Quicker US victory over Japan in WW2

[Max Sinister]

This is something I also have pondered several times. Unfortunately, I'm neither an expert for the Pacific War nor for naval war in general. (I've read a lot about WW2, but usually concentrate on the European/North African theater.)

Would it be possible for the US and Allies to defeat Japan earlier, on the assumption that the war still starts in late 1941? With their troops standing in Okinawa about one whole year earlier and a landing on the Main Islands being the next step? Since nukes aren't available yet? Even if the SU was still neutral?

Would this be possible if FDR decided to throw 60% of the US' power against Japan, instead of 40%? Or 80%, or almost 100% even, in case Nazi Germany decided not to declare war?

Or would we need a different PoD? Maybe the US learning of the planned attack and removing most ships, or putting up better defense in Pearl Harbor? Or is this possible only with an earlier PoD?

[lordroel]

Apr 5, 2023 14:11:01 GMT Max Sinister said:

Would this be possible if FDR decided to throw 60% of the US' power against Japan, instead of 40%? Or 80%, or almost 100% even, in case Nazi Germany decided not to declare war?

Japan wins the Battle of Midway, raids the East Coast, attacks the Panama Canal, that might force FDR to move more resources to fight Japan instead of Germany.

[Max Sinister]

Apr 5, 2023 14:43:00 GMT lordroel said:

Apr 5, 2023 14:11:01 GMT Max Sinister said:

Would this be possible if FDR decided to throw 60% of the US' power against Japan, instead of 40%? Or 80%, or almost 100% even, in case Nazi Germany decided not to declare war?

Japan wins the Battle of Midway, raids the East Coast, attacks the Panama Canal, that might force FDR to move more resources to fight Japan instead of Germany.

Maybe, if this is feasible - I don't know. (Maybe if the Japanese took out the US carriers as well, if they had been around Pearl Harbor? But that'd give the Japanese an even bigger advance than IOTL. Which means that the Allies would need even more time to take back lost territory.)

On the map, it looks like the US "only have to take a few islands". But especially if they want to play it safe, each of those needs time, for destroying the Japanese navy and airforce, make a landing, break the defenses/fortifications, defeat any last Japanese soldier resisting (and you know how they thought that surrendering was dishonorable), rinse and repeat... even with island-hopping!

Or would a different, more daring commander (Patton?) be able to make a faster conquest, even if the Allies suffered more casualties?

[lordroel]

Apr 5, 2023 15:21:25 GMT Max Sinister said:

Or would a different, more daring commander (Patton?) be able to make a faster conquest, even if the Allies suffered more casualties?

Patton and MacArthur, the Pacific War cannot handle thier ego, unless MacArthur dies during the Japanse invasion of the Philippines.

[Max Sinister]

Apr 5, 2023 15:24:18 GMT lordroel said:

Apr 5, 2023 15:21:25 GMT Max Sinister said:

Or would a different, more daring commander (Patton?) be able to make a faster conquest, even if the Allies suffered more casualties?

Patton and MacArthur, the Pacific War cannot handle thier ego, unless MacArthur dies during the Japanse invasion of the Philippines.

I definitely guess so. And I wouldn't have a problem with MacArthur being killed, in general.

[stevep]

   The best option would be that things go better for Britain in the early stages of the war which means that the forces in SE Asia aren't drawn down as much and their able with reinforcements to hold Malaya/Sumatra/Java region.  The US is persuaded to fully support this and the Coral Sea/Midway/Solomon's type initial exhaustion battle occur in this region.  From this the US is persuaded to push north, obvious route being via Borneo/Celebes into the Philippines.  This would get US forces a lot closer a lot earlier, albeit that also means they won't have the ground forces especially that they had OTL in 44/45.

  The other, probably even bigger bonuses are that Japan is denied the vital raw materials they went to war for and also aid to China can be done a lot more efficiently.  Those will greatly reduce the Japanese ability to seriously contest any allied advance.

  Its still likely it would take until 43/44 for a victory over Japan, quite possibly with greater US losses than OTL especially if it involves an invasion of Japan itself.  Unless some deal is done with less than unconditional surrender but that would probably be unlikely.

