What if: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå (Sweden) in 1940

[lordroel]

So i just found out that the Royal Navy’s plan for an attack on Luleå in 1940.

The British Naval Staff History Naval Operations of the Campaign in Norway (1946) set out the aims of the campaign in April to June 1940 as:

• stopping the export of Swedish iron ore from Narvik to Germany
• denying use of the Norwegian coast to the German navy

Yet it makes no mention of Operation Paul, the Royal Navy’s plan to attack the port of Luleå in neutral Sweden.

The British official history The Campaign in Norway (1952), in discussing the strategic context of the campaign, highlights three concerns:

• the perceived dependence of the German war machine on Swedish iron ore;
• British uncertainty whether Russia or Germany (who in 1940 were allies) would drive on from their respective advances in Norway and Finland to Luleå;
• and doubts about the efficacy of Swedish neutrality makes no mention of Operation Paul.

The Campaign in Norway does not mention Operation Paul by name but refers in passing to a plan by Churchill to “bottle up Luleå”.

Captain S. W. Roskill’s official history, War At Sea (1960), is silent.

The subject is dealt with in passing in Peter C. Smith’s book on the Royal Navy’s first fighter-divebomber, the Sea Skua.

The only lengthy treatment of Operation Paul is contained within Thomas MunchPetersen’s The Strategy of the Phoney War (1981), which is regrettably not well-known in
Britain or Sweden.

Would Operation Paul have succeeded?

As they were to show a few weeks later, the British were certainly ruthless enough to carry out Operation Paul. Then, on 3 July 1940, the Royal Navy bombarded the French fleet, at its berths in Mers-el-Kebir, North Africa, to stop it from falling into German hands. Over 1 200 Frenchmen died and a battleship was sunk: France and Britain were not at war and until a week or so before had been allies against the Germans. The bombardment of Mers-el-Kebir poisoned Anglo-French naval relations for half a century and more. Operation Paul was certainly practicable as the Doolittle raid was to show on 18 April 1942 when US Army bombers were launched from the USS Hornet to attack the Japanese mainland and, with insufficient fuel to return to Hornet, flew on to land in China. Operation Paul would also have been effective, as the British were to show during Operation Judgement, when Swordfish torpedo-bombers attacked the Italian fleet at its anchorage in Taranto on the night 11/12 November 1940. At full scale, Operation Paul would have used three carriers and almost four times more aircraft (78) than were used during the Battle of Taranto (21) against a heavily defended Italian harbour, and at reduced scale would have used only a few less aircraft (18 or 15) against an unalerted and poorly defended Swedish port.

The attack on Taranto is widely held to mark the rise of power of naval aviation over the big guns of battleships. According to Admiral Cunningham, “Taranto should be remembered forever as having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon.”48 Taranto is also supposed to have inspired the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Operation Paul had many of the characteristics of Taranto, Pearl Harbour and the Doolittle Raid. Had the attack on Luleå taken place, there is little doubt that it would have succeeded, at whatever cost to the British, and it would deserve entry into the pantheon of naval warfare. However, for all that Anglo-Swedish naval relations are warm today, perhaps, like Anglo-French relations after Mers-el-Kebir, the Luleå raid would have had a lasting effect upon Anglo-Swedish relations. And in 1940 it might have brought Sweden into the war against the Allies

Short Version: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå in 1940

Long Version: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå in 1940

[stevep]

Nov 11, 2021 15:50:32 GMT lordroel said:

So i just found out that the Royal Navy’s plan for an attack on Luleå in 1940.

The British Naval Staff History Naval Operations of the Campaign in Norway (1946) set out the aims of the campaign in April to June 1940 as:

• stopping the export of Swedish iron ore from Narvik to Germany
• denying use of the Norwegian coast to the German navy

Yet it makes no mention of Operation Paul, the Royal Navy’s plan to attack the port of Luleå in neutral Sweden.

