Quicker US victory over Japan in WW2

[miletus12]

Apr 6, 2023 12:35:49 GMT stevep said:

Given the fact it was the RN which was training the RCN and supplying the bulk of their equipment that's even more BS than your usual comments on a war you clearly have no understanding off

It was KING, as Lantfleet Actual who took a look at the British and the Canadians and who made that judgement call. Why?

a. The Candaians and Lantfleet had interoperated together. They got along well. Not so with the arrogant and bigotted RN.
b. The British admiralty LIED to the USN about how well they were doing. The Americans (Royal Ingersoll, the LantFleet after King) had their own observers and when American data and British claims did not gibe... King concluded that the RN as thay had proverd in WWI could not be trusted to tell you the sky was blue.
c. US sonars not ASDIC was the RCN gear on those British built ships. Was our gear better than your gear? Yes, it was.

You have no idea of what I know, Steve.

[1bigrich]

Apr 5, 2023 14:11:01 GMT Max Sinister said:

This is something I also have pondered several times. Unfortunately, I'm neither an expert for the Pacific War nor for naval war in general. (I've read a lot about WW2, but usually concentrate on the European/North African theater.)

Would it be possible for the US and Allies to defeat Japan earlier, on the assumption that the war still starts in late 1941? With their troops standing in Okinawa about one whole year earlier and a landing on the Main Islands being the next step? Since nukes aren't available yet? Even if the SU was still neutral?

Would this be possible if FDR decided to throw 60% of the US' power against Japan, instead of 40%? Or 80%, or almost 100% even, in case Nazi Germany decided not to declare war?

Or would we need a different PoD? Maybe the US learning of the planned attack and removing most ships, or putting up better defense in Pearl Harbor? Or is this possible only with an earlier PoD?

if you're looking for a POD, one would be no Lend Lease.   More equipment for American units at the start of the war.   

Another would be FDR's speech of December 9th, which you can see here


docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/120941.html

But in the speech he said


"Your Government knows that for weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in dividing the spoils with Germany when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in she would receive the complete and perpetual control of the whole of the Pacific area -- and that means not only the Ear East, but also all of the Islands in the Pacific, and also a stranglehold on the west coast of North, Central and South America.



We know also that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations in accordance with a joint plan. That plan considers all peoples and nations which are not helping the Axis powers as common enemies of each and every one of the Axis powers.



That is their simple and obvious grand strategy. And that is why the American people must realize that it can be matched only with similar grand strategy. We must realize for example that Japanese successes against the United States in the Pacific are helpful to German operations in Libya; that any German success against the Caucasus is inevitably an assistance to Japan in her operations against the Dutch East Indies; that a German attack against Algiers or Morocco opens the way to a German attack against South America and the Canal.



On the other side of the picture, we must learn also to know that guerilla warfare against the Germans in, let us say Serbia or Norway, helps us; that a successful Russian offensive against the Germans helps us; and that British successes on land or sea in any part of the world strengthen our hands.



Remember always that Germany and Italy, regardless of any formal declaration of war, consider themselves at war with the United States at this moment just as much as they consider themselves at war with Britain or Russia. And Germany puts all the other Republics of the Americas into the same category of enemies. The people of our sister Republics of this Hemisphere can be honored by that fact."

My bold in the above.    So if you wonder why Italy and Germany waited until December 11th to declare war on the US, that's the reason.   FDR wanted in the war in Europe, and he basically told Germany and Italy they were in his sights.  

But if you have FDR focus solely on the attack on Pearl Harbor and Japan to the exclusion of what was happening in Europe, you would see more US equipment in the Pacific.  

Another POD might be have FDR listen to Admiral James O. Richardson and NOT move the Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.    Richardson opposed the move, saying it would open the fleet up to attack and he was sacked for it.   But he was right.    With the bulk of the US Fleet out of reach, the IJN would start the war in the western Pacific, and the USN would not have the losses of Pearl Harbor.  

That said, there are some lessons that take time.    Combat loading is a good example, and Watchtower and Torch taught the USN and the USMC those lessons very well.    Normal loading would dictate the heaviest cargo goes deepest in the ship.   So ammunition, for example, being very dense, would be loaded first, and unloaded last.   Tents on the other hand are very light and would be stored high in the ship or on deck, and would be unloaded first.    But in combat, ammunition is going to be a priority, and tents are not.   So combat loading dictates ammo will be loaded where it can be unloaded first while less important equipment is placed where it can be unloaded later. 

Another limiting step is logistics.   Kimmel figured he needed 25 oilers for a cross-Pacific offensive against the IJN.    He lost a number to Neutrality Patrol and the Atlantic Fleet, so prior to Pearl Harbor he had 11.   And not all of those were capable of underway replenishment.  And Pecos, Neches and Neosho were lost very early in the war, and Neosho was one of the largest tankers on the planet at the time.   The Doolittle raid, for example was only possible because the oiler Cimarron had come west with the Hornet.    The oilers the USN needed were on the ways, but it would take time to build up the logistics needed for a full offensive.  This incidentally is also why the older USN battleships didn't get into action around Guadalcanal.   Nimitz had enough oilers for the fast carrier task forces or the old battleship battleline, but not both.    So the battleships got assigned to convoy escort, tied to places where they could be replenished.   The closest any got to Guadalcanal was BatDiv 4 (Colorado and Maryland) operating out of Fiji, guarding the island against Japanese invasion.  

The USN will still have to learn night fighting in surface ships, learn proper damage control in a modern environment, learn to trust their radar and learn to coordinate air power, especially from carriers, but historically, they garnered those lessons rather quickly...

My thoughts, 

[miletus12]

Apr 6, 2023 17:28:03 GMT 1bigrich said:

Another POD might be have FDR listen to Admiral James O. Richardson and NOT move the Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.    Richardson opposed the move, saying it would open the fleet up to attack and he was sacked for it.   But he was right.    With the bulk of the US Fleet out of reach, the IJN would start the war in the western Pacific, and the USN would not have the losses of Pearl Harbor.  

And as it was understood at the time and I think you know, Pearl Harbor was actually fairly unnecessary as a Japanese opening attack, since the known material condition of the USN was such that the Americans still had to give up the Philippine Islands and most of the western Pacific until the necessary fleet trains / logistics had been built, the sailors had been trained and war stocks of effectors built up. Not to mention the abandonment of the battle-line centric one big battle concept of tactical operations that Husband Kimmel planned to execute.

