Nieuport 161 - A Stronger French Air Force in May 1940

[stevep]

Oct 27, 2021 13:51:54 GMT DMZ said:

575 ,

Option II will likely see the French government continuing the fight from Africa. It will depend on how long it took for the German to overwhelm Allies. IMHO, the longest they hold, the more difficult will be the position of the supporters of the armistice: "you betray the men died to defend the fatherland". On the other hand, "too many blood shed"...

More troops saved with Dynamo doesn't mean really stronger defense as they lost all their equipment and have to be reorganized but existing units could have been reinforced or re-completed leading to a better combative value. More important would be the longer defense of the Dunkirk perimeter delaying the final invasion of France by more than one week, leaving time for the government and especially Paul Reynaud to foresee the fall of the mainland and to decide and prepare evacuation.

In FNA scenario, should Italy join the fight, it will be swept away from Africa before the end of the year as the total air supremacy (before LW could deploy one or two FK) will deny naval convoys to reinforce Libya and allow a kind of blietzkrieg to the Allies.

575 ,stevep ,

Bessarabia was part of the Germano-Soviet pact but was also guaranteed by France... Not sure what Stalin will do as long as France still stands. Of course he won't fear any intervention but he could prefer to wait for a clearer view of the situation before pushing his pawns. Maybe the fall of Libya will stop him or he will take advantage of the fight in North Africa to seize Bessarabia...

stevep ,

I have given all the elements I rely on to build this TL. There is no doubt LN 161 was far better(close to Hurricane) and easier to build than MS 406. The climb rate have been officially mesured twice and exceeded those of every other fighter of the time. The delay to put in production the close LN 40 shows that it would have been much earlier for the LN 161; at least, giving the whole OTL fighters production to the Nieuport will lead to the minimum number I gave. The proposed evolution to LN 162 is based on actual performance of the CAO.200. So, no, I don't think it is wankish (thank you for the term...)

The choice of a scenario is far from obvious as the crossing of the Meuse at Sedan was made by a few men destroying or catching in a dozen of minutes the fortifications on the river bank. But it is unlikely to happend before the night if the air bombardment is greatly disturbed as envisionned. I would say one day left to cross is more likely as 55e DI was a second class division. That doesn't mean the scenario will be the encirclement of the GA 1, there could be enought butterfly to stop Guderian before Abbeville and permit a successory counter-attack. In my opinion, we would be somewhere between II and III...

I agree, the situation is always better for the Allies as the Germans will have much more casualties and the LW will lost much more planes anyway. But I'm not sure they are unlikely to win as soon as the GA1, even not encircled, will loose a lot of equipment and will be disorganized even in scenario IV. But in this last case, the front line will probably freeze for some months and the duration of the combat plays against Germans.

Operation Barbarossa is unlikely in 1941 in scenario III and IV, I agree. And Italy will stay out of war in this case. But will attack Greece in the end on 1940 and Churchill will probably try to intervene leading to a clash in Libya if so.

You are right, L-L will happend later and France will spend a lot of gold before. But I don't think Roosevelt goes for more isolationism after hir reelection, he had concern about the German and Japanese expansion and suppremacy in Europe or Asia, and won't change his mind beause France fight on, on the contrary IMHO.

And no future for LN 161 if France falls... but in Canada? There was discussions OTL to build Breguet 695 (with Pratt & Whitney engines), the same could be done for the Nieuport with an Allison or P&W.


An other very important short term impact is Norway. OTL, the decision to withdraw from Narvik was taken on May 24. In III and IV scenarios (and maybe II), there is no need to bring back british units and Narvik will fall in the beginning of June and stay in allied hands. This will change a lot the situation for the IIIrd Reich. It will also keep Stalin more cautious having Allies at the door able to help Finnish for example.

And, of course, the whole Chinese and Pacific wars will be changed...

  Just to clarify what I meant about the scenario.  I no longer have the will-power to do the level of research your done here.  As such if I was doing a TL where Britain did better in WWII - don't have more than a couple of dozen or so - I would be rather reluctant to have as dramatic an effect as has happened here.  However your obviously done a hell of a lot of research so willing to accept its definitely possible.  Hope I wasn't causing any offense as none was meant.

  Ah I didn't realise that France had guarantee the Bessarabian borders - or was it all the Romanian borders?  If the latter and French is still looking strong does Germany go through with pushing Romania to cede land to Hungary and Romania or delay things a bit?  If they do is there any chance that Romania might fight, either against them or the Soviets a few days later?  They would lose but it would mean few/no Romanian forces aiding the Germans in the east later, Romania being on the allied side [although it probably wouldn't save them from the Soviets if they enter the wider war one way or another].  It would also disrupt supplies of Romanian oil, especially if the latter were willing to trash Polesti before surrendering.  No problem while Germany can import from the USSR but gives them a very short leash until Polesti is restored to full activity.

  In terms of Germany winning a long war in France it would depend on the details but pretty obvious that they would lose air superiority with their heavy losses and higher British and French production.  Also the Germans are going to lose a lot of equipment especially and they have a very thin diet at this point in the war given the speed of the build up and the scatter-gun approach Hitler had to production.  Even if there's still a Dunkirk evacuation which means a lot of men British, French and hopefully Belgium will be out of equipment its faster to re-equip them than train new ones so the Germans are going to have to win quickly and not sure that would happen.

  If Italy stays out of the war but then attacks Greece I'm not sure that Britain would offer direct military support and that Greece would accept it.  They didn't initially as their dictator general Metaxas was fearful of inciting German intervention and it was only after his death that his replacement invited in British support.  Even ignoring that if Britain isn't at war with Italy and France has fallen then its a big step for Churchill as it also means fighting in at least two parts of Africa while Britain is either distinctly isolated [if mainland France falls] or engaged with French in a bitter was with Germany and the latter currently seem to have the upper hand.  Not to mention either way Britain is allied to France, which still have a recognised government and especially if that's still in a free Paris that's going to have a say and is likely to oppose some of Churchill's wilder ideas. If Italy has joined the war [i.e. France has fallen] and is already losing Libya and still attacks Greece then Greece will be supported as OTL.

  Interesting option of production of the LN 161 in Canada.  It might be decided that its logistically an unwanted complication, especially if/when the US joins the war but could make for a useful facility to maintain the type in service.

  Not so sure that staying in Norway is a good idea.  Yes possibly a very good defensive line could be established somewhere south of it and it would make allied trade with Sweden a lot easier.  However the supply lines across the N Sea could be vulnerable.  Plus the Germans are likely to gain air superiority as they would have much better airfields in southern Norway than the allies would have.  It might make a difference as well events in France.  If France is looking vulnerable but possibly rescue-able then the allies could decide that N Norway is less important than holding France.  Plus while it would cut winter supplies of iron ore from Sweden to hold Narvik if France and its iron ore sources fall to Germany is that still as important?

  Definitely some butterflies in the FE.  Most noticeably if France fights on even from the colonies with the homeland occupied the Japanese occupation of FIC is going to be a very interesting issue.  They can probably pressurize a government in exile to stop supplying China via that route.  However if they don't occupy FIC - or especially the southern parts - they lack the bases for secure landings in Malaya and to a degree elsewhere in the DEI.  Plus if Africa is cleared of Axis forces in late 1940 - possibly early 41 for Italian E Africa - that frees up a lot of forces and resources, on land, sea and air and some of which could make a hell of a difference in the Far East.

  Roosevelt will definitely want to help the allies and if necessary go to war with Japan but he may find it harder if their doing better in Europe given US public opinion.

  Anyway looking forward to seeing what you go with and how things develop.

  Steve

[DMZ]

stevep,

I think it was the Bassarbian border but Romania was part of the defunct "Petite entente" (Yugoslavia, Tchecoslovaquia, Romania under French protection) and remained close to France, will Hitler risk to open a second front in Romania if France is not yet beaten? And russian oil deliveries to IIIrd Reich was far from enought to cover its needs, this is a major threat that, alone, would have prevented a too chalenging confrontation with Romania.

