Soviet Domination - A Red Dawn story

[James G]

(24)

September 1979:

The panel of experts delivered their report to the Politburo regarding Afghanistan and Iran. There was a verbal presentation which contained a summary though the written report was delivered in long-form and given to the Soviet leadership to digest properly. Some took an interest in what was said, others already had their mind made up on the matter regardless of what was said and written. The report stated that the internal situation in both communist-led nations on the Soviet Union’s southern border was only going to get worse. There was widespread lawlessness and the security situation was out of control. Divisive political factionism had reared its ugly head alongside a growing religious fundamentalism. This not only spelled trouble for the future of those regimes in Kabul and Tehran which were aligned to Moscow, but for the Soviet state itself due to the proximity of those countries to a population within areas of the Soviet Union neighbouring them being ripe for the wrong sort of influences which were likely to come across the frontiers soon enough. As specified in the instructions for those compiling the report, recommendations were given as to how to solve the problems which had arisen. It was those which caused quite the debate within the wider Politburo and also the smaller Defence Council too.

The first recommendation presented was one that the Soviet Union should effectively hope for the best and wait for the situation to correct itself. The second was that there should be an active effort made using the services of the intelligence organs to directly influence events within each country so that there was a correction in Afghanistan and Iran. Then there was the final recommendation: intervene forcefully in each control and impose Soviet guidance in leadership upon the regimes of each, replacing them if need be with more cooperative leaders using military power.

Washington had its hawks and doves, so did Moscow. There were those among Andropov’s colleagues who pushed for all three options individually or a mixture of two of them. There were criticisms made of the experts which were coded attacks upon the ministries and organisations which they worked for and therefore rivals within the country’s leadership. Not all of the arguments made for each recommendation were thus made in good faith. Whilst the debates were ongoing, there were developments on the ground in the countries whose fate they were discussing. In Afghanistan, there was a successful coup d’état where Taraki was overthrown and Amin came to power. Meanwhile, there was news that came up from Iran that what was left of Iran’s oil industry was suffering from unexplained and fatal sabotage from suspected Maoist guerrillas who were all supposed to be beaten by now: the Soviet Union had geo-political plans for Iranian oil which were now going to have to be binned in a costly fashion. As the report told them, this was all getting worse. Still, they argued the issue though with no decision being yet made on what to do.

[lordroel]

Feb 17, 2018 16:25:56 GMT James G said:

 Still, they argued the issue though with no decision being yet made on what to do.

I hope it is not a Soviet invasion of Iran.

[James G]

Feb 17, 2018 16:53:57 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 17, 2018 16:25:56 GMT James G said:

 Still, they argued the issue though with no decision being yet made on what to do.

I hope it is not a Soviet invasion of Iran.

Ah... yes. Not just Iran either.

[James G]

(25)

October 1979:

Amin had Taraki murdered. Afghanistan’s new leader decided that it would be the most prudent thing to do with the man he had deposed last month. He professed his friendship to the Soviet Union before and after killing Taraki, someone tied completely to Afghan-Soviet relations. Across in Iran, Soviet paratroopers protecting intelligence personnel going over American-supplied combat aircraft that had ended up in Tudeh hands when The Shah departed needed protecting themselves when Doshan Tappeh Airbase came under attack. Unfortunately, there was no immediate help available and almost a dozen Soviet personnel were killed in a guerrilla attack while nearby Iranian Army personnel remained in their barracks. The regimes in Kabul and Tehran had already earned the displeasure of Moscow and with these acts – the latest in a long line of other failings – they secured their own fates, such a fate as being soon to be deposed by Soviet force of arms. Enough was enough, the Soviet Union would act in response.

The Defence Council made the decision to invade Afghanistan and Iran on October 11th. This followed a series of previous strong disagreements about what to do over the matter of disorder in both and whether the threat posed by them to the security of the Soviet state was as bad as the naysayers said it was or whether the optimists were correct in their view that it would all blow over. Chebrikov and Ustinov were at last supported by the ideological chief Suslov in calling for an armed intervention with Andropov weighing in at the end. The strong opposition from Kirilenko and Kosygin – both soon to be on their way out after finding them on the wrong side here but in other previous matters too – was no longer reinforced by foreign minister Gromyko who jumped ship to the intervention side. His concern had been over increasing tensions with the West, but in the end he finally came around to coming out in support of what was proposed by the others: Gromyko was certain by October that any American response would be negligible.

