What if: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå (Sweden) in 1940

[575]

Nov 13, 2021 9:07:11 GMT simon darkshade said:

Nov 13, 2021 8:33:02 GMT DMZ said:

Not sure it was so idealistic, it was the first time, as far as I know, that an interposition force had to be deployed.

For Germans, invading Northern Norway in such a situation would likely lead to a war with Sweden that would have been a disaster for them as the wide country would have necessitated numerous troops to control it and, moreover, the risks of sabotage on iron mines was very high. Better for Germans to keep Swedes out of the war and being their sole iron customer.

For Swedes, being atacked in Norway or in Sweden would have been the same so why not trying to help their neigbors while satisfying Germans in giving them access to Narvik iron export?

Of course we may question the rational behind lots of Hitler's decisions but, on a Swedish point of view, and even for Norwegians if they could trust Germans, it made sense.

I don't understand your point about Koht, are you talking about Halvdan Koht? According to Wikipedia, he was a strong defender of the continuation of the war and rejected German initial demands of capitulation, although he was later in charge of the negotiation of the Mowinckel plan. Or are you refering to his strict neutrality policy before the war and non intervention in Spanish civil war?

I think it was naive idealism on behalf of the Norwegians that Nazi Germany would accept any proposal they put together with the Swedes. Even if it is temporarily accepted by the Germans, they had proven their word could not be trusted and, once other distractions were out of the way, they were at the mercy of Adolf Hitler’s goodwill and adherence to international law.

In the case of the Swedes, it pushes them towards a potential flashpoint with Germany over a Norwegian government that has seemingly been defeated and driven from its homeland. It is better for their interests to try and work with the Germans to preserve Swedish independence.

Koht’s attachment to neutrality before the war was increasingly obsolescent in the face of changing international events, but my view comes on an appraisal of his views and record as a whole. He did get it right in his actions during the Norwegian campaign and his advocacy for joining Britain if forced into war, but before and afterwards his neutralist idealism was at odds with the real coutse of European politics. Neutrality, far from being a shield, was an invitation to invasion or exploitation.

Like Koht so his Danish counterparts P. Munch; they were representatives of a small nation without allies and without allies being a possible!

Post war they didn't really know what to do but at least knew some sort of alliance was needed hence the discussions of the Nordic defensive league before joining NATO.

[simon darkshade]

I know about Pike, so there is no need for the information C+P. My point that Pike was based on the obsolete thinking of the USSR and power balance, hence the juxtaposition between 1919 and 1939.

[lordroel]

Nov 13, 2021 9:30:22 GMT simon darkshade said:

I know about Pike, so there is no need for the information C+P. My point that Pike was based on the obsolete thinking of the USSR and power balance, hence the juxtaposition between 1919 and 1939.

As well it seems with the British and plans like attack Sweden.

[simon darkshade]

Pike was far more advanced in planning and preparation than any operation against Sweden by virtue of the timeframe involved.

[miletus12]

Nov 11, 2021 15:50:32 GMT lordroel said:

So i just found out that the Royal Navy’s plan for an attack on Luleå in 1940.

The British Naval Staff History Naval Operations of the Campaign in Norway (1946) set out the aims of the campaign in April to June 1940 as:

• stopping the export of Swedish iron ore from Narvik to Germany
• denying use of the Norwegian coast to the German navy

Yet it makes no mention of Operation Paul, the Royal Navy’s plan to attack the port of Luleå in neutral Sweden.

The British official history The Campaign in Norway (1952), in discussing the strategic context of the campaign, highlights three concerns:

• the perceived dependence of the German war machine on Swedish iron ore;
• British uncertainty whether Russia or Germany (who in 1940 were allies) would drive on from their respective advances in Norway and Finland to Luleå;
• and doubts about the efficacy of Swedish neutrality makes no mention of Operation Paul.

The Campaign in Norway does not mention Operation Paul by name but refers in passing to a plan by Churchill to “bottle up Luleå”.

Captain S. W. Roskill’s official history, War At Sea (1960), is silent.

The subject is dealt with in passing in Peter C. Smith’s book on the Royal Navy’s first fighter-divebomber, the Sea Skua.

The only lengthy treatment of Operation Paul is contained within Thomas MunchPetersen’s The Strategy of the Phoney War (1981), which is regrettably not well-known in
Britain or Sweden.

Would Operation Paul have succeeded?