I agree with you: time is the key factor for Germans, they could win on the momentum they initiated in preventing Allieds to recover on a strong defense line as they did OTL; othewise time is playing against them.

Canadian production of french planes has an other important benefit: the cost of american weapons was very high due to the currency exchange rate. A MS 406 costed ~1M francs where a P-36/H-75 was billed (in USD of course) the equivalent of 2.3 M francs to be paid in gold! Building a factory in a join venture with National Steel Car, Canadian Car & Foundry Company Limited or Canadian Associated Aircraft Limited would save a lot of currencies, even with american engines, and the investment will be recovered after the war. It will also cut the risk of US embargo (we know there was none but the french government of the time could fear it).

ingeniumcanada.org/fr/le-reseau/articles/un-aspect-quelque-peu-oublie-de-lhistoire-de-la-425e-escadrille-alouette-1 (in french)

[575]

No matter what is the outcome the loss of French loot to supply the German troops in a Barbarossa will be substantial. As I recall at least one Panzer Division was build up with French vehicles but also all the support vehicles and the many trucks used will be missing. Some French aircraft engines will also be missed.

Good point on Norway; instead of demolishing Narvik harbour the Allies may try stall the German advance north post Trondheim. The Norwegian King will leave Norway later and the Norwegians will be building a very capable Mountain Division in North Norway. The Norwegians may also be aquiring their Hawk 75 fighters enroute to Norway as well as the floatplanes. A small batch but every fighter will count in Norway when trying to keep the LW bombers away as the German fighters didn't have the range to escort them all the way up north.

The Swedes may well decide to block German movement of "medical" equipment through Sweden to Norway by train and have a terrible time of interning Gen. Dietl and his remaining Mountain Division. Which may have some long time effect depending upon how long the Allies stay in Norway and if there is a Barbarossa.

Germany will also be denied the Belgian Gold Reserve the main part transported back from FNA following the Armistige.

[DMZ]

For Norway frontline development, see:
alternate-timelines.com/thread/3977/norway-fauske-struggle

About the possible outcome of a more efficient Air force

A presentation of the French general Paul Dassault (elder brother of Marcel Dassault) related to the French defeat of May-June 1940 to the Parliament in 1949:

The question of the tanks being also well gone, why did the French army finally end up in the cruel failure of 1940. The reasons are, in my opinion, the following:
(...)
4° - Whatever the importance of these three reasons of inferiority, the fourth is infinitely more essential: it alone is decisive. It lies in the absence of aviation, dive planes to attack the enemy's tanks and artillery, bombing planes to prevent the enemy from getting gasoline, ammunition and spare parts, and fighter planes to fight the enemy's aviation.
My opinion on this point is formal and is not based on theoretical considerations. The many tank and other weapons fighters who were withdrawn from the IInd and IXth armies, with whom I was able to speak, all gave me, as the determining cause of the setbacks suffered, the action of the German air force and, only, as a secondary cause, the action of the tanks to which the air force gave its importance.
But, to support this opinion, I cannot do better than to quote to you, from the other side of the barricade, the declarations of the German general Bayerlein.
(...)
General Bayerlein had a magnificent armored division, armed with excellent tanks that had ten hours of gasoline in their sides. But there was no more German air force and there was an American air force. The Panzer Lehr division under these conditions suffered exactly the same fate as our tanks in 1940. General Bayerlein's report evokes in us, by its very terms, the memory of our misfortunes of yesteryear, but with the air force, fortune has changed sides. We read there: that the mere presence in the sky of dive bombers demoralizes the German troops on the ground; that the supply is made impossible by the bombing of the rear; that the movement of tanks on long routes imposed by the constant surveillance of the opposing air force ruins the equipment ; that air attacks against gasoline depots or refueling vehicles require the abandonment on the roads of intact tanks for lack of gasoline or spare parts, as was the case in four days for fifty-three tanks of the division; that tanks and artillery, including anti-aircraft artillery, are the prey of dive bombers
I wished to insist on this irrefutable document because it shows that the tanks, even if they are of indisputable quality, even if they are constituted in independent divisions, even if they are used in a perfectly correct way, are doomed to impotence and annihilation if they find themselves in the presence of an adversary having a strong air force, whereas they are themselves deprived of it.

www.cairn.info/revue-guerres-mondiales-et-conflits-contemporains-2011-3-page-93.htm (in French)

This testimony and many others of the time show that with more capable fighters force, French could have disturbed the Luftwaffe efforts to support Heer offensive. Once again, it's difficult to say to what extend but it seems obvious (to me at least...) that Sedan bombing would have been far less effective than OTL, leading to a stronger defense. That is the main reason why I think that Germans would have spent at least one more day to cross the Meuse and break through the defenses of the IIe armée.

Not to say that the presence of GBA (groupes de bombardement d'assaut) equiped with LN 163 could have turn the tide on the whole frontline.

[stevep]

  DMZ ,

   Sorry if this is somewhat off subject but just viewed this video - here - which showed a serious problem with British a/c during WWII due to using carburetors rather than direct fuel injection.  Apparently down to one 'expert' who seems to have ignored the evidence being presented!  The Germans and US developed such systems before the war.  What were French aero-engines like on this issue?  Suggests that the Merlin was - this factor aside - and even better engine than I thought to be able to compete despite this handicap.  Just wonder how many lives were lost due to this short-coming.

  Steve

[DMZ]

stevep,

Not completly of subjet as the LN 161 demonstrated that although engine power is fundamental, aerodynamics makes sometime bigger difference. LN 161 with 860 HP Hispano-Suiza 12Y 31 had better performances than Dewoitine D.520 with 920 HP H-S 12Y 12Y 45, and even more the 545 km/h of the CAO.200 with the same 860 HP engine.

Ten per cent power more on the Spitfire would have given some 3 to 5 % more speed, it would have reached nearly 600 km/h. This would have saved some lives but probably not as many as improving tactics (Vic vs Four fingers, Big Wing controversy...) or pilots skills.

French engines didn't had fuel injection and, as far as I know, little effort was made on it. One German fuel injection pump have been secretely obtained but officials shown no interrest in it (I have to check my sources).

Anyway, the main concern on the French engines was the low octane rating fuel used in French Armée de l'Air wich lead to a hudge loss of specific power. Other concerns was poor reliability of engines due to design issues according to some authors (including less bearing than in equivalent foreign engines) but I suspect more the low quality of manufacturing, regularly reported in some companies including Gnome & Rhône or Marcel Bloch Aviation, as no reliability issues has been reported on foreign licensed engines in Switzerland, Romania, Czhechoslovakia... On the other hand, Szydlowski-Planiol variable supercharger used on H-S 12Y 45 was the most efficient of the time. Engine industry in France, as many other, was a mix of leading technology and below state of the art.

[stevep]

Nov 15, 2021 8:29:57 GMT DMZ said:

stevep ,

Not completly of subjet as the LN 161 demonstrated that although engine power is fundamental, aerodynamics makes sometime bigger difference. LN 161 with 860 HP Hispano-Suiza 12Y 31 had better performances than Dewoitine D.520 with 920 HP H-S 12Y 12Y 45, and even more the 545 km/h of the CAO.200 with the same 860 HP engine.

Ten per cent power more on the Spitfire would have given some 3 to 5 % more speed, it would have reached nearly 600 km/h. This would have saved some lives but probably not as many as improving tactics (Vic vs Four fingers, Big Wing controversy...) or pilots skills.

French engines didn't had fuel injection and, as far as I know, little effort was made on it. One German fuel injection pump have been secretely obtained but officials shown no interrest in it (I have to check my sources).

Anyway, the main concern on the French engines was the low octane rating fuel used in French Armée de l'Air wich lead to a hudge loss of specific power. Other concerns was poor reliability of engines due to design issues according to some authors (including less bearing than in equivalent foreign engines) but I suspect more the low quality of manufacturing, regularly reported in some companies including Gnome & Rhône or Marcel Bloch Aviation, as no reliability issues has been reported on foreign licensed engines in Switzerland, Romania, Czhechoslovakia... On the other hand, Szydlowski-Planiol variable supercharger used on H-S 12Y 45 was the most efficient of the time. Engine industry in France, as many other, was a mix of leading technology and below state of the art.