In three weeks, Soviet forces would move into those two neighbouring countries. The way ahead for them would be opened by special forces from the military and elite KGB paramilitary units. There would be use made of friendly locals too, more use made of those locals tricked into helping something that they weren’t fully aware of. A perfect plan was put together, one designed to limit direct heavy fighting during entry and exploitation. For the sake of international diplomacy, Soviet forces would be invited in to help restore the peace. It would be a repeat of Czechoslovakia in 1968 with that in terms of local political figures making a plea for Soviet troops. However, once they were inside, then Soviet forces would deal with the troubles in each country, help install proper governance and then withdraw as soon as possible. In addition, there were options on the table to establish military bases at key locations. The Soviet Navy needed a warm water port and there was the Persian Gulf at the bottom of Iran. The plan was perfect, and it was all expected to work with the invasions and what would come after them. What could go wrong?

[lordroel]

Feb 17, 2018 19:10:36 GMT James G said:

(25)

October 1979:

Amin had Taraki murdered. Afghanistan’s new leader decided that it would be the most prudent thing to do with the man he had deposed last month. He professed his friendship to the Soviet Union before and after killing Taraki, someone tied completely to Afghan-Soviet relations. Across in Iran, Soviet paratroopers protecting intelligence personnel going over American-supplied combat aircraft that had ended up in Tudeh hands when The Shah departed needed protecting themselves when Doshan Tappeh Airbase came under attack. Unfortunately, there was no immediate help available and almost a dozen Soviet personnel were killed in a guerrilla attack while nearby Iranian Army personnel remained in their barracks. The regimes in Kabul and Tehran had already earned the displeasure of Moscow and with these acts – the latest in a long line of other failings – they secured their own fates, such a fate as being soon to be deposed by Soviet force of arms. Enough was enough, the Soviet Union would act in response.

The Defence Council made the decision to invade Afghanistan and Iran on October 11th. This followed a series of previous strong disagreements about what to do over the matter of disorder in both and whether the threat posed by them to the security of the Soviet state was as bad as the naysayers said it was or whether the optimists were correct in their view that it would all blow over. Chebrikov and Ustinov were at last supported by the ideological chief Suslov in calling for an armed intervention with Andropov weighing in at the end. The strong opposition from Kirilenko and Kosygin – both soon to be on their way out after finding them on the wrong side here but in other previous matters too – was no longer reinforced by foreign minister Gromyko who jumped ship to the intervention side. His concern had been over increasing tensions with the West, but in the end he finally came around to coming out in support of what was proposed by the others: Gromyko was certain by October that any American response would be negligible.

In three weeks, Soviet forces would move into those two neighbouring countries. The way ahead for them would be opened by special forces from the military and elite KGB paramilitary units. There would be use made of friendly locals too, more use made of those locals tricked into helping something that they weren’t fully aware of. A perfect plan was put together, one designed to limit direct heavy fighting during entry and exploitation. For the sake of international diplomacy, Soviet forces would be invited in to help restore the peace. It would be a repeat of Czechoslovakia in 1968 with that in terms of local political figures making a plea for Soviet troops. However, once they were inside, then Soviet forces would deal with the troubles in each country, help install proper governance and then withdraw as soon as possible. In addition, there were options on the table to establish military bases at key locations. The Soviet Navy needed a warm water port and there was the Persian Gulf at the bottom of Iran. The plan was perfect, and it was all expected to work with the invasions and what would come after them. What could go wrong?

I fear that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan-Iran might cause a American responds.

[stevep]

Feb 17, 2018 19:10:36 GMT James G said:

(25)

October 1979:

Amin had Taraki murdered. Afghanistan’s new leader decided that it would be the most prudent thing to do with the man he had deposed last month. He professed his friendship to the Soviet Union before and after killing Taraki, someone tied completely to Afghan-Soviet relations. Across in Iran, Soviet paratroopers protecting intelligence personnel going over American-supplied combat aircraft that had ended up in Tudeh hands when The Shah departed needed protecting themselves when Doshan Tappeh Airbase came under attack. Unfortunately, there was no immediate help available and almost a dozen Soviet personnel were killed in a guerrilla attack while nearby Iranian Army personnel remained in their barracks. The regimes in Kabul and Tehran had already earned the displeasure of Moscow and with these acts – the latest in a long line of other failings – they secured their own fates, such a fate as being soon to be deposed by Soviet force of arms. Enough was enough, the Soviet Union would act in response.

The Defence Council made the decision to invade Afghanistan and Iran on October 11th. This followed a series of previous strong disagreements about what to do over the matter of disorder in both and whether the threat posed by them to the security of the Soviet state was as bad as the naysayers said it was or whether the optimists were correct in their view that it would all blow over. Chebrikov and Ustinov were at last supported by the ideological chief Suslov in calling for an armed intervention with Andropov weighing in at the end. The strong opposition from Kirilenko and Kosygin – both soon to be on their way out after finding them on the wrong side here but in other previous matters too – was no longer reinforced by foreign minister Gromyko who jumped ship to the intervention side. His concern had been over increasing tensions with the West, but in the end he finally came around to coming out in support of what was proposed by the others: Gromyko was certain by October that any American response would be negligible.

