Nieuport 161 - A Stronger French Air Force in May 1940
Oct 25, 2021 13:58:46 GMT
lordroel, stevep, and 1 more like this
Post by DMZ on Oct 25, 2021 13:58:46 GMT
Uchrony Nieuport 161
The War in the Air
February 1938 - Reims - The I/7 receive its first LN 161. The pilots are enthousiastic about the new plane. It outclass every existing AdA's fighter but the Spad 510 in dog fight and somehow in climbing rate, but far overun it in speed enabling the pilots to evade when in dangerous position. The II/7 is equiped the next month.
September 1938 - Munich - Even though the rising power of the fighers (four GC fully equiped with LN 161) in AdA makes general Vuillemin more confident in the possibility to resist LW, the Chamberlain appeasment policy prevented Daladier to go to fight alone. No change then in this uchrony but I will explore a French refusal of Munich in an other branch later on.
April 13, 1939 - A French mission, Captain Ballande, visits the Air Ministry and is being presented the RDF (Radio Detection and Finding). His report lead to the order of 11 fixed stations, 40 mobile ones, 310 gun layers and one or two thouthan of IFF on April 25. (1)
June 1939 - The LN 162 arrives in units.
Summer 1939
At the beginning of the war, the AdA had 23 CGs, ten of which were fully staffed (34 aircraft divided into two squadrons of 12), the rest had 24 aircraft (no reserve aircraft). Nineteen groups are equipped with LN 161 and four with LN 162. Thirteen GCs were facing Germany in the NE (312 operational aircraft), four were protecting Paris and the lower Seine Valley, three were in the south-east between Lyon and Cannes and three in FNA.
Monday August 21, 1939 - All units of AdA are put in an alert state, permissions are cancelled.
August 28 - One week later, all GC are moving to their respective war airfields. The III/3 leaving Dijon to Aix-en-Provence found a cloudy barrier and the leader, captain Montjean, decided to go under. Six fighters crashed on the ground due to the bad visibility with three deads and three badly injured... On all airfields, the pilots and ground teams discovered no installation but fuel tanks! All was to be done to accomodate units and their personnal; general Vuillemein visiting a unit was told that if the crew was in the tent like him during the WW I, "it was probably the very same tent...". In Velaine-en-Hay near Nancy, the I/3 fighters coming from Dijon land on a field covered with stones that hardly struck the empennage, luckily without making real damages; one can easily imagine what have been the result on the fabric covered fins of the Morane-Saulnier MS 406 in such a case...
September 7 - Three Messerschmitt 109 damage a Potez Po.637 that will manage to come back on one engine but crash on the airfield without loss of crewmen.
September 8 - First reconnaissance missions over Germany. No opposition on air nor from the ground.
September 8 - First victory - A patrol of six Nieuport, chief warrant officer Cruchant, from the II/4 "Diables Rouges" fight against six Bf 109, shooting down three of them for no loss.
September 9 - Straffing of Sarrebrück airfield by a patrol (I/3) leaded by lieutenant Lacombe. Three Bf 109, including one taking off, and a twin-engine airplane destroyed. Lacombe was severly blamed for this action "which could lead to retaliation on the French airfields", the victories won't be homologated...
During the second half of September, the LW came back on the Western front from Poland, producing an intense aerail activity despite poor weather condition. The GCs in ZOAE are reinforced by some pilotes coming from other units. The reconnaissance and observation aircraft suffer lots of casualties (especially Muraux 115, MB 200-210) but at a high cost for the Luftwaffe: 40 Bf 109 destroyed for the loss of six LN 161 and three dead. Muraux 115-117 was forbidden to cross the frontline and only the Po 637-63.11 and MB 174 are allowed to reconnaissance into German territory. Flak precision and density became a very bad surprise.
The Aéronautique Navale received its LN 172s in September. Landing tests on the Bearn were carried out in November off Toulon in conjuction with Chance Vought V156F. The Béarn then sailed back to Brest to join the "Force de Raid" to hunt German raiders.