Admiral O'Richardson also bought into the "big battle in the Caroline Islands" battle-line element, so I am not sure that the IJN and the most incompetent admiral it ever had in command of Combined Fleet, Yamamoto, did not do the allies, especially the Americans, a huge favor by forcing them to learn how to fight with flattops and with cruiser-destroyer forces in an extended naval campaign.

Apr 6, 2023 17:28:03 GMT 1bigrich said:

That said, there are some lessons that take time.    Combat loading is a good example, and Watchtower and Torch taught the USN and the USMC those lessons very well.    Normal loading would dictate the heavies cargo goes deepest in the ship.   So ammunition, for example, being very dense, would be loaded first, and unloaded last.   Tents on the other hand are very light and would be stored high in the ship or on deck, and would be unloaded first.    But in combat, ammunition is going to be a priority, and tents are not.   So combat loading dictates ammo will be loaded where it can be unloaded first while less important equipment is placed where it can be unloaded later. 

Those lessons come with operational experience. What were pre-war known issues that should not have taken combat to sort out, was that the effectors were defective and the people were not trained for the war that had been in progress ever since 1933.

What do i mean? 

a. Americans had been observers at the Taranto Raid. They knew the British had solved the shallow depth launch entry problem for air dropped torpedoes and also solved the shock of water entry problem, but even so, most of the dropped torpedoes failed to function as they ought. They also knew that the British submariners had complained that their torpedoes did not work and that magnetic influence features and impact fuaes were involved. 
b. It did not take much inquiry to find out that British gunnery was less than acceptable, due to mechanical and technological issues and that "green crews" and unready ships had also contributed to disasters like Denmark Strait and First Narvik, or that the same issues were present in British AAA defensive systems which was costly off Crete.      
c. Kimmel may have estimated 25 oilers, but if we take operations like Galvanic into account (Tarawa), it was more like 60 tankers. Slow speed was asking for an I-19 happy day for the Japanese. Moving fast constantly raised fuel consumption by a factor of 2x.
 
So about a year before Pearl Harbor, what should the USN have scrambled to do as their utmost priorities?

a. Check torpedoes, bombs and guns. The money was there.
b Train from British experience with battle losses and ship damages and tactical mistakes like the USN crews' lives depended on it. The money was there.
c, Ships taken up from trade. The money was there. Anything that could laughably pass as a subchaser gets hydrophones and depth charge throwers. The presently unemployed fisherman get drafted and trained to fish for submarines. The money was there. Put FDR's idea for jeep carriers as flight decks over Ashtaboulas and Cimmarons. The money was there for that, too. 
d. Put the political instruments for martial law into place for port traffic control and blackout. That one is on FDR. All he had to do was declare an emergency and a proclamation. That was one time the British were right. American citizens of Japanese ancestry could be rounded up and put into concentration camps by FDR decree and Miami could not be de-illuminated? 
e. Fix the shell ladder dispersion problems (training and delay clocks), fix the 1.1 inch AAA shell (desensitize the impact fuse by 30%). Fix the Midvale Unbreakables duds by going to a spin unlock safety instead of an impact safety.          
f. REAM everybody at the Bureau of Ordnance with court martials and prison time after the weapon proofs tests come back as bolos. Same for Stark and Leahy and Towers.  
g. Get someone who actually understands the Japanese to talk to FDR. (Not Ruth Benedick but THOMAS HART.). That would nix FDR bluffing. 
h. Get Stalin's agents, who sabotaged FDR's limited embargo order into a complete petroleum ban, out of the USG. Remove them ex judicia if necessary, but those traitors were worse than Sempill.    

=========================================================

There is about a year and a whole lot to do. Not all of it will be accomplished. But if you hop-to, you can fix about half of it with the REAL HISTORY assets at hand.    

One comment about RADAR. The British had shown very little surface warfare aptitude for it prior to 1943, so I still think it comes with battle experience, and not experimental war games.
 

[stevep]

Apr 6, 2023 17:28:03 GMT 1bigrich said:

Apr 5, 2023 14:11:01 GMT Max Sinister said:

This is something I also have pondered several times. Unfortunately, I'm neither an expert for the Pacific War nor for naval war in general. (I've read a lot about WW2, but usually concentrate on the European/North African theater.)

Would it be possible for the US and Allies to defeat Japan earlier, on the assumption that the war still starts in late 1941? With their troops standing in Okinawa about one whole year earlier and a landing on the Main Islands being the next step? Since nukes aren't available yet? Even if the SU was still neutral?

Would this be possible if FDR decided to throw 60% of the US' power against Japan, instead of 40%? Or 80%, or almost 100% even, in case Nazi Germany decided not to declare war?

Or would we need a different PoD? Maybe the US learning of the planned attack and removing most ships, or putting up better defense in Pearl Harbor? Or is this possible only with an earlier PoD?

if you're looking for a POD, one would be no Lend Lease.   More equipment for American units at the start of the war.   

Another would be FDR's speech of December 9th, which you can see here


docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/120941.html

But in the speech he said


"Your Government knows that for weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in dividing the spoils with Germany when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in she would receive the complete and perpetual control of the whole of the Pacific area -- and that means not only the Ear East, but also all of the Islands in the Pacific, and also a stranglehold on the west coast of North, Central and South America.



We know also that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations in accordance with a joint plan. That plan considers all peoples and nations which are not helping the Axis powers as common enemies of each and every one of the Axis powers.



That is their simple and obvious grand strategy. And that is why the American people must realize that it can be matched only with similar grand strategy. We must realize for example that Japanese successes against the United States in the Pacific are helpful to German operations in Libya; that any German success against the Caucasus is inevitably an assistance to Japan in her operations against the Dutch East Indies; that a German attack against Algiers or Morocco opens the way to a German attack against South America and the Canal.



On the other side of the picture, we must learn also to know that guerilla warfare against the Germans in, let us say Serbia or Norway, helps us; that a successful Russian offensive against the Germans helps us; and that British successes on land or sea in any part of the world strengthen our hands.



Remember always that Germany and Italy, regardless of any formal declaration of war, consider themselves at war with the United States at this moment just as much as they consider themselves at war with Britain or Russia. And Germany puts all the other Republics of the Americas into the same category of enemies. The people of our sister Republics of this Hemisphere can be honored by that fact."