In three weeks, Soviet forces would move into those two neighbouring countries. The way ahead for them would be opened by special forces from the military and elite KGB paramilitary units. There would be use made of friendly locals too, more use made of those locals tricked into helping something that they weren’t fully aware of. A perfect plan was put together, one designed to limit direct heavy fighting during entry and exploitation. For the sake of international diplomacy, Soviet forces would be invited in to help restore the peace. It would be a repeat of Czechoslovakia in 1968 with that in terms of local political figures making a plea for Soviet troops. However, once they were inside, then Soviet forces would deal with the troubles in each country, help install proper governance and then withdraw as soon as possible. In addition, there were options on the table to establish military bases at key locations. The Soviet Navy needed a warm water port and there was the Persian Gulf at the bottom of Iran. The plan was perfect, and it was all expected to work with the invasions and what would come after them. What could go wrong?

  I think someone's been hitting the vodka [or something] too much.  Even with no western response [not to mention other Muslims states or China possibly] this had quagmire written all over it.  Even with the basic theme of the thread.

[lordbyron]

Feb 17, 2018 19:10:36 GMT James G said:

What could go wrong?

Well, there's a reason why that question is a trope on TVTropes.org...

BTW, James G, I'm Unknown on AH.com...

[James G]

Feb 17, 2018 23:23:41 GMT stevep said:

Feb 17, 2018 19:10:36 GMT James G said:

(25)

October 1979:

Amin had Taraki murdered. Afghanistan’s new leader decided that it would be the most prudent thing to do with the man he had deposed last month. He professed his friendship to the Soviet Union before and after killing Taraki, someone tied completely to Afghan-Soviet relations. Across in Iran, Soviet paratroopers protecting intelligence personnel going over American-supplied combat aircraft that had ended up in Tudeh hands when The Shah departed needed protecting themselves when Doshan Tappeh Airbase came under attack. Unfortunately, there was no immediate help available and almost a dozen Soviet personnel were killed in a guerrilla attack while nearby Iranian Army personnel remained in their barracks. The regimes in Kabul and Tehran had already earned the displeasure of Moscow and with these acts – the latest in a long line of other failings – they secured their own fates, such a fate as being soon to be deposed by Soviet force of arms. Enough was enough, the Soviet Union would act in response.

The Defence Council made the decision to invade Afghanistan and Iran on October 11th. This followed a series of previous strong disagreements about what to do over the matter of disorder in both and whether the threat posed by them to the security of the Soviet state was as bad as the naysayers said it was or whether the optimists were correct in their view that it would all blow over. Chebrikov and Ustinov were at last supported by the ideological chief Suslov in calling for an armed intervention with Andropov weighing in at the end. The strong opposition from Kirilenko and Kosygin – both soon to be on their way out after finding them on the wrong side here but in other previous matters too – was no longer reinforced by foreign minister Gromyko who jumped ship to the intervention side. His concern had been over increasing tensions with the West, but in the end he finally came around to coming out in support of what was proposed by the others: Gromyko was certain by October that any American response would be negligible.

In three weeks, Soviet forces would move into those two neighbouring countries. The way ahead for them would be opened by special forces from the military and elite KGB paramilitary units. There would be use made of friendly locals too, more use made of those locals tricked into helping something that they weren’t fully aware of. A perfect plan was put together, one designed to limit direct heavy fighting during entry and exploitation. For the sake of international diplomacy, Soviet forces would be invited in to help restore the peace. It would be a repeat of Czechoslovakia in 1968 with that in terms of local political figures making a plea for Soviet troops. However, once they were inside, then Soviet forces would deal with the troubles in each country, help install proper governance and then withdraw as soon as possible. In addition, there were options on the table to establish military bases at key locations. The Soviet Navy needed a warm water port and there was the Persian Gulf at the bottom of Iran. The plan was perfect, and it was all expected to work with the invasions and what would come after them. What could go wrong?

  I think someone's been hitting the vodka [or something] too much.  Even with no western response [not to mention other Muslims states or China possibly] this had quagmire written all over it.  Even with the basic theme of the thread.

I don't drink Russian standard premium Vodka!
It will be a bloody mess and so too will be where the war eventually goes to, up across the Rio Grande too.
Every careful plan in this story will eventually go awry somewhere.

[James G]

Feb 18, 2018 1:10:07 GMT lordbyron said:

Feb 17, 2018 19:10:36 GMT James G said:

What could go wrong?

Well, there's a reason why that question is a trope on TVTropes.org...

BTW, James G, I'm Unknown on AH.com...

I guessed by your writing style. I should be a detective!
Love the new name.
This forum is small but getting a little bit busier (not just me, others too). Welcome aboard.

