Washington Naval Treaty 2.0

[miletus12]

Jul 6, 2023 1:57:06 GMT miletus12 said:

International Journal of Naval History, October 2002 Volume 1 Number 2 Building a Doctrine: U. S. Naval Tactics and Battle Plans in the Interwar Period Trent Hone, Senior Associate, Rubicon Technologies

And so we now will take a look at the mistakes the USN (and maybe some other navies) made as a result of the Washington Naval Treaty. 
 
As a hint: the fleet problems, in the real history, were structured to teach the fleet the wrong lessons.

Actual fleet maneuver formation used in war circa 1942-1943.  The idiot who came up with that one was Richmond Kelly Turner.



Take an example of a fleet formation that learned RADAR the hard way? 

Continuing with the incoherent lessons learned as illustrated by dysfunctional practice. 



That would be a British example of convoy. PQ-18 was a typical British defeat on the Arctic supply run.

And we will illustrate further how interwar exercises taught the wrong lessons:



The illustration description taken from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of a typical USN 1944 convoy attack shows that the Japanese had learned nothing either about ship dispositions between the wars, either.

The Naval Onion.



The principles of the naval onion or the layered defense was not exactly equivalent to the WWI developed land tactic of defense in depth. It was rather the acknowledgment, or should have been, that the naval problem of survival in a three threat characteristics environment where a surface fleet floated on the boundary layer of a liquid over-capped by a gas, allowed the enemy to swim under the fleet, fly over the fleet and chase that fleet with a surface fleet of his own. Consequently: observation, that was / is detection, acquisition, before track, and engagement was a time distance and vector analysis problem of considerable interest. It would make a great deal of sense to tailor the tactical operations of BLUE along the main axis of expected intrusion into the detection layer, (3) so that specialist BLUE tailored assets could be oriented to meet the type of expected threat along the vector in the next layer (2). In the generic example above, this was the predicted threat distribution ORANGE could mount off Okinawa.  ORANGE wanted to reach (1). BLUE obviously wanted to prevent that situation. 

The rotten thing about the Fleet Problems, was that this exact situation was predicted as ORANGE TEAM began trouncing BLUE TEAM in aircraft carrier and submarine simulated warfare by 1935. Yet, nobody, BLUE, paid enough attention to the need to develop either reconnaissance or assisted mechanical sensor means to that detect and acquire aspect of the problem.  They were blind mechanically, doctrinally, and functionally. .   
         
You might consider one more example:





There were two possible threat axes to the Guadalcanal landings. Northwest from Rabaul was one. Northeast from Truk was the other.  The same exact expletive deleted imbecile who botched the TF62 cruising disposition to CACTUS (Lunga Point at Guadalcanal just east of the Henderson Field where the Americans came ashore.) was that idiot, Richmond Kelly Turner, who failed to unload the transports expeditiously, failed to set up the Tulagi seaplane base on time, failed to establish shore based air reconnaissance to the northwest or to the northeast and who scattered his anti-surface warfare assets about as if he was Horatio Nelson about to refight the Battle of Aboukir Bay.


At least Nelson pulled his scattered ships together and used his frigates properly to ascertain the enemy threat axis.   

The nitwit, Turner, micromanaged to the point where he divided command three ways, called away the officer in actual tactical command, a FUD who looked like a refugee from The Ghost and Misses Muir. 

   

The result was inevitable. By BLUE failing to establish a correct zone (3) asset reconnaissance distribution (His seaplanes and submarines to the northwest and northeast.), and to employ his surface warfare oriented assets properly in zone  (2) (Again northwest.), ORANGE was able to exploit BLUE's blind condition and demolish half of BLUE's available anti-surface warfare assets with paltry hazard to his own forces.  Self-imposed disunity of command and cowardice in battle (Captain Bode of USS Chicago), compounded the dispositional errors Turner made in zone (1).

This collection and collation of imbecility, that was Savo Island, should have been thrashed out in peacetime in the 1930s. Those fleet problems burned up millions of dollars in the 1930s exercises.  Not only should have the lessons earned about how blind the fleet was to enemy surprise, without a strong and ongoing reconnaissance element in zone (3), apparent, but as a result of those fleet problems, officers of dubious quality should have been identified and cashiered for incompetence, as well as effectors tested out and properly validated in "near war conditions".   

=======================================================

The modern USN has returned to the Fleet Problem way of doing things in the mistaken belief that it was the fleet problems that taught it how to fight tactically in WWII. The error is that the fleet problems taught it how to refight Jutland indecisively, as the British already had. The Americans had not learned THE NAVAL ONION, nor had they worked out the human being kinks in their organization, nor had they evaluated themselves honestly in the material condition sense.   

Nobody, human or machine, can predict or prepare perfectly how human beings in the aggregate or launch platforms and effectors will interact at the moment, but we, human beings, can cut down the odds against us significantly enough, that we can make remarkably accurate predictions, over time, if we have good is / was data.   What that means is that we use game theory. This was not formally developed until John von Neuman published his mathematical encyclical in 1944, but as early as 1895, Alfred Thayer Mahan was applying it to solve the "British" problem.  

The point is that you can explain stupidity post-hoc, but cannot justify it pre-hoc, if you can prove that the idiots in charge did know, but failed to do due diligence.  

That is supposed to be the reason we have boards of inquiry and courts-martial. 


     

[miletus12]

A recap of the previous post.


And rest assured, reader, we will discuss that one. 

 

This very simplistic diagram reflects the local application of THE NAVAL ONION 

In a strictly 1930 sense, the BLUE team was capable of radar and sonar (not to scale, but approximate to ratio) sensor superiority over the ORANGE team as represented in the diagram. It must be understood that ORANGE team was limited to optical search for sky and surface threats to his naval surface launch platforms. In functional terms, ORANGE team had the experts who could have produced RADAR and SONAR equivalent to BLUE team or BLACK team. Their fault condition was their technological manufacture base. They lacked the ability to build the necessary MILSPEC electronics.   

ORANGE team did have a recon search advantage in that ORANGE team aircraft generally, class for class and type for type, outranged BLUE team aircraft by 50% time aloft and thus had longer effective search radii in any coverage plan overlays prepared to scan a given volume of air and sea. This advantage in air warfare, did somewhat negate BLUE team's belated and late acquired RADAR advantage in air warfare.

Both teams had SONAR, but did not know how to deploy and use it properly. Significantly, BLUE team never equipped BLUE capital ships with SONAR. BLUE team restricted SONAR to destroyers and escorts and submarines. ORANGE team followed BLACK team's practice and equipped as many capital ships with SONAR as possible for threat warning against enemy submarines and enemy surface ships via surface duct conduit effective out to 2 convergence zones under nominal conditions (About 20 nautical miles, if the sea states were favorable. M.). 

SONAR for ORANGE team was a threat detector and not applied as BLACK team did to attack contacts (Denmark Strait).

It is significant that RED team, through enforced generosity (BLUE team Tizard Mission.) and STUPIDITY (ORANGE team capture of Singapore.), supplied working base model radar technology which BLUE and ORANGE rapidly exploited and surpassed.  

The difference in SONAR was that BLUE team obtained and maintained a unique technological advantage that allowed the abundant and cheap m, manufacture of thousands of effective systems which could be put on anything, or applied as throwaway drone platforms. (Sonobuoys.). 

The difference in RADAR systems was again abundance, in that ORANGE could only manufacture search sets and those in mere hundreds. BLUE was putting the systems out in such abundance that torpedo boats and aircraft and blimps and submarines had powerful search and FIRE CONTROL sets to detect, acquire, track, engage (DATE) enemy platforms.  The four-step kill-chain was a thing by 1943. Significantly, RED team never universally developed this methodology generally, restricting the process to hunting for U-boats and intercepting enemy bombers. You would think that since RED invented the four-step kill-chain as part of their national air defense system, they would have used it offensively, but they did not actually do so. The proof of this error in application can be seen in the continued reliance on searchlight and night flare directed gunnery at Cape Matapan and North Cape, in those naval surface gunnery actions, at Taranto in the night torpedo action, and in North Atlantic U-boat surface gunnery kills.

For the BLUE team, RADAR was an offensive tool for ranging in AAA as well as anti-ship gunnery. In night intercept of enemy air raids, AAA guns relied on radar. As a corollary, SONAR and RADAR for BLUE team submarines were used akin to BLACK team doctrine as a means to steer to contact. It was unique to BLUE team to obtain torpedo solutions through the use of RADAR and SONAR, when optical conditions were substandard.

Such was the importance of a sensor advantage, that BLUE team came to rely on RADAR as a means to stage ambush gun and torpedo actions in bad weather and conditions of reduced visual applicability, in which ORANGE team optical systems, generally superior to BLUE, were rendered null. 

======================================================

In general, the sensor adjunct that extended the depth of situation awareness and provided the possibility of superior information management in a time constrained manner, allowed BLUE to neutralize the following ORANGE advantages:
a. longer ranged aircraft.
b. superior aircraft carrier sortie rates and operating tempos. 
c. superior optical fire control systems.
d. better ASW air cover.
e. superiority of numbers of platforms, 1941-1944. 
f. superior tactical movement speed.
g. superior defensive geographic situation. 

To be BLUNT, the Americans, through 1942 and 1943, built the sensors and learned how to use them in such wise that they could see and hear their enemies before their enemies saw them. This allowed for game theory application of deployment along threat vectors of too few resources: The 1st and 2nd Guadalcanal, plus the Battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands, hundreds of raids from Rabaul, and so many barge battles that not even the United States Navy is sure how many barges they destroyed (The Japanese claim 40,000!)   

The point is...

 


For fleets, and...

 

for individual platforms... very much resembles

 

 
From where do you think the cybersecurity idiots learned THE ONION? 

[miletus12]

So; you have figured this stuff out by 1930? The battleship is a bomb and torpedo magnet, the freighter is about to become the principal objective in the next naval war, and you have your naval staff working on the solutions to finding, orientating and engaging the enemy fleet, because "there will always be a Jutland", and you do not want to screw it up like they did.

================================================================================



We had NO IDEA where they were during most of this chaotic engagement...

================================================================================



Is that American?