My bold in the above.    So if you wonder why Italy and Germany waited until December 11th to declare war on the US, that's the reason.   FDR wanted in the war in Europe, and he basically told Germany and Italy they were in his sights.  

But if you have FDR focus solely on the attack on Pearl Harbor and Japan to the exclusion of what was happening in Europe, you would see more US equipment in the Pacific.  

Another POD might be have FDR listen to Admiral James O. Richardson and NOT move the Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.    Richardson opposed the move, saying it would open the fleet up to attack and he was sacked for it.   But he was right.    With the bulk of the US Fleet out of reach, the IJN would start the war in the western Pacific, and the USN would not have the losses of Pearl Harbor.  

That said, there are some lessons that take time.    Combat loading is a good example, and Watchtower and Torch taught the USN and the USMC those lessons very well.    Normal loading would dictate the heaviest cargo goes deepest in the ship.   So ammunition, for example, being very dense, would be loaded first, and unloaded last.   Tents on the other hand are very light and would be stored high in the ship or on deck, and would be unloaded first.    But in combat, ammunition is going to be a priority, and tents are not.   So combat loading dictates ammo will be loaded where it can be unloaded first while less important equipment is placed where it can be unloaded later. 

Another limiting step is logistics.   Kimmel figured he needed 25 oilers for a cross-Pacific offensive against the IJN.    He lost a number to Neutrality Patrol and the Atlantic Fleet, so prior to Pearl Harbor he had 11.   And not all of those were capable of underway replenishment.  And Pecos, Neches and Neosho were lost very early in the war, and Neosho was one of the largest tankers on the planet at the time.   The Doolittle raid, for example was only possible because the oiler Cimarron had come west with the Hornet.    The oilers the USN needed were on the ways, but it would take time to build up the logistics needed for a full offensive.  This incidentally is also why the older USN battleships didn't get into action around Guadalcanal.   Nimitz had enough oilers for the fast carrier task forces or the old battleship battleline, but not both.    So the battleships got assigned to convoy escort, tied to places where they could be replenished.   The closest any got to Guadalcanal was BatDiv 4 (Colorado and Maryland) operating out of Fiji, guarding the island against Japanese invasion.  

The USN will still have to learn night fighting in surface ships, learn proper damage control in a modern environment, learn to trust their radar and learn to coordinate air power, especially from carriers, but historically, they garnered those lessons rather quickly...

My thoughts, 

  If there's no L-L then the US is on its own against the European as well as the Asian axis.  It would be dropping the two big power blocs that carried the bulk of the load in Europe.  Also it might well mean that Japan doesn't have to go to war to gain raw materials from Malaya/DEI and related areas.

  Much of what Roosevelt was saying was wrong, although he might have believed that.  There was a belief at the time in fascist efficiency and a 'master-plan' for world conquest but we know nowadays how incompetent and disorganised they actually were.  Both internally and between themselves.

  Attacking Pearl Harbour was undoubtedly a huge mistake for Japan and probably they would have been better off not attacking any US possessions at all - but having forces in place to isolate and destroy US aligned ones in the Philippines and Guam.  This would have put the onus on the US to declare war on Japan which if Roosevelt could get a dow past Congress would have lead to a much more divided US on the war.  If he does manage then the isolated Philippines and Guam are going to be mopped up pretty much as they were.  A great danger for the USN might be that - despite the WPO decision to abandon the Philippines as indefensible - there would be strong pressure for the USN to 'do something'.  Which given the qualitative edge that the Japanese had in ship attack at the time and the fact any relief operation would have to move deep into Japanese controlled waters could mean a far worse disaster than OTL Pearl Harbour.  [Even a sustained raid on Japanese held islands could turn nasty, especially if the fleet was slowed to the speed of the old BBs]  Which might in turn prompt further opposition to the war.

  If the US has to start basically from an advance across the Pacific its always going to be a long war and doubtful you can do it much quicker than OTL unless you assume a lot of luck somewhere I think. 

[miletus12]

Apr 6, 2023 22:47:13 GMT stevep said:

If there's no L-L then the US is on its own against the European as well as the Asian axis.  It would be dropping the two big power blocs that carried the bulk of the load in Europe.  Also it might well mean that Japan doesn't have to go to war to gain raw materials from Malaya/DEI and related areas.

That thesis does not follow. The reason it does not follow is that while Stalin may try to cut a deal at some point before December 1941, once Pearl Harbor happens, he knows his best chance for victory in his game is to play along with the Americans.

Apr 6, 2023 22:47:13 GMT stevep said:

Much of what Roosevelt was saying was wrong, although he might have believed that.  There was a belief at the time in fascist efficiency and a 'master-plan' for world conquest but we know nowadays how incompetent and disorganised they actually were.  Both internally and between themselves.

That thesis also does not follow. The Axis were each in it for themselves (This includes Russia from 1939 to mid 1941, for they too were part of the Axis of evil. M.). Each nation fought an opportunistic war and yet somehow in 1941, as the Americans saw it, there was a convergence.

Apr 6, 2023 22:47:13 GMT stevep said:

Attacking Pearl Harbour was undoubtedly a huge mistake for Japan and probably they would have been better off not attacking any US possessions at all - but having forces in place to isolate and destroy US aligned ones in the Philippines and Guam.  This would have put the onus on the US to declare war on Japan which if Roosevelt could get a dow past Congress would have lead to a much more divided US on the war.  If he does manage then the isolated Philippines and Guam are going to be mopped up pretty much as they were.  A great danger for the USN might be that - despite the WPO decision to abandon the Philippines as indefensible - there would be strong pressure for the USN to 'do something'.  Which given the qualitative edge that the Japanese had in ship attack at the time and the fact any relief operation would have to move deep into Japanese controlled waters could mean a far worse disaster than OTL Pearl Harbour.  [Even a sustained raid on Japanese held islands could turn nasty, especially if the fleet was slowed to the speed of the old BBs]  Which might in turn prompt further opposition to the war.

See MAP.



Notice the Philippine Islands? They were always going to be attacked. The answer was whether to go with the Through Ticket to Manila or to use the Subway station by station approach.

The old battle-line tactical speed limit, of 16 knots (30 km / h) was never going to work in the cruiser destroyer brawls that were inevitable due to the naval geography involved.