  DMZ,

  Ah so France is in a similar plight to the RAF.   I know that higher octane fuel from the US helped in getting a performance edge over the Luftwaffe so hopefully it can do the same here.

  As you say better tactics and training are bigger issues but every advantage will help.

  Steve

[DMZ]

Nov 15, 2021 16:39:44 GMT stevep said:

As you say better tactics and training are bigger issues but every advantage will help.

Indeed, the decision to develop fuel injection would have been of greater importance for the Hurricane, helping it to match with the "Emil", that would have changed a lot the balance of the victories against LW and perhaps shortened the Battle of Britain.

In France, 100 octane was to be introduced into the AdA at the beginning of the war, the Hispano-Suiza 12Y 51 delivering 1,100 HP (same as the Soviet licensed derivative Klimov 105 of the same period), and the H-S 12Z 1,600 HP (100/130 octane) was on trial and equiped several prototypes in May 1940. The gap was about to be filled but "too few, too late"... And there was no new design able to reach the 2,000+ HP class.

[miletus12]

Oct 23, 2021 22:50:48 GMT DMZ said:

Uchrony Nieuport 161

The Contest

All the following is the real history.

A program to select the future standard single-seater fighter (C1, Chasseur) for the French Air Force (Armée de l'Air, AdA) was issued on July 3rd, 1934. The re-equipment plan foresaw 355 online fighters plus one third in reserve.

The program called for a single-seat aircraft with closed cockpit, retractable landing gear, equipped with radio, propelled by an 800 to 1,000 HP engine, capable of 400 km/h, with an autonomy of 2.5 hours at 330 km/h, i.e. 825 km, a ceiling of 11,500 m and climb times of 6 minutes for 4,000 m, 15 minutes for 8,000 m and 19 minutes for 10,000 m [this last value is surprising and need to be checked because it gives 4 minutes for the last 2,000 m where the previous 4,000 m would have taken 9 minutes]. The armament should consist of one or two 20 mm cannons and two machine guns. The required top speed will be increased to 450 km/h in November 1935.

The Morane-Saulnier 405, powered by a Hispano-Suiza 12 Ygrs engine developing 850 HP at 4,000 m, made its first flight on August 8, 1935. The aircraft seemed promising, but the top speed reached was lower than 400 km/h.

Each design department of Loire-Nieuport, former Loire and former Nieuport, presented its own prototype.

On September 28, the Loire 250, powered by a 980 HP Hispano-Suiza 14 Ha-79 air-cooled star engine, made its first flight. It lacked stability, and the engine had tuning problems that prevented it from reaching its calculated speed.

A few days later, on October 5, the Nieuport 160 took off. It only had a Hispano-Suiza 12 Xcrs engine of 680 HP at 4,500 m driving a two-bladed wooden propeller with a fixed pitch. Despite the lack of power and a fixed landing gear, it quickly reached 440 km/h. Like the Loire 250, it has a canopy with 360° visibility which has the particularity of being monobloc, shaped like a water drop. Unfortunately, this ultra-modern canopy has vibration problems at high speeds.



Nieuport 160. Air Mag - Collection S. H. A. A.

After manufacturer's tests, the Nieuport 160 returned to the factory in January 1936 to be modified: it received a Hispano-Suiza 12 Ycrs engine of 860 HP at 4,000 m with a three-blade variable pitch propeller, its landing gear became retractable and the wing has a slightly higher dihedral, but the bubble canopy was replaced by a faceted one to solve the problem of vibration, which should result in a slight increase of drag.

On February 20, 1936, the MS 405 entered the Centre d'Essai des Matériels Aéronautique (CEMA) for official tests, which it completed in April; it was quite healthly and very maneuverable, but its maximum speed, as well as its climb times and ceiling, were far below the program requirements. Moreover, its engine tends to overheat and will have to be changed several times; no modification of the radiator will ever solve the problem.

The modified LN 160, now Loire-Nieuport 161, made its first flight in March and entered CEMA on May 9 until the end of July. Its behavior was good and its performance better than required.

However, in June 1936, even before the LN 161 tests were completed, a pre-production run of 16 MS 405s was ordered, even though none of its performance was acceptable in view of the program requirements.

In August, LN 161 went to Cazaux to realize firing tests on air and to the ground...

The Fate

Still real history.

Mid-September, the pre-production order for 30 LN 161s was ready. But due to the accident of the prototype at Cazaux, it was not placed to Loire-Nieuport. Only three new prototypes and a sample of tools for the construction of a small series were ordered at the end of December.

Although the LN 161 was once again in the spotlight in the spring of 1938 due to MS 405-406's production delays, the Bloch MB 151 and the Curtiss H-75 were ordered instead and the history of the Nieuport 161 was over. In May 1940, the French Air Force had to fight with outdated aircraft that were far too few in number: 328 operational fighters against Germany (excluding the defense of Paris and the lower Seine Valley, groupement 21), including 196 MS 406s, 99 H-75s and 33 MB 151-152s.


What was the actual performance of the two competitors?

	C1 Requirement	MS 405	LN 161	MS 405	LN 161	MS 406 (1)
year	1935	1936	1936	1937	1938	1939
max speed (km/h)	450	433	478	443 (2)	496	457 to 465
max speed (mph)	280	269	297	275	308	284 to 289
ceiling (m)	11,500		11,250		11,250	9,300
ceiling (feet)	37.730		36,900		36,900	31,170
climb to 4.000 m	6min		4min58s		4min29s	6min28s to 6min46s
climb to 7.000 m				19min
climb to 8.000 m	15min		11min05s		10min51s	16min32s to 18min10s
range (km)	825		875	650		800 (3)
range (miles)	513		544	404		497

It should be noted that the maximum speed of the MS-406, with the radiator raised, could not be maintained for more than a few minutes (2 minutes according to the testimonies of the pilots of the time) under penalty of burning out the engine. The maximum speed of the LN 161, on the other hand, was continuous.

(1) Official rejection values for serial aircraft. The values vary according to the type of mounted propeller.

(2) The top speed of 480 km/h or sometimes 486 km/h (298 or 302 mph) could be found in various newspapers of this era but does not appear in any official documents.
See Pierre-Yves Hénin's blog (in french):
sam40.fr/le-morane-406-des-handicaps-connus-des-performances-occultees/

(3) With additionnal fuel tank on top of the main one that slowed down the filling.

My Comments

It's obvious that such a huge difference and such a shortcoming compared to the program requirements makes the MS 406's choice simply beyond any understanding. It should be noted that the third prototype of the Nieuport had better performances than the prototype of the famous Dewoitine 520 at the same time (480 km/h in 1938, and a lower rate of climb than LN 161) while having a less powerful engine (860 hp vs 920 hp)! The mere installation of propulsive exhaust pipes on the LN 161-03, as on the D.520 in the spring of 1939, would have given it a speed of more than 510 km/h, enough to hold its own even against the Bf 109E (560 km/h for 5 minutes only, 520 km/h continuous) which also had a lower climb speed; not to mention the switch to a 920 hp engine and the aerodynamic improvements proposed at this time by the Nieuport design team.

In my opinion, the decision to choose the Morane and to reject the Nieuport was based on serious collusion between Morane-Saulnier and the CEMA, or even other high responsible of the AdA or the Air Ministry. Nothing else can explain the lies about the performance of the two aircraft and the systematic denigration of the Nieuport, including during official meetings (Comité du matériel, Conseil supérieur de l'Air). I have no proof of what I am saying, it is simply for me the only plausible explanation of the facts. If you have another one, I'll be happy to hear it.

About the Cazaux accident

Louis Bonte and Jacques Lecarme (in "Histoire des Essais en Vol, Docavia #3") indicate that the origin of the accident would be a stall of a part of the wing induced in certain configurations [of flight, I imagine] by the air outlets of the radiators on the extrados.