Kawanishi H8K "Emily"

The Kawanishi H8K flying boat (Allied code name "Emily") was an all-metal, four-engine, large-size, Type 2 Flying Boat used by the Imperial Japanese Navy and was considered to be the best flying boat of World War II. It was built to replace the Kawanishi H6K and to exceed the performance of the Short S.25 Sunderland and Sikorsky XPBS-1 Patrol Bomber. The Navy specification 13-Shi called for a top speed of 276 mph (444 km/h), a cruising speed of 207 mph (333 km/h) and a maximum range of 5,180 miles (8,336 km). It was ordered in 1938 the same time its predecessor, the Kawanishi H6K, went into service. A total of 167 of the type were built, and it made its inaugural flight in January 1941.1
The H8K had good performance, impressive speed and range, and was well armed and provided armor protection for the crew. Its offensive capability was very effective in anti-submarine campaigns and was the scourge of American submarines during the war.

The cockpit sat high just forward of a cantilever wing and was powered by was powered by four 1,530 hp (1,140 kW) Mitsubishi MK4A Kasei 11 engines. The later version, the H8K2, was powered by four 1,850 hp (1,380 kW) Mitsubishi MK4Q Kasei 22 engines with water injection driving four-blade propellers.
It had eight small unprotected fuel tanks in the wings and six large, partially self-sealing, fuel tanks in the hull. It used a Co2 inert gas system for fuel tank fire protection and had a unique feature that if a hull fuel tank was pierced, the fuel would drain into the bilge and could be pumped back into the undamaged tanks. The fuel capacity was 4,500 gallons (17,040 liters).

The prototype was heavily armed with three 7.7 mm machine guns in the ventral position and each side-hatch. Five 20 mm cannons were provided in the nose, tail, dorsal and waist blisters. Armament on the H8K1 was reduced to two 20 mm cannons in the dorsal and tail turrets and four flexible 7.7 mm machine guns and carried two 800 kg (1,764 lb) torpedoes or sixteen 60 kg (132 lb) bombs or depth charges. The H8K2 carried the same armament as the H8K1, plus two additional 7.7 mm machine guns in either side of the cockpit. Most late production aircraft utilized a Mark VI Air to Surface Vessel radar system for submarine detection and served with first-line units. It was also heavily armored and was considered to be the most difficult Japanese aircraft to shoot down.2

The H8K was involved in a second raid on Pearl Harbor on March 4-5, 1942 and this was the longest distance ever undertaken by a two-plane bombing mission, and the longest bombing sortie ever planned without fighter escort. Two airplanes left Wotje Atoll in the Marshall Islands and were refueled by submarine at the French Frigate Shoals. However, due to cloud cover, the raid did not accomplish any significant damage and there were no American casualties. Another long distance mission had been planned for Midway, but was cancelled after the refueling submarine discovered that the French Frigate Shoals were occupied by American Forces.3

The H8K was used on a wide range of patrol, reconnaissance, bombing, and transport missions throughout the Pacific war. As a troop carrier, it could hold up to 64 soldiers. Only four aircraft survived to the end of the war.

Specifications:
Kawanishi H8K2
Dimensions:
Wing span: ...........................124 ft 8 in (38.00 m)
Length: ..................................92 ft 4 in (28.15 m)
Height: ..................................30 ft 0 in (9.15 m)
Weights:
Empty: ............................40,436 lb (18,380 kg)
Loaded: ...........................53,900 lb (24,500 kg)
Performance:
Maximum Speed: ..................290 mph (465 km/h)
Cruising Speed: ....................184 mph (296 km/h)
Range: ..............................4,440 miles (7,150 km)
Service Ceiling: ................28,740 ft. (8,760 km)
Power plant:
........................................... Four 1,850 hp (1,380 kW) MK4Q Mitsubishi Kasei 22 14-cylinder radial engines.
Armament:
........................................... Five 7.7 mm Type 97 machine guns in fuselage hatches,
........................................... Five 20 mm Type 99 cannons in nose, dorsal, tail and waist positions plus
........................................... Two 800 kg (1,764 lb) torpedoes or two 1,000 kg (2,205 lb) bombs or depth charges.
Radar:
........................................... Mark VI Model 1 ASV radar.
End notes:

1. Rene J. Francillon, Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 308.
2. Ibid. 310.
3. Ibid. 309.

=======================================================

Just how stupid are you, USN?

[miletus12]

Some things never change. What you see here is a rough approximation of this timeline problem for the Japanese, if these three things exist by 1940.

C. → 

B→  
A.→


Those are the P-38 Lightning, the B-26 Marauder and the PBB Sea Ranger respectively, a 600-mile radius fighter-bomber, an 800-mile radius bomber and a 1,500- mile radius amphibious seaplane, each of which could use a 3,000-foot runway and carry a torpedo.

That would have been a smart USN. 

[miletus12]

Have we finished with THE NAVAL ONION?

Not quite.



The basic difference from what we previously discussed as that this is the "onion" using 1920s and 1930s technology against the expected era air threat. That is the naval platform versus the aircraft which attacked it.

This is the part which excites the amateurs, because they think of the application from a "shooter perspective" rather than from the correct perspective. 



Like that amateur... (^^^)

===================================================================

If you were charged with addressing the issue of the airplane at sea, you faced the threats of the level bomber, the dive bomber and the torpedo bomber. The Dive bomber came at the ship from the forward  or aft quarters, the torpedo bomber came from the side (beam attack) from the forward quarters and the level bomber came from any compass bearing point but usually liked to drop in a crossing attack fore to aft or aft to fore. The torpedo bomber drop-released close with a low angle of inclination and very little cross drift in horizontal slue track. The horizontal bomber could arrive at any angle of inclination at its approach in the vertical track-inclination component despite what the incompetent British navy thought, as German bombers attacking at mast height taught them. Dive bombers were the hardest track problem, since they appeared in the aimer's field of view as a slant object with both a high traverse and vertical climb track component. 

Various navies tried to solve for the radically different traverse elevate track requirements for the different aircraft attack profiles, as an AAA gunner / aimer would see it. NONE OF THEM got it right. The closest to solving the matrices were the Americans. They developed an almost universal mechanical tracker that allowed for high, mid and low angle solution on aircraft up to 400 knots crossing component. They were not so good with dive bombers, but they could slaughter torpedo planes and level bombers, provided they could obtain the right flak guns to do it with the correct ammunition. 

They made two major attempts:

a. the 1.1 inch / 70 gun. This was intended low angle and inner defense.
b. the 5 inch / 38 gun. This was intended for high angle and outer defense.
       
Both relied on that universal director

The 5 / 38 proved successful mainly because it was not challenged until the very end of the war by a diving threat that it could not handle. The Japanese, Germans and Italians proved lousy at dive-bombing. Even in the Kamikaze phase or the Fritz X phase, the Axis chose the wrong attack profiles. The Kamikazes came closest to swamping the target track service rates of American warships' AAA.

The 1.1 / 70s failed, mainly because of a supersensitive fuse in the rounds. These were hit to kill guns with impactor shells, rushed into service before trials were complete. The guns were presumably able to perform as intended once shell fuses had been fixed. In this wise, they were not unlike the Japanese 25 mm/60 (1 inch) Type 96 machine gun in function. The problem with either guns in US or Japanese service was the error in lay and track solutions. If you were going to splash a plane inside the inner defense zone hemisphere, you mechanically had to saw the plane or blow it apart, That meant either a machine gun with an absurd rate of fire and high velocity ammunition or something smaller than a 5 inch with a hit to kill medium velocity explosive shell.
   
 

Update that concept. 

[miletus12]

Inaccurate clickbait.

There is a lesson here in how the first type built is first sunk. It is interesting to compare Akagi to the USS Lexington

.

He is still an "amateur".

Or it can be the lesson of complete imbecility and acceptable competence.^1 I refer to the two USS Hornets.

The lessons of Akagi and USS Lexington were mainly design defects, as both ship's crews were decidedly well-trained in damage control. Fitch handled his aircraft carrier in battle much better than the incompetent Nagumo would handle his, but that is not what killed Akagi. It was the lack of shock mounting among the pump stations and piping among the fire main system that rendered Akagi's aft automatic sprinkler system and hose stations inoperative. Add in the draft alley and no hangar cross ventilation, defective fire curtains that jammed in their shutter runners, and aircraft elevators which descended below the hangar into the bilge wells, and you had a floating blowtorch that needed a spark and sustainment fuel to rearrange her into a suitable condition from the American point of view. It helped to doom the ship that the Japanese adopted the incredibly stupid British practice of strike below to refuel and rearm planes in a mostly enclosed hangar. Kaboom, was followed by burn-down. 

USS Lexington was lost through damage control errors similar to those that would kill Taiho, Soryu and eventually Shokaku. Basically, when the piping to the fuel system, not shock mounted, which supplied aviation gas, ruptured; the vapors released created a fuel air explosive that would ignite and engulf the ship. Similar to Akagi, the fire mains failed. End of the USS Lexington.    

^1 You have to work with what incompetencies you find in a Wiki article. It was obviously written by a non-American. The USN design philosophy was exactly like the purported "Japanese design philosophy" which was to pack as many planes into an aircraft carrier as possible. The "Japanese aircraft carrier design philosophy" was to AUTOMATE the process as much as possible, so as to get aircraft into the air as fast as possible, turn them around and cycle aircraft sortie operations. When you get into details about what they wanted to era build, you find the armor plating of magazines, fuel lines, and fire mains you do not find on American aircraft carriers, due to weight and stability issues the Americans refused to ship characteristics compromise about. The Japanese "automation" such as their firefighting systems and takeoff and landon setups was to reduce berthing, manning requirements, speed op tempos, and to make machines do what the Americans cheerfully crammed men into an aircraft carrier to do. 

Now, both navies did not do enough shock testing pre-war to prevent fuel spillage and vaporization of fumes from leaking fuel storage. That was inexperience. The Japanese did not accumulate enough survivor experience, nor did they have enough time to remedy their inbuilt human training, operator process, and engineered design defects in aircraft carriers, so they repeated their mistakes. Same for the British, who taught the Japanese these wrong lessons to begin.   

The curious thing about USS Lexington, which led to the far tougher and error forgiving Yorktowns was a little incident between the wars. She caught fire and was nearly lost due to "fire in the paint locker" human stupidity. The lessons were applied, but still were not enough until POSTWAR, when the still defective Essexes  were rebuilt to a better fire safety standard. During the war, the accepted shortcomings had to be paid for in dead sailors as a "fight and die for the ship" damage control culture was substituted for more sound engineering and preventable safety measures during battle.
        
The USN really believes in the sailor solution to overcome mechanical faults. And to be honest, when compared to foreign practices, it has proven to be the correct solution.          

[miletus12]

By now you should realize I have little use for this "amateur"; since he is stuck in superficialities and does not consider the actual situations and operants in play.