Apr 6, 2023 22:47:13 GMT stevep said:

If the US has to start basically from an advance across the Pacific its always going to be a long war and doubtful you can do it much quicker than OTL unless you assume a lot of luck somewhere I think. 

Three years if the torpedoes work, instead of four as it was. It only took a year to slaughter the Japanese merchant fleet once the torpedoes were fixed.

[stevep]

Apr 7, 2023 0:20:25 GMT miletus12 said:

Apr 6, 2023 22:47:13 GMT stevep said:

If there's no L-L then the US is on its own against the European as well as the Asian axis.  It would be dropping the two big power blocs that carried the bulk of the load in Europe.  Also it might well mean that Japan doesn't have to go to war to gain raw materials from Malaya/DEI and related areas.

That thesis does not follow. The reason it does not follow is that while Stalin may try to cut a deal at some point before December 1941, once Pearl Harbor happens, he knows his best chance for victory in his game is to play along with the Americans.

Apr 6, 2023 22:47:13 GMT stevep said:

Much of what Roosevelt was saying was wrong, although he might have believed that.  There was a belief at the time in fascist efficiency and a 'master-plan' for world conquest but we know nowadays how incompetent and disorganised they actually were.  Both internally and between themselves.

That thesis also does not follow. The Axis were each in it for themselves (This includes Russia from 1939 to mid 1941, for they too were part of the Axis of evil. M.). Each nation fought an opportunistic war and yet somehow in 1941, as the Americans saw it, there was a convergence.

Apr 6, 2023 22:47:13 GMT stevep said:

Attacking Pearl Harbour was undoubtedly a huge mistake for Japan and probably they would have been better off not attacking any US possessions at all - but having forces in place to isolate and destroy US aligned ones in the Philippines and Guam.  This would have put the onus on the US to declare war on Japan which if Roosevelt could get a dow past Congress would have lead to a much more divided US on the war.  If he does manage then the isolated Philippines and Guam are going to be mopped up pretty much as they were.  A great danger for the USN might be that - despite the WPO decision to abandon the Philippines as indefensible - there would be strong pressure for the USN to 'do something'.  Which given the qualitative edge that the Japanese had in ship attack at the time and the fact any relief operation would have to move deep into Japanese controlled waters could mean a far worse disaster than OTL Pearl Harbour.  [Even a sustained raid on Japanese held islands could turn nasty, especially if the fleet was slowed to the speed of the old BBs]  Which might in turn prompt further opposition to the war.

See MAP.



Notice the Philippine Islands? They were always going to be attacked. The answer was whether to go with the Through Ticket to Manila or to use the Subway station by station approach.

The old battle-line tactical speed limit, of 16 knots (30 km / h) was never going to work in the cruiser destroyer brawls that were inevitable due to the naval geography involved.

Apr 6, 2023 22:47:13 GMT stevep said:

If the US has to start basically from an advance across the Pacific its always going to be a long war and doubtful you can do it much quicker than OTL unless you assume a lot of luck somewhere I think. 

Three years if the torpedoes work, instead of four as it was. It only took a year to slaughter the Japanese merchant fleet once the torpedoes were fixed.

  As usual your ignoring what I said or even in the 2nd case seeking to claim what I said as your argument. 

[miletus12]

Apr 7, 2023 10:37:19 GMT stevep said:

Apr 7, 2023 0:20:25 GMT miletus12 said:

That thesis does not follow. The reason it does not follow is that while Stalin may try to cut a deal at some point before December 1941, once Pearl Harbor happens, he knows his best chance for victory in his game is to play along with the Americans.

That thesis also does not follow. The Axis were each in it for themselves (This includes Russia from 1939 to mid 1941, for they too were part of the Axis of evil. M.). Each nation fought an opportunistic war and yet somehow in 1941, as the Americans saw it, there was a convergence.

See MAP.



Notice the Philippine Islands? They were always going to be attacked. The answer was whether to go with the Through Ticket to Manila or to use the Subway station by station approach.

The old battle-line tactical speed limit, of 16 knots (30 km / h) was never going to work in the cruiser destroyer brawls that were inevitable due to the naval geography involved.
Three years if the torpedoes work, instead of four as it was. It only took a year to slaughter the Japanese merchant fleet once the torpedoes were fixed.

  As usual your ignoring what I said or even in the 2nd case seeking to claim what I said as your argument. 

I quoted each point and addressed it as to point. Summary:

Attacking Pearl Harbour was undoubtedly a huge mistake for Japan and probably they would have been better off not attacking any US possessions at all

The Philippine Islands were between the Japanese and Indonesia. That negates the underlined. 

Much of what Roosevelt was saying was wrong,

The February 22 FDR speech that I cited was what the American high command saw and what FDR reported to the American people. It encompasses how the world ocean operates in peace and war. It did not matter how efficient or inefficient the Axis then was. It only mattered in that they were trying to disrupt Allied communications and logistics. and that in their individual efforts the result was convergence.  

if the US has to start basically from an advance across the Pacific its always going to be a long war and doubtful you can do it much quicker than OTL unless you assume a lot of luck somewhere I think.

a. That was the start point, the west coast against Japan. 
b. The torpedo crisis was not luck, it was stupidity. No torpedo crisis and the Japanese run out of shipping (tankers) by late 1943. That means they starve sooner and that means an easier and earlier advance toward the final blockade positions.   

If there's no L-L then the US is on its own against the European as well as the Asian axis

Functionally there was  no Lend Lease before 11 March 1941. The Americans' supply of Lend Lease for offensive operations  did not begin to reach the British and Russians in quantities that mattered until about June 1942. Even then, the way it flowed, it was Britain first and then the leavings for Russia until about February 1943.

The Russians, hence, were not defeated in front of Moscow or Stalingrad. The Russians would not have been defeated because the Germans ran out of stolen French trucks.      

People skew the timescales of when the Russians began successful offensive operations. With the correct timescales in place, plus the fact that the British were still in the fight before Lend Lease made a cross channel invasion possible in France, it can certainly be argued that the US would still have the geographic and military options to operate from where it did, how it did, when it did. Lend Lease substituted British and Russian infantry, tank and truck drivers, and other effects operators for American ones. That is a callous cynical way to read Lend Lease and so far as that goes, I actually agree that Lend Lease made the war easier. 