[TheRomanSlayer]

Placing Patton or some other US general in charge in the Philippines would be a given, although I wonder if placing Dugout Doug in Europe would make things a bit better or worse. However, there's a reason why a lot of Filipinos love MacArthur in the first place.

I would also say that having the US become more alert and prepared in Pearl Harbor could result in lessened casualties in the event that the Japanese would attack.

[miletus12]

Apr 5, 2023 14:11:01 GMT Max Sinister said:

This is something I also have pondered several times. Unfortunately, I'm neither an expert for the Pacific War nor for naval war in general. (I've read a lot about WW2, but usually concentrate on the European/North African theater.)

Would it be possible for the US and Allies to defeat Japan earlier, on the assumption that the war still starts in late 1941? With their troops standing in Okinawa about one whole year earlier and a landing on the Main Islands being the next step? Since nukes aren't available yet? Even if the SU was still neutral?

Would this be possible if FDR decided to throw 60% of the US' power against Japan, instead of 40%? Or 80%, or almost 100% even, in case Nazi Germany decided not to declare war?

Or would we need a different PoD? Maybe the US learning of the planned attack and removing most ships, or putting up better defense in Pearl Harbor? Or is this possible only with an earlier PoD?

Well, you might have come to the right place.

It always helps, when a foreign viewpoint makes the American argument. 

I can summarise the situation as it was and then tell you what "sixes" the Allies have to roll to make an early Japanese defeat possible. 

To put it succinctly, the Allies had about equal naval power and TWICE as many troops and aircraft as the Japanese devoted to the Southern Road. The factors that caused the Japanese to win so clearly and quickly, was the stationing of 3rd rate commanders (British and American) and  political leaders (Dutch, Helfrich specifically ), cross national jealousies (British, Chinese, American) , inadequate defense planning (British), utter incompetence, (British), wishful thinking, (British), arrogance (British and American) , and fabulous stupidity at the highest command levels, (Pound, Phillips, Wavell. Percival, Brook Popham, Stark, Kimmel, Short, Pye and Wainwright, and Brereton) and such factionalized and compartmented and narrow-minded applicatiion of available assets that the Japanese were able to exploit interior lines, shorter supply distances and  locally concentrate at contact at the necessary 2 to 1 offense / defense odds to easily defeat the untrained amateurs who opposed them, despite some incompetents of their own (Namely Yamamoto, Nagumo, Takagi, Oto, Inouye, Fukedome and Homma.).

See MAP.
          


To defend against the Malaya action was IMPOSSIBLE. The reason was because British Eastern Command was filled with incompetents, who misjudged the range of Japanese twin engine bombers, the IJNAS antiship land based aircraft anti-ship capacity, and the basically idiotic British army command that had refused to prepare a series of retirement lines across the neck of the Kra Peninisula once they knew the Japanese had landed in Thailand and seized the "Churchill aerodromes" just across the Thai / Malay settlements border. Those Japanese forces headed for Singapore, came out of southeast Asia, what used to be French Indochina, and was supported by those bombers that killed Force Z in the Gulf of Siam, that flew out of FRENCH air fields around Saigon. 

I should mention that Malay nationalists and British traitors gave Yamashita, the complete British order of battle, and plan of operation.

It is also easy for the attacker to win when the defender does not know how to establish a defense line (Percieval), lets his air force be committed piecemeal (Brook Popham) and has a defense led by two complete imbeciles whose experience on land in WWI (Percieval) was to become a shell-shock casualty, and at sea, (Pound and Phillips) was to parade battleships in a pass in review.     

Compared to them; the Philippines command, who let their air command get slaughtered on the ground (Brereton) and whose army command bungled the counterattack at Lingayen Plain (Wainwright, the drunk, and MacArthur the stage actor.), turned in sterling performances against heavier odds. 

The Dutch had Conrad Helfrich as their political albatross, but below that poltroon, the senior army, navy and especially air force commanders did better than their better armed and supposedly more capable British and American counterparts.  Dutch submariners and airman proved far more competent than their allied cousins for as long as they lasted. 

If there were any Shining Moments among my countrymen, it was ADMS, Hart and Glassford. Some of their fights were well planned raids against Japanese landing attempts. They had too few ships and had to dance to Helfrich's and Wavell's directives, which made no military sense, since the only logical moves in January to March 1942 was to delay and buy time.    