October 23, 1939 - The first GM1 RDF equipement is installed in Neuville sur Ornain and connected by phone to the headquarters of the groupement 22 and groupement 23. But the average transmission delay won't decrease under 15 minutes where the British achieved one to three minutes to give the same information to the groupement 23.
November 6 - Nine LN 161 from II/5 clash against 27 Bf 109, a furious melée ensues resulting in 10 losses for the Germans with no one for the French.
November 21 - First encouter with the "Emils", the German was more able to interrupt the fight when in bad posture. The matchs were more balaced but the LN 162 continues to outperform Bf 109E on climbing rate and dive speed.
December 21 - A double patrol from II/7 is attacked by surprise by a dozen of Bf 109. Despite the tactical and numerical advantage, the Germans suffer five casualties against one Nieuport, pilot badly injured.
From the beginning of the war, the confrontations often turned to the advantage of the French pilots, and Göring soon forbade LW fighters to cross the Franco-German border.
Thanks to the good climbing rate at all altitude, the hunting patrols were carried out under 4,000 m to avoid using the oxygen reserves. In the event of an encounter with a German reconnaissance flying at 8,000 m at 360 km/h, the time to altitude for the LN 161 was 6m22s at an estimated horizontal speed of 240 km/h; should the enemy be detected at 5 km, this will give it 18 km of advance if it flees. It will then take nine minutes of pursuit at full speed over 54 km to catch up with the runner. If contact is not lost, there is little chance that the fugitive could escape, except by crossing the Belgian or German border. Reconnaissance in depth in French territory will be very difficult.
On the other hand, reconnaissance over the border structures will have more opportunities to escape by diving at maximum speed towards Germany or Belgium, which continues to refuse the right of pursuit; Luxembourg was not a refuge for German planes.
The winter was particularly bad (very cold and bad weather, cloudy with a lot of snow) and the activity was low until spring.
From March, the fighter groups began to receive a third squadron, in accordance with the objectives of Plan V. This allowed for a much more efficient and less tiring organization for the pilots and mechanics than when the groups had only two. Each day, one squadron carried out patrols on the border or accompanying missions for the cooperating GCs, a second one covering the airfield and remaining on alert while the third was at rest.
The two Polish CGs were created in the spring. They soon proved to be very aggressive and mercyless, even straffing bailed out pilots under parachute.
In the spring of 1940, the Germans became aggressive again and large concentrations of fighters clashed on both sides of the border. Despite the presence of Bf 109Es, the French generally held the advantage, thanks to the good performance of the LN 162 that is by now the most numerous in the rank of the AdA. Reconnaissance missions intensified, generally escorted by numerous fighters.
March 9 - A network of heighteen stations using British RDF technology is forcasted.
March 31 - Fifteen LN 162 from III/7 were attacked by a hudge formation of 109 when the French leader had to dive due to an oxygen equipment failure, followed by all the team. Three Nieuport were shot down in the first pass for the cost of three Bf 109 against one Nieuport in the following battle.
In April, all the GCs in the NE have been exetended to 3 flights of 10 aircraft. There were 21 CGs facing Germany, including two Poles (i.e. 630 operational aircraft compared to 330 historically), five protecting Paris and the lower Seine Valley, all equiped with LN 162, two covering the Italian border, three in FNA which served as a breeding ground for pilots and one in Lebanon. Each reserved group permanently covered about 40 kilometers of border with at least a single patrol (three fighters), while the other aircraft of the group could intervene on alert.
The Aéronautique navale has 6 flights of LN 172s operational, one of which embarked on the Béarn along with a flight of LN 401 dive bombers and another of Chance-Vought 167F, the others covering the ports of Brest, Cherbourg, Calais-Dunkirk, Toulon and Bizerte.
The final result of the "Phoney War" amounts to 30 Do 17 or 215, 60 Bf 109, 5 Bf 110, 8 Hs 126, 10 He 111, 2 Ju 88 and 1 Ju 52 destroyed for the cost of 25 LN 161-162 and numerous reconnaissance and observation aircraft.
That's it, the stage is set, the curtain may rise...