“Well, let me give you an illustration: Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire. Now, what do I do? I don’t say to him before that operation, “Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.” What is the transaction that goes on? I don’t want $15—I want my garden hose back after the fire is over. All right. If it goes through the fire all right, intact, without any damage to it, he gives it back to me and thanks me very much for the use of it. But suppose it gets smashed up—holes in it—during the fire; we don’t have to have too much formality about it, but I say to him, “I was glad to lend you that hose; I see I can’t use it any more, it’s all smashed up.” He says, “How many feet of it were there?” I tell him, “There were 150 feet of it.” He says, “All right, I will replace it.” Now, if I get a nice garden hose back, I am in pretty good shape.”

FDR

That quote is from December 1940 about three months before the Lend Lease Act and just a week or two after Churchill told FDR that HMG was out of credit and cash for the means to buy supplies, so it would have to be the American taxpayer to fund everything or nothing. 

FDR lied (^^^). It was the American taxpayer. Lend Lease was not about effectors and tools of war, it was not raw materials, food, and fuel and just about everything you could imagine from knotting needles to locomotives to human experts on how to use, either. It was what the American taxpayer funded, to have it built, grown, or purchased from domestic and foreign suppliers (Venezuelan and Mexican oil, and Argentine beef and wool sent to the UK; for example.), and then sent to the British and the Russians and as soon as war with Japan broke out, to the Chinese.     .      

Lend Lease, thus, was not a list of "existent lent commodities" that the Americans expected back. It was the US funding of the war. 

[stevep]

   Lets look at some facts.

a) Yes the Philippines are across the Japanese supply lines, especially after a strike southwards for resources.  That doesn't mean that Japan had to strike the US 1st.  As your agreed with me elsewhere the islands were unsupportable so if the US declares war as a result of a Japanese attack on the European powers then they can still be snapped up fairly quickly as OTL.

b)  What Roosevelt said about the Axis powers was wrong.  It may well have been genuinely what he and other parts of the American leadership thought at the time but it vastly over-estimated the actual level of co-operation in the shambles that was Axis non-cooperation.  That's all I said.

c)  If your only going to consider an drive the long way around across the central Pacific then its going to be a long war.  End of..  You might be able to shorten it by a few months, albeit possibly at higher US casualty rates but that's the case.  The only likely way to shorten the war with say a 1939 POD is to stop them getting resources in the 1st place.

d)  If no L-L, as was suggested by one poster - then the US fights without the UK and most/all of the other historical allies in Europe.  Simple fact.  L-L came in to keep Britain and its allies fighting and if it, in some form doesn't then Britain is forced to make peace.  If Britain is forced to make peace ~April 41 then the Soviets are going to seriously struggle to get aid from the US and won't get any from the UK/allies.  Their also possibly not going to have a casus belli in the Pacific either, at least in the short term as Britain/Netherlands that can't oppose them aren't going to be in a position to deny them the raw materials they want, or provide supply lines to China.

[Max Sinister]

Thanks for all the suggestions! Now I'm wondering which of those might actually be possible - not in a perfect world where you could decide it, but in the messy real world which has politicking, corruption, people with a too big ego etc.

[stevep]

Apr 8, 2023 21:44:40 GMT Max Sinister said:

Thanks for all the suggestions! Now I'm wondering which of those might actually be possible - not in a perfect world where you could decide it, but in the messy real world which has politicking, corruption, people with a too big ego etc.

  Well there are a number of butterflies that might get the option I suggested.  For instance if Ioannis Metaxas the de-facto ruler of Greece hadn't died suddenly in Jan 1941.  He had accepted British material aid but refused to allow British forces on Greek soil as he feared that would prompt a German reaction.  Unfortunately after his death his successor reversed that decision.

  Without that change Greece is still likely to be occupied by the Germans, or possibly more slowly by the Italians as they simply ran out of trained men.  However British/Commonwealth forces wouldn't have been pulled in and would have been available for operations elsewhere.  Most importantly a chance to clear Libya before serious German aid is asked for by Mussolini - finally admitting he has a problem - and arriving.  Instead of the British forces in Cyrenaica being run down and a lot of others being switched to support what turned out to be a costly failure in Greece then while logistics would be a serious problem it should be a practical option, especially with how demoralised the Italians were.  Also denied a chance in Greece such an operation would appeal to Churchill's gung-ho approach to warfare.

  This would be a game changer for the entire British position.  Instead of a continued drain, at sea, in the air and on land, of men and resources the Med would be pretty much partitioned.  Malta would be a lot easier to supply and would lose much of its strategic importance without Axis supply to Libya occurring.  Its likely that having secured his southern flank in the Balkans and rescued the Italians there Hitler, with the desire for the conquest of the USSR would have largely ignored the theatre.  This makes the clearing of Italian E Africa and suppression of pro-Axis movements in places like Iraq and Iran - if they still occur.  Probably a lot of the resources released would be used elsewhere but at least some units are likely to be sent east as the Japanese threat grows and probably there will be a build up of forces in Egypt for possible offensive operations in the Med.  [Plus OTL I know that in 1942 and probably in 1941 Britain was seeking to assemble a force in the Iraq/Iran area to cover against a Soviet collapse and the Germans being able to invade from southern Russia.]  As such there is likely to be a substantial reserve that could be transferred eastwards when the Japanese storm hits.

  Similarly the bulk of the British 1939 sub fleet was designed for a war with Japan and deployed in the Far East.  However the war in Europe and especially the collapse of France and threat of invasion for Britain meant they were drawn westward, initially for an unwise watch on Norway to give warning against invasion from that route and then into the Med to interdict Italian naval and merchant movements.  With the Med largely nullified there's a good chance they could be moved back east and play a big role in disrupting the initial invasions.

  All in all the holding of Malaya and at least key parts of the DEI is the most certain way of shortening the war with a late, i.e. ~1939 POD - other than something that possibly stops France falling.

[raharris1973]

Apr 6, 2023 2:02:46 GMT miletus12 said:

c. Do in 1942 what was done in 1944? The war at sea is decided in early to mid 1943, instead of the latter hald of 1945. You still  have to wait for the Lemay firestorms to raze Japanese warmaking and that depends on B-29s and city killing. I still think the war goes into 1945. 

Does that winning of the war at sea earlier cripple Japan across the board enough in POL that even its land forces can't do Ichigo on the mainland in 1944 against China and U-Go in 1944 against India?  