Without going into technical details, this is doubtful for several reasons:
- The message informing the minister of the accident specifies: "the accident does not seem to be attributable to the material", not an evidence but to be considered;
- The dive-bomber Loire-Nieuport LN 40-401-411 had the same radiators and was used in operational configurations that were far more challenging than those of the LN 161 (dive-bombing, landing on carrier) without any accident despite being heavier (2,835 kg vs. 2,278 kg fully loaded) with a smaller engine (Hispano-Suiza 12X 690 hp); there is even a photo showing an LN 40 on final approach on the carrier Béarn with one of the wing flaps extended (on the left) and the other not, without apparently causing the slightest problem of stability;
- Michel Detroyat stated in January 1938, during the discussions intended to choose a complementary aircraft to the MS 406: "There is no possible comparison between them [LN 161 and MB 151]: because of its ease of piloting, the Nieuport 161 is the only aircraft likely to be entrusted to the majority of military pilots";
- Despite intensive test in wind tunnel following the crash, the radiators did not evolve on the subsenquent prototypes of the LN 161 whereas this was the case for many other aircraft, including the MS 405-406 and the D.520; the simple fact of moving the outlets from the upper to the lower surface of the wing would have eliminated the problem if such was the case, modifications which are extremely easy to carry out and do not modify the structure of the wing.



LN 40 landing on the carrier Béarn. Note the internal right flap not lowered. Source Clausuchronia.



LN 161 radiator installation diagram. L'Aéronautique - December 1937 - BNF

So, here again, we are most likely in face of a FUD campaign (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt) to justify and legitimize a posteriori the dismissal of the Nieuport and the choice of the Morane.

Other operational issues of the MS 406

The wing's machine guns freezed at high altitude (above 4,000 m). Even though it's impossible to say the LN 161 would have been immune from it, the constant developpement of this plane should have made it fixed by May 1940 (on the opposite, very few work has been done on the MS 406).

The machine guns mount had some looseness which increased the dispersion of the weapons. And the reflector-sight was subject to vibration (due to its installation out of the cockpit, this having be changed on the last examples of Morane) which made the sighting not very precise. On the opposite, the LN 161 was declared "good shooting platform" in Cazaux.

These points, added to the poor top speed, climbing rate and the overheating was the main criticisms raised by the pilots from September 1939 until the end of fight in June 1940; commandant Maurice Arnoux replied to his superior about MS 406: "Our fighters, but they make us excellent turkey shoot for the enemy!". It is noticeable that the manufacturing of the Morane-Saulnier 406 was stopped in March 1940 even before the Dewoitine 520 production was nominal and despite the dramatic lack of modern fighters. All MS 406 was to be replaced before the end of the year.

Okay. These are good points and a solid indictment of the Morane Saulnier, but I need to ask a few questions to clarify the situation in my mind.

As far as I know, the Morane did not have the vertical rudder flutter instability, or the sudden wing drop stall problem opposite to propeller torque that was found in the LN`161? 


Did the Swiss not solve the engine overheating problem in their versions of the Morane?

Why was the reflex gunsight not shock mounted? 


The MAC 1934 tended to seize up at minus 10 Celsius at any atmospheric condition or altitude. The pawl was rather weak and the drum feed was another jam event waiting to happen. In many respects it suffered the same feed faults as the Browning .303 or its American cousin, although the Reibel seems to have operated without the inverted gravity misfeed problems of the British and American machine guns.

Solve all of it with solenoid cycle jam clearing and heaters and belt feeds.

==========================================================

General comments on fighter selection and support in an air campaign.


1. The air campaign is an attrition affair. It is not jousting between two aircraft.  The fighter in the air campaign exists to kill bombers and to deny the enemy the use of the air to reconnoiter, bomb and move through the air to harass your own forces below his aircraft while you scout, bomb, strafe and harass his forces, denying him the ability to hide or even move against you in the land or sea campaigns.

2. In regards to 1: the most important aspect of fighter choices for production is quantity, availability, ease of production, pilot use and ground crew maintainability. To take the RAF example of the era, the Spitfire was a far superior technical achievement to the Hurricane, but the key qualities of the Hurricane were that it was easier to make, easier to fly, had a higher availability rate, less intensive ground crew work load was cheap and was good enough, when present  in good numbers to shoot down Dorniers and Heinkels.  The Spitfire was a niche fighter used to chop out the German air superiority fighters at the time. 

    
3. In reference to 2: the AdA might have used the LN161 and the De520+ series, in a hypothetical France 1940 to chop away the BF 109s, but it would still need numbers of other fighters to go bomber and Stuka hunting. And this gets to the real problems with the French air establishment as it existed.

a. Planes were delivered to frontal aviation units incomplete without radios, gunsights, guns or even essential spare parts for routine flight familiarization and check rides.
b. Air crew were not given sufficient flight hours to learn the quirks of what they had.
c. There was no competent ground observer corps, radar net, ground controlled intercept or AIR STAFF to direct either air attack or air defense in either the immediate battlefield support or battlefield interdiction sense. The RAF had an air defense staff and ground controlled intercept service system with radars, but they did not have any competent trained air staff for tactical air or strategic operations either. About the only air forces who did, were the Japanese and the Republic of China as regards air offense and air campaign but they learned it the hard way from 1937 to 1940. It would be remarkable if anyone else had a clue before a couple of years of learn by failure as the RAF did. 
d. In the critical category of aircraft sortie rates, the Germans were cycling each aircraft in their tactical air campaign once every six to eight hours or about 3 times a day. French air sortie rates were about once per day per available aircraft. This was a ground crews and spare parts problem. Add the difference of 35% French aircraft actual availability as opposed to 70% German as to "paper aircraft on hand" and the numerical odds the AdA faced were not 2 to 1 in air combat. it was more like 6 to 1. The good news for the AdA, what little there was, was that their fighter pilot corps was deadly. They accounted for between 2/3 or 3/4 of Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed in the air campaign via air combat in France 1940 and might have been the difference in the Battle of Britain as the French pilots killed the best of the German bomber crews and may have seriously dented LW mid level in the air leadership thereby.     


 
      


 

[DMZ]

Dec 2, 2021 14:18:29 GMT miletus12 said:

Okay. These are good points and a solid indictment of the Morane Saulnier, but I need to ask a few questions to clarify the situation in my mind.

As far as I know, the Morane did not have the vertical rudder flutter instability, or the sudden wing drop stall problem opposite to propeller torque that was found in the LN`161? 

LN 161 was considered as a good plane without vice "the only able to be put in hands of all AdA's pilots" (Michel Detroyat famous testing pilot).

It was accused to have stall problem due to the radiators configuration, without any evidence. I explained in my second post why this was false.

Propeler torque was common on the fighters of this time, notably the Dewoitine D.520. As far as I know, nobody reported this on LN 161, probably due to the less powerfull engine than on D.520.

miletus12 said:

Did the Swiss not solve the engine overheating problem in their versions of the Morane?

Yes and Morane-Saulnier developed MS-410 that have solved this problem too but it came too late (10 MS 406 modified in 410 before armistice) and was still outclassed by Dewoitine D.520 in speed and climbing rate.

miletus12 said:

Why was the reflex gunsight not shock mounted? 

Gunsight reflector was mounted out of the canopy resulting in vibration. This have been corrected later but the first batch of MS 406 (several hundreds) was affected.

miletus12 said:

The MAC 1934 tended to seize up at minus 10 Celsius at any atmospheric condition or altitude. The pawl was rather weak and the drum feed was another jam event waiting to happen. In many respects it suffered the same feed faults as the Browning .303 or its American cousin, although the Reibel seems to have operated without the inverted gravity misfeed problems of the British and American machine guns.

Solve all of it with solenoid cycle jam clearing and heaters and belt feeds.

Electro-pneumatic gun trigger and drum feed was AdA's technical services requirements in 1935, not Morane-Saulnier's fault.