As they were to show a few weeks later, the British were certainly ruthless enough to carry out Operation Paul. Then, on 3 July 1940, the Royal Navy bombarded the French fleet, at its berths in Mers-el-Kebir, North Africa, to stop it from falling into German hands. Over 1 200 Frenchmen died and a battleship was sunk: France and Britain were not at war and until a week or so before had been allies against the Germans. The bombardment of Mers-el-Kebir poisoned Anglo-French naval relations for half a century and more. Operation Paul was certainly practicable as the Doolittle raid was to show on 18 April 1942 when US Army bombers were launched from the USS Hornet to attack the Japanese mainland and, with insufficient fuel to return to Hornet, flew on to land in China. Operation Paul would also have been effective, as the British were to show during Operation Judgement, when Swordfish torpedo-bombers attacked the Italian fleet at its anchorage in Taranto on the night 11/12 November 1940. At full scale, Operation Paul would have used three carriers and almost four times more aircraft (78) than were used during the Battle of Taranto (21) against a heavily defended Italian harbour, and at reduced scale would have used only a few less aircraft (18 or 15) against an unalerted and poorly defended Swedish port.

The attack on Taranto is widely held to mark the rise of power of naval aviation over the big guns of battleships. According to Admiral Cunningham, “Taranto should be remembered forever as having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon.”48 Taranto is also supposed to have inspired the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Operation Paul had many of the characteristics of Taranto, Pearl Harbour and the Doolittle Raid. Had the attack on Luleå taken place, there is little doubt that it would have succeeded, at whatever cost to the British, and it would deserve entry into the pantheon of naval warfare. However, for all that Anglo-Swedish naval relations are warm today, perhaps, like Anglo-French relations after Mers-el-Kebir, the Luleå raid would have had a lasting effect upon Anglo-Swedish relations. And in 1940 it might have brought Sweden into the war against the Allies

Short Version: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå in 1940

Long Version: Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå in 1940

Minelaying and port bombing with the then existent Fleet Air Arm aircraft (Taranto Raid) was limited to 100 nautical miles effective. The British RAF would have to carry out the raid with medium bombers from ashore in Norway. They were not trained for it and their air staff was not equipped or even capable of planning that kind of complex operation. The Doolittle Raid, as the example, took over 100 days to plan and train crews was laid on by one of the finest pilots / air planners on earth at the time. The aircraft carriers employed, launched twin engine medium bombers that did have the 550 nautical mile range, but the mission was laid on as a one-way suicide mission; with planes and crews practically being written off, although the hope was that the planes could fly on through to China and join Chennault's Flying Tigers near Chongqing. This was a staged two hop event in the "planning".

So was Operation Paul even possible? Frankly, like many a Churchill plan... no.

[TheRomanSlayer]

Would the British even risk Sweden joining the Axis powers in this case? Not sure, given how Axis Sweden would have been helpful to the Allies, but it might have a big effect on the Eastern Front, since Axis Sweden that is fighting alongside Axis Finland would have an effect on the Siege of Leningrad. I think that plan might have backfired on the Allies in the long run, which wouldn't help them at all.

[DMZ]

If we rely on the presented document, plans was ready, reharsal have been carried out and Churchill didn't care of Swedish reaction.

There was no comparison between Operation Paul and Doolittle Raid on Tokyo as Swordfish was embarked mono-engine light bomber fully operational on carriers while B-25 was twin-engine land based medium bombers... So one month of preparation is enought in this case.

It seems to me that Operation Paul was ready to be launched on May 10.

The interdiction of Swedish iron ore exports to Germany was first addressed by the British War Cabinet on Saturday 16 December 1939.

It thereafter dominated British strategic and political policy towards Norway and Sweden.

The Joint Planning Sub Committee (JPSC) of the British Chiefs of Staff agreed that sabotage was the method to be used to halt iron ore exports, but that if sabotage failed, then naval action should be considered.


On 12 May 1940, the Chiefs of Staff gave the JPSC terms of reference to consider “the strategic implications of carrying out Operation Paul in the present conditions”.

On 14 May, Churchill gave instructions for Operation Paul to be put into effect within three weeks.


Winston Churchill, wrote to Ismay on 24 May: “Before Narvik is evacuated, it is essential that the largest possible number of mines should be laid in the approaches to Lulea (sic). Let a plan be prepared for laying mines by flights from aircraft carriers.”