[miletus12]

Apr 9, 2023 21:38:44 GMT raharris1973 said:

Apr 6, 2023 2:02:46 GMT miletus12 said:

c. Do in 1942 what was done in 1944? The war at sea is decided in early to mid 1943, instead of the latter hald of 1945. You still  have to wait for the Lemay firestorms to raze Japanese warmaking and that depends on B-29s and city killing. I still think the war goes into 1945. 

Does that winning of the war at sea earlier cripple Japan across the board enough in POL that even its land forces can't do Ichigo on the mainland in 1944 against China and U-Go in 1944 against India?  

Actually, the data suiggests; "yes".

If you look at the charts provided at the site, notice the drop-off of activity between 1944 and 1945; especially see the desperation involved in the Japanese shipbuilding program? In a war where merchant shipping for bulk solids haulers to move raw stock ore from occupied China should have been most important for the production of aluminum and steel in the home islands for weapons to be exported to oversea forces: what do you see as the largest single category of ship built? 

Oil tankers.  A lot of POL went into electric generation and into goods movement, even though the majority of power generation was based on coal.   .

The evidence of what the Japanese did, is astonishingly indicative of possible effect results if you shift that column left in those charts by as little of 12 months. I do not claim the war ends in 2 years. Far from it, would I; but it could have ended in China 9 months to a year earlier if the Japanese army there ran out of aircraft, trucks, and the other steel and aluminum based made tools of war. Ichigo was as much the failure to get supply to Chiang's forces as it was the Japanese Army burning up 1943 production to mount their 1944 offensives.  

 

[miletus12]

Chew on this thesis.

January 16, 2020 Topic: Security Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: JapanWorld War IIMilitaryTechnologyNavyU.S. Navy
Japan Really Could Have Won World War II. Here's How.
Here's how.

by James Holmes

Key point: Political victory isn't achieved through overt military dominance alone.

Let's face it. Imperial Japan stood next to no chance of winning a fight to the finish against the United States. Resolve and resources explain why. So long as Americans kept their dander up, demanding that their leaders press on to complete victory, Washington had a mandate to convert the republic's immense industrial potential into a virtually unstoppable armada of ships, aircraft, and armaments. Such a physical mismatch was simply too much for island state Japan -- with an economy about one-tenth the size of America's -- to surmount.

Quantity has a quality all its own. No amount of willpower or martial virtuosity can overcome too lopsided a disparity in numbers. Tokyo stared that plight in the face following Pearl Harbor.

So Japan could never have crushed U.S. maritime forces in the Pacific and imposed terms on Washington. That doesn't mean it couldn't have won World War II. Sounds counterintuitive, doesn't it? But the weak sometimes win. As strategic sage Carl von Clausewitz recounts, history furnishes numerous instances when the weak got their way. Indeed, Clausewitz notes that it sometimes makes sense for the lesser contender to start a fight. If its leadership sees force as the only resort, and if the trendlines look unfavorable -- in other words, if right now is as good as it gets -- then why not act?

There are three basic ways to win wars according to the great Carl. One, you can trounce the enemy's armed forces and dictate whatever terms you please. Short of that, two, you can levy a heavier price from the enemy than he's willing to pay to achieve his goals. The value a belligerent assigns his political objectives determines how many resources he's prepared to expend on those objectives' behalf, and for how long. Taking measures that compel an opponent to expend more lives, armaments, or treasure is one way to raise the price. Dragging out the affair so that he pays heavy costs over time is another. And three, you can dishearten him, persuading him he's unlikely to fulfill his war aims.

A disconsolate adversary, or one who balks at the costs of war, is a pliant adversary. He cuts the best deal he can to exit the imbroglio.

If a military triumph lay beyond Tokyo's reach, the second two methods remained available in the Pacific. Japanese commanders could have husbanded resources, narrowing the force mismatch between the warring sides. They could have made the conflict more costly, painful, and prolonged for America, undercutting its resolve. Or, alternatively, they could have avoided rousing American fury to wage total war in the first place. By foregoing a strike at Hawaii, they could have enfeebled the opponent's resolve or, perhaps, sidelined the opponent entirely.

Bottom line, no likely masterstroke -- no single stratagem or killing blow -- would have defeated the United States. Rather, Japanese commanders should have thought and acted less tactically and more strategically. In so doing they would have improved Japan's chances.

Which brings us to Five Ways Japan Could Have Won. Now, the items catalogued below are far from mutually exclusive. The Japanese leadership would have boosted its prospects had it embraced them all. And granted, enacting some of these measures would have demanded preternaturally farseeing leadership. Foresight was a virtue of which Japan's vacillating emperor and squabbling military rulers were woefully short. Whether it was plausible for them to act wisely is open to debate. With these caveats out of the way, onward!

- Wage one war at a time. Conserving enemies is a must even for the strongest combatants. It's imperative for small states with big ambitions to avoid making war against everyone in sight. Imposing discipline on the war was particularly hard for Japan, whose political system -- patterned on Imperial Germany's, alas -- was stovepiped between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy (IJA and IJN), with no meaningful civilian political oversight. Absent a strong emperor, the army and navy were free to indulge their interservice one-upsmanship, jostling for influence and prestige. The IJA cast its gaze on continental Asia, where a land campaign in Manchuria, then China proper, beckoned. The IJN pushed for a maritime campaign aimed at resources in Southeast Asia. By yielding to these contrary impulses between 1931 and 1941, Japan in effect surrounded itself with enemies of its own accord -- invading Manchuria and China before lashing out at the imperial powers in Southeast Asia and, ultimately, striking at Pearl Harbor. Any tactician worth his salt will tell you a 360-degree threat axis -- threats all around -- makes for perilous times. Tokyo should have set priorities. It might have accomplished some of its goals had it taken things in sequence.

- Listen to Yamamoto. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto reputedly cautioned his superiors that Japan must win a quick, decisive victory lest it awaken the American "sleeping giant" with fateful consequences for Japan. The IJN, prophesied Yamamoto, could run wild for six months -- maybe a year -- before the United States mustered its full power for combat. During that interval, Japan needed to stun American society into a compromise peace -- in effect a partition of the Pacific -- while firming up the island defense perimeter enclosing the Asia-Pacific territories won by Japanese arms. What if its efforts fell short? U.S. industry would be turning out armaments in massive quantities, while new vessels laid down under the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 -- in effect a second, bulked-up U.S. Navy -- would start arriving in the theater. The balance would shift irretrievably. In short, Yamamoto warned military leaders against "script-writing," or assuming the enemy would do precisely what they foresaw. The admiral knew a thing or two about the United States, and understood the American propensity to defy preconceptions.