Belt feed was adopted on MS-410 as on all other french fighters in 1939.

But, as far as I know, no gun heating was ever implemented on MS 406 or derivative.

miletus12 said:

==========================================================

General comments on fighter selection and support in an air campaign.


1. The air campaign is an attrition affair. It is not jousting between two aircraft.  The fighter in the air campaign exists to kill bombers and to deny the enemy the use of the air to reconnoiter, bomb and move through the air to harass your own forces below his aircraft while you scout, bomb, strafe and harass his forces, denying him the ability to hide or even move against you in the land or sea campaigns.

2. In regards to 1: the most important aspect of fighter choices for production is quantity, availability, ease of production, pilot use and ground crew maintainability. To take the RAF example of the era, the Spitfire was a far superior technical achievement to the Hurricane, but the key qualities of the Hurricane were that it was easier to make, easier to fly, had a higher availability rate, less intensive ground crew work load was cheap and was good enough, when present  in good numbers to shoot down Dorniers and Heinkels.  The Spitfire was a niche fighter used to chop out the German air superiority fighters at the time. 

Ease of production: MS 406 was especially difficult to produce and required some 16,000 hours where D.520 needed 8,000.

LN 161 had a similar structure of the D.520 and could have been easily produced quicker on larger quantities than MS 406.

miletus12 said:

3. In reference to 2: the AdA might have used the LN161 and the De520+ series, in a hypothetical France 1940 to chop away the BF 109s, but it would still need numbers of other fighters to go bomber and Stuka hunting. And this gets to the real problems with the French air establishment as it existed.

Choosing the MS 406 in 1936 leaded to its replacement beginning 1940 as it was outclassed by Bf 109E and even not able to catch German bombers. LN 161, on the opposite, was far more efficient and could have stay in front line in its initial configuration all 1940 long (nearly the same performances as D.520 if equiped with propulsive exhaust pipes).

Moreover, the next version (see CAO.200 caracteristics) would have had the same top speed as the Bf 109E. And it wouldn't have had a long tuning period as the completly new D.520. This simple facts would have increased by at least 300 the number of fighters in line on May 1940 with exactly the same initial production.

miletus12 said:

a. Planes were delivered to frontal aviation units incomplete without radios, gunsights, guns or even essential spare parts for routine flight familiarization and check rides.

True. But we have seen that the same production would have leaded to a greater number of operational fighters.

On top of that, one can expect that earlier production (easier to produce and best industrial plants for Loire-Nieuport) would hade shown earlier to bottleneck of equipment. In my opinion, at least six mounths could have been gained meaning production would have been nominal (200 to 300 a month) beginning of 1940 at the latest.

miletus12 said:

b. Air crew were not given sufficient flight hours to learn the quirks of what they had.

Do you have any reference about it? French pilots was considered at that time as more skilled than Germans.

Are you talking about D.520 knowledge? In this case, as the LN 161 was in Groupes de chasse for two years, this wouldn't have append.

miletus12 said:

c. There was no competent ground observer corps, radar net, ground controlled intercept or AIR STAFF to direct either air attack or air defense in either the immediate battlefield support or battlefield interdiction sense. The RAF had an air defense staff and ground controlled intercept service system with radars, but they did not have any competent trained air staff for tactical air or strategic operations either. About the only air forces who did, were the Japanese and the Republic of China as regards air offense and air campaign but they learned it the hard way from 1937 to 1940. It would be remarkable if anyone else had a clue before a couple of years of learn by failure as the RAF did. 

True and it won't change in this time line. But remember first french built radar was operatinal on June 6, 1940 in Paris and Great Britain was delivering CH and GD radars to French Arrmy. Should the front line hold, this situation could evolve quickly, even if not becoming completly as efficient as British Chain Home.

miletus12 said:

d. In the critical category of aircraft sortie rates, the Germans were cycling each aircraft in their tactical air campaign once every six to eight hours or about 3 times a day. French air sortie rates were about once per day per available aircraft. This was a ground crews and spare parts problem. Add the difference of 35% French aircraft actual availability as opposed to 70% German as to "paper aircraft on hand" and the numerical odds the AdA faced were not 2 to 1 in air combat. it was more like 6 to 1. The good news for the AdA, what little there was, was that their fighter pilot corps was deadly. They accounted for between 2/3 or 3/4 of Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed in the air campaign via air combat in France 1940 and might have been the difference in the Battle of Britain as the French pilots killed the best of the German bomber crews and may have seriously dented LW mid level in the air leadership thereby.

True but French sorties rate improved during the Battle of France.

BTW, 1,000 victories to French Air Force was a myth and it was actually (according to several historians) betwen 355 and 500 victories, the first being the most probable as cross checked with German records. So one could assume only about 1/3 of the total LW losses in combat are from AdA. The figures given in "The War in the Air- France 1940" are false (but shared by most of the authors) and there are other common urban legends in it (total number of French fighters, distance from airfields to front line...)

[miletus12]

Dec 2, 2021 21:16:48 GMT DMZ said:

Dec 2, 2021 14:18:29 GMT miletus12 said:

Okay. These are good points and a solid indictment of the Morane Saulnier, but I need to ask a few questions to clarify the situation in my mind.

As far as I know, the Morane did not have the vertical rudder flutter instability, or the sudden wing drop stall problem opposite to propeller torque that was found in the LN`161? 

LN 161 was considered as a good plane without vice "the only able to be put in hands of all AdA's pilots" (Michel Detroyat famous testing pilot).

Hmm. I might be thinking of the LN40?

It was accused to have stall problem due to the radiators configuration, without any evidence. I explained in my second post why this was false.

I presume the French aeronautical engineers knew about boundary air flow disruption of the upper wing chord surface was inimical to a Bernouli effect? Maybe the radiators were not the disruption but something was causing the airflow to unstick?

Propeller torque was common on the fighters of this time, notably the Dewoitine D.520. As far as I know, nobody reported this on LN 161, probably due to the less powerfull engine than on D.520.

It was a problem for the Curtiss H-75 and that bird was grossly underpowered with insufficient counter-side wing lift to counteract the torque? I've looked at the LN161 and it seems to have the same problem?

miletus12 said:

Did the Swiss not solve the engine overheating problem in their versions of the Morane?

Yes and Morane-Saulnier developed MS-410 that have solved this problem too but it came too late (10 MS 406 modified in 410 before armistice) and was still outclassed by Dewoitine D.520 in speed and climbing rate.

My only comment here, is that the Morane was overbuilt to function. It might have made a dandy close air support fighter bomber. Also, like some of the fat overweight American planes of the era, one can make up a lot of deficiencies by adding a better engine of similar mass to the HS 12 Y. Maybe a Pratt R1830? Would be weird to shove a radial into a Morane, but it would be like shoving an Allsion into an H-75. The need is for additional watts through props.

miletus12 said:

Why was the reflex gunsight not shock mounted? 

Gunsight reflector was mounted out of the canopy resulting in vibration. This have been corrected later but the first batch of MS 406 (several hundreds) was affected.

Was there room to mount internally?

miletus12 said:

The MAC 1934 tended to seize up at minus 10 Celsius at any atmospheric condition or altitude. The pawl was rather weak and the drum feed was another jam event waiting to happen. In many respects it suffered the same feed faults as the Browning .303 or its American cousin, although the Reibel seems to have operated without the inverted gravity misfeed problems of the British and American machine guns.

Solve all of it with solenoid cycle jam clearing and heaters and belt feeds.

Electro-pneumatic gun trigger and drum feed was AdA's technical services requirements in 1935, not Morane-Saulnier's fault.

I suppose this was government supplied ordnance? Like the Americans learned from their own ordnance mistakes in WWIi, maybe one should let private companies actually solve the armament and aiming system issues as is now currently done in modern practice?

Belt feed was adopted on MS-410 as on all other french fighters in 1939.

Kind of late.

But, as far as I know, no gun heating was ever implemented on MS 406 or derivative.

Would have helped.

miletus12 said:

==========================================================

General comments on fighter selection and support in an air campaign.