Ismay replied the same day with an advance copy of the JPSC’s revised plan for the attack on Luleå. It was not until the next day, 24 May 1940, that the plan, still in draft, was agreed by the JPSC and forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff for their approval.


Churchill grew impatient about the Norway situation and on 3 June 1940 demanded of Ismay: “Is there any danger of the so-called Mowinkle (sic) plan preventing the planting of mines in the approaches to Lulea (sic)? This operation called Paul is indispensable. Make sure we do not find ourselves prevented by any neutrality agreement.”


The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, was determined to prove that ’Paul’ was possible without land bases.

He told the Chiefs of Staff, also on 5 June, that 60 Swordfish torpedo-bombers had been modified by fitting them with long range tanks. These long-range tanks should in theory have given a range of 600 miles, and six aircraft had taken part in a long range endurance trial, flying 520 miles from Hatston in the Orkney Islands to lay mines in the Stavanger area.


Amongst the political considerations were ”unfavourable reactions in the United States”, but there was no mention of the effect upon Swedish public opinion.


First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound had already given an executive order in the early hours of 8 June, saying that the operation would be carried on a reduced scale using one carrier, Ark Royal, and 18 Swordfish of 810 and 820 Naval Air Squadrons. The written operation order was signed into being on 8 June, though there was no way this could reach Vice Admiral (Air) or Ark Royal as they were at sea off Norway.


9 June, Churchill was adamant: there should be no prior announcement, minelaying should be accompanied by torpedo attacks against iron ore ships, and ”if these attacks resulted in sinking neutral ships, we could express our regret in suitable terms.” Operation Paul was now fully approved. The attack on Luleå is imminent Luleå in neutral Sweden could expect an air raid by aircraft launched from British ships in the Norwegian Sea at any moment.

10 June: Invasion of Benelux...

[miletus12]

Dec 2, 2021 9:24:09 GMT DMZ said:

If we rely on the presented document, plans was ready, reharsal have been carried out and Churchill didn't care of Swedish reaction.

There was no comparison between Operation Paul and Doolittle Raid on Tokyo as Swordfish was embarked mono-engine light bomber fully operational on carriers while B-25 was twin-engine land based medium bombers... So one month of preparation is enought in this case.

It seems to me that Operation Paul was ready to be launched on May 10.

The interdiction of Swedish iron ore exports to Germany was first addressed by the British War Cabinet on Saturday 16 December 1939.

It thereafter dominated British strategic and political policy towards Norway and Sweden.

The Joint Planning Sub Committee (JPSC) of the British Chiefs of Staff agreed that sabotage was the method to be used to halt iron ore exports, but that if sabotage failed, then naval action should be considered.


On 12 May 1940, the Chiefs of Staff gave the JPSC terms of reference to consider “the strategic implications of carrying out Operation Paul in the present conditions”.

On 14 May, Churchill gave instructions for Operation Paul to be put into effect within three weeks.


Winston Churchill, wrote to Ismay on 24 May: “Before Narvik is evacuated, it is essential that the largest possible number of mines should be laid in the approaches to Lulea (sic). Let a plan be prepared for laying mines by flights from aircraft carriers.”

Ismay replied the same day with an advance copy of the JPSC’s revised plan for the attack on Luleå. It was not until the next day, 24 May 1940, that the plan, still in draft, was agreed by the JPSC and forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff for their approval.


Churchill grew impatient about the Norway situation and on 3 June 1940 demanded of Ismay: “Is there any danger of the so-called Mowinkle (sic) plan preventing the planting of mines in the approaches to Lulea (sic)? This operation called Paul is indispensable. Make sure we do not find ourselves prevented by any neutrality agreement.”


The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, was determined to prove that ’Paul’ was possible without land bases.

He told the Chiefs of Staff, also on 5 June, that 60 Swordfish torpedo-bombers had been modified by fitting them with long range tanks. These long-range tanks should in theory have given a range of 600 miles, and six aircraft had taken part in a long range endurance trial, flying 520 miles from Hatston in the Orkney Islands to lay mines in the Stavanger area.


Amongst the political considerations were ”unfavourable reactions in the United States”, but there was no mention of the effect upon Swedish public opinion.