- Don't listen to Yamamoto. If Admiral Yamamoto rendered wise counsel on the strategic level, it was suspect on the operational level. His solution to the problem of latent U.S. material superiority was to strike at what navalists saw as the hub of enemy power -- the adversary's battle fleet. For decades IJN planners had envisioned waging "interceptive operations" to slow down and weaken the U.S. Pacific Fleet as it steamed westward, presumably to the relief of the Philippine Islands. Once aircraft and submarines deployed to outlying islands whittled the Pacific Fleet down to size, the IJN battle fleet would force a decisive battle. Yamamoto, however, convinced IJN commanders to jettison interceptive operations in favor of a sudden blow at Pearl Harbor. But in reality, the battle line stationed in Hawaii wasn't the core of American naval strength. The nascent Two-Ocean Navy Act fleet was. The best that Yamamoto's scheme could accomplish, consequently, was to delay an American counteroffensive into 1943. Tokyo may have been better off sticking with the interwar plan, which would have driven up U.S. costs, protracted the endeavor, and potentially sapped U.S. perseverance.

- Concentrate rather than disperse resources. Just as Japanese officials seemed incapable of restricting themselves to one war at a time, they seemed incapable of limiting the number of active operations and combat theaters. Look no further than Japanese actions in 1942. IJN task forces struck into the Indian Ocean, inflicting a Pearl Harbor on the British Eastern Fleet off Ceylon. They saw the need to shore up the northern flank at the Battle of Midway by assaulting the remote Aleutian Islands. And they extended the empire's outer defense perimeter -- and assumed vast new waterspace to defend -- by opening a secondary theater in the Solomon Islands, in a vain effort to interrupt sea routes connecting North America with Australia. It's incumbent on the weaker combatant to ask itself whether the gains from secondary enterprises are exceptional, and what it risks in the most important theaters, before undertaking new adventures. Japan, which had fewer resources to spare, raised the costs to itself -- more than the United States -- through its strategic indiscipline.

- Wage unrestricted submarine warfare. Inexplicably, the IJN neglected to do what the U.S. Pacific Fleet set in motion while Battleship Row was still afire: unleash its submarine force to sink any ship, naval or merchant, that flew an enemy flag. By 1945, American boats dismembered the island empire by severing the shipping lanes connecting its parts. Japanese submarines were the equals of their U.S. Navy counterparts. IJN commanders should have looked at the nautical chart, grasped the fact that U.S. naval forces must operate across thousands of miles of ocean simply to reach the Western Pacific, and directed sub skippers to make the transpacific sea lanes no-go zones for American shipping. It's hard to imagine a more straightforward, cost-effective scheme whereby Japan's navy could exact a heavy toll from its opponent. Neglecting undersea warfare was an operational transgression of the first order.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own. This piece was first featured several years ago and is being republished due to reader's interest.

[stevep]

Apr 9, 2023 21:38:44 GMT raharris1973 said:

Apr 6, 2023 2:02:46 GMT miletus12 said:

c. Do in 1942 what was done in 1944? The war at sea is decided in early to mid 1943, instead of the latter hald of 1945. You still  have to wait for the Lemay firestorms to raze Japanese warmaking and that depends on B-29s and city killing. I still think the war goes into 1945. 

Does that winning of the war at sea earlier cripple Japan across the board enough in POL that even its land forces can't do Ichigo on the mainland in 1944 against China and U-Go in 1944 against India?  

  I would say that it would have to be a very dire Japanese position to prevent Japan performing those operations as their army used relatively little oil which would have been the big issue whether using my proposals or miletus12's but they would have lacked air support - which may have played a part in the Ichigo  operation and what few tanks they were able to deploy.  As such depending on the status of the Chinese forces and how much supply they actually get from the west - which will be a major limiting factor in miletus12's route - the Chinese could possibly do a lot better than OTL.

  The basic thing is denying Japan the resources it needs to wage war, whether by keeping them out of Japanese hands or sinking shipping seeking to carry them - especially oil - to whether their needed.

  The mass fire-bombing of civilian centres is largely irrelevant to Japanese war production by the time it started OTL in early 45 but is about undermining their will to continue fighting.

[stevep]

Apr 10, 2023 2:20:19 GMT miletus12 said:

Chew on this thesis.

January 16, 2020 Topic: Security Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: JapanWorld War IIMilitaryTechnologyNavyU.S. Navy
Japan Really Could Have Won World War II. Here's How.
Here's how.

by James Holmes

Key point: Political victory isn't achieved through overt military dominance alone.

Let's face it. Imperial Japan stood next to no chance of winning a fight to the finish against the United States. Resolve and resources explain why. So long as Americans kept their dander up, demanding that their leaders press on to complete victory, Washington had a mandate to convert the republic's immense industrial potential into a virtually unstoppable armada of ships, aircraft, and armaments. Such a physical mismatch was simply too much for island state Japan -- with an economy about one-tenth the size of America's -- to surmount.

Quantity has a quality all its own. No amount of willpower or martial virtuosity can overcome too lopsided a disparity in numbers. Tokyo stared that plight in the face following Pearl Harbor.

So Japan could never have crushed U.S. maritime forces in the Pacific and imposed terms on Washington. That doesn't mean it couldn't have won World War II. Sounds counterintuitive, doesn't it? But the weak sometimes win. As strategic sage Carl von Clausewitz recounts, history furnishes numerous instances when the weak got their way. Indeed, Clausewitz notes that it sometimes makes sense for the lesser contender to start a fight. If its leadership sees force as the only resort, and if the trendlines look unfavorable -- in other words, if right now is as good as it gets -- then why not act?

There are three basic ways to win wars according to the great Carl. One, you can trounce the enemy's armed forces and dictate whatever terms you please. Short of that, two, you can levy a heavier price from the enemy than he's willing to pay to achieve his goals. The value a belligerent assigns his political objectives determines how many resources he's prepared to expend on those objectives' behalf, and for how long. Taking measures that compel an opponent to expend more lives, armaments, or treasure is one way to raise the price. Dragging out the affair so that he pays heavy costs over time is another. And three, you can dishearten him, persuading him he's unlikely to fulfill his war aims.