(1) sam40.fr/de-la-detection-electromagnetique-au-guet-de-lair-septembre-1939-juin-1940/ (in french)
The War in the Air
February 1938 - Reims - The I/7 receive its first LN 161. The pilots are enthousiastic about the new plane. It outclass every existing AdA's fighter but the Spad 510 in dog fight and somehow in climbing rate, but far overun it in speed enabling the pilots to evade when in dangerous position. The II/7 is equiped the next month.
September 1938 - Munich - Even though the rising power of the fighers (four GC fully equiped with LN 161) in AdA makes general Vuillemin more confident in the possibility to resist LW, the Chamberlain appeasment policy prevented Daladier to go to fight alone. No change then in this uchrony but I will explore a French refusal of Munich in an other branch later on.
April 13, 1939 - A French mission, Captain Ballande, visits the Air Ministry and is being presented the RDF (Radio Detection and Finding). His report lead to the order of 11 fixed stations, 40 mobile ones, 310 gun layers and one or two thouthan of IFF on April 25. (1)
June 1939 - The LN 162 arrives in units.
Summer 1939
At the beginning of the war, the AdA had 23 CGs, ten of which were fully staffed (34 aircraft divided into two squadrons of 12), the rest had 24 aircraft (no reserve aircraft). Nineteen groups are equipped with LN 161 and four with LN 162. Thirteen GCs were facing Germany in the NE (312 operational aircraft), four were protecting Paris and the lower Seine Valley, three were in the south-east between Lyon and Cannes and three in FNA.
Monday August 21, 1939 - All units of AdA are put in an alert state, permissions are cancelled.
August 28 - One week later, all GC are moving to their respective war airfields. The III/3 leaving Dijon to Aix-en-Provence found a cloudy barrier and the leader, captain Montjean, decided to go under. Six fighters crashed on the ground due to the bad visibility with three deads and three badly injured... On all airfields, the pilots and ground teams discovered no installation but fuel tanks! All was to be done to accomodate units and their personnal; general Vuillemein visiting a unit was told that if the crew was in the tent like him during the WW I, "it was probably the very same tent...". In Velaine-en-Hay near Nancy, the I/3 fighters coming from Dijon land on a field covered with stones that hardly struck the empennage, luckily without making real damages; one can easily imagine what have been the result on the fabric covered fins of the Morane-Saulnier MS 406 in such a case...
September 7 - Three Messerschmitt 109 damage a Potez Po.637 that will manage to come back on one engine but crash on the airfield without loss of crewmen.
September 8 - First reconnaissance missions over Germany. No opposition on air nor from the ground.
September 8 - First victory - A patrol of six Nieuport, chief warrant officer Cruchant, from the II/4 "Diables Rouges" fight against six Bf 109, shooting down three of them for no loss.
September 9 - Straffing of Sarrebrück airfield by a patrol (I/3) leaded by lieutenant Lacombe. Three Bf 109, including one taking off, and a twin-engine airplane destroyed. Lacombe was severly blamed for this action "which could lead to retaliation on the French airfields", the victories won't be homologated...
During the second half of September, the LW came back on the Western front from Poland, producing an intense aerail activity despite poor weather condition. The GCs in ZOAE are reinforced by some pilotes coming from other units. The reconnaissance and observation aircraft suffer lots of casualties (especially Muraux 115, MB 200-210) but at a high cost for the Luftwaffe: 40 Bf 109 destroyed for the loss of six LN 161 and three dead. Muraux 115-117 was forbidden to cross the frontline and only the Po 637-63.11 and MB 174 are allowed to reconnaissance into German territory. Flak precision and density became a very bad surprise.
The Aéronautique Navale received its LN 172s in September. Landing tests on the Bearn were carried out in November off Toulon in conjuction with Chance Vought V156F. The Béarn then sailed back to Brest to join the "Force de Raid" to hunt German raiders.
October 23, 1939 - The first GM1 RDF equipement is installed in Neuville sur Ornain and connected by phone to the headquarters of the groupement 22 and groupement 23. But the average transmission delay won't decrease under 15 minutes where the British achieved one to three minutes to give the same information to the groupement 23.