First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound had already given an executive order in the early hours of 8 June, saying that the operation would be carried on a reduced scale using one carrier, Ark Royal, and 18 Swordfish of 810 and 820 Naval Air Squadrons. The written operation order was signed into being on 8 June, though there was no way this could reach Vice Admiral (Air) or Ark Royal as they were at sea off Norway.


9 June, Churchill was adamant: there should be no prior announcement, minelaying should be accompanied by torpedo attacks against iron ore ships, and ”if these attacks resulted in sinking neutral ships, we could express our regret in suitable terms.” Operation Paul was now fully approved. The attack on Luleå is imminent Luleå in neutral Sweden could expect an air raid by aircraft launched from British ships in the Norwegian Sea at any moment.

10 June: Invasion of Benelux...

 

1. Dudley Pound knew as much about naval air power as Gertrude Stein. This was evident in his incompetent deployment of aircraft carriers during the opening phases of the Battle of the Atlantic and of the general operations carried out by the Fleet Air Arm during Operaztion Weserebung, particularly during the first and second battles of Narvik and with the loss of HMS Glorious.



2, The only FAA weapon platform, that was aircraft carrier borne, which was capable of torpedo attack and or minelaying at the time was the Fairey Swordfish.



Now what could that plane actually do?


a. Its range, burdened, was about 840 kilometers or 450 nautical miles.

b. Its service ceiling with a torpedo was about 2,500 meters or 8,200 feet.

c. The distance between launch points off the Norwegian coast and Lulea was about 300 to 350 nautical miles.

d. The attack radius of a Swordfish with bombs or torpedoes is optimally 100 nautical miles, based on a 5.5 hour cruise endurance of 100 knots. It takes time to climb, form up and head out as a strike package. When Lumley Lyster launched off Taranto, he was about 100 nautical miles from the seaport.   

d. The route through the Scandinavian mountain range is wind current treacherous and requires an absolute safe altitude to clear the peaks of 2,500 meters or about 8,000 feet. 

3. Based on operating weapon platform characteristics and what was the physical requirements to reach the target, not even a KATE could pull Operation Paul off, and that was the longest ranged torpedo bomber launched from an aircraft carrier in existence at the time.

See map.



The launch points would be about 100 km southwest of Bode, Norway. Expect a dogleg navigation check point along Jokkmokk and then an attack vector following the valley down from Boden to Lulea. It is suicide as an air op.

  

 

[DMZ]

Dec 2, 2021 11:57:06 GMT miletus12 said:

1. Dudley Pound knew as much about naval air power as Gertrude Stein. This was evident in his incompetent deployment of aircraft carriers during the opening phases of the Battle of the Atlantic and of the general operations carried out by the Fleet Air Arm during Operaztion Weserebung, particularly during the first and second battles of Narvik and with the loss of HMS Glorious.



2, The only FAA weapon platform, that was aircraft carrier borne, which was capable of torpedo attack and or minelaying at the time was the Fairey Swordfish.



Now what could that plane actually do?


a. Its range, burdened, was about 840 kilometers or 450 nautical miles.

b. Its service ceiling with a torpedo was about 2,500 meters or 8,200 feet.

c. The distance between launch points off the Norwegian coast and Lulea was about 300 to 350 nautical miles.

d. The attack radius of a Swordfish with bombs or torpedoes is optimally 100 nautical miles, based on a 5.5 hour cruise endurance of 100 knots. It takes time to climb, form up and head out as a strike package. When Lumley Lyster launched off Taranto, he was about 100 nautical miles from the seaport.   

d. The route through the Scandinavian mountain range is wind current treacherous and requires an absolute safe altitude to clear the peaks of 2,500 meters or about 8,000 feet. 

3. Based on operating weapon platform characteristics and what was the physical requirements to reach the target, not even a KATE could pull Operation Paul off, and that was the longest ranged torpedo bomber launched from an aircraft carrier in existence at the time.

See map.

(...)

The launch points would be about 100 km southwest of Bode, Norway. Expect a dogleg navigation check point along Jokkmokk and then an attack vector following the valley down from Boden to Lulea. It is suicide as an air op.

  

 

1. The operational plan have been issued by the Joint Planning Sub Committee 5JPSC), not Dudley Pound.

2.
a. c. & d. The Swordfish to be used in Operation Paul have been modified with extra tanks and tested from Orkney to Stavanger for a similar operation (500 km on Google Map). Only two planes failed to return.

Due to lubricant limitation, it has been decided that the operation will be launched at a maximum distance of 250 miles, 460 km (I assume nautical miles as it was FAA bombers).