He does get most of the facts approximately correct without understanding the politics involved or the rational for why a navy would do something this incredibly wasteful and stupid.

General characteristics (From Wiki)
Type..............................Large cruiser / Battlecruiser
Displacement
..................................29,771 long tons (30,249 t) (standard)
..................................34,253 long tons (34,803 t) (full load)
Length
.....................................808 ft 6 in (246.43 m) overall[1]
.....................................791 ft 6 in (241.25 m) waterline
Beam..................................91 ft 9.375 in (28.0 m)[1]
Draft.................................27 ft 1 in (8.26 m) (mean)[8] 31 ft 9.25 in (9.68 m) (maximum)[1]
Propulsion
..................................4-shaft General Electric steam turbines, double-reduction gearing, 8 Babcock & Wilcox boilers 150,000 shp (110,000 kW)
Speed.................................33 knots (61 km/h; 38 mph)[9][3][10][6]
Range.............................12,000 nautical miles (22,000 km; 14,000 mi) at 15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph)[1]
Complement.........................1,517–1,799–2,251[8]
Armament
.......................................9 × 12-inch (305 mm)/50 caliber Mark 8 guns[1] (3 × 3)
......................................12 × 5-inch (127 mm)/38 caliber dual-purpose[2] guns[1] (6 × 2)
......................................56 × 40 mm (1.57 in) Bofors (14 × 4)
......................................34 × 20mm Oerlikon (34 × 1)
Armor
...................................Main side belt: 9 in (230 mm) gradually thinning to 5 in (130 mm), sloped at 10 degrees
...................................Armor deck:3.8–4 in (97–102 mm)
...................................Weather (main) deck: 1.4 in (36 mm)
...................................Splinter (third) deck: 0.625 in (15.9 mm)
...................................Barbettes: 11–13 in (280–330 mm)
...................................Turrets: 12.8 in (330 mm) face, 5 in (130 mm) roof, 5.25–6 in (133–152 mm) side and 5.25 in (133 mm) rear.
...................................Conning tower: 10.6 in (270 mm) with 5 in (130 mm) roof
Aircraft carried...................4 × OS2U Kingfisher or SC Seahawk
Aviation facilities................Enclosed hangar located amidships

I pick on these lemons because they are low-hanging fruits. They are easy teaching examples to show why me-tooism in the 1930s was and in our modern era, is a wrong way to approach how a navy should be built. Notice that I wrote a NAVY, not a ship?

Let us look at a ship that cost the near same to build, fuel, victual, man, arm and operate.

General characteristics
Type Fast battleship
Displacement
......................................35,412 long tons (35,980 t) (standard)
......................................44,519 long tons (45,233 t) (1942 full load)
Length
......................................666 ft (203 m) (waterline)
......................................680 ft (207 m) (o/a)
Beam..................................108 ft 2 in (33 m)
Draft..................................36 ft 2 in (11 m)
Installed power
........................................8 × water-tube boilers
..................................130,000 shp (97,000 kW)
Propulsion..............................4 × screws; 4 × geared steam turbines
Speed................................27.5 knots (50.9 km/h; 31.6 mph)
Range..............................15,000 nmi (28,000 km; 17,000 mi) at 15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph)
Complement..........................1,793–2,634
Sensors and processing systems
........................................SC radar
........................................SK radar
........................................SR radar (South Dakota, Indiana and Alabama)
Armament
.........................................3 × triple 16 in (406 mm) guns
........................................16 or 20 × 5 in (127 mm) DP guns
........................................76 × 40 mm (1.6 in) AA guns
........................................67 × single 20 mm (0.8 in) AA guns
Armor
........................................Belt 12.2 in (310 mm)
........................................Bulkheads 11.3 in (287 mm)
........................................Barbettes: 11.3–17.3 in (287–439 mm)
........................................Turrets: 18 in (457 mm)
........................................Conning tower 16 in (406 mm)
........................................Decks 1.5 in (38 mm), 5.75–6.05 in (146–154 mm), 0.63–1 in (16–25 mm)
Aircraft carried........................2 × OS2U Kingfisher floatplanes
Aviation facilities.....................1 × aircraft catapult

These silly things were armed with twice the AAA, had superior radar, armor, better turning circles, a 3x torpedo defense, better fuel economy and cost the same to build, fuel, victual, man, arm and operate as an Alaska. They used up the same amount of raw materials. What was the operating characteristic difference that the Alaska class proponents claimed that justified the Alaskas? The top speed of a South Dakota class was 4 knots slower than was the Scharnhorst class.  As a practical matter, the South Dakotas were as fast as any German, French, British or Japanese modern capital ship in a North Atlantic seaway which was functionally 24-27 knots.    

We need these ships as cruiser killers to chase down enemy commerce raiders.
--ADM King.

King obviously had lost the thread of the plot in 1940 when he said that nonsense.

The Alaskas were a waste of steel.
--ADM Spruance

That was 1943. 

Which of the two men was correct?

The key point to remember about the 1930s was that there was still uncertainty among naval tacticians about whether airplanes could be massed in enough numbers in time to kill ships, provided that a navy could even find an enemy raider and track that lone wolf ship upon the high seas long enough to mass the effectors. The prevailing accepted opinion was that the raider would have to be hunted down by "cruisers" and killed; a la USS Kearsage versus the pirate ship Alabama. The confused admiralties were not thinking clearly, except for the French who understood that chasing raiders was a combination of cruiser convoy escorts, who would meet the raider at the convoy, and hunt for the raider with a force de raid, by being steered onto the enemy raider by one of these things:



Now obviously, ADM Castax, the French naval theoretician had wanted to replace the slow MNS Bearn with a pair of better Joffre Class aircraft carriers.

The Joffre class consisted of a pair of aircraft carriers ordered by the Marine Nationale (French Navy) prior to World War II. The Navy had commissioned an experimental carrier in 1927, but it was slow and obsolete by the mid-1930s. Support for naval aviation in the navy was weak during this time as it had lost control of its aircraft, its training and their development to the new Air Ministry when it formed in 1928 and did not regain full control until 1936. Traditionalists among the naval leadership had begun a battleship building program in the early 1930s to counter German ships that were suitable for commerce raiding and carriers were deemed useful to hunt them down, especially once the Germans began building a carrier of their own in 1936.

Someone thought about a naval problem as a NAVAL problem, instead of a ship versus ship problem. 

=========================================================

So, by 1940, before the first keel member was laid for the badly designed and incompetently conceived Alaskas was laid down; was there sufficient experience in peace and war to negate the futile exercise? Well, Henry Harwood bungled the Battle of the River Plate by 13 December 1939, but still managed to send off Langsdorf and the Graf Spee.  We can safely ascertain that ADM King, that idiot, Stark, and RADM Spruance, each, had the general information about how the British navy could mass cruisers to deal with a raider, provided the raider was obliging enough to show up long enough to massed against. A whole lot of NTB necessary for that evolutiion had to be invoked to force the evolution.^1        

^1 "Not too bright" in the intellectual department.  
 
 Stark, being a glad hander and a gun clubber, a man of no discernible merit, who would critically fail the Republic in those disastrous years when he was CNO, passed and approved the stupidity when he advised Knox and FDR on the 2 ocean Navy Bill. He wanted 6 Alaskas. The bozo reasoning he used to justify the 6 number, was that with the 7 US aircraft carriers existent plus the 3 new ones approved, the USN needed 6 new cruisers to escort the 3 new flattops at the 2 cruisers per flattop rule, the USN used as a baseline.  

Here is a hint. Stark was thinking about this British Navy performance at the time. Never mind that the three idiots responsible for that debacle, Churchill, Pound and the apparently psychotic Guy D’Oyly-Hughes were the actual reason that Scharnhorst and Gniesenau blundered into HMS Glorios. Between them, Pound and Churchill, as they would do with Force Z, sent a wrong and inadequate naval force under the command of a complete idiot to the slaughter on 8 June 1940.

Except, if you were going to spend that kind of money for those reasons, would not 6 South Dakotas make more sense?          

  

[miletus12]

What are we doing on the world ocean?





Ours, we protect. Others, not ours, we sink.  That is the dogma according to Mahan. 

Why?



Seems simple enough. One of the problems with the exercise is that the competitors out there on the world ocean want to do the same thing to us.   

Now, while that is a 2022 traffic distribution map, it is about the same now as it was for conditions in 1930 as to ship borne commerce. As a result, if you were OP-20-K and planning a naval war in 1930, you would be very exercised about the Caribbean Sea and South American northeast coast, the North Atlantic and North Pacific Ocean lanes, somewhat concerned about the choke points at both ends of the Red Sea and very interested in the Cape of Good Hope and the Malacca Straits. It is somewhat shocking how dense the flow around the southern tip of Africa is, but when you consider how screwed up traffic management through the Suez Canal has always when the British mismanaged it, and now the Egyptians, well that is a submarine happy hunting grounds.       

=================================================================

In the 1930s, what do we want to build to accomplish  our very simple goals here?



The whole rational for building a navy from this viewpoint is to tailor the tools to the use / denial of merchant ship traffic upon the world ocean. The starvation of an island nation or the collapse of a continental industrialized nation by denying aforesaid nation's access to raw materials it does not have (Like fertilizer and trace rare earths for Germany for certain steel alloys.), while sustaining that enemy nation's adversary(s) with your trade, does not require showy battles, but it does require patrol, escort of convoys and blockade efforts. 

Battleships do not make a lot of sense by that rational. Cruisers and destroyers, aircraft carriers, mine-layers, and submarines do.     



Do not forget the airplanes...  

[miletus12]

This is why you do not allow landlubbers discuss operations upon the world ocean.

POOR HISTORY AND FAILED PARADIGMS: FLAWED NAVAL STRATEGY AND LEARNING THE WRONG LESSONS FROM A CENTURY OF CONFLICT
R. B. Watts | 02.15.22

This article is part of the National War College’s contribution to the series “Compete and Win: Envisioning a Competitive Strategy for the Twenty-First Century.” The series endeavors to present expert commentary on diverse issues surrounding US competitive strategy and irregular warfare with peer and near-peer competitors in the physical, cyber, and information spaces. The series is part of the Competition in Cyberspace Project (C2P), a joint initiative by the Army Cyber Institute and the Modern War Institute. Read all articles in the series here.

Special thanks to series editors Capt. Maggie Smith, PhD, C2P director, and Dr. Barnett S. Koven.