Commander Far East Asia Submarines, Thomas Withers, however, should have been court martialed for dereliction of duty and summarily imprisoned. He demoralized, and misused the submarines under his command in such an appalling manner that five which need not have been lost, were sunk, and NONE of them were effective in the defensive plans in place.    

I do not think there were any British remedies possible for Malaya, for that was how fouled ujp British Eastern Command was. The only hope lay with the ANZACs, Dutch and Americans.          

Apr 5, 2023 15:21:25 GMT Max Sinister said:

Maybe, if this is feasible - I don't know. (Maybe if the Japanese took out the US carriers as well, if they had been around Pearl Harbor? But that'd give the Japanese an even bigger advance than IOTL. Which means that the Allies would need even more time to take back lost territory.)

On the map, it looks like the US "only have to take a few islands". But especially if they want to play it safe, each of those needs time, for destroying the Japanese navy and airforce, make a landing, break the defenses/fortifications, defeat any last Japanese soldier resisting (and you know how they thought that surrendering was dishonorable), rinse and repeat... even with island-hopping!

Or would a different, more daring commander (Patton?) be able to make a faster conquest, even if the Allies suffered more casualties?

The Pacific War depended on aircraft, on submarines, on engineers, on logistics and on amphibious assault infantry. That takes time to create if you do not have them. The big showy naval battles  are less meaningful than helpless Japanese ships stuck at Chu'uK because there are no Japanese oil tankers to bring fuel forward, or freighters  to bring food and ammunition to stranded Japanese troops. The Pacific War was not about land armies, it was about use and denial of the sea.  It was about getting into a position of blockade and bombardment to starve and shock the Japanese home islands' population into surrender. 

Apr 5, 2023 21:17:20 GMT stevep said:

   The best option would be that things go better for Britain in the early stages of the war which means that the forces in SE Asia aren't drawn down as much and their able with reinforcements to hold Malaya/Sumatra/Java region.  The US is persuaded to fully support this and the Coral Sea/Midway/Solomon's type initial exhaustion battle occur in this region.  From this the US is persuaded to push north, obvious route being via Borneo/Celebes into the Philippines.  This would get US forces a lot closer a lot earlier, albeit that also means they won't have the ground forces especially that they had OTL in 44/45.

  The other, probably even bigger bonuses are that Japan is denied the vital raw materials they went to war for and also aid to China can be done a lot more efficiently.  Those will greatly reduce the Japanese ability to seriously contest any allied advance.

  Its still likely it would take until 43/44 for a victory over Japan, quite possibly with greater US losses than OTL especially if it involves an invasion of Japan itself.  Unless some deal is done with less than unconditional surrender but that would probably be unlikely.

Plan Orange was the only plan that formed the basis of decisive action.

Fighting the Japanese in the South China Sea, as Dudley Pound intended, showed an appallingly amateurish grasp of naval geography and effectors. To call the British plan, moronic, was to insult morons.



=========================================================

But given the nature of Plan Orange and the need to bomb Japan into rubble; while sending its merchant fleet to the bottom, the prime effectors=> aircraft and submarines, and MARINES which should have been the focus of American naval effort, was shortchanged by the "gun club".   

Once you know what your tools are and what you need to do with those tools, you quickly understand what you have to have to effect your national strategy.
      
a. Your fleet has to attain control and use of the sea and the air above it. You can use land based air forces to achieve this end, but you might need a blue water navy to fight enemy surface fleets to prevent the enemy from invading islands which hold your airfields. Conversely, you want to neutralize his land-based air and invade his island airfields.  In an aircraft carrier centric surface fleet, you will quickly find aircraft carriers (dive bombers) neutralize each other, so you need torpedo bombers to sink enemy aircraft carriers and you need destroyers and cruisers to SCREEN aircraft carriers and island airfields from their enemy counterparts. The best way to handle your enemy counterpart effectors is via torpedo.

b. American saying: "Bombs and shells create portholes. TORPEDOES sink them and drown them." Whether by Devastator, Porter class destroyer or Sargo class submarine, the TORPEDO has to work.  The Marks 13, 14, and 15 clanged into 150 IJN warships and 800 freighters in 1942 and did not function. What if they had?  

