How many Sixes does Adolf Nazi have to Roll?

[stevep]

Nov 16, 2024 23:25:10 GMT Max Sinister said:

Nov 6, 2024 16:28:02 GMT stevep said:

  Bit short of time as a multi-player gaming session shortly but some quick responses.

a)  Don't forget that with the air force its got a much longer tail than the ground units.  There's all those ground crew along with people in supply, administration and the like for each aircraft which even for the B-17's when they become available with dwarf the aircrew.

(With the rest of your post I agree.)

We just have to avoid the mistake of counting the tail twice, so to speak. If we stated "3,000 planes with 15,000 men fighting will need 375,000 as a tail. Of the 3 million men in the US Army in total, 700,000 do the fighting. 700,000 minus 375,000 makes...", that'd be this mistake.

But I definitely have to think about the war in the air. So far, I haven't given it much thought. Until the war in the East ends, it'll be pretty much the same as IOTL anyway.

The WAllies made very many attacks on the German sub bases in W France - if the Luftwaffe is back, and the Germans will build fewer panzers and more planes (which goes quicker than building subs...), things will change. And it won't be pretty. But I'll have to work this out.

After reading Timothy Mulligan, I had some more thoughts:

* As usual in Nazi Germany, developments of new weapons were very secret. That's why Dönitz only learned of improvements which'd have been good for his subs too only when it was too late. (Hard to change, though.)

* Something important about Enigma: It didn't just help the Allies to find subs more easily. Dönitz sent suggestions how to cope with new Allied tactics to his subs per radio... encrypted with guess what. So this'd change too if Enigma was still safe.

  Well if the allies are committing more bombers to the U boat bases in France that would reduce allied losses compared to if they were trying to attack deep into Germany as its a much shorter distance, with relatively little over enemy controlled territory and more in range of escort craft.  Still quite possibly higher losses than OTL strategic campaigns into Germany if the Luftwaffe opposing raids are that much stronger. 

  This would probably be especially the case for the Americans who are flying by day as its easier for a generic fighter pilot and aircraft to intercept them than night time attacks by BC.

[Max Sinister]

The Zaunkönig/GNAT came after mid-1943 IOTL, but its predecessor T IV "Falke" might come soon enough. Since Dönitz will have been Kriegsmarine head for two years, it is possible that research might be accelerated... if it depended solely on the money, of course...

About the influence of German planes returning from the East: In 1941, the Luftwaffe had five Luftflotten. (No. 6, 10, "Reich" came later.) Three of those, plus a bit of no. 5 were used in Barbarossa. One (plus the bit) may stay in the East, another one might go to North Africa/the Near East, but the third one would certainly go to France. So the WAllies would face, depending on the place, 50-100% more German planes from the very beginning. Not to mention those additional planes the "Reich" can build after B-L 2.

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Now to what I took from Dönitz' bio.

* Only the head of the KM had a regular connection to the "Reich"'s leadership. Hence, Dönitz rising to the position earlier would help a lot. IOTL, until that happened, many of his suggestions were refuted. As he claimed, he met Hess for the first time in 1940, Göring in 1941, Himmler in 1943.
* Until 1943, the KM didn't even get 5% of the available steel! Really makes you wonder...
* The Torpedo-Versuchsanstalt which had created those infamous non-working magnet torpedoes was responsible for everything - inventing it, contructing it, testing it, and evaluating. There seems to be some mistake...
* The Battle of the Atlantic Committee/Anti-U-Boat-Committee is still pretty unknown, despite Churchill being its head.
* Pre-war, there had been the idea to make Friedeburg Dönitz' successor on April 1st (no joke) in 1940, and send him to East Asia.
* Dönitz didn't like his subs being used for tasks/places of less importance: Weather reports for the Atlantic, fighting in the Baltic, the Polar Sea, later the Med...
* Raeder didn't know of Barbarossa when he suggested his Mediterranean strategy.
* In March 1943, before the turn came, some Brits actually considered giving up the convoy system. (It's true that organizing it cost them one third of their tonnage, effectively.)
* When the US joined the war, the German crews cut down their (little) comfort even more, to be able to stow more fuel on the subs.
* He claims his subs missed attacking the ships for Torch because they were busy with SL 125.
* He didn't get along with Canaris and thought he had failed.
* When Admiral Horton took over, the "chessplaying" (he thinks I'll do this, so I'll do that instead) became more difficult.
* Until the end of 1942, the "Reich" leadership thought they had to win the war on land.
* Did FDR and Churchill only start to see the subs as enemy no. 1 since Casablanca?
* Only in February 1943, Dönitz had success when he wanted wharf laborers to be exempt to be drafted by the Heer.
* He's against the men of July 20th. Bah.