In 2006 the United States Navy published a startling photograph. The picture clearly showed a Chinese submarine, periscope raised, with the USS Kitty Hawk in the background. That the photo was taken by an antisubmarine helicopter hovering over the submarine was lost in the initial wave of reactions but the point was clear: a new, modern force had arrived, and it posed a direct threat to our primary naval strike power. US naval power and strategy has a rich history that includes epic battles, catastrophic losses, and stalwart traditions. Around the globe, naval forces have long been the power of empires and used to extend a nation’s reach beyond its geographic homeland. At the dawn of the twentieth century, it was not uncommon to hear British and German naval officers toasting with De Tag! (To the Day!) and to clink their raised glasses in the acknowledgement that they would one day meet in a decisive battle at sea. For navalists, a battle between the world’s greatest navies was a certainty.

For the US Navy and other great navies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Mahanian theory predicting a decisive battle at sea between the world’s great powers has dominated strategy discussions. The ruling classes and top theorists became firmly entrenched in an ethos of then-modern conflict that demanded expansion, expected conflict with other great powers, and predicted a great naval battle for command of the sea. According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, eliminating an enemy fleet by capital ships—a navy’s most important ships, typically the largest and leading or primary ships in a naval fleet—in a decisive battle would not only win command of the sea, but would also win the war. Ironically, when war finally came the supposedly decisive naval battle of World War I at Jutland was anything but decisive—Mahan’s theory of naval warfare was instead shown to be decisively misguided.

Of course, history never really repeats itself, but its echoes tend to carry forward into modern times. Most often, history’s echoes ring painfully familiar and today’s great power competition—a thinly disguised reference in US strategic parlance to competition specifically with China—is no exception. But another echo is also starting to ring—namely, the presumption that competition will inevitably lead to war. The fact that China is building a modern navy is viewed by Western analysts with alarm, but not panic. Dark quotations from the “Thucydides Trap” and dire warnings of how China’s militarization of man-made islands will somehow close the South China Sea are frequently predicted to result in any number of global catastrophes. War, it is said, will hinge upon US naval power being able to engage the Chinese navy successfully, to ensure command of the sea and theoretical victory. Many navalists wonder if De Tag! is upon us once again.

Today’s Assumptions

Today our formidable Navy is preparing for battle with gusto, stressing capital ship power—namely, aircraft carriers—to execute Mahanian style battle in an offensive strategy, seeking out and destroying the enemy at sea. But the reason we assume China will engage at sea and play our game is unclear. The foundation upon which modern naval strategy is built is fatally flawed, relying on dubious theory, and selectively listening to the echoes of history. Unlike other naval powers, the United States Navy clings to Mahanian theory as rationale for its force structure and strategy. While going all in on Mahanian theory has enabled an enormously powerful Navy that can travel and strike globally—virtually unopposed—the adherence to Mahanian theory has resulted in a limited record of operational success in the twentieth century. And, crucially, the Mahanian US Navy is particularly unsuited for a projected conflict with China.

Even a neutral observer—a near impossibility in the practical sense—is likely to wonder why the United States continues to rely on outdated theory despite having the ability and capability to update, modernize, and strategize for the modern era. The reason we do so is simple: we want to return to it. We rationalize incorporating dated theory into modern warfare with dubious historical examples and assumptions. The result is a protracted attempt to mold any potential adversary into our desired theoretical vision and the continuation of some bad habits—theorizing war against our ideal enemy instead of the enemy we have, envisioning an enemy that fits a desired vision to match how we want to fight the next war, and developing an understanding of modern conflict that is rooted in a selective instead of wholistic examination of a century of naval conflict.

Poor History: Mahan Vindicated?

Mahanian theory was a poor predictor of events in World War I, but it could be argued that Mahan’s theory was vindicated in World War II. In 1945 the United States Navy stood at the height of its power. Relatively new as a capital ship force—the first modern battleships of the great white fleet had sailed in 1907—the US Navy undertook a massive expansion to prepare for war, both materially and philosophically. Pearl Harbor demonstrated how the battleship had been eclipsed by the aircraft carrier. The Navy immediately adapted—taking what it learned at Pearl Harbor, the Navy grew to thirty fleet carriers by 1945, and added hundreds of smaller ships to fight Japan in a distinctly Mahanian fashion. Ultimately the primary tool of victory in the Pacific was carrier power.

However, as the United States emerged from World War II as a superpower pitted against the now-hostile Soviet Union, Navy admirals took the lessons learned at Pearl Harbor and argued for the continued development of larger “super carriers” to provide the US Navy with a forward-deployed naval strike capability. In its push for bigger and better carriers, the Navy was making a distinctly Mahanian argument supported by the overwhelming victory in the Pacific during World War II. As a military service, the Navy saw its growth as key to its survival as a service—especially as post-war funding became more limited and it was unclear which service would be prioritized for growth in the new bipolar superpower era. Despite hostility from the other services—especially the Air Force, which understood power projection as its singular province—the Navy got what it wanted and aircraft carriers, a capital ship force that could execute Mahanian theory of decisive battle, became the bedrock of the US Navy’s intimidating fleet.

But the lessons taken from World War II and the rationale for a battle fleet of capital ships was a selective one that ignored how World War II was a two-ocean war, and how the war in the Pacific had a markedly different character from the war in the Atlantic. The war in the Atlantic was not a carrier war, but rather one in which the primary threat was the German U-boat, a formidable enemy whose potential success threatened the entire Allied war effort. The Atlantic was a small-boy war of destroyers, escorts, and antisubmarine aircraft, with little Mahanian theory influencing the plan. To defeat the undersea U-boat threat, the Navy relied on a unique combination of defensive measures, intelligence, and small-unit actions. As the Navy set a course for modernization and expansion, it failed to encompass the historical lessons from its World War II Atlantic experience. Instead, the core philosophical ethos focused on capital ships and how carriers were needed to fight a peer at sea. The strategy overlooked the lessons learned from the smaller antisubmarine forces that won in the Atlantic. Ultimately, the problem of future warfare was more complex than the Navy chose to acknowledge.

Failed Paradigms: Creating an Enemy

In the post–World War II era, the United States fell deep into the Cold War, and great power competition was focused on the US relationship with the Soviet Union (and to a lesser extent, China) within the context of containing communism. During this time, the Navy continued to argue that a Mahanian strategy reliant on its capital ships was the best way to accomplish containment and to keep command of the sea. Outside of naval planning circles, few understood the difficulties with, and inherent weaknesses of the Navy’s approach.

Most noticeably, during the Cold War, the US capital ship fleet had no peer opponent. The Soviet Union, although developing as a modern naval power, was not imperial Japan and would never present the same formidable foe at sea. The Soviet surface fleet was small by comparison, and its combat power remained questionable. The poor condition of the Soviet surface ships kept them close to home, and while the Soviets were certainly capable of global deployment, they rarely strayed far in large groups of credible combat power. These facts were ignored by a succession of Navy admirals who were determined to keep the focus on capital ships. The ruse continued into the late 1970s when then-Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt went so far as to testify that the Soviets, as a great power, had surpassed US naval strength. In the final years of the Soviet Union, the myth continued as US government printing offices kept producing slick publications outlining the threat posed by the Soviet surface fleet and how US carriers would defeat them in combat.

The irony is that the Soviet navy did pose a threat at sea, but not in the manner pushed by the US Navy. During the Cold War the Soviets developed a substantial force of nuclear submarines—almost twice the size of the US submarine fleet. Instead of a World War II Pacific-like battle, the Soviet Union’s investment in submarines should have signaled to the US Navy that any future war at sea would be far more like the battles fought in the Atlantic and that carrier power was secondary. Incredibly, naval strategists did not shift to focus on building an antisubmarine force composed of smaller ships and attack submarines. Instead, the Navy continued to identify its carrier fleet as the primary means to defeat the undersea threat despite the lessons learned in World War II in the Atlantic. In the 1980s, the Navy introduced a new Maritime Strategy, which was an aggressive forward deployment to the far north intent on bottling the Soviet surface and submarine power in their bases, while simultaneously conducting strikes against enemy bases in the frozen Kola peninsula. Naturally, such actions would—in theory—provoke the Soviets to sail their weaker force out to sea and engage in battle at sea. In short, De Tag! was back.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent opening of the former Soviet Union showed how the US Navy got its strategic assumptions and paradigms wrong. The Soviet navy was, as some had suggested, intended to operate in defense of the homeland. Ultimately, the Soviets did not consider the US Navy’s strategy of a forward deployment and command of the sea within striking distance of the Soviet homeland—in this case, the frozen Kola peninsula—a relevant threat. The US Navy’s entire strategy and the force structure built to execute it, was mistaken. Which brings us to the present day and China.

Rising from the Ashes: Mahan in the East

Following the photo of the Chinese submarine near the USS Kitty Hawk, China continued to add to its naval power. In 2011, China launched its first aircraft carrier and subsequently built a series of small naval bases on man-made islands off the mainland coast cementing it as a peer naval power capable of threatening US dominance at sea. The Chinese navy is being built for offensive operations in the spirit of Mahan, and it is possible that De Tag! is here again.

Given our history of producing naval strategies based on flawed assumptions and incorrect core beliefs, we should be wary of making similar mistakes with our naval strategy toward China. Assumptions about how the Chinese will employ military force at sea are echoing historical mistakes, including the notion that China is building its navy to engage in an open-sea battle, or that any strike warfare against the Chinese mainland will be decisive, and that capital ship dominance is the sole enabler of US command of the sea.

Currently, US naval strategy emphasizes the concept of “freedom of the seas”—a concept that Mahan would have wholeheartedly endorsed—and is focused on access, or the free flow of ocean-born commerce. However, a strictly military approach to protecting shipping-lane access to enable international trade is woefully dated. Freedom of the seas is an established international norm, codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but the United States has refused to ratify the convention over sovereignty concerns. Therefore, in theory, the United States is using its naval powers to enforce an international treaty it has not even signed. Freedom of the sea is intended to protect merchant ships and trade routes, but the United States is no longer a dominant merchant power. The US strategy is really committing our naval power as a global police force—much as the British Empire did—at significant cost and risk, to protect foreign ships that are already bound by the UN convention. Using our naval power in this manner is becoming increasingly provocative and history shows that wars have started over mishaps and incidents at sea.