The British official history The Campaign in Norway (1952), in discussing the strategic context of the campaign, highlights three concerns:

• the perceived dependence of the German war machine on Swedish iron ore;
• British uncertainty whether Russia or Germany (who in 1940 were allies) would drive on from their respective advances in Norway and Finland to Luleå;
• and doubts about the efficacy of Swedish neutrality makes no mention of Operation Paul.

The Campaign in Norway does not mention Operation Paul by name but refers in passing to a plan by Churchill to “bottle up Luleå”.

Captain S. W. Roskill’s official history, War At Sea (1960), is silent.

The subject is dealt with in passing in Peter C. Smith’s book on the Royal Navy’s first fighter-divebomber, the Sea Skua.

The only lengthy treatment of Operation Paul is contained within Thomas MunchPetersen’s The Strategy of the Phoney War (1981), which is regrettably not well-known in
Britain or Sweden.

Would Operation Paul have succeeded?

As they were to show a few weeks later, the British were certainly ruthless enough to carry out Operation Paul. Then, on 3 July 1940, the Royal Navy bombarded the French fleet, at its berths in Mers-el-Kebir, North Africa, to stop it from falling into German hands. Over 1 200 Frenchmen died and a battleship was sunk: France and Britain were not at war and until a week or so before had been allies against the Germans. The bombardment of Mers-el-Kebir poisoned Anglo-French naval relations for half a century and more. Operation Paul was certainly practicable as the Doolittle raid was to show on 18 April 1942 when US Army bombers were launched from the USS Hornet to attack the Japanese mainland and, with insufficient fuel to return to Hornet, flew on to land in China. Operation Paul would also have been effective, as the British were to show during Operation Judgement, when Swordfish torpedo-bombers attacked the Italian fleet at its anchorage in Taranto on the night 11/12 November 1940. At full scale, Operation Paul would have used three carriers and almost four times more aircraft (78) than were used during the Battle of Taranto (21) against a heavily defended Italian harbour, and at reduced scale would have used only a few less aircraft (18 or 15) against an unalerted and poorly defended Swedish port.

The attack on Taranto is widely held to mark the rise of power of naval aviation over the big guns of battleships. According to Admiral Cunningham, “Taranto should be remembered forever as having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon.”48 Taranto is also supposed to have inspired the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Operation Paul had many of the characteristics of Taranto, Pearl Harbour and the Doolittle Raid. Had the attack on Luleå taken place, there is little doubt that it would have succeeded, at whatever cost to the British, and it would deserve entry into the pantheon of naval warfare. However, for all that Anglo-Swedish naval relations are warm today, perhaps, like Anglo-French relations after Mers-el-Kebir, the Luleå raid would have had a lasting effect upon Anglo-Swedish relations. And in 1940 it might have brought Sweden into the war against the Allies

Short Version: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå in 1940

Long Version: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå in 1940

  At times you wonder what the hell Churchill was on!   This is an insane idea.  Even if it disrupted shipments for a while the largest considered force for the attack, whether laying mines or sinking merchant ships would only cause temporary problems while you would lose a large proportion of the force when the FAA was already short of trained aircrew.  Not to mention the political impacts with Sweden effectively forced into the Axis and other neutrals alienated.  Or that with German progress in France, even if the latter had fought on from N Africa Germany would have gotten an alternative source of iron ore totally under its control.

  The entire operation might just possibly have been a war winner, but NOT for Britain.

[lordroel]

Nov 12, 2021 9:37:56 GMT stevep said:

Nov 11, 2021 15:50:32 GMT lordroel said:

So i just found out that the Royal Navy’s plan for an attack on Luleå in 1940.

The British Naval Staff History Naval Operations of the Campaign in Norway (1946) set out the aims of the campaign in April to June 1940 as:

• stopping the export of Swedish iron ore from Narvik to Germany
• denying use of the Norwegian coast to the German navy

Yet it makes no mention of Operation Paul, the Royal Navy’s plan to attack the port of Luleå in neutral Sweden.

The British official history The Campaign in Norway (1952), in discussing the strategic context of the campaign, highlights three concerns:

• the perceived dependence of the German war machine on Swedish iron ore;
• British uncertainty whether Russia or Germany (who in 1940 were allies) would drive on from their respective advances in Norway and Finland to Luleå;
• and doubts about the efficacy of Swedish neutrality makes no mention of Operation Paul.