A disconsolate adversary, or one who balks at the costs of war, is a pliant adversary. He cuts the best deal he can to exit the imbroglio.

If a military triumph lay beyond Tokyo's reach, the second two methods remained available in the Pacific. Japanese commanders could have husbanded resources, narrowing the force mismatch between the warring sides. They could have made the conflict more costly, painful, and prolonged for America, undercutting its resolve. Or, alternatively, they could have avoided rousing American fury to wage total war in the first place. By foregoing a strike at Hawaii, they could have enfeebled the opponent's resolve or, perhaps, sidelined the opponent entirely.

Bottom line, no likely masterstroke -- no single stratagem or killing blow -- would have defeated the United States. Rather, Japanese commanders should have thought and acted less tactically and more strategically. In so doing they would have improved Japan's chances.

Which brings us to Five Ways Japan Could Have Won. Now, the items catalogued below are far from mutually exclusive. The Japanese leadership would have boosted its prospects had it embraced them all. And granted, enacting some of these measures would have demanded preternaturally farseeing leadership. Foresight was a virtue of which Japan's vacillating emperor and squabbling military rulers were woefully short. Whether it was plausible for them to act wisely is open to debate. With these caveats out of the way, onward!

- Wage one war at a time. Conserving enemies is a must even for the strongest combatants. It's imperative for small states with big ambitions to avoid making war against everyone in sight. Imposing discipline on the war was particularly hard for Japan, whose political system -- patterned on Imperial Germany's, alas -- was stovepiped between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy (IJA and IJN), with no meaningful civilian political oversight. Absent a strong emperor, the army and navy were free to indulge their interservice one-upsmanship, jostling for influence and prestige. The IJA cast its gaze on continental Asia, where a land campaign in Manchuria, then China proper, beckoned. The IJN pushed for a maritime campaign aimed at resources in Southeast Asia. By yielding to these contrary impulses between 1931 and 1941, Japan in effect surrounded itself with enemies of its own accord -- invading Manchuria and China before lashing out at the imperial powers in Southeast Asia and, ultimately, striking at Pearl Harbor. Any tactician worth his salt will tell you a 360-degree threat axis -- threats all around -- makes for perilous times. Tokyo should have set priorities. It might have accomplished some of its goals had it taken things in sequence.

- Listen to Yamamoto. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto reputedly cautioned his superiors that Japan must win a quick, decisive victory lest it awaken the American "sleeping giant" with fateful consequences for Japan. The IJN, prophesied Yamamoto, could run wild for six months -- maybe a year -- before the United States mustered its full power for combat. During that interval, Japan needed to stun American society into a compromise peace -- in effect a partition of the Pacific -- while firming up the island defense perimeter enclosing the Asia-Pacific territories won by Japanese arms. What if its efforts fell short? U.S. industry would be turning out armaments in massive quantities, while new vessels laid down under the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 -- in effect a second, bulked-up U.S. Navy -- would start arriving in the theater. The balance would shift irretrievably. In short, Yamamoto warned military leaders against "script-writing," or assuming the enemy would do precisely what they foresaw. The admiral knew a thing or two about the United States, and understood the American propensity to defy preconceptions.

- Don't listen to Yamamoto. If Admiral Yamamoto rendered wise counsel on the strategic level, it was suspect on the operational level. His solution to the problem of latent U.S. material superiority was to strike at what navalists saw as the hub of enemy power -- the adversary's battle fleet. For decades IJN planners had envisioned waging "interceptive operations" to slow down and weaken the U.S. Pacific Fleet as it steamed westward, presumably to the relief of the Philippine Islands. Once aircraft and submarines deployed to outlying islands whittled the Pacific Fleet down to size, the IJN battle fleet would force a decisive battle. Yamamoto, however, convinced IJN commanders to jettison interceptive operations in favor of a sudden blow at Pearl Harbor. But in reality, the battle line stationed in Hawaii wasn't the core of American naval strength. The nascent Two-Ocean Navy Act fleet was. The best that Yamamoto's scheme could accomplish, consequently, was to delay an American counteroffensive into 1943. Tokyo may have been better off sticking with the interwar plan, which would have driven up U.S. costs, protracted the endeavor, and potentially sapped U.S. perseverance.

- Concentrate rather than disperse resources. Just as Japanese officials seemed incapable of restricting themselves to one war at a time, they seemed incapable of limiting the number of active operations and combat theaters. Look no further than Japanese actions in 1942. IJN task forces struck into the Indian Ocean, inflicting a Pearl Harbor on the British Eastern Fleet off Ceylon. They saw the need to shore up the northern flank at the Battle of Midway by assaulting the remote Aleutian Islands. And they extended the empire's outer defense perimeter -- and assumed vast new waterspace to defend -- by opening a secondary theater in the Solomon Islands, in a vain effort to interrupt sea routes connecting North America with Australia. It's incumbent on the weaker combatant to ask itself whether the gains from secondary enterprises are exceptional, and what it risks in the most important theaters, before undertaking new adventures. Japan, which had fewer resources to spare, raised the costs to itself -- more than the United States -- through its strategic indiscipline.

- Wage unrestricted submarine warfare. Inexplicably, the IJN neglected to do what the U.S. Pacific Fleet set in motion while Battleship Row was still afire: unleash its submarine force to sink any ship, naval or merchant, that flew an enemy flag. By 1945, American boats dismembered the island empire by severing the shipping lanes connecting its parts. Japanese submarines were the equals of their U.S. Navy counterparts. IJN commanders should have looked at the nautical chart, grasped the fact that U.S. naval forces must operate across thousands of miles of ocean simply to reach the Western Pacific, and directed sub skippers to make the transpacific sea lanes no-go zones for American shipping. It's hard to imagine a more straightforward, cost-effective scheme whereby Japan's navy could exact a heavy toll from its opponent. Neglecting undersea warfare was an operational transgression of the first order.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own. This piece was first featured several years ago and is being republished due to reader's interest.

  Good summary.  I would disagree with "listen to Yamamoto" as his aggressive actions removed the best prospect Japan had of coming out with a 'win' so once that's happened it take a massive collapse in US morale to stop the clear defeat of Japan.  Otherwise basically what I've been arguing in terms of forcing the enemy to fight as close to your terms as you can get.