If we assume the rhetoric of great power competition is correct and war is inevitable, or at least likely, the Navy is correct to prepare. But blindly continuing its love affair with Mahanian naval theory could be catastrophic. China is not Japan or the Soviets and presents a new, formidable threat. Militarily, the Chinese navy, although modern, is very much a regional force. And despite an aggressive building program, China is not yet an overwhelming threat to US naval power. The presumption that China is seeking Mahanian-style battle despite the given combat power of the US Navy is not credible. To win at sea, the United States must consider the adversary we face, not the adversary we want to face.

Yet we still must consider war with China a possibility and therefore must reinvigorate the debate over how best to employ US naval power and the Navy’s composition. Aircraft carriers, while impressive, are becoming increasingly vulnerable, not less so. The newer threats of hypersonic missiles, targeting from space, and cyber present unique challenges for the US Navy and the loss of a single carrier will have enormous consequences. Additionally, even if the US Navy achieves command of the sea, it may be irrelevant due to modern strike capabilities. History has shown that the ability to strike an adversary’s mainland from sea is not decisive in war—including examples from North Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Additionally, it is important to recognize that in war, an enemy will play its own game, not ours. China understands US naval capabilities, tactics, and theory and to assume otherwise is foolish. However, in open waters, China’s naval power is effectively neutralized by our combat power. China fears isolation and its own lack of access to trade and shipping routes, and with our seaborne allies, it is possible to keep a hostile China in check. Developing a flexible naval force, increasing trade alliances, and signing onto the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are key to any naval strategy to combat China.

The United States has a mighty history of seapower and maintains longstanding traditions that our US Navy bears with pride. But as times change and power shifts, it is critical for the US Navy to avoid clinging to antiquated naval theory to rationalize a fleet that supports a familiar strategy instead of a strategy that will counter modern threats at sea. The question is not if the US Navy should maintain its capabilities to engage in, and decisively win, a battle at sea—which it absolutely should­—but instead, whether the current naval strategy is based on sound assumptions and is focused on modern-day threats and challenges. Whether we will once again see De Tag! is uncertain but clinging to the myth of Mahanian theory and capital ship invincibility is a losing strategy.

Dr. R. B. Watts is a professor of national security strategy at the National War College. He retired from the US Coast guard as a captain after serving twenty-six years on active duty, including six sea tours with both the Navy and the Coast Guard. He holds an advanced degree from the Naval War College in strategic studies, master’s degrees from Old Dominion University in history, American Military University in international naval studies, and the Naval Post Graduate School in homeland security, and a PhD from the Royal Military College of Canada in war studies.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the author is affiliated with, including the National War College, National Defense University, and US government.

Mister Watts has about as much understanding of ADM Mahan as he has the actual operations of seapower during WWI. The "great naval battle for command of the sea" in WWI was the "Battle of the North Atlantic".


As usual, the inept British initially bungled the battle and stubbornly refused to learn quickly that the threat to their nation lay not in the North Sea with the High Seas Fleet, but with the actual blockaders the Germans could employ against the British, the submarine weapon system.   

In the modern example of the Chinese enemy, if Mister Watts would have bothered to actually look at what the American navy does, instead of what he writes, he would notice that the capital ship under urgent construction is the submarine. Obviously it is a misread of history to assume that the United States Navy plans to to refight the aircraft carrier based tactical campaigns of WWII, or rather Mister Watts completely misread what happened, in Mahanic terms. 

To illustrate to the reader, 


You will notice as the United States Navy extended its coverage east, how the U-boat war changed? The U-boat was Germany's blockade weapon, usaed according to the denial paradigm as described by ADM Mahan.

Now look at the Pacific...



US submarine KILLS of Japanese shipping. 



US aircraft carrier operations.

The two elements, the submarine  campaign and the aircraft carrier operations tended to support this:



The USN in the 1930s was not about fighting "the big battle" against Japan. It was about establishing use and denial of the Pacific Ocean.  Belatedly, after the British failed to seal the deal in the Atlantic, it tacked on the Atlantic use / denial mission as well.  

     

[miletus12]

How do you plan a submarine campaign for PLAN ORANGE if you have never fought one before?



You just might take a look at several factors...

Whether from Brisbane or Perth it would take US subs about 2 weeks one way to reach their assigned patrol stations in the Philippine and South China Seas. 



From Pearl Harbor to reach their assigned stations in the East China Sea and off Japan proper would be two weeks one way. US subs had six weeks patrol sortie time available by fuel and victuals.   



Those are transit times for atomic submarines. Multiple 3x-4x for diesel electrics.  

The geography of the Western Pacific Ocean gave the Americans from Pearl Harbor a straight and clear route right at the Japanese ship traffic between Taiwan and Sakhalin. But to get at the rubber, tin and oil, and to starve the Japanese of strategic raw materials, American submarines had to run the Gauntlet of the Indonesian and Philippine Islands. Here were SHALLOW seas where there was no depth to be had and where Japanese sub-chasers and ASW aircraft would be plentiful. They would have an easy ASW war, compared to the Allies in the North Atlantic.  That map, you see reader, indicating where American submarines operated? Each numbered dot is also where a US submarine DIED.

The casualty rate for submariners is traditionally the HIGHEST of any service branch, and THAT is if everything goes exactly right. 20% historically for the United States. It should have been less.     

Expletive deleted.     

 

[miletus12]

Remember that this is an alternate timeline and we are still ~ 1930.

Let us plan effectors?

1. 16-inch/45-caliber Mark 1, 5, & 8 guns
2. 14-inch/50-caliber Mark 4, 6, 7, 11 & B guns
3. 10-inch/40-caliber Mark 3 gun
4. 8-inch/55-caliber Mark 9, 12, & 14–16 guns
5. 8-inch/45-caliber Mark 6 gun
6. 6-inch/54-caliber Mark 12, 14, 15 & 18 guns
7. 6-inch/50-caliber Mark 6 & 8 guns
8. 6-inch/47-caliber Mark 16, 16DP, & 17 guns
9. 5-inch/51-caliber Mark 7–9, 14, & 15 guns
10. 5-inch/50-caliber Mark 5 & 6 guns
11. 5-inch/38-caliber Mark 21, 22, 24, 28–30, 32, 37, & 38 guns
12. 5-inch/25-caliber Mark 10, 11, 13, & 17 guns
13. 4-inch/50-caliber Mark 7–10 guns
14. 3-inch/50-caliber Mark 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 17–22 guns
15. 1.1-inch/75-caliber gun

From a technical standpoint, those were the only viable elements of naval artillery in the real  / atl timeline as of 1930, either existent or programmed for development, that were viable. 

I would probably pare that list down by eliminating the non-treaty compliant 10 inch and the 5 inch and 6-inch guns which were not DP, nor AAA. I would eliminate the 4-inch guns as non-useful as well.

1. 16-inch/45-caliber Mark 1, 5, & 8 guns
2. 14-inch/50-caliber Mark 4, 6, 7, 11 & B guns
3. 8-inch/55-caliber Mark 9, 12, & 14–16 guns
4. 6-inch/47-caliber Mark 16, 16DP, & 17 guns
5. 5-inch/38-caliber Mark 21, 22, 24, 28–30, 32, 37, & 38 guns
6. 5-inch/25-caliber Mark 10, 11, 13, & 17 guns
7. 3-inch/50-caliber Mark 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 17–22 guns
8. 1.1-inch/75-caliber gun

As to the AAA threat, I would have sent out an overseas shopping expedition for guns to cover that key altitude band of 2,500 to 7,000 meters that no one covered well in the 1930s. 

a. Bofors 25 mm Automatic Gun L/64
b. Bofors 40 mm Automatic Gun L/43 
c. Bofors 40 mm Automatic Gun L/60

What about other effectors?

--Mark 7 (Bliss-Leavitt) torpedo
--Mark 8 (Bliss-Leavitt) torpedo
--Mark 9 (Bliss-Leavitt) torpedo
--Mark 10 Torpedo
--Mark 11 Torpedo
--Mark 12 Torpedo
--Mark 13 Torpedo
--Mark 14 Torpedo
--Mark 15 Torpedo

Of that collection of garbage fish, I would hang onto the Bliss Leavitt torpedoes, especially the Mark 8 Bliss Leavitt.   The Mark 13 should have been live fired until it ran hot true and normal. Of all the torpedoes, the one that was most critical was the Mark 14 model. Not only was the testing screwed up, but the expletive deleteds  who designed the thing, gave no thought at all to the fail path analysis in single fault loss of effector before function components. Nor did the idiots consider how essential it was to have an effector that could be mass-produced in a hurry.   

[miletus12]

Going off-topic a little, I ported this one in as a naval geography lesson. Yes, reader, there is such a thing as key terrain features within an ocean.

Jul 17, 2023 13:04:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

Jul 17, 2023 3:34:02 GMT miletus12 said:

If you want to bring British, German and JAPANESE imperialism to a screeching halt in the Pacific, make that key terrain American in 1898.  The Philippine Islands could become a client like Cuba, which would still be disgraceful, but it would not involve the criminality, nor the direct dishonor of imperialist misgoverning.

The blue outlined region by contrast was a more manageable administrative and defense problem. 

Better map.

Interesting idea, miletus12 !

What is the essential part of your proposal - everything within that parallelogram box, or everything within the blue shading?

The parallelogram is vital. The subsequent blue area of domination is the inevitable spillover where outside interlopers would be neutralized as a result; since they have neither the  basing,  nor the logistics to operate in those waters; once  the parallelogram is under positive control. Note that the Japanese, once they had that parallelogram, were extremely difficult to dislodge? It was only due to their sheer naval incompetence that the Americans were able to wrest the region from them.  

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To add into that mapping overlay the factors I suggest that make that naval geography, key terrain; I submit the following criteria.  



When I use the term "dominate" I mean in the strictly Mahanic sense, which is to allow or deny use of the sea /air for transit. It does have a political component, since access is a political decision. However, the right of self-determination within those waters can and should be a guarantee by the naval power that dominates those waters.  The only possible power in that era that would make that decision is an anti-imperialist one. That leaves out the Japanese, Germans and the British. The only ones who begin to qualify as possible respecters of the international law right to self determine, would be the Americans. 

And even the Americans are only defensible in that their historical political behavior actually matches what I described. Every other imperialist colonizer had to be kicked out by force.  Too bad Vietnam spoiled that record. 
  

[miletus12]

The Vital Importance Of Radio Communication In Modern Naval WarfareBy Lieutenant Harry F. Breckel, U. S. N. R. F. 2March 1922 Proceedings Vol. 48/3/229
THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF RADIO COMMUNICATION IN MODERN NAVAL WARFARE

By Lieutenant Harry F. Breckel, U.S.N.R.F. 2

The successful carrying out of modern naval warfare is, in the main, entirely dependent upon the art of radio communication. A broad statement perhaps, but nevertheless, one that the writer feels is justified.