The Campaign in Norway does not mention Operation Paul by name but refers in passing to a plan by Churchill to “bottle up Luleå”.

Captain S. W. Roskill’s official history, War At Sea (1960), is silent.

The subject is dealt with in passing in Peter C. Smith’s book on the Royal Navy’s first fighter-divebomber, the Sea Skua.

The only lengthy treatment of Operation Paul is contained within Thomas MunchPetersen’s The Strategy of the Phoney War (1981), which is regrettably not well-known in
Britain or Sweden.

Would Operation Paul have succeeded?

As they were to show a few weeks later, the British were certainly ruthless enough to carry out Operation Paul. Then, on 3 July 1940, the Royal Navy bombarded the French fleet, at its berths in Mers-el-Kebir, North Africa, to stop it from falling into German hands. Over 1 200 Frenchmen died and a battleship was sunk: France and Britain were not at war and until a week or so before had been allies against the Germans. The bombardment of Mers-el-Kebir poisoned Anglo-French naval relations for half a century and more. Operation Paul was certainly practicable as the Doolittle raid was to show on 18 April 1942 when US Army bombers were launched from the USS Hornet to attack the Japanese mainland and, with insufficient fuel to return to Hornet, flew on to land in China. Operation Paul would also have been effective, as the British were to show during Operation Judgement, when Swordfish torpedo-bombers attacked the Italian fleet at its anchorage in Taranto on the night 11/12 November 1940. At full scale, Operation Paul would have used three carriers and almost four times more aircraft (78) than were used during the Battle of Taranto (21) against a heavily defended Italian harbour, and at reduced scale would have used only a few less aircraft (18 or 15) against an unalerted and poorly defended Swedish port.

The attack on Taranto is widely held to mark the rise of power of naval aviation over the big guns of battleships. According to Admiral Cunningham, “Taranto should be remembered forever as having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon.”48 Taranto is also supposed to have inspired the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Operation Paul had many of the characteristics of Taranto, Pearl Harbour and the Doolittle Raid. Had the attack on Luleå taken place, there is little doubt that it would have succeeded, at whatever cost to the British, and it would deserve entry into the pantheon of naval warfare. However, for all that Anglo-Swedish naval relations are warm today, perhaps, like Anglo-French relations after Mers-el-Kebir, the Luleå raid would have had a lasting effect upon Anglo-Swedish relations. And in 1940 it might have brought Sweden into the war against the Allies

Short Version: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå in 1940

Long Version: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå in 1940

  At times you wonder what the hell Churchill was on!   This is an insane idea.  Even if it disrupted shipments for a while the largest considered force for the attack, whether laying mines or sinking merchant ships would only cause temporary problems while you would lose a large proportion of the force when the FAA was already short of trained aircrew.  Not to mention the political impacts with Sweden effectively forced into the Axis and other neutrals alienated.  Or that with German progress in France, even if the latter had fought on from N Africa Germany would have gotten an alternative source of iron ore totally under its control.

  The entire operation might just possibly have been a war winner, but NOT for Britain.

As the article already mentions, Dunkirk saved Sweden from being attacked.

[DMZ]

Very interesting document.
I knew this operation through this one:
www.hmsglorious.com/
which is somehow conspiratorial and contradictory with yours as Ark Royal was to carry on the operation alone.

It seems fall of France saved Sweden, not Dunkirk as the operation was prepared until June 10 at least.

Two points not mentionned:
- Lorraine iron ore was of lower quality than Swedish one and couldn't be used as easily, it needs a specific process; French blast furnaces was equiped for.
- Germany had made large stocks of Swedish iron during the Poney war and had nearly one year of consumption (I have to check the real quantity) but British were not aware of that.

