out with the Soviet Union when within days of taking power – there had been encouragement from their envoys to do this – there was a (polite) rebuff from Moscow when it came towards Saddam’s desires towards Iran. He spoke with the Soviet ambassador straight after having all of those traitors arrested, when he was in a bombastic mood. Negativity had come when Saddam had made mention of those promises on the autonomy of Iran’s Sunni-dominated southwestern regions and the ideas on joint (Iraqi-controlled) oil exports from Iran once the industry was up and running again there. The ambassador was polite and spoke with full diplomatic respect, but it was clear that the Soviet position had changed. Saddam read the refusal to seriously consider what he was saying as one pre-planned. Instead, the ambassador spoke of a strong and stable Iran being what was best for that country and the proposals put forward by Saddam would only harm such a future. Saddam spoke to one of his friends from the Soviet Union, one of their unofficial envoys in the form of Primakov: a man who held no official diplomatic nor government title. Primakov repeated the ambassador’s position though was softer with Saddam on this. There was also talk of how a stable and prosperous Iran could only be of benefit to Iraq too.

Saddam put his mind to thinking on this. Something was up. He hadn’t done anything wrong and he had kept his promises. He asked himself why weren’t the Soviets keeping theirs? Was it something to do with that ‘stability’ that he was told twice was important for Moscow when it came to Iran? Because from what he understood, the civil war there was over but there was no stability. It seemed that the Soviets had put the wrong kind of communists in power in Iran. Now… maybe if he could help correct that, then Moscow might be more agreeable to his ideas. He held himself back and waited. The right moment would come.

[lordroel]

Feb 15, 2018 21:51:52 GMT James G said:

Saddam put his mind to thinking on this. Something was up. He hadn’t done anything wrong and he had kept his promises. He asked himself why weren’t the Soviets keeping theirs? Was it something to do with that ‘stability’ that he was told twice was important for Moscow when it came to Iran? Because from what he understood, the civil war there was over but there was no stability. It seemed that the Soviets had put the wrong kind of communists in power in Iran. Now… maybe if he could help correct that, then Moscow might be more agreeable to his ideas. He held himself back and waited. The right moment would come.

I start to wonder if Saddam willingness to help the Soviets in Iran would mean a start of a war we know.

[James G]

Feb 15, 2018 22:30:47 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 15, 2018 21:51:52 GMT James G said:

Saddam put his mind to thinking on this. Something was up. He hadn’t done anything wrong and he had kept his promises. He asked himself why weren’t the Soviets keeping theirs? Was it something to do with that ‘stability’ that he was told twice was important for Moscow when it came to Iran? Because from what he understood, the civil war there was over but there was no stability. It seemed that the Soviets had put the wrong kind of communists in power in Iran. Now… maybe if he could help correct that, then Moscow might be more agreeable to his ideas. He held himself back and waited. The right moment would come.

I start to wonder if Saddam willingness to help the Soviets in Iran would mean a start of a war we know.

I've got all the pieces in place now for the Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan mess to take place. Just need to write that plus the Central American development too now my notes are done. 1979 and it's conflicts will be completed by the end of the weekend.

[lordroel]

Feb 16, 2018 9:42:24 GMT James G said:

Feb 15, 2018 22:30:47 GMT lordroel said:

I start to wonder if Saddam willingness to help the Soviets in Iran would mean a start of a war we know.

I've got all the pieces in place now for the Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan mess to take place. Just need to write that plus the Central American development too now my notes are done. 1979 and it's conflicts will be completed by the end of the weekend.

That is going to be a giant mess in the Middle East which is think will draw in more players creating a even bigger mess.

[James G]

Just you wait!

[James G]

(21)

August 1979:

As Saddam believed, there were the wrong type of communists in-charge in Iran as far as the Soviets were now concerned. Everything with the Tudeh had been done in a rush, that adventurism that Andropov’s opponents were concerned about but had been unable to halt. While the general secretary was no dictator and unable to act unchecked, the Politburo was increasingly coming under his control as opposition was ebbing away all the time. Recent events in Iran threatened that. The communists there were too used to acting independently, as should have been expected from the underground movement which they long were, and continued to do that now that they were in power. What Tehran said wasn’t being followed far from the Iranian capital. There was the strong influence of Islam in many of the members, especially the new ones who’d hitched themselves to the bandwagon when the Tudeh moved towards the power that it now had. Revolutionary justice being implemented in Iran was getting out of hand. The firing squads were being given far too much latitude to shoot whomever offended them today. Efforts by the new government to build a functioning state, one which Moscow wanted to see, were being disrupted by all of this killing: much of it seemed to be to do with personal grudges and also ethnicity rather than ridding the country of ‘enemies of the people’ as was supposed to be the case. There were also many of those who had come into the government who weren’t communists and had attained their position with bribes to get them to stop fighting in the civil war: these influential figures were working to bring down the Tudeh from within and possibly replace them because the number of true communists was very small and they were divided themselves on countless domestic issues. Kianouri faced an attempted coup d’état – including a serious effort made to murder him; he was Moscow’s chosen man to lead Iran – and the reaction from the Iranians themselves to address the causes of that plus find those really responsible, those who were behind it in terms of the plotting, was unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union.

At the urging of Chebrikov, supported by Ustinov who too had people in Iran and was getting some negative feedback from there like the KGB head, the Politburo commissioned a panel of experts to deliver them a report on the situation in that country. There was already an ongoing effort to do the same with neighbouring Afghanistan. Academics, theologians, diplomats and senior intelligence people were working together on what was first two reports but which soon became one due to the similarities between both nations on what was going on internally in each. That was linked to how internal matters would affect the relationship that the Soviet Union had with each country. The report was compiled throughout the summer. The Politburo waited for it to reach them with the idea then to reflect on what was said before doing anything rash. There was already a thinking from many that something would have to be done with regards to solving the problems in the two countries on their southern border but they waited to have that spelt out to them. There would need to be recommendations too, measures suggested to be debated. Once the report was finished though.

[lordroel]

Feb 16, 2018 16:37:55 GMT James G said:

(21)

August 1979:

As Saddam believed, there were the wrong type of communists in-charge in Iran as far as the Soviets were now concerned. Everything with the Tudeh had been done in a rush, that adventurism that Andropov’s opponents were concerned about but had been unable to halt. While the general secretary was no dictator and unable to act unchecked, the Politburo was increasingly coming under his control as opposition was ebbing away all the time. Recent events in Iran threatened that. The communists there were too used to acting independently, as should have been expected from the underground movement which they long were, and continued to do that now that they were in power. What Tehran said wasn’t being followed far from the Iranian capital. There was the strong influence of Islam in many of the members, especially the new ones who’d hitched themselves to the bandwagon when the Tudeh moved towards the power that it now had. Revolutionary justice being implemented in Iran was getting out of hand. The firing squads were being given far too much latitude to shoot whomever offended them today. Efforts by the new government to build a functioning state, one which Moscow wanted to see, were being disrupted by all of this killing: much of it seemed to be to do with personal grudges and also ethnicity rather than ridding the country of ‘enemies of the people’ as was supposed to be the case. There were also many of those who had come into the government who weren’t communists and had attained their position with bribes to get them to stop fighting in the civil war: these influential figures were working to bring down the Tudeh from within and possibly replace them because the number of true communists was very small and they were divided themselves on countless domestic issues. Kianouri faced an attempted coup d’état – including a serious effort made to murder him; he was Moscow’s chosen man to lead Iran – and the reaction from the Iranians themselves to address the causes of that plus find those really responsible, those who were behind it in terms of the plotting, was unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union.

At the urging of Chebrikov, supported by Ustinov who too had people in Iran and was getting some negative feedback from there like the KGB head, the Politburo commissioned a panel of experts to deliver them a report on the situation in that country. There was already an ongoing effort to do the same with neighbouring Afghanistan. Academics, theologians, diplomats and senior intelligence people were working together on what was first two reports but which soon became one due to the similarities between both nations on what was going on internally in each. That was linked to how internal matters would affect the relationship that the Soviet Union had with each country. The report was compiled throughout the summer. The Politburo waited for it to reach them with the idea then to reflect on what was said before doing anything rash. There was already a thinking from many that something would have to be done with regards to solving the problems in the two countries on their southern border but they waited to have that spelt out to them. There would need to be recommendations too, measures suggested to be debated. Once the report was finished though.

Another good update.

Do not think we will ever see the merger of Iran and Afghanistan. 

[James G]

Feb 16, 2018 19:22:30 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 16, 2018 16:37:55 GMT James G said:

(21)

Another good update.

Do not think we will ever see the merger of Iran and Afghanistan. 

Thank you.
No, just in the minds of the men in the Kremlin.