The many lessons handed down to us by careful study of the past wars, serve to emphasize the fact that the successful execution of any strategical plan involving a combatant force spread over a wide area, is dependent on the maintenance of reliable communication between the different units comprising the force. THEREFORE THE NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING A LOYAL, EFFICIENT, RADIO COMMUNICATION SERVICE SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

The successful functioning of a radio communication service is, of course, based on the efficiency and ability of the men at its head, but too much stress cannot be laid on the necessity for having loyal, competent, enlisted personnel conduct the operation of the various radio stations, both ship and shore.

There can be no doubt as to the superiority of American naval radio equipment over that employed by foreign navies and in this regard we need have no concern whatever. The fact that the United States (and particularly the American navy) is farther advanced in this art is largely due to the extensive research work carried out in this country, fostered, to a great extent, by the Navy Department. American inventive ability has also been exercised to the fullest extent by the insistent demand by the navy for radio apparatus of efficient design. The fact that the radio telephone is today a practical device, is largely due to experimental and research work either carried out, or fostered, by the Navy Department. As early as the year 1915 the navy was conducting practical tests with radio telephone equipment, and the writer recalls clearly hearing the human voice transmitted via radio, between an American man o' war and a naval radio shore station, in that year.

There can be no doubt but what the individual responsibility borne by the naval radio operator is far greater than that shared by the enlisted personnel of other branches of the service, for much depends upon his efficient performance of the duties of his rating. Higher officials of the service, such as those in charge of the various bureaus, admirals of fleets or squadrons, commanding officers of the hundreds of vessels comprising the navy and many other officers in important positions, all are more or less dependent on the loyalty and ability of the naval radio operator to efficiently discharge his duties, for in these days of divided forces the successful working of the entire service depends upon perfect coordination between the units comprising it, which end can only be attained through the medium of a thoroughly efficient and reliable communication service.

Innumerable instances could be cited to show where, during the late war, dispatches of extreme if not vital importance, were entrusted to the enlisted radio operator and which, if they had failed to reach their destination, might have caused disaster or delay. The entire convoy system which proved so effective, the safety of the vessels at sea, the rescue of survivors of sunken vessels, the warning of vessels at sea to avoid certain areas, the general broadcasting of important information concerning mined areas, etc., the transmission of important dispatches between Washington and the military commanders in Europe, all depended on the efficient performance of the naval radio communication service, the successful operation of which hinged entirely on the loyalty and efficiency of the personnel actually carrying out the practical working details at the different stations, both ship and shore. These facts all serve to show that THE RELIABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF A NAVAL RADIO COMMUNICATION SERVICE CAN BE NO GREATER THAN THAT OF THE INDIVIDUAL OPERATORS ACTUALLY CARRYING OUT TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION, REGARDLESS OF HOW EFFICIENT THE VARIOUS OFFICERS COMPRISING ITS HEAD MAY BE. It can easily be seen that the necessity for having LOYAL and WELL-TRAINED personnel in this branch of the naval service is of paramount importance.

Above all, it should be realized that inefficiency or disloyalty in a naval radio communication service is a condition which should not be allowed to exist and which, if it did exist, would, under certain conditions, jeopardize an entire fleet. Therefore more than ordinary care should be exercised in selecting its personnel. It should be borne in mind that an inefficient or disloyal radio operator is in position to work untold harm, and in the case of the disloyal man it might be stated that there are ways in which he could accomplish his end and still avoid suspicion or detection. By way of example let us assume that a state of war exists. An admiral of a fleet has received a supposedly authentic report from some reliable source to the effect that an enemy force of a certain strength has proceeded to carry out an attack on a certain city on the coast. He has reached a decision that it will be necessary to intercept the enemy force and engage it with a view to destroying same and he, therefore, has dispatched a force of similar character but of superior strength to do so. His force has proceeded to carry out his orders and is now several hundred miles at sea. Suddenly he receives another report to the effect that the enemy force is far stronger than the first report stated. The situation is now such that it is too late to increase the strength of his force to match that of the enemy's and that in all probability his force would be annihilated if allowed to engage in battle. There is, however, still available time in which he can recall his force. What does he do? The only way that he can get word to his force in time is by means of the radio, therefore he issues orders to his communication officer to transmit a dispatch telling the commanding officer of the force in question to proceed to such and such a rendezvous where he will receive reinforcements, after which he can proceed to engage the enemy, if this proceeding be possible, with some degree of assurance that the operation will be successful. Now after coding the dispatch for transmission the communication officer turns same over to the radio operator for transmission. It is more than likely that the radio operator is aware that a certain force has been dispatched, for in the majority of cases he will have been notified to keep a sharp lookout for radio signals from it. Also it may be possible that the enemy force has been using his radio and perhaps, due to increasing signal strength, etc., the radio operator is sure that it is headed toward, or getting closer to, his station. Summing up the general situation he feels sure that an enemy force is moving to attack somewhere, but where of course he cannot say. With the aid of the radio compass, however, it is possible that he may have determined that the enemy was proceeding in a certain direction and that in all probability the force which left some hours previous was dispatched for the purpose of intercepting him. If this operator should happen to be disloyal and should garble the message in transmission by failing to properly space his code characters, or leave out say the first code group WHICH IN PRACTICALLY ALL CODES IS THE KEY TO THE CIPHER USED, or fail to use sufficient power to "raise" the operator on watch at the station being called or in some other way cause the dispatch to fail to reach its destination entirely, the force which it was intended to warn might unwittingly engage an enemy of far superior strength and go down in defeat. It might be argued that the force would have out a scouting line to further insure protection. Granted, but as a rule we are also dependent on the radio for the receipt of information from our scouting line and a similar condition of disloyalty or inefficiency might exist here also. It might also happen that an enemy submarine would be successful in disposing of the only scout in a position to sight the enemy, long before visible contact had been made and many other conditions could arise, whereby it would be impossible for the force to evade an engagement. Now let us assume that the operator transmitting was a loyal, efficient man and that the message was sent in proper form. It may be that the receiving operator is not loyal or is inefficient, in which case the same situation might arise. In my mind too much importance cannot be attached to having tried and true operators in the naval communication service, for much depends upon their reliable performance of duty. There can be no doubt but that the successful accomplishment of our ends during the late war was largely due to the use we made of the art of radio and a little foresight cannot fail to convey the fact that we will be even more dependent on radio in any future conflict. With the addition of air craft to our fleets for spotting, scouting, offensive or defensive work; with seagoing submarines attached to the fleet equipped so that radio communication with them is possible even though they are submerged; with possibilities of employing radio controlled torpedoes or battleships far from being a vague supposition; with practical navigation of aircraft and vessels by radio not far off, it cannot but be apparent that the art of radio is becoming more and more every day a vital factor in carrying out naval warfare.