The entrance of Vestfjord (in the middle) is 440 km from Luleå. So within range.

b. & d. (second) On a direct flight from Bodo to Luleå, you have no peak higher than 1,400 m and you can follow the valleys at a maximum altitude of 800 m. So far below service ceiling fully loaded.

3. No need to a Kate...

And one way operation ending in Finland have been envisaged.

[lordroel]

Dec 2, 2021 18:04:19 GMT DMZ said:

And one way operation ending in Finland have been envisaged.

Finland, they would not be pleased that the United kingdom had bombed Sweden.

[miletus12]

Dec 2, 2021 18:04:19 GMT DMZ said:

Dec 2, 2021 11:57:06 GMT miletus12 said:

1. Dudley Pound knew as much about naval air power as Gertrude Stein. This was evident in his incompetent deployment of aircraft carriers during the opening phases of the Battle of the Atlantic and of the general operations carried out by the Fleet Air Arm during Operaztion Weserebung, particularly during the first and second battles of Narvik and with the loss of HMS Glorious.



2, The only FAA weapon platform, that was aircraft carrier borne, which was capable of torpedo attack and or minelaying at the time was the Fairey Swordfish.



Now what could that plane actually do?


a. Its range, burdened, was about 840 kilometers or 450 nautical miles.

b. Its service ceiling with a torpedo was about 2,500 meters or 8,200 feet.

c. The distance between launch points off the Norwegian coast and Lulea was about 300 to 350 nautical miles.

d. The attack radius of a Swordfish with bombs or torpedoes is optimally 100 nautical miles, based on a 5.5 hour cruise endurance of 100 knots. It takes time to climb, form up and head out as a strike package. When Lumley Lyster launched off Taranto, he was about 100 nautical miles from the seaport.   

d. The route through the Scandinavian mountain range is wind current treacherous and requires an absolute safe altitude to clear the peaks of 2,500 meters or about 8,000 feet. 

3. Based on operating weapon platform characteristics and what was the physical requirements to reach the target, not even a KATE could pull Operation Paul off, and that was the longest ranged torpedo bomber launched from an aircraft carrier in existence at the time.

See map.

(...)

The launch points would be about 100 km southwest of Bode, Norway. Expect a dogleg navigation check point along Jokkmokk and then an attack vector following the valley down from Boden to Lulea. It is suicide as an air op.

  

 

1. The operational plan have been issued by the Joint Planning Sub Committee 5JPSC), not Dudley Pound.

2.
a. c. & d. The Swordfish to be used in Operation Paul have been modified with extra tanks and tested from Orkney to Stavanger for a similar operation (500 km on Google Map). Only two planes failed to return.

Due to lubricant limitation, it has been decided that the operation will be launched at a maximum distance of 250 miles, 460 km (I assume nautical miles as it was FAA bombers).

The entrance of Vestfjord (in the middle) is 440 km from Luleå. So within range.

b. & d. (second) On a direct flight from Bodo to Luleå, you have no peak higher than 1,400 m and you can follow the valleys at a maximum altitude of 800 m. So far below service ceiling fully loaded.

3. No need to a Kate...

And one way operation ending in Finland have been envisaged.
   

1. Respectfully those staffers worked for the DCNS at the time, a protege of Dudley Pound, one Tom Phillips of Force Z fame who was even more aircraft carrier incompetent than the CNS if possible. They all worked for Pound and for Churchill.

2. I read the Westfjord to Lulea as ~ 400 nautical miles or 740 km, not 440 km from the launch points as indicated off Lefoten. That is a bathtub constricted seaway. One does not put aircraft carriers in a kill box.

3. One has maybe three valleys or passes that low? One still has wind currents and weather, and I suspect that both require as much altitude as possible.

4. Finland was hostile territory.


5. Orkney Islands to Stavanger is about 295 nm or 540 km.

6. Fuel tanks to reach that far add approximately 200 gallons or 1300 pounds to the fuel load of a big underpowered plane like the Swordfish. One will not be carrying a torpedo at all.

7. The Kate was a much better more survivable bird than a Swordfish. For that matter, so was a Devastator. and that bird was a flying deathtrap. I would not attempt Op-Paul with even an Albacore and that bird was a much better aircraft than a Swordfish or a Kate or the Devastator. 