[lordbyron]

Well, I decided to become a member in part to comment on this story (and others); I'm still on AH.com...

[James G]

Feb 18, 2018 1:20:46 GMT lordbyron said:

Well, I decided to become a member in part to comment on this story (and others); I'm still on AH.com...

A very difficult place to leave. It was harder for me to quit there than to quit FB.
(Not saying, suggesting, hinting you or anyone should)
Anyway, more of the story coming soon. Much to write today from my extensive notes.

[lordroel]

Feb 18, 2018 1:20:46 GMT lordbyron said:

Well, I decided to become a member in part to comment on this story (and others); I'm still on AH.com...

Well lets see if James can bring yo to this forum completely.

[James G]

(26)

October 1979:

The US Senate had the power to refuse to ratify international treaties signed by the president. Ford had been told that the SALT II treaty with the Soviets wouldn’t gain the ratification of the Senate. He had pushed ahead regardless, sure that he could win the senators over. No, he couldn’t. The Senate wouldn’t budge on the issue. The chamber had the Democrats in the majority with the minority being Republicans. From both sides, the latter Ford’s own party, there was stringent opposition to SALT II. The whole thing was a mass Soviet deception as far as much of the Senate was concerned. Senators pointed to Soviet missile development elsewhere and how they were just getting around the restrictions imposed by SALT II by that; meanwhile, the United States was restricting itself. Chief among the opponents in the Senate, who represented a wider view elsewhere across the country, were Democrats John Glenn and Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson along with the Republican majority leader Howard Baker.

SALT II wasn’t the only issue that the Senate, the House of Representatives and others not in such bodies had taken issue with the president with over how he dealt with the Soviets. The Soviets were arming themselves with new nuclear weapons like the SS-20 missile and plenty of conventional weapons as well as they engaged in a military build-up. They were expanding their geo-political influence worldwide and sponsoring proxy wars elsewhere. What was Ford doing to counter this? Nothing. Grain was being supplied on favourable terms to the Soviet Union so they could feed themselves and therefore didn’t have to spend the export revenues which they gained by selling oil to the West – only recently had the Soviets become an oil-exporting nation – on that instead of military hardware. Soviet expansion into Iran was another serious issue which Ford had failed to address. Despite the denials, his political opponents lined up to level accusations that the US Government knew long in advance of the influence by Moscow in the Iranian Revolution and did nothing to stop that either with the end result being the fall of an American ally and its immediate subsuming into the Soviet orbit.

The Ford Administration’s military programmes were another source of contention. There was debacle after debacle there. Not all of these criticisms were valid as politics came into play but there was a pattern of attack present. The MICV programme to build a new series of armoured infantry vehicles for the US Army was delayed and delayed again. The B-1A bomber was sure to be a white elephant. Then there were the new series of air- & ground-launched cruise missiles with both seen as costly mistakes. When it came to the latter, those cruise missiles designed for nuclear use, some of the same critics who argued that their development was flawed still questioned while even after that, they weren’t forward deployed. Many governments in Western Europe wanted them there to help defend their countries when the Soviets had their SS-20s. What was the Ford Administration doing about this? All of that came alongside the continued attacks made from different directions about the dirty wars in Central America that were still ongoing with allegations made that United States support for regimes with no regard for human rights continued unabated.

The last year of Ford’s presidency, where had hoped to be cementing his legacy, was going to see more of this coming especially with the twin storms of the Middle East and Central America. Some of his opponents were speaking in good faith, others not so much. There was political manoeuvring going on for the race to win the White House next year and other nationwide races too. Ford’s own vice president was getting ready to make a presidential bid – Dole would most likely be faced Reagan; the latter long a thorn in the president’s side – and his fate would be tied to the actions of the president… plus his perceived failures. There would be no let up in the politics at home in the United States, especially as further troublesome developments happened abroad.

[lordroel]

Feb 18, 2018 14:31:47 GMT James G said:

The Ford Administration’s military programmes were another source of contention. There was debacle after debacle there. Not all of these criticisms were valid as politics came into play but there was a pattern of attack present. The MICV programme to build a new series of armoured infantry vehicles for the US Army was delayed and delayed again. The B-1A bomber was sure to be a white elephant. Then there were the new series of air- & ground-launched cruise missiles with both seen as costly mistakes. When it came to the latter, those cruise missiles designed for nuclear use, some of the same critics who argued that their development was flawed still questioned while even after that, they weren’t forward deployed. Many governments in Western Europe wanted them there to help defend their countries when the Soviets had their SS-20s. What was the Ford Administration doing about this? All of that came alongside the continued attacks made from different directions about the dirty wars in Central America that were still ongoing with allegations made that United States support for regimes with no regard for human rights continued unabated.

So no B-1A bomber ore Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

[James G]

No Bradley.
B-1A instead of B-1B. The whole programme is a mess.