[James G]

(22)

August 1979:

Castro’s redirection of his attention away from Africa towards Central America was watched by the United States. Satellite imagery, signals intelligence and physical reports from inside Cuba depicted the sudden burst of activity in transporting weapons and supplies to rebel groups across to the other side of the Caribbean. What had been hidden before was now out in the open. The Cubans were no longer making clandestine transfers across to the fighting in Guatemala and Nicaragua. What the Americans wanted to know was whether Castro was sending troops: that would be a real gamechanger. Kissinger was in full-on Hawk mode. He came to the White House and was talking like it was early 1976 when Castro had started sending troops to Angola: he used the words ‘smash’ and ‘clobber’ with regard to Cuba once again should they do that this time with Central America. The secretary of state asked rhetorically when would be the right time to stop Cuba. Should it be when they moved onwards next from Guatemala and Nicaragua to Costa Rica, to Panama to Mexico… Rumsfeld came to see Ford too with the defence secretary having discussions with the president on the matter of Cuba focused on presenting outlines of military options if the president wanted to see them. Airports and harbours in Cuba could be hit with American air power to shut down the surge in activity even if there were no troop movements spotted. In addition, the acting director of the CIA – Ford was looking for a replacement for Bush and had appointed Bush’s deputy in an acting role – came to the White House and brought with him something else gained from the increased satellite overflies of Cuba. The Soviets had troops in Cuba, a brigade-strength force. It would later be discovered that this unit (the men rotated through Cuba) had lain undiscovered on the island for the past sixteen years. Sixteen years! What else had been missed?

Surrounded by Hawks, Ford acted like a Dove though. There were no Cuban troops moving to Central America. If they had been, it would be a different matter entirely. This wasn’t the time and there wouldn’t be enough political nor public support. Kennedy was still attacking the Ford Administration and his tirade against the revelations about the dirty wars being fought in Latin America plus the attempt on Castro’s life were being joined by others. Some critics had called for impeachment: they were voices in the wind, but Ford decided not to strengthen their sails at this moment. The situation would be closely monitored but no move would be made. As to Central America, Lucas García and Somoza had information passed to them on the movements of Cuban aid to the guerrillas in their country. In return, they asked for extra assistance. There was none that could currently be sent though, not in this political climate. Kissinger made sure that the leaders of Guatemala and Nicaragua were told that they still had United States’ support but there needed to be a quiet period for a little while. It would all die down, the storm would pass. No, it wouldn’t: not there in Central America nor in the United States either.

[lordroel]

Feb 16, 2018 21:43:21 GMT James G said:

(22)

August 1979:

Castro’s redirection of his attention away from Africa towards Central America was watched by the United States. Satellite imagery, signals intelligence and physical reports from inside Cuba depicted the sudden burst of activity in transporting weapons and supplies to rebel groups across to the other side of the Caribbean. What had been hidden before was now out in the open. The Cubans were no longer making clandestine transfers across to the fighting in Guatemala and Nicaragua. What the Americans wanted to know was whether Castro was sending troops: that would be a real gamechanger. Kissinger was in full-on Hawk mode. He came to the White House and was talking like it was early 1976 when Castro had started sending troops to Angola: he used the words ‘smash’ and ‘clobber’ with regard to Cuba once again should they do that this time with Central America. The secretary of state asked rhetorically when would be the right time to stop Cuba. Should it be when they moved onwards next from Guatemala and Nicaragua to Costa Rica, to Panama to Mexico… Rumsfeld came to see Ford too with the defence secretary having discussions with the president on the matter of Cuba focused on presenting outlines of military options if the president wanted to see them. Airports and harbours in Cuba could be hit with American air power to shut down the surge in activity even if there were no troop movements spotted. In addition, the acting director of the CIA – Ford was looking for a replacement for Bush and had appointed Bush’s deputy in an acting role – came to the White House and brought with him something else gained from the increased satellite overflies of Cuba. The Soviets had troops in Cuba, a brigade-strength force. It would later be discovered that this unit (the men rotated through Cuba) had lain undiscovered on the island for the past sixteen years. Sixteen years! What else had been missed?