[lordroel]

Dec 2, 2021 18:55:23 GMT miletus12 said:

4. Finland was hostile territory.

For Sweden ore the United Kingdom.

[DMZ]

Dec 2, 2021 18:55:23 GMT miletus12 said:

1. Respectfully those staffers worked for the DCNS at the time, a protege of Dudley Pound, one Tom Phillips of Force Z fame who was even more aircraft carrier incompetent than the CNS if possible. They all worked for Pound and for Churchill.

2. I read the Westfjord to Lulea as ~ 400 nautical miles or 740 km, not 440 km from the launch points as indicated off Lefoten. That is a bathtub constricted seaway. One does not put aircraft carriers in a kill box.

3. One has maybe three valleys or passes that low? One still has wind currents and weather, and I suspect that both require as much altitude as possible.

4. Finland was hostile territory.


5. Orkney Islands to Stavanger is about 295 nm or 540 km.

6. Fuel tanks to reach that far add approximately 200 gallons or 1300 pounds to the fuel load of a big underpowered plane like the Swordfish. One will not be carrying a torpedo at all.

7. The Kate was a much better more survivable bird than a Swordfish. For that matter, so was a Devastator. and that bird was a flying deathtrap. I would not attempt Op-Paul with even an Albacore and that bird was a much better aircraft than a Swordfish or a Kate or the Devastator. 

1. Anyway this topic is about the possibility to launching an attack to Luleå and its outcome. The plan have to be evaluated for itself, not for its designers even if it's important to know the background.

2. Bodo - Lulea 400 km. Vestfjord - Lulea 440 km. Off Lofoten (20 nautical miles off) - Lulea 500 km. Check on Google Map.

Risks to launch an attack so close to the German airfields have been clearly mentionned in the document.

3. Maximum peak altitude 1,400 m, all other summits between 1,000 and 1,200 m. Flying at 1,500 to 2,000 m is more than enought to avoid problems.

4. Fighters and pilots would have been interned in Finland, yes. It is mentionned in the document.

5. Hatston in the Orkney Islands to Stavanger harbour is exactly 500 km (Google Map here again).

6. Swordfish was not to carry torpedo but mine. The test on Stavanger was succesfully done without fuel shortage.

7. OK, so what? Should the decision be taken, it would have been proceed on the operation whatever the losses.

I fully agree with you that this operation would have leaded to numerous cassualties and political issues with Scandinavian coutries and USA but it was not the only nor the first time Churchill toke such a decision...

[miletus12]

Dec 2, 2021 21:44:23 GMT DMZ said:

Dec 2, 2021 18:55:23 GMT miletus12 said:

1. Respectfully those staffers worked for the DCNS at the time, a protege of Dudley Pound, one Tom Phillips of Force Z fame who was even more aircraft carrier incompetent than the CNS if possible. They all worked for Pound and for Churchill.

2. I read the Westfjord to Lulea as ~ 400 nautical miles or 740 km, not 440 km from the launch points as indicated off Lefoten. That is a bathtub constricted seaway. One does not put aircraft carriers in a kill box.

3. One has maybe three valleys or passes that low? One still has wind currents and weather, and I suspect that both require as much altitude as possible.

4. Finland was hostile territory.


5. Orkney Islands to Stavanger is about 295 nm or 540 km.

6. Fuel tanks to reach that far add approximately 200 gallons or 1300 pounds to the fuel load of a big underpowered plane like the Swordfish. One will not be carrying a torpedo at all.

7. The Kate was a much better more survivable bird than a Swordfish. For that matter, so was a Devastator. and that bird was a flying deathtrap. I would not attempt Op-Paul with even an Albacore and that bird was a much better aircraft than a Swordfish or a Kate or the Devastator. 

1. Anyway this topic is about the possibility to launching an attack to Luleå and its outcome. The plan have to be evaluated for itself, not for its designers even if it's important to know the background.

2. Bodo - Lulea 400 km. Vestfjord - Lulea 440 km. Off Lofoten (20 nautical miles off) - Lulea 500 km. Check on Google Map.

Risks to launch an attack so close to the German airfields have been clearly mentionned in the document.

3. Maximum peak altitude 1,400 m, all other summits between 1,000 and 1,200 m. Flying at 1,500 to 2,000 m is more than enought to avoid problems.