1. The air campaign is an attrition affair. It is not jousting between two aircraft.  The fighter in the air campaign exists to kill bombers and to deny the enemy the use of the air to reconnoiter, bomb and move through the air to harass your own forces below his aircraft while you scout, bomb, strafe and harass his forces, denying him the ability to hide or even move against you in the land or sea campaigns.

2. In regards to 1: the most important aspect of fighter choices for production is quantity, availability, ease of production, pilot use and ground crew maintainability. To take the RAF example of the era, the Spitfire was a far superior technical achievement to the Hurricane, but the key qualities of the Hurricane were that it was easier to make, easier to fly, had a higher availability rate, less intensive ground crew work load was cheap and was good enough, when present  in good numbers to shoot down Dorniers and Heinkels.  The Spitfire was a niche fighter used to chop out the German air superiority fighters at the time. 

Ease of production: MS 406 was especially difficult to produce and required some 16,000 hours where D.520 needed 8,000.

Was there any attempt to simplify construction as was done between the P-36 and P-40 which are direct line evolutions of one another?

LN 161 had a similar structure of the D.520 and could have been easily produced quicker on larger quantities than MS 406.

I would have to see factory floor documentation as to unit hours to be sure for the LN161, because that air-frame looks involved, but the De520 was definitely designed to be fast and cheap to make.

miletus12 said:

3. In reference to 2: the AdA might have used the LN161 and the De520+ series, in a hypothetical France 1940 to chop away the BF 109s, but it would still need numbers of other fighters to go bomber and Stuka hunting. And this gets to the real problems with the French air establishment as it existed.

Choosing the MS 406 in 1936 leaded to its replacement beginning 1940 as it was outclassed by Bf 109E and even not able to catch German bombers. LN 161, on the opposite, was far more efficient and could have stay in front line in its initial configuration all 1940 long (nearly the same performances as D.520 if equiped with propulsive exhaust pipes).[/quote]

Moreover, the next version (see CAO.200 caracteristics) would have had the same top speed as the Bf 109E. And it wouldn't have had a long tuning period as the completly new D.520. This simple facts would have increased by at least 300 the number of fighters in line on May 1940 with exactly the same initial production.

The SNCAO 200 would have needed a 970 kW engine to achieve the specified performance.

miletus12 said:

a. Planes were delivered to frontal aviation units incomplete without radios, gunsights, guns or even essential spare parts for routine flight familiarization and check rides.

True. But we have seen that the same production would have leaded to a greater number of operational fighters.

On top of that, one can expect that earlier production (easier to produce and best industrial plants for Loire-Nieuport) would hade shown earlier to bottleneck of equipment. In my opinion, at least six mounths could have been gained meaning production would have been nominal (200 to 300 a month) beginning of 1940 at the latest.

This presupposes a year to set up the production line and train the work force? It is not an evolved design.

miletus12 said:

b. Air crew were not given sufficient flight hours to learn the quirks of what they had.

Do you have any reference about it? French pilots was considered at that time as more skilled than Germans.

Are you talking about D.520 knowledge? In this case, as the LN 161 was in Groupes de chasse for two years, this wouldn't have append.

See my previous comments about time to build and availability?

miletus12 said:

c. There was no competent ground observer corps, radar net, ground controlled intercept or AIR STAFF to direct either air attack or air defense in either the immediate battlefield support or battlefield interdiction sense. The RAF had an air defense staff and ground controlled intercept service system with radars, but they did not have any competent trained air staff for tactical air or strategic operations either. About the only air forces who did, were the Japanese and the Republic of China as regards air offense and air campaign but they learned it the hard way from 1937 to 1940. It would be remarkable if anyone else had a clue before a couple of years of learn by failure as the RAF did. 

True and it won't change in this time line. But remember first french built radar was operatinal on June 6, 1940 in Paris and Great Britain was delivering CH and GD radars to French Arrmy. Should the front line hold, this situation could evolve quickly, even if not becoming completly as efficient as British Chain Home.

Based on USN history of fleet air defense and attack, it would take two years and at least two air campaigns to get to where the ROCs and IJN were were in 1939. The USAAF and RAF experience in the western European air campaign against an equally inexperienced Luftwaffe was three years. I do not see it happening any faster. The trial by error has to occur so that air forces learn what does not work. Introducing the air campaign was a military event akin to introducing the machine gun or motorized artillery to land warfare. After a century of practice, most practitioners still have trouble with the air campaign. I know the AdA was and is good at it; (WWI example circa 1918.), but they would still have to make the mistakes of 1940-1943. Handwaves in the era of Douhet and Mitchell are not going to happen miraculously. Chennault was correct about this aspect of the air campaign offense at the time. So was Dowding in the defense.

miletus12 said:

d. In the critical category of aircraft sortie rates, the Germans were cycling each aircraft in their tactical air campaign once every six to eight hours or about 3 times a day. French air sortie rates were about once per day per available aircraft. This was a ground crews and spare parts problem. Add the difference of 35% French aircraft actual availability as opposed to 70% German as to "paper aircraft on hand" and the numerical odds the AdA faced were not 2 to 1 in air combat. it was more like 6 to 1. The good news for the AdA, what little there was, was that their fighter pilot corps was deadly. They accounted for between 2/3 or 3/4 of Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed in the air campaign via air combat in France 1940 and might have been the difference in the Battle of Britain as the French pilots killed the best of the German bomber crews and may have seriously dented LW mid level in the air leadership thereby.

True but French sorties rate improved during the Battle of France.[/quopte]

BTW, 1,000 victories to French Air Force was a myth and it was actually (according to several historians) betwen 355 and 500 victories, the first being the most probable as cross checked with German records. So one could assume only about 1/3 of the total LW losses in combat are from AdA. The figures given in "The War in the Air- France 1940" are false (but shared by most of the authors) and there are other common urban legends in it (total number of French fighters, distance from airfields to front line...)

I am going to supply this document:

TACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE DURING THE WAR IN THE WEST – 1939-1940 BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL XAVIER GALLAIS, FRENCH AIR FORCE

I hope it clarifies and answers some of the points in this discussion.

[DMZ]

The point in MS 406 vs LN 161 contest was that the first had too many shortcuts to be a good fighter while the last was promising and the only to meet AdA's requirements.

MS 406 was ordered while not having achieved required top speed. Its climbing rate was disastrous and its ceiling 1,500 m less that requested. And the construction technics (welded tubes) too costly. Albert Caquot made hudge effort to accelerate its production but it still needed at least 50 % more work hours than contemporaries.

On the other side, LN 161 achieved all requirements by 1936 and was better than 1938 D.520 with less powerfull engine. Its successor in late 1938 acheived 545 km/h with the same 12Y 31 860 HP engine! (source: magazine "Avions" # 235 Jul. Aug. 2020; even if it was wrong and the engine was the same as D.520 (12Y 45 920 HP), CAO 200 was far better) LN 161 was designed to be modular and easy to produce (probably even more than D.520).

As Loire-Nieuport had better knowledge and industrial equipment, the LN 161 would have been delivered in production at least six months and probably one year before MS 406, giving all time to equip and train all existing Groupes de Chasse before the outbrake of the war.

For the other points:

There was room to put refloctor gun sight internally as it was done later.

French was in contact with British to implement early watch based on radars. A first room was operationnal in Reims but far less efficient than English one. With the same procedures, one could assume that, under event pressure, it would have quickly improved.

I will read carefully you document "TACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE DURING THE WAR IN THE WEST" before giveng feedback.

[miletus12]

Dec 3, 2021 8:48:04 GMT DMZ said:

The point in MS 406 vs LN 161 contest was that the first had too many shortcuts to be a good fighter while the last was promising and the only to meet AdA's requirements.

This is unclear. If one means the political fix was in, then One remembers that French industrial policy in the automotive and aviation sectors was in chaos between 1935 and 1938 with firms such as Bloch and Loire Nieuport resisting rationalization and consolidation. I will remark a little on the aero-engine problems globally in a moment.