I intend to talk about Operation Paul in "The Faulke Struggle"

[simon darkshade]

I'd approach the issue with a little bit of skepticism, given the limited sources and examination of it when other proposed operations have been dealt with from here to Doomsday. This would indicate that the degree of seriousness involved was fleeting; Churchill and others came up with a lot of ideas that never saw the light of day.

In all likelihood, it would not have received the go ahead, as the commercial strategy employed with Sweden was ultimately more effective/less self-defeating.

[lordroel]

Nov 12, 2021 11:31:18 GMT DMZ said:

Very interesting document.
I knew this operation through this one:
www.hmsglorious.com/
which is somehow conspiratorial and contradictory with yours as Ark Royal was to carry on the operation alone.

It seems fall of France saved Sweden, not Dunkirk as the operation was prepared until June 10 at least.

Two points not mentionned:
- Lorraine iron ore was of lower quality than Swedish one and couldn't be used as easily, it needs a specific process; French blast furnaces was equiped for.
- Germany had made large stocks of Swedish iron during the Poney war and had nearly one year of consumption (I have to check the real quantity) but British were not aware of that.

I intend to talk about Operation Paul in "The Faulke Struggle"

Found it while searching what the Mowinckel plan was, it seems it involves Sweden occupying Narvik.

[DMZ]

Yes, Swedes would have been interposition force while all other foreign armies but German Allies would have evacuated Norway.

[simon darkshade]

The Mowinckel Plan was naive idealism and faith in neutrality at its finest, which is rather less understandable in 1940 than before the outbreak of the war; I can't say I think a huge deal of Koht's grip on political realities.

[lordroel]

Nov 12, 2021 14:06:38 GMT DMZ said:

Yes, Swedes would have been interposition force while all other foreign armies but German would have evacuated Norway.

Wich i doubt would happen as it would mean Hitler had to back down.

[575]

Nov 12, 2021 12:35:08 GMT simon darkshade said:

I'd approach the issue with a little bit of skepticism, given the limited sources and examination of it when other proposed operations have been dealt with from here to Doomsday. This would indicate that the degree of seriousness involved was fleeting; Churchill and others came up with a lot of ideas that never saw the light of day.

In all likelihood, it would not have received the go ahead, as the commercial strategy employed with Sweden was ultimately more effective/less self-defeating.

Or just shows like Operation Pike that the outlook was still formed by the perceptions since WWI - Germany defeated Russia by 1917 which during the 19. century had everybody dancing to its pipe; France and Britain defeated Germany 1918 and the Poles defeated the Soviets 1921. Who's to oppose us???

[DMZ]

Not sure it was so idealistic, it was the first time, as far as I know, that an interposition force had to be deployed.

For Germans, invading Northern Norway in such a situation would likely lead to a war with Sweden that would have been a disaster for them as the wide country would have necessitated numerous troops to control it and, moreover, the risks of sabotage on iron mines was very high. Better for Germans to keep Swedes out of the war and being their sole iron customer.

For Swedes, being atacked in Norway or in Sweden would have been the same so why not trying to help their neigbors while satisfying Germans in giving them access to Narvik iron export?

Of course we may question the rational behind lots of Hitler's decisions but, on a Swedish point of view, and even for Norwegians if they could trust Germans, it made sense.

I don't understand your point about Koht, are you talking about Halvdan Koht? According to Wikipedia, he was a strong defender of the continuation of the war and rejected German initial demands of capitulation, although he was later in charge of the negotiation of the Mowinckel plan. Or are you refering to his strict neutrality policy before the war and non intervention in Spanish civil war?

[DMZ]

Nov 13, 2021 8:22:22 GMT lordroel said:

Nov 12, 2021 14:06:38 GMT DMZ said:

Yes, Swedes would have been interposition force while all other foreign armies but German would have evacuated Norway.

Wich i doubt would happen as it would mean Hitler had to back down.

Ooops! Allies of course... 

I will correct it.

[simon darkshade]

Nov 13, 2021 8:33:02 GMT DMZ said:

Not sure it was so idealistic, it was the first time, as far as I know, that an interposition force had to be deployed.