4. Fighters and pilots would have been interned in Finland, yes. It is mentionned in the document.

5. Hatston in the Orkney Islands to Stavanger harbour is exactly 500 km (Google Map here again).

6. Swordfish was not to carry torpedo but mine. The test on Stavanger was succesfully done without fuel shortage.

7. OK, so what? Should the decision be taken, it would have been proceed on the operation whatever the losses.

I fully agree with you that this operation would have leaded to numerous cassualties and political issues with Scandinavian coutries and USA but it was not the only nor the first time Churchill toke such a decision...

1. This is the planning assumption with which one approaches a desired outcome. 

2. 290 nautical miles beeline Bodo to Lulea. Out of range. Please note..; out of range. And one cannot fly beeline. Also Lefoten is the actual geo-point where a Yankee Option could be mounted due to the need for an aircraft carrier to speed run WEST 30 minutes to fly off heavily laden bombers. This is one of those technical details that battleship men like Pound or Phillips did not understand or sociopaths like D'Orly Hughes (submariner) could not conceive. To get a Swordfish package aloft one needed wind over deck of 20 knots or better and time. That means a half hour running away from Lulea or 37 km, or 20 nautical miles added to the distance where one assumes Yankee Option occurs. One might also want fleet maneuver room for submarine and torpedo boat defense of at least 50 to 100 km offshore in addition to the distance specified above.     

3. Given the time of year? Respectfully disagree. I would not fly Appalachia in March with similar named conditions at less than 2,500 meters. 

4. Loss of planes and aircrew. Operation Paul, it must be stated, to shut down Lulea, has to be a repetitive operation. The port damage of a prospective 18 plane one way sortie would be cleared as fast as the Italians cleared Taranto or the Americans cleared Pearl Harbor for service. Mere days. This would have to be more like Charleston, South Carolina with repetitive mining that would shut ship channel access down for up to six months.  Incidentally that last effort was a German submarine operation and was extremely costly for both sides. 
 
5. Again out of range.

6. Low payload. One mine of nominally 300 kg? Stavanger might have been proof of so-called fly-out, but was hardly realistic to the expected flight profile. 

7. If nothing reaches the objective, then the operation falls into the category of "proposed" but not possible. One looks at the proposal and then one looks at why it never happened. 

8. Like Churchill's idea of feeding refitted R class battleships into the Baltic to obstruct Swedish iron ore trade, one classifies Operation Paul into the realm of fantasy and sheer imagination. The Doolittle Raid and the Lae Salamauna Raids and Taranto were extremely high risk operations laid on by professionals who knew exactly what the aircraft carrier limits and planes' expected performances were and one notes, that each operation was meticulously planned to the last knot, the last ounce and in some cases were refined over years (as in the case of Lyster, about three years of planning for Taranto.).

Even Pearl Harbor was a year long Japanese effort with final ordnance mods and flight dress rehearsals against the simulated target set up by the IJN, requiring 70 days of hard work and dry runs.   

[DMZ]

miletus12,

2. & 5. Sorry, did you measure distances on Google Map? Bodo - Lulea is definitly 400 km, 215 nautical miles, I checked several times.

And running West half an hour at 20 knots are 10 nautical miles, not 20. Plus Værøy wind statistics show mainly northern or southern wind.
www.windfinder.com/windstatistics/vaeroy-heliport_rossnesvagen

Dec 3, 2021 2:07:01 GMT miletus12 said:

One might also want fleet maneuver room for submarine and torpedo boat defense of at least 50 to 100 km offshore in addition to the distance specified above. 

Fleet entered several time in Vestfjord until Narvik to support terrestrial operations.

3. June is the quietest month in north Norway but OK, 2,500 m, within ceiling.

Dec 3, 2021 2:07:01 GMT miletus12 said:

4. Loss of planes and aircrew. Operation Paul, it must be stated, to shut down Lulea, has to be a repetitive operation.

Agree. This operation had no future.

6. Do you mean Stavanger raid didn't happen or was a failure?

7. Loosing all planes in failing to come back to the carriers doesn't mean the raid is a failure. The two Swordfish lost in Stavanger raid were on the way back.

8. Operation Catherine was one of the maddest ideas of Churchill...

But 70 days from the idea to execution for Pearl Harbour raid, including torpedoes modifications for shallow waters and at extrem range both for fleet and planes, was much more an achievment than Operation Paul setting. And Taranto raid was imagined before the war but it doesn't mean it was continuously prepared throughout this period.