Dec 3, 2021 8:48:04 GMT DMZ said:

MS 406 was ordered while not having achieved required top speed. Its climbing rate was disastrous and its ceiling 1,500 m less that requested. And the construction technics (welded tubes) too costly. Albert Caquot made hudge effort to accelerate its production but it still needed at least 50 % more work hours than contemporaries.

The implication here is that the Morane Saulnier MS406 was somehow a backward or obsolescent airframe at the time of its development. The Hawker Hurricane was of metal tube and stretched fabric construction as well in part and it shared many of the same design elements/flaws of the 1932-1935 design era Morane. The chief complaint against the Morane was the design hours required to assemble the complex air frame and that it was underpowered. Here the Hawker held a significant advantage in simpler barrel design and performance since the RR Merlin XX gave a clear 200 kW advantage over the HS 12 Y at similar power egg weight and the airscrew was more efficient at turning the watts provided into thrust.

I think the wing chord on the main spar, a Clark airfoil was rather good for the Hawker too. It might not have been as good as the modified NACA airfoils used on the later De520 or the Spitfire or the Curtiss Hawks, but that is the result of new general knowledge gained post 1932. These mods could have been applied to the Morane or the LN161 post 1935?

Dec 3, 2021 8:48:04 GMT DMZ said:

On the other side, LN 161 achieved all requirements by 1936 and was better than 1938 D.520 with less powerfull engine. Its successor in late 1938 acheived 545 km/h with the same 12Y 31 860 HP engine! (source: magazine "Avions" # 235 Jul. Aug. 2020; even if it was wrong and the engine was the same as D.520 (12Y 45 920 HP), CAO 200 was far better) LN 161 was designed to be modular and easy to produce (probably even more than D.520).

I will contest that the SNCAO 200 was a good aircraft. The barrel back of the fighter was fat and very draggy. The vertical rudder area was too small to bite hard in a tight high angle of attack cornering turn. It was grossly underpowered for weight. In many respects it had all the vices of the Curtiss XP-43 with none of the redeeming features being unstable and a stall hazard.

With the LN161, now that I have read some further background, I understand the sub-assembly approach to making the aircraft. I am not sure if this was French innovated or copied from Mitsubishi since it is very similar to the A6M in that it fits wings and engine modules as subassemblies. But then again, this was done by the French aircraft builders in WWI, so is this more a manufacturer's choice or something new to Nieuport?

Dec 3, 2021 8:48:04 GMT DMZ said:

As Loire-Nieuport had better knowledge and industrial equipment, the LN 161 would have been delivered in production at least six months and probably one year before MS 406, giving all time to equip and train all existing Groupes de Chasse before the outbrake of the war.

See previous remarks.

Dec 3, 2021 8:48:04 GMT DMZ said:

There was room to put refloctor gun sight internally as it was done later.

Then why was it not so done from the start? Motor vibration in the fore barrel would have been a known fault. It was obviously so known for a robust item like the motor cannon, and that confuses me. If mounting outside in a vibration intensive environment affected the HS404, why would one put the fragile gunsight into the same mechanical environment without shock mounting?

Dec 3, 2021 8:48:04 GMT DMZ said:

French was in contact with British to implement early watch based on radars. A first room was operationnal in Reims but far less efficient than English one. With the same procedures, one could assume that, under event pressure, it would have quickly improved.

The British took three years (1937-1940) to work the ground controlled intercept system bugs out. During the period 1940-1941 the Americans sent observers (USN / Army) to study the system and stood up their own versions of Chain Home with superior air warning radar sets. How well did they do?

Clark Field and Pearl Harbor?

At the same time Claire Chennault and the Flying Tigers were taking air warfare lessons from the Republic of China air force. The Chinese did not have radar, but they had four years of plotting room and telephone and ground observer corps and radio reporting experience. The AVG did rather well once they figured out that they were the pupils and the Chinese were the masters / tutors. The point is that a few weeks or months was not going to help one bit. One had to practice for years and build up trained cadres of ground personnel and a communications network to make ground controlled intercept work. Dowding did this for the RAF.

Dec 3, 2021 8:48:04 GMT DMZ said:

I will read carefully you document "TACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE DURING THE WAR IN THE WEST" before giveng feedback.

Perhaps this additional document will help?

freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3073707/posts

I think some of the conclusions are not justified, but there is a kernel of evidence in it that could be followed and discussed?

The air force was a convenient scapegoat for the French Army generals who dominated the Vichy regime that ruled France under the Germans. By attributing the defeat of French forces to weakness in the air, the army officers diverted attention from their own failures. Moreover, the Vichy leaders were able to strengthen their claim to legitimacy by blaming the parliamentary regime they had supplanted for failing to provide a sufficient number of aircraft. The Vichy leaders also reproached the British for holding the bulk of their air force in the British Isles. Concurrently, the Vichy army officers used the defeat of the air force to justify abolishing the air ministry and the air force general staff, incorporating their functions into the war ministry and army general staff and returning the air force to its former status as a branch of the army. With the army controlling the postwar sources of information, for many years there was no voice to challenge the official position that France had lost the war because the prewar politicians had not equipped the air force adequately.

Since the mid-1960s, fragments of information--aviator's memoirs, production reports, aircraft inventories, and Anglo-French correspondence--have come to light. These sources reveal four new facts about the French Air Force.

The French aviation industry (with modest assistance--about 15 percent-from American and Dutch producers) had produced enough modern combat aircraft (4360) by May 1940 to defeat the Luftwaffe, which fielded a force of 3270.2
The French planes were comparable in combat capability and performance to the German aircraft.
The French had only about one-fourth of their modern combat aircraft in operational formations on the Western Front on 10 May 1940.3
The Royal Air Force stationed a larger proportion (30 percent) of its fighter force in France than the French committed from their own resources (25 percent).4
These data exculpate the prewar parliamentary regime and the British. They raise questions about the leadership of an air force that had parity in numbers of aircraft, the aid of a powerful ally, the latest radar, and the most advanced aviation technology in Europe, yet lost a defensive battle over its own territory.5

For what it worth, I might add this article to illustrate that perhaps the thesis of method of employment of what existed and could be built in 1939 was more important than what was a missed opportunity to build the LN161?

link

The thesis here is that confusion as to what to do and how to do it, was more important than the selection of aircraft, as even the Germans appear to have been somewhat less competent with their aircraft types than is supposed?

[DMZ]

miletus12,

Three interesting documents... with a lot of common error, the most important and shared in the three articles being the overestimation of French victories.

"TACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE DURING THE WAR IN THE WEST, Lt-Col. X. Gallais" is a fair and accurate description of the numerous flaws of Armée de l'Air doctrine and tactics despite the said mistakes (including strange statement that French Army was to reinforce Canal Albert defenses!).

"Why Did the French Air Force Fail in 1940? - A.D. Harvey" presents an original point of view: Luftwaffe was of no effect on the Campagne of France... I see no major factual error despite it overestimates MS 406 capabilities. But I desagree on the Meuse River crossing at Sedan, all testimonies show that the continuous bombing had a strong effect on the untrained soldiers of the 55e Division d'Infanterie, and there are lots of other occasions where LW was called to support terrestrial units.

I knew "The French Air Force In 1940: Was It Defeated by the Luftwaffe or by Politics? - Lt-Col. F. R. Kirkland". It's based on wrong facts (notably the number of modern French fighters) and generaly considered as wrong in its conclusions.

The thesis here is that confusion as to what to do and how to do it, was more important than the selection of aircraft, as even the Germans appear to have been somewhat less competent with their aircraft types than is supposed?

I fully agree, changing MS 406 for a better fighter, whatever it was, won't be sufficient to change the multiple weaknesses of the French Army, including AdA.

My point is that LN 161 could have initiated multiple butterfly effects that could have leaded to some different outcome.

1. Even though the LW was able to use its ressources much more efficiently than AdA, having two times the number of planes on line would have had an effect. To what extend?