Surrounded by Hawks, Ford acted like a Dove though. There were no Cuban troops moving to Central America. If they had been, it would be a different matter entirely. This wasn’t the time and there wouldn’t be enough political nor public support. Kennedy was still attacking the Ford Administration and his tirade against the revelations about the dirty wars being fought in Latin America plus the attempt on Castro’s life were being joined by others. Some critics had called for impeachment: they were voices in the wind, but Ford decided not to strengthen their sails at this moment. The situation would be closely monitored but no move would be made. As to Central America, Lucas García and Somoza had information passed to them on the movements of Cuban aid to the guerrillas in their country. In return, they asked for extra assistance. There was none that could currently be sent though, not in this political climate. Kissinger made sure that the leaders of Guatemala and Nicaragua were told that they still had United States’ support but there needed to be a quiet period for a little while. It would all die down, the storm would pass. No, it wouldn’t: not there in Central America nor in the United States either.

Lets make the 100 post in this thread and just say that where ever you look in this universe, war is not far away.

[James G]

Feb 16, 2018 22:25:53 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 16, 2018 21:43:21 GMT James G said:

Lets make the 100 post in this thread and just say that where ever you look in this universe, war is not far away.

It is going to be almost everywhere in the end!

[James G]

(23)

September 1979:

Cuban troops were sent to Central America. American intelligence efforts missed their deployment due to a little bit of subterfuge on the part of Raúl Castro – Cuba’s defence minister – in how they were deployed. Cuban special forces went to the fight against Somoza via Panama and then moved across Costa Rica up into Nicaragua. When inside Nicaragua, they wore the uniforms of the Sandinistas and were limited in their activities away from where Cuban intelligence said that Americans could be encountered. Small but lethal attacks were made by them against government forces where they hit isolated garrisons and wiped them out as well as running ambushes against patrols. Overall, their impact in the fighting was minimal yet it was important though for they were the first wave of many more to come afterwards, those who wouldn’t be under such stringent conditions when they arrived of where and who they could fight either. Information was brought to Somoza through his own sources and from the Americans through the month of what was going on with the seemingly brilliant successes being had by the Sandinistas. There was a strong suspicion that this was Cuban activity. No proof was available though. That was then sought as both the CIA and Nicaragua’s own intelligence agents went looking for it. What they needed was to capture one of these Cubans, alive preferably. The challenge was difficult though not regarded as impossible, especially if they got lucky. Then, with a live Cuban prisoner, evidence could be presented to the Ford Administration of direct, undeniable Cuban involvement with troops inside Central America: the lack of such troops was what those down in Nicaragua were being told was the reason why the United States had yet to overtly act against Cuba.

Across in Guatemala, it wasn’t the Cubans involved in the upsurge in fighting there but rather those Cuban-trained guerrillas with the EGP. The Guatemalan Army attacked the rebel-controlled areas and won a major victory through the highlands. The few guerrillas who knew what they were doing couldn’t make up for the lack of capability nor inability to stand in the face of Guatemalan fire-power when caught by them in open battle as was the case with the rest of the rebel force. There were American advisors with the Guatemalans though also some others from abroad too including fellow Latin American countries such as Argentina and Chile. A retreat was made afterwards by whatever guerrillas were left and the army moved in to begin an orgy of repression through the areas where the EGP had taken under temporary control. As usual, that repression was brutal. Civilians bore the brunt of the activity from the soldiers who robbed, raped and murdered their way through the countryside when they were meant to be pursing their beaten enemy. Such was the Guatemalan Army’s fight against rebels. Away from that battle and its aftereffects, inside the country’s capital of Guatemala City, Lucas García was facing a different kind of conflict. There was a lot of dissatisfaction with his rule by others of influence within the country. The landowners who held most of the nation’s wealth along with corrupt military officers (who held most of the rest) were fed up with how their president was putting them all at risk. They had no intention of giving into the rebels or anything silly like that. What they wanted was someone who could deal better with guerrillas and also secure further support from the Americans. Lucas García was tainted as far as they were concerned. They wanted a strongman who could also negotiate better foreign support than Lucas García was bringing. They plotted and searched for such a figure.

[lordroel]

Feb 17, 2018 15:04:49 GMT James G said:

Feb 16, 2018 22:25:53 GMT lordroel said:

Lets make the 100 post in this thread and just say that where ever you look in this universe, war is not far away.

It is going to be almost everywhere in the end!

That is going to be messy.

[James G]

Feb 17, 2018 15:41:03 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 17, 2018 15:04:49 GMT James G said:

It is going to be almost everywhere in the end!

That is going to be messy.

Indeed. Let's have some more of that, shall we?