November 6 - Nine LN 161 from II/5 clash against 27 Bf 109, a furious melée ensues resulting in 10 losses for the Germans with no one for the French.
November 21 - First encouter with the "Emils", the German was more able to interrupt the fight when in bad posture. The matchs were more balaced but the LN 162 continues to outperform Bf 109E on climbing rate and dive speed.
December 21 - A double patrol from II/7 is attacked by surprise by a dozen of Bf 109. Despite the tactical and numerical advantage, the Germans suffer five casualties against one Nieuport, pilot badly injured.
From the beginning of the war, the confrontations often turned to the advantage of the French pilots, and Göring soon forbade LW fighters to cross the Franco-German border.
Thanks to the good climbing rate at all altitude, the hunting patrols were carried out under 4,000 m to avoid using the oxygen reserves. In the event of an encounter with a German reconnaissance flying at 8,000 m at 360 km/h, the time to altitude for the LN 161 was 6m22s at an estimated horizontal speed of 240 km/h; should the enemy be detected at 5 km, this will give it 18 km of advance if it flees. It will then take nine minutes of pursuit at full speed over 54 km to catch up with the runner. If contact is not lost, there is little chance that the fugitive could escape, except by crossing the Belgian or German border. Reconnaissance in depth in French territory will be very difficult.
On the other hand, reconnaissance over the border structures will have more opportunities to escape by diving at maximum speed towards Germany or Belgium, which continues to refuse the right of pursuit; Luxembourg was not a refuge for German planes.
The winter was particularly bad (very cold and bad weather, cloudy with a lot of snow) and the activity was low until spring.
From March, the fighter groups began to receive a third squadron, in accordance with the objectives of Plan V. This allowed for a much more efficient and less tiring organization for the pilots and mechanics than when the groups had only two. Each day, one squadron carried out patrols on the border or accompanying missions for the cooperating GCs, a second one covering the airfield and remaining on alert while the third was at rest.
The two Polish CGs were created in the spring. They soon proved to be very aggressive and mercyless, even straffing bailed out pilots under parachute.
In the spring of 1940, the Germans became aggressive again and large concentrations of fighters clashed on both sides of the border. Despite the presence of Bf 109Es, the French generally held the advantage, thanks to the good performance of the LN 162 that is by now the most numerous in the rank of the AdA. Reconnaissance missions intensified, generally escorted by numerous fighters.
March 9 - A network of heighteen stations using British RDF technology is forcasted.
March 31 - Fifteen LN 162 from III/7 were attacked by a hudge formation of 109 when the French leader had to dive due to an oxygen equipment failure, followed by all the team. Three Nieuport were shot down in the first pass for the cost of three Bf 109 against one Nieuport in the following battle.
In April, all the GCs in the NE have been exetended to 3 flights of 10 aircraft. There were 21 CGs facing Germany, including two Poles (i.e. 630 operational aircraft compared to 330 historically), five protecting Paris and the lower Seine Valley, all equiped with LN 162, two covering the Italian border, three in FNA which served as a breeding ground for pilots and one in Lebanon. Each reserved group permanently covered about 40 kilometers of border with at least a single patrol (three fighters), while the other aircraft of the group could intervene on alert.
The Aéronautique navale has 6 flights of LN 172s operational, one of which embarked on the Béarn along with a flight of LN 401 dive bombers and another of Chance-Vought 167F, the others covering the ports of Brest, Cherbourg, Calais-Dunkirk, Toulon and Bizerte.
The final result of the "Phoney War" amounts to 30 Do 17 or 215, 60 Bf 109, 5 Bf 110, 8 Hs 126, 10 He 111, 2 Ju 88 and 1 Ju 52 destroyed for the cost of 25 LN 161-162 and numerous reconnaissance and observation aircraft.
That's it, the stage is set, the curtain may rise...
(1) sam40.fr/de-la-detection-electromagnetique-au-guet-de-lair-septembre-1939-juin-1940/ (in french)