2. The number of LN 161 on line would have allowed to acheive one goal of Plan VI: 50 GC (or at least 40) with three flights each instead of two. This would have given the rest needed to the pilots and left twice the number of Dedicated Aerial Forces (and not Reserve Aerai Forces as said in the first paper: "Forces aériennes réservées", not "Forces aériennes de réserve"). General Vuillemin or general Tétu could have tried to gain aerial superiority over the frontline.

3. This could have made that bombing in Sedan would have been much less efficient should two or three GCs have intervene in the battle...

4. On top of that, having an efficient monoengine fighter could have leaded to a familly of fighter-bomber, photo-reco plane... that would also have changed a lot of things.

What could have been the outcome? I don't know but, as proposed previously, one day left to cross the Meuse River at Sedan could have had a huge impact on the speed of advance to the Channel with two DCrs more ready to fight. Not to mention two or three days...


About your remarks:
Bloch and Loire Nieuport didn't resist to nationalizations, on the opposite, Marcel Bloch take advantage of it to develop its independant design department.

MS 406 was underpowered but it was not the reason why it was a poor fighter. Finns and Swiss have increased the power and refined the aerodynamics without reaching the performances of the contemporaries.

A6M was designed far later than LN 161 and couldn't have been a model.

I didn't said CAO.200 was a good fighter (I don't know about it), I just noticed it achieved 545 km/h, showing that a derivative of LN 161 using similar wings could have reached this speed at this time.

Gunsight reflector was initialy put outside of the canopy on MS 406, I don't know why, this misconception was modified later, that's all what I know...

[miletus12]

Dec 4, 2021 20:21:41 GMT DMZ said:

miletus12 ,

Three interesting documents... with a lot of common error, the most important and shared in the three articles being the overestimation of French victories.

That seems to be a reporting problem of estimated enemy losses of all eras and all estimators. Ot is most difficult to accurately count splashes, destroyed on the ground and merely damaged, even if there is gun and radar camera confirmation that something was hit by somebody in an air campaign. Asking someone fresh from an air fight to remember what he saw is like asking a survivor of a violent crime what she or he saw. One gets Kurosawa not the Pearl Harbor Report.

"TACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE DURING THE WAR IN THE WEST, Lt-Col. X. Gallais" is a fair and accurate description of the numerous flaws of Armée de l'Air doctrine and tactics despite the said mistakes (including strange statement that French Army was to reinforce Canal Albert defenses!).

That one threw me. I thought the Diehl Plan was a delay action?

"Why Did the French Air Force Fail in 1940? - A.D. Harvey" presents an original point of view: Luftwaffe was of no effect on the Campagne of France... I see no major factual error despite it overestimates MS 406 capabilities. But I desagree on the Meuse River crossing at Sedan, all testimonies show that the continuous bombing had a strong effect on the untrained soldiers of the 55e Division d'Infanterie, and there are lots of other occasions where LW was called to support terrestrial units.

Having actually been bounced on the ground by jets, I can tell you that even trained troops have that scared mouse being chased by hawks experience. It is worse when they near miss you. However a few times and one becomes like the Russian peasant who gets used to hanging if it happens to her or him often enough. So those screaming sirens on the Stukas were effective. Training helps mitigate. So does friendly air presence chasing those Stukas.

I knew "The French Air Force In 1940: Was It Defeated by the Luftwaffe or by Politics? - Lt-Col. F. R. Kirkland". It's based on wrong facts (notably the number of modern French fighters) and generaly considered as wrong in its conclusions.

He is a USAF political officer with an ax to grind. I should have mentioned that was one of the reasons I might not have agreed with his conclusions.

The thesis here is that confusion as to what to do and how to do it, was more important than the selection of aircraft, as even the Germans appear to have been somewhat less competent with their aircraft types than is supposed?

I fully agree, changing MS 406 for a better fighter, whatever it was, won't be sufficient to change the multiple weaknesses of the French Army, including AdA.[/quote]

My point is that LN 161 could have initiated multiple butterfly effects that could have leaded to some different outcome.

There is a similar argument made about the P-38 versus the P-40. The Lockheed plane was never going to be the panacea plane. The P-40 was a complex to build, rather expensive and at the time obsolescent derivative of the P-36, but it was in production, it was good enough for 80% of expected air combat work and it was needed immediately. Does this sound familiar? M.S.405=> 406 => 410 => 411/412, Finnish Morgo-Morane. The P-40 went from B to J and was still not as good as a Wildcat in the air to air role, but still was good enough, just as the Hurricane was good enough for most of the war. The LN 161 like the P-38 was full of unforeseen problems that would have taken years to iron out.

1. Even though the LW was able to use its ressources much more efficiently than AdA, having two times the number of planes on line would have had an effect. To what extend?

That goes to industrial management and logistics more than technological iteration for supplying the air tools. It is like suggesting that having a plane park of 800 Leo 45 bombers or even 3x the number of Farman 222s would have helped at the Meuse? Also consider this little observation. There is a point in these articles where AdA generals are asking French army generals for missions and the army generals shrug their shoulders and say "I have no work for you!" What kind of ground pounder in charge tells his aerial eyes that he has no work for them? Insane is what that situation is. Were the French army generals that out of touch with reality?

2. The number of LN 161 on line would have allowed to acheive one goal of Plan VI: 50 GC (or at least 40) with three flights each instead of two. This would have given the rest needed to the pilots and left twice the number of Dedicated Aerial Forces (and not Reserve Aerai Forces as said in the first paper: "Forces aériennes réservées", not "Forces aériennes de réserve"). General Vuillemin or general Tétu could have tried to gain aerial superiority over the frontline.

One needs runways, gasoline, ammunition, pilots and ground crews and spare parts and people to process and send those planes forward to the GCs. There were over 200 crated American built fighters gathering cobwebs in warehouses during France 1940. That could have been 200+ LN161s or De520s? You have to solve the logistics and get the support from factory to runway and on top of that have a GCI no matter how rudimentary up and running at the front to provide the tac-air desired as described above.

3. This could have made that bombing in Sedan would have been much less efficient should two or three GCs have intervene in the battle...

Or it could have put French bombers over that huge traffic jam behind the panzers in the Ardennes and created a Falaise Pocket type aerial massacre in France 1940.

4. On top of that, having an efficient monoengine fighter could have leaded to a familly of fighter-bomber, photo-reco plane... that would also have changed a lot of things.

There was already the Potez 63 series. How was it used? Not too well.

What could have been the outcome? I don't know but, as proposed previously, one day left to cross the Meuse River at Sedan could have had a huge impact on the speed of advance to the Channel with two DCrs more ready to fight. Not to mention two or three days...

Artillery would have been more practical. Night operations in France 1940 via air was much less effective.

About your remarks:
Bloch and Loire Nieuport didn't resist to nationalizations, on the opposite, Marcel Bloch take advantage of it to develop its independant design department.

Post war lesson learned by Dessault. (Bloch). I seem to remember he wanted to keep his own show in his own hands and away from the politicians in an article I read about him.

MS 406 was underpowered but it was not the reason why it was a poor fighter. Finns and Swiss have increased the power and refined the aerodynamics without reaching the performances of the contemporaries.

See my comment about the P-40? And the Finns did get the Morane's altitude problem fixed with the Klimov. Zoom and Boom works. That is how the Wildcat did it.

A6M was designed far later than LN 161 and couldn't have been a model.

Except that it was based on the A5M Claude. Same design philosophy.

I didn't said CAO.200 was a good fighter (I don't know about it), I just noticed it achieved 545 km/h, showing that a derivative of LN 161 using similar wings could have reached this speed at this time.

The example of the Curtiss XP-43 and later XP-60 was what I used to show what I could find about the SNCAO 200. It was a step backwards.

Gunsight reflector was initialy put outside of the canopy on MS 406, I don't know why, this misconception was modified later, that's all what I know...

It was the same mistake Kurt Tank made with the FW187, but at least he pretended to shock mount the reflex sight. I just do not understand why, either.