In short, so much will be required of the naval communication service in any future war that a great deal of thought should be given toward the careful training of the communication officers and the enlisted operators in direct supervision of the operation details at the different stations. The officers at the head of the naval communication service will no doubt, as they are now, be officers of the line who have had broad experience in all matters naval and who will fully realize the importance to the service of an efficient communication system. Therefore the main problem resolves itself into one of having communication officers and enlisted personnel entirely capable of carrying out the details connected with the organization. During the period of time that the writer served with the Atlantic fleet as a radio operator it was customary to detail officers who had but recently graduated from the Academy, as communication officers on board the different vessels. In some cases these officers had a fair knowledge of matters radio but in the majority of cases they knew little or nothing about it for the reason that they did not study the art sufficiently to enable them to efficiently handle the practical operation of a station. In so far as the handling of the different codes and ciphers were concerned their efficiency was excellent, but when it came to the examination of personnel for advancement in rating, or the actual standing of a watch, or the manipulation of the instruments, or further, to the actual repairing of apparatus which was out of order, these were details which, due to lack of practical experience, they were unable, in most cases, to carry out and dependence had to be placed on the ability of the chief petty officers who, with their broad practical experience were able to do so. This system worked well even under this apparent handicap, and in many instances within a year's time communication officers who had taken charge of a station with no previous practical experience had become proficient operators and were able to take over the practical operation of the radio equipment. However, in many cases the officer would have many additional duties to perform in which he, due to natural inclination, would take greater interest, with a result that his proficiency as regards matters radio was not as great as it would have been if he had been enabled to follow them entirely. Further, it is believed that at the time not enough importance was attached to matters radio on board ship to provide an incentive for commissioned officers to promote their efficiency in this branch. In the main it might be stated that the subject of radio simply aroused curiosity rather than genuine serious interest as in the case of matters pertaining to ordnance or other subjects dear to the heart of all naval men. The time has arrived, however, when the question of "Radio Efficiency" should be studied with the same tense interest as the subject of "Battle Efficiency," for unquestionably the "Battle Efficiency" of a modern fleet is vitally dependent on the efficiency and reliability of its radio communication .service. Knowing this, we should act accordingly. We should have radio communication officers attached to the different units comprising the fleet and also in charge of the numerous important high-powered naval shore stations who are not only interested in the art of radio communication, but who have taken up the study of same and who are conversant with the theoretical principles pertaining to it. These officers should be given an incentive to remain in this branch of the service as long as possible and means for promotion should be provided which would permit of their advancement in rank on a basis equal to that of their classmates serving in the various branches of the line. They should also take up the study of the divers communication methods employed by ALL foreign navies and more especially those of potential enemies; they should be thoroughly conversant with the character of the codes used by the radio operators transmitting so that the radio personnel under them can be thoroughly instructed in the reception of same in order that all enemy communications, in the event of war, could be correctly intercepted for the information of the commanding officers, or for the Naval Intelligence Bureau. For example, during the early period of the late war a large number of our naval radio operators were not familiar with the so-called "prime" letters used so extensively by the operators comprising the personnel of the Allied and enemy radio forces and for the time being they were unable to intelligently copy all. Communications heard. Of course it did not take them long to master these new code characters but it would have been muck better if they had known them in advance. Further, the communication officer should be in a position to instruct his force intelligently as regards the different systems of communication employed by foreign navies and as far as possible we should have several communication officers who are not only familiar with the various codes employed by foreign operators, but who are also familiar with the various languages. The study of foreign languages by the radio personnel should also be encouraged. Especial attention should be given the various methods of communication used by any potential enemy, with a view to working out details in regard to either maintaining deliberate interference during battle and "jamming" his operators, or determining the best method for getting our communications through without serious interruption. By careful observation it can easily be determined just how many different wave lengths the enemy has available and steps can be taken to interfere on ALL of them with a view to preventing him from getting his communications through. Further, as a rule a flagship does the most transmitting and a careful, observing operator can soon determine simply by the amount of radio traffic transmitted that the particular station in question is an important one and that steps should be taken to pay particular attention to copying all communications transmitted by it, or, if deemed necessary, that means be taken to create interference with his transmissions if possible. An observing operator can also determine by the amount of radio activity going on in an enemy fleet that some unusual activity is taking place or pending. Further, he can easily identify certain vessels after having heard them transmitting radio signals a number of times, in certain cases. Sometimes a station will have a "spark" of a peculiar tone frequency, or there may be a certain operator attached to it who has a certain characteristic way of handling his traffic, and by remembering these details an efficient radio operator can readily identify this vessel in the future when it is heard transmitting, regardless of whether a call sign is used or not. Perhaps one of the most easily "identified" vessels attached to the American navy was the U.S.S. Birmingham, which vessel had a very peculiar sounding "spark" which differed greatly from that of the average vessel. During a war game in 1916 the Birmingham was readily "singled out" and identified in spite of the fact that bogus calls were used to prevent it. Also I might add that the writer, during the late war, copied signals from the Birmingham, which vessel at the time was serving in waters adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea, and was able to identify her instantly in spite of the fact that he did not previously know she was in European waters. This possibility of identifying vessels can easily be eliminated through the use of arc or tube transmitting systems which are far more efficient and have practically the same "tone frequency," thus making it practically impossible to identify vessels as mentioned above. Radio officers should be qualified to instruct their personnel in regard to the numerous conditions which might arise during the practical operation of a radio station on board ship during wartime. Another essential feature that he should pay particular attention to is the necessity for having competent operators attached to his force who are capable of copying code signals at high speed. It is often possible to prevent an enemy from copying your communications if high speed is employed by the operators in transmitting the code characters. For example, during the late War the enemy was noted for the operating efficiency of the radio personnel; invariably his communications went through at top speed and without waste of time and I recall several instances where our operators were unable to copy his messages because of their inability to copy at high speed. These operators were of course in most cases men who lacked experience, but nevertheless it will be seen that the ability of operators to copy any other operator regardless of his speed is essential, to say the least. Also it might not be unwise to change the dot and dash code characters used by the operators at times for this would be disconcerting to enemy operators trying to intercept our signals, to say the least, for in practically all cases he would be familiar with only the standard code characters generally used and would be utterly unprepared for any change with a result that our communications would get through without having been intercepted. There are many details such as these which could be studied and worked out by a communication officer fully interested in the work and proper instruction in regard to same be conveyed to the personnel under his command, with a resultant increase in the state of efficiency of the force. Further, a system of drills could be devised simulating actual battle conditions for the purpose of instructing the personnel as regards the effecting of quick emergency repairs, the clearing away of radio antennae which have been shot away and the rapid erecting of emergency auxiliary antennae to take their place. In short, there are so many details to be taken into consideration by a communication officer besides the maze of instructions relating to fleet traffic, the changing of codes and ciphers and other routine duties, that to give proper attention to same will, without doubt, occupy his entire time. Therefore it seems only proper that an officer having this duty should not be encumbered with additional duties. Of course it may be stated that radio gunners are available to take care of the majority of the mass of detail. Granted, but we should have competent commissioned officers in charge of the Radio Department who are also fully familiar with all its workings as in the case of other departments. With officers in charge of the practical operations as well as the various executive duties it is believed that a general increase in all-round efficiency will undoubtedly result. Due to his superior education various advantages and disadvantages can be more carefully weighed and proper steps taken and he will no doubt often take into careful consideration smaller details of importance which in many cases are overlooked by men charged only with the practical operation of a station. Also, officers who are familiar with the general principles of radio and who have observed the station's operation at first-hand, may be able to devise or invent valuable additions to its equipment, which may further improve its efficiency in battle.

Another angle of great importance which should receive careful attention, is the training of adequate reserve personnel, for in time of war a large number would be required for immediate service. The navy is fortunate in this respect in having available splendid material for this purpose. There are hundreds of thousands of amateur radio operators scattered throughout the nation who with a brief period of training would eventually develop into efficient operators. As a rule the average amateur is more or less familiar with the constructional details of practical radio equipment and the majority of them are proficient in handling the code in a more or less efficient manner, but all of them have a general foundation as regards matters radio which could readily be built up. To provide for the enrolling of the more efficient amateurs in the reserve force, it is believed that the appointment on the staff of the various state reserve force commanders, of radio communication officers to take care of the details of this work, is a desirable feature. In some cases former communication officers are actively engaged in radio research work, or the manufacture of radio equipment, or have taken up amateur radio as a hobby, in which case they are more or less in direct touch with the amateurs in their state and know who are the most desirable for naval purposes. Such officers who are still affiliated with the reserve force, would, no doubt, take up the work of training an adequate reserve radio personnel with a great deal of interest, if not absolute enthusiasm. Many interesting details, such as a chain of naval reserve force radio stations, operated by reserve personnel, for handling the communications of the reserve force commanders, code classes, theory classes, radio drills, etc., etc., could be worked out and put into practice and judging from the writer's personal experience in handling the problems relating to amateur radio during the past two years, it would become necessary to stop enrolling additional recruits, for the American radio amateur is unquestionably a most enthusiastic individual and one can "listen in" almost any hour of the day and night and hear any number of amateur stations "hamming." The average amateur will, with proper training, undoubtedly develop into an ideal naval radio operator, and steps should be taken to sift out the more desirable material for enrollment in the naval reserve force, after which proper intensive training could be provided so that in the event of a national emergency an efficient, reliable radio reserve could be called to the colors, who would be available for instant service.

The writer has read with a great deal of interest the timely article written by Lieutenant (jg) H.D. Kent, U.S. Navy, in the July, 1921, issue of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings and can but agree with him when he states the necessity for having a Communication College for the Training of Radio Communication Officers in the art of radio communications and radio strategy, for much will depend on our having an efficient, organized radio communication service in any future conflict, capable of "going the enemy one better."

In conclusion, might I even go so far as to state that under certain battle conditions, the fleet with the most highly developed communication service will in most cases obtain a decision over the one possessing an inferior radio service?

(Nothing in the article I have written should be construed to cast reflection in any manner whatsoever on the radio communication service, its personnel or the officers attached thereto, for this article was solely written with a view to setting forth the important part that radio will play in any future conflict between the United States navy and a foreign power, and also to set forth certain facts which the writer observed during his service as a radio communication officer during the period of his service with the regular navy.)

Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.)

You know something?

Navy Cryptology: The Early Days
"All nations have learned the lessons of the World War and will probably make even greater efforts to intercept and read enemy messages in the future than were made in the past…. In a war between nations of approximately equal strength, Radio Intelligence could easily become the decisive factor." -- Laurance Safford, speech, Naval Postgraduate School, 1925

During World War I, the U.S. Navy engaged in "radio intelligence" only in a limited way. Navy personnel attempted, unsuccessfully it appears, to track German submarines by direction finding. Primarily, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) cooperated with MI-8, the cryptanalytic office in the Army's Military Intelligence Division. At the end of the First World War, the office was staffed by 13 officers, 14 male enlisted personnel, and 34 "yeomanettes," a term used at that time for enlisted women.

It is reported that this office solved a Japanese diplomatic code before the end of the war, but the project was abandoned because of a lack of traffic and a lack of linguists. No further information is available about this early effort. The office was quickly downsized at the end of the war.

Just before the end of World War I, ONI established a Research Desk in the Code and Signal Section to engage in cryptanalysis. At the end of the war, because cryptanalysis was seen as an important adjunct to preparing secure systems for one's own use, the Research Desk was kept in existence and placed under the Director of Naval Communications (DNC). Under an agreement between ONI and DNC, the Research Desk was responsible for intercept and cryptanalysis, while ONI would handle translation, evaluation, and distribution.

In 1918, the Code and Signal Section of ONI acquired spaces in the sixth wing of the Navy Headquarters Building on Constitution Avenue in the District of Columbia. This would remain its home until February 1943, when the Navy acquired the Mt. Vernon Academy on Nebraska Avenue, and moved the Naval Communications Annex there.

In 1922, the office was given the designator OP-20-G, which it would carry until shortly after World War II.

In the post World War I period, the Research Desk was authorized one officer, two enlisted men, and four civilians. The officer billet was filled in 1924 with the assignment of Lieutenant Laurance F. Safford. A few months later, Miss Agnes Meyer -- who had been among the "yeomanettes" during the war -- became one of the civilian employees.

Agnes Meyer (married name Driscoll) became one of the key figures in Navy cryptanalysis. In addition to her experience during the war, she had some training with Edward Hebern's private code company, and, it is believed, spent some time with Yardley's "Black Chamber."^1 Edward Hebern made cryptographic machines for sale to businesses, although the machines were not secure enough to interest the government. The time spent with Hebern, however, gave Ms. Meyer invaluable experience with the new concept of machine ciphers. Because officers were required to rotate out of OP-20-G every few years for sea duty, Ms. Meyer provided continuity on targets. She also trained many of the important Navy figures in cryptology.

Safford, who eventually rose to the rank of captain, is regarded by many as the "father" of Navy cryptology. Throughout the 1920s he strongly advocated more effort for Communications Intelligence, took steps to acquire intercept for analysis, and conducted training for good cryptanalytic prospects.

Safford recruited promising cryptanalysts by putting puzzles in the Navy's monthly Communications Bulletin, beginning in mid 1924. Over the years, he recruited many who sent in successful solutions.

The first pupil to come to Safford for training, in 1924, was Ensign Joseph N. Wenger. A more formal class in all aspects of communications intelligence and communications security was begun the following year; among the students in that group of five was LT Joseph J. Rochefort. Both Wenger and Rochefort went on to make significant contributions to American cryptology.

It should be noted that the first formal class, which ran from October 1925 to January 1926, was comprised of four Navy officers and one from the Marine Corps. The Marine Officer, however, never received a COMINT assignment.

Among other actions, Safford used a secret ONI fund to purchase five typewriters; he had them modified and sent to the Asiatic Fleet to facilitate copying Japanese kana characters by Navy radiomen. Over time, about 40 units were purchased, and eventually, this machine came to be called the RIP-5. Some of these machines were shared later with the counterpart organization in the Army.