For Germans, invading Northern Norway in such a situation would likely lead to a war with Sweden that would have been a disaster for them as the wide country would have necessitated numerous troops to control it and, moreover, the risks of sabotage on iron mines was very high. Better for Germans to keep Swedes out of the war and being their sole iron customer.

For Swedes, being atacked in Norway or in Sweden would have been the same so why not trying to help their neigbors while satisfying Germans in giving them access to Narvik iron export?

Of course we may question the rational behind lots of Hitler's decisions but, on a Swedish point of view, and even for Norwegians if they could trust Germans, it made sense.

I don't understand your point about Koht, are you talking about Halvdan Koht? According to Wikipedia, he was a strong defender of the continuation of the war and rejected German initial demands of capitulation, although he was later in charge of the negotiation of the Mowinckel plan. Or are you refering to his strict neutrality policy before the war and non intervention in Spanish civil war?

I think it was naive idealism on behalf of the Norwegians that Nazi Germany would accept any proposal they put together with the Swedes. Even if it is temporarily accepted by the Germans, they had proven their word could not be trusted and, once other distractions were out of the way, they were at the mercy of Adolf Hitler’s goodwill and adherence to international law.

In the case of the Swedes, it pushes them towards a potential flashpoint with Germany over a Norwegian government that has seemingly been defeated and driven from its homeland. It is better for their interests to try and work with the Germans to preserve Swedish independence.

Koht’s attachment to neutrality before the war was increasingly obsolescent in the face of changing international events, but my view comes on an appraisal of his views and record as a whole. He did get it right in his actions during the Norwegian campaign and his advocacy for joining Britain if forced into war, but before and afterwards his neutralist idealism was at odds with the real coutse of European politics. Neutrality, far from being a shield, was an invitation to invasion or exploitation.

[simon darkshade]

Nov 13, 2021 8:30:23 GMT 575 said:

Nov 12, 2021 12:35:08 GMT simon darkshade said:

I'd approach the issue with a little bit of skepticism, given the limited sources and examination of it when other proposed operations have been dealt with from here to Doomsday. This would indicate that the degree of seriousness involved was fleeting; Churchill and others came up with a lot of ideas that never saw the light of day.

In all likelihood, it would not have received the go ahead, as the commercial strategy employed with Sweden was ultimately more effective/less self-defeating.

Or just shows like Operation Pike that the outlook was still formed by the perceptions since WWI - Germany defeated Russia by 1917 which during the 19. century had everybody dancing to its pipe; France and Britain defeated Germany 1918 and the Poles defeated the Soviets 1921. Who's to oppose us???

I’d say that is very true of Pike - an operation conceived for the world of 1918/19 with the weapons of 1939. Much had changed. 

[lordroel]

Nov 13, 2021 9:09:12 GMT simon darkshade said:

Nov 13, 2021 8:30:23 GMT 575 said:

Or just shows like Operation Pike that the outlook was still formed by the perceptions since WWI - Germany defeated Russia by 1917 which during the 19. century had everybody dancing to its pipe; France and Britain defeated Germany 1918 and the Poles defeated the Soviets 1921. Who's to oppose us???

I’d say that is very true of Pike - an operation conceived for the world of 1918/19 with the weapons of 1939. Much had changed. 

But preparations where made for a atack against the Soviets in Baku as you can read here: Operation Pike: Anglo-French plan to bomb the Soviet Union

On 31 December 1939, British General Butler went to Turkey to discuss military cooperation with the Turks against the USSR; the use of airfields and seaports by the British in Eastern Turkey was considered. On January 15, 1940, French Foreign Affairs Ministry’s general secretary Leger informed the US Ambassador to France W. Bullitt of Prime Minister Daladier’s suggestion to send a naval force to the Black Sea so that to blockade Soviet communication lines and conduct air raids against oil wells in Baku. “France won’t break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, nor will war be declared. France will destroy the Soviet Union by guns if required,” said Leger. On January 24, 1940, Britain’s Chief of General Staff General Ironside submitted his Memorandum entitled, “The Main Strategy for War” to the War Cabinet. According to his views, the only effective way for Britain to help Finland was attacking Russia from multiple directions; the most important would have been to attack Baku, which was an oil production area so that to cause a national crisis in Russia.