When Safford rotated out for sea duty in 1926, he was replaced on the Research Desk by LT Joseph Rochefort. In turn, Rochefort was replaced in September 1927 by Lt. Bern Anderson. Safford returned from sea duty to the Research Desk in August 1929.

The Chief of Naval Operations recognized the need for radio intelligence, and, in a letter dated May 13, 1929, indicated his intention to establish a radio intelligence office with the Asiatic Fleet and to organize cryptanalytic units afloat. He noted that Navy war plans were being modified to include major cryptologic units in Washington and Hawaii, and the establishment of a special cryptographic system strictly for COMINT.

The increased emphasis on COMINT operations paid off early. Larger numbers of intercept operators enabled the U.S. fleet to copy a considerable volume of radio traffic from the Japanese fleet's 1930 Grand Maneuvers. The traffic was forwarded to Washington, where it was worked on by LCDR Safford, LT. Wenger, and Mrs. Driscoll. These messages revealed Japan's battle plan against the United States, Japanese fleet mobilization procedures, and Japanese plans for defense of the western Pacific. The surprised Americans also learned that the Japanese had an excellent grasp of American war plans for the Pacific.

In 1933, Lt. Joseph Wenger compiled all the American intercept of that year's Japanese fleet maneuvers, and, through traffic analysis over a period of six months, produced a report on the composition of the Japanese fleet. The results of three years of cryptanalysis on the same messages eventually proved Wenger's list correct.

(Often, in the period before war broke out, traffic analysis was the only way to track movement and other activity by the Japanese fleets. Traffic analysis also was of considerable assistance to the cryptanalysts. Once war broke out, the knowledge gained over time in the pre-war period about radio patterns and callsigns proved valuable in working Japanese traffic.)

In 1930, the Director of Naval Communications, Captain Stanley C. Hooper sent OP-20-G a memorandum suggesting the use of tabulating machines for "mechanical labor" such as counting frequency distributions and repetitions. LCDR Safford and Ms. Driscoll discussed the idea and dismissed it as unfeasible due to the unpredictable nature of ciphers.

Captain Hooper, however, did not let the matter drop and arranged for Lt. Wenger to attend demonstrations of modern office equipment. Among the machines demonstrated, Wenger saw possibilities in a Hollerith sorter distributed by the Tabulating Machine Company. He, in turn, persuaded Safford and Meyer to get a demonstration, and, after further discussions, OP-20-G got funds to rent a punch machine and a sorter.

Wenger himself did not get to use it. His replacement, Lt. Thomas Dyer, became the first U.S. cryptanalytic machine operator.

The Navy itself was small, and Navy cryptology began with a very small organization -- even by 1941, OP-20-G had only about 60 persons plus small field contingents. But it had backing at the highest levels, and by the outbreak of the Second World War, the organization had become a respected component of Navy operations.

Note:
Joseph Wenger at the end of his career became Vice Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, NSA's predecessor, and was promoted to Rear Admiral, the first Navy cryptologic officer to achieve flag rank.

Incidentally, the Tabulating Machine Company later became IBM Corporation.

Sources:

Doug Adams, "The Early Years," NCVA (Paducah, Ky.: Turner Publishing Company, 1996), pp. 8-10.
Captain J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN (Ret), Naval Security Group History to World War II, June 1971, SHR-355, CCH Files.
Carl Jensen, "Traffic Analysis," NCVA (Paducah, Ky.: Turner Publishing Company, 1996), pp. 26-27.
James McIntire & R. D. Howell, Sr., "U.S. Marine Corps in COMINT," NCVA (Paducah, Ky.: Turner Publishing Company, 1996), pp. 46-50.
Albert Pelletier, "Cryptography -- Target Japan," NCVA (Paducah, Ky.: Turner Publishing Company, 1996), pp. 27-32.
J. N. Wenger, U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence Organization, Liaison and Collaboration 1941-1945, 8 October 1945, SRH-197, CCH Files.

Herbert Yardley had a big mouth.

A very BIG MOUTH.

It is incredible how America's enemies paid no attention to what was plain in print.

Hence that "Proceedings" article with its yaddita yadditta about "loyalty" among the communications people makes perfect sense. Even back then, the far below average enlisted radioman was likely to sell his knowledge to an enemy nation.



The Problem is that the lessons never seemed to be learned. 

2 man rule and sealed keys and passguards are being defeated today. Human screening methods are still the weakness, which is the exploit. 

[miletus12]

Okay, you fixed the radio communications, you tested your effectors, and you convinced your reluctant legislators to fund a build out to the treaty limits and even cheated like the British did to hide the fact that when war comes, you will clad your cruisers with additional appliquéing armor plate.

You even went so far as to develop super-heavyweight torpedoes to go with your super-heavyweight shells.

Illustration of Torpedo Mk 17

Torpedo
Mk 17 DEVELOPMENT DATE:
1940
APPROXIMATE IN-SERVICE DATES:
1944-1950

Development on Torpedo Mk 17 began in 1940 by the Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, R.I., and the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. A long-range, high-speed torpedo, the Mk 17 was a destroyer-launched, antisurface ship weapon using "Navol" (concentrated hydrogen peroxide (H2O2O)) as an oxidant. Torpedo Mk 17 development, halted in 1941 due to pressure to produce Torpedoes Mk 13 and Mk 15 for the war effort, was resumed again in 1944. (Detailed knowledge of the Japanese type 93 "Long Lance," a 22,000-yard, 49-knot oxygen torpedo became available about this time.) As in the case of the Mk 16 torpedo, the Mk 17 went into production before development was completed. The producer was the Torpedo Station in Newport. Although there were 450 Mk 17 torpedoes completed before the end of the second World War, none were used in combat. Torpedo Mk 17 was discontinued around 1950 after seeing only limited use in post-war years. Main factors in the early demise of the Mk 17 were its contribution to destroyer topside weight, similarity to the Mk 16, and, also, the emerging role of destroyer as an antisubmarine warfare platform.

CHARACTERISTICS
PHYSICAL
Length.....................288 inches
Diameter....................21 inches
Weight....................4600 pounds
Propulsion.....................Turbine
Guidance.......................Gyro
Enabling.......................No
Homing.........................No
FC Settings....................Mechanical
Warhead........................Mk 17 Mod 3
...............................879.5 pounds HBX
Exploder.......................Mk 6 Mod 1
Contact........................yes
PERFORMANCE
Speed..........................46 knots
Range..........................18,000 yards

===============================================================

You trained your officers and crews in fleet problems during Caribbean hurricanes, which is a fair simulation of a Philippine typhoon. Now what?

What is there left to do?

There is the national ammunition stockpile. What the expletive deleted is the nationsal ammunition stockpile?

You take your launch systems, that is the exact numbers by bore sizes / calibers of all of your launch systems in existence. Then you compute peacetime training rates and expected wartime use of ammunition (effectors) rates per year.

Take the examples of torpedoes.

100 destroyers x 10 tubes = 1000 torpedoes + 2x reloads = 3,000 torpedoes
100 submarines x 10 tubes = 1000 torpedoes + 4x reloads = 4,000 torpedoes

=========================================================================

500 torpedo planes x 1 torpedo = 500 torpedoes + 4 reloads = 2,500 torpedoes

You have a 1930 national ammunition stockpile requirement of 7,000 ship-launched antiship torpedoes and a NSN (national stockpile number) requirement for 2,500 air dropped torpedoes.

Want to know your artillery shell requirements?

16 inch => 3,600 base load (1 battle) + 2 reloads = 10,800 shells.
14 inch => 7,200 base load (1 battle) + 2 reloads = 21,600 shells
08 inch => 13,500 base load (1 battle) + 2 reloads = 40,500 shells
06 inch => 90,000 base load (1 battle) + 2 reloads = 270,000 shells

Now here is where it gets really hairy...

05 => 210,000 base load (1 battle) + 2 reloads = 630,000 shells
03 => 105,000 base load (1 battle) + 2 reloads = 315,000 shells
1.1 => 1,000,000 base load (1 battle) + 2 reloads =3,000,000 shells

The Americans had 1/5 of that war year total on hand for WWII on 7 December 1941.

They manufactured 4x that war year total to fight WWII in the Pacific.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Back in 1898 the Spaniards supplied what they thought was enough 7mm bullets for their garrison in Santiago de Cuba for 5,000 men for a whole year.  1,000,000 bullets would hold off the Cuban insurrectos at 200 bullets per trooper.   Then the Americans showed up. That ammunition was gone in 15 days. Jose Valesquez gave up because he was out of bullets.

Nobody talks about the USN ammunition crisis from May 1942 until August 1943.  

[miletus12]

There was another ammunition shortage... or should I call it "guidance system" shortage.



Those would be pilots and aircrew.



There were twice as many of those guys as the Americans had globally (3,300 versus 1,500 pilots). Notice that funny looking thing behind them with the TORPEDO? The Americans kind of lacked that land based anti-ship capability and the training to go with it.

After 6 months of war, the Americans still had 1,500 trained naval aviators and 2,000 aircrew left. After Midway, they were down 189 PILOTS. In the entire Pacific fleet, the trained pilot shortage was so severe that the Japanese did the Americans a favor when they torpedoed the USS Saratoga.  Now the Americans could staff up the three aircraft carriers they had left.  The Americans had about 600 naval pilots left after the battle, with only 200 of them completely carrier qualified.   

After Midway, since the Japanese went to extraordinary lengths to save their pilots at the expense of flight and hanger deck crews, the IJN still had about 3,000 pilots, 1000+ of them completely carrier qualified.

It takes two years to train a naval pilot in that era. Most of that is flying hours. About 500 to become proficient. 

The Americans threw six-month men (150 hours) in against the Japanese (600 hour + pilots.).  You can guess how that turned out during the latter half of 1942 and most of 1943? NOT TOO GOOD.

But it worked. The Japanese could not replace their air cadres as fast as the Americans churned out their half-trained yahoos. It might take 2.5 half trained Americans to kill 1 trained Japanese pilot, but if there was no replacement Japanese pilot, and that .5 American survivor passed on his on the job training to the "fresh meat", then rookie against rookie, the odds became EVEN. And at EVEN the Americans would always win, because now there were many more of them than Japanese in the air. More Americans lived to OJT into veterans and soon the trained pilots were all mostly Americans, not the Japanese.     
 
That is NOT the way to run a railroad.