On February 3, 1940, French General Staff issued operational guidelines for General Jenaut, French air force commander in Syria, to start preparations for an aerial attack on Baku, “the outcome of the war will be decided in the Caucasus, not on the Western Front.” On 7 February 1940, the British War Cabinet discussed bombardment of the Soviet oilfields; they opined that “a successful operation could fundamentally disrupt the Soviet economy, inclusive of the agriculture.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff received instructions to draft an appropriate document to that effect. To attack Baku, the British deployed several brand-new Blenheim Mk.IV bomber squadrons to the Middle East.

On March 8, 1940, Britain’s Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a report to the War Cabinet, “The Consequence of Military Operations Against Russia, in 1940”. The document stipulated for three main areas of operations against the Soviet Union: The North (Petsamo, Murmansk, and Archangelsk); The Far East, and The South, the latter one was given top priority. The report emphasized the most vulnerable targets in the Caucasus (Baku, Grozny, and Batumi). The Royal Navy should have been involved in air operations wherefore aircraft carriers would have been committed to bombing the Soviet oil refineries, oil storage facilities, and port installations in Batumi and Baku, in addition to the main attack on the Caucasus and which would have temporarily destroyed the Russian defenses.

PREPARATIONS FOR COUNTERATTACK

The British Air Force conducted a series of reconnaissance flight missions over the Soviet territory. A brand-new US-made Lockheed 12-A aircraft fitted with three high-resolution aerial photo-cameras covering 18.5-km width from 6-km altitude flew its missions from Habbania airfield near Bagdad. On March 30, 1940, Lockheed 12-A made several circles over Baku and nearby oilfields flying at 7-km altitude. After 4 days, they flew another reconnaissance mission over Poti and Batumi oil refineries where the flak artillery fired 34 76-mm rounds but missed the target. A formal protest was lodged with the Turkish Border Guards Commissar by the Soviet Border Guards. Those missions were flown after 12 March 1940, the date when Peace Agreement between Finland and the USSR had been signed. The Soviet spies informed Moscow from Britain about the Allied plans. A “warm welcome” was being prepared for the Allied Air Force in and around Baku. The air defense corps stationed in Baku consisted of 9 flak regiments, each had 100 85-mm and 76-mm guns, 12 37-mm automatic guns, 25 anti-aircraft machine guns, and 30 motor searchlights. Several hundred defensive air force aircraft were deployed to cover Baku. The Soviet Command began their counterattack preparations, in February 1940.

6 long-range bomber aviation regiments total of 350 DB-3 bomber aircraft were deployed: regiments ## 6, 42, and 83 were stationed to operate from the airfields in the Crimea, and another 3 regiments were committed to operating from the airfields around the Sevan Lake, Armenia. Most pilots (except for regiment # 83) flew their combat missions in Finland. In April 1940, the regiment commanders were ordered to prepare for combat missions accordingly. The navigators plotted their flight plans. The bomber crews flew their training sorties taking off from an airfield near Eupatoria to fly along the Bulgarian coast and further on along the Turkish coast towards hypothetical targets in Abkhazia; and then they would fly back home to Eupatoria along the same route. The first group squadrons were assigned to attack their British targets in Larnaka, Nicosia and Famagusta in Cyprus, and the Haifa base in Palestine. The French targets ordered to attack were in Syria. The second group squadrons were ordered to take off from Armenia to fly over Iran towards Iraq. In the vicinity of Baghdad, they were to split to attack their targets in Turkey and British bases in Iraq and Egypt. The Bomber Regiment # 21 was assigned the main mission: two squadrons were ordered to engage the British Navy stationed in Alexandria and another two squadrons were ordered to attack the Port Said targets. One squadron was ordered to bomb the Suez Canal gates in order to paralyze the British shipping. The French and British bases operated under peace-time-conditions throughout the first five months of 1940, and nobody would have thought about a potential enemy aerial attack.