3 aircraft carriers killed.
2 battleships killed.
11 cruisers killed.
200+ transports sunk.
50 oilers sunk. 

c. Do in 1942 what was done in 1944? The war at sea is decided in early to mid 1943, instead of the latter hald of 1945. You still  have to wait for the Lemay firestorms to raze Japanese warmaking and that depends on B-29s and city killing. I still think the war goes into 1945. 

[belushitd]

Have the US start the two ocean navy a year earlier. The limiting factor in the US advance across the Pacific wasn't the strength of the Japanese Navy, it was the lack of aircraft carriers and cargo ships / tankers.

If you get the shipyards in the US to start the buildup a year earlier, you can possibly move the commissioning dates of the first tranche of Essex carriers a year earlier. Of course, that means that the triggering event to shock the politicians into action would have to be the German annexing of Czechoslovakia, so maybe a year and a quarter earlier, since the triggering event in @ was the fall of France.

Of course, I'm not sure exactly how that would work with the slips in the yards at the time. Additional shifts could be hired and put to work to complete existing construction early, but I don't know if you'd actually get a full year advancement of the Essex class carriers.

In the long run, you might see Kentucky and Illinois completed, rather than construction being halted. But, then again, maybe not. The Montanas still probably never see steel cut.

Kicking the merchant shipping into high gear probably wouldn't happen much earlier than in @, as the triggering event for that was the losses to submarines in late 39 and early 40. You might be able to save a fair number of ships due to having additional escorts from the earlier Two Ocean Navy ships available to prevent the second "happy time" off the east and gulf coasts of the US, which would mean the existing ships wouldn't get sunk as quickly, leaving them available to haul cargo to support the Pacific advances.

Belushi TD

[miletus12]

Battleships are a waste of steel. Get the torpedoes to work and learn how to night fight before Pearl Harbor. Also Learn from the Canadians how to ASW. The British on the other side of the Pond were TERRIBLE at it.

[TheRomanSlayer]

There was also the fact that two British spies working for Japan had also passed information to the Japanese government, namely Sempill and Rutland. I actually covered a bit about these guys in an old TL that I was not able to finish.

[DMZ]

I see no reason why anything could have been changed before the start of the war. Building up the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Force and Two Ocean Navy Act would have been as IOTL.

As soon as PH, some "little" changes could have been of huge impact.

The first is taking into account the war declaration to put into alert airfields in Philippines and launch retaliation raid on Formosa. It could have disrupted the initial Japanese attack and extended the American-Philipos resistance, leading to a delay in the whole Japanese invasion timeline. This could have helped Allies to stop them earlier.

"Germany First!"
There was no chance FDR would have assigned more ressources to Pacific War, even if Hitler didn't have declared war to USA. FDR would have find a way to start the fight with Germany, probably with a sunk US destroyer by an U-Boot (or vice versa).

Anyway, there were plenty of ressources in the Pacific Ocean Theatre and choosing Nimitz strategy to invade Formosa instead of the Philippines after the island hopping through Micronesia would have given earlier a closer plateform to bomb Japan and a base to threaten either Japan and China coast, allowing USA to help TKS and KMT to repel Japanese from the southern China. The supply lines would have been cut between Japan and SE Asia as well as with Pilippines invasion but also communication lines between Japan and China would have been theatened as well with bombers in addition to the submarines historically used.

IMHO, having Nimitz as single commander in the POT from the beginning would have eased the definition of the strategy and speed up the Japan blockade.

Taking into account the British experience against U-Boots in the Atlantique to impose convoys in American waters from the very beginning of the war would also have saved a lot of ressources and eased the ramp up of the American power overseas, including in the POT.

[stevep]

Apr 6, 2023 2:36:47 GMT miletus12 said:

Battleships are a waste of steel. Get the torpedoes to work and learn how to night fight before Pearl Harbor. Also Learn from the Canadians how to ASW. The British on the other side of the Pond were TERRIBLE at it.

  Given the fact it was the RN which was training the RCN and supplying the bulk of their equipment that's even more BS than your usual comments on a war you clearly have no understanding off.  Once the USN finally took its head out of its arse and accepted that the U boat was was important and that it could learn from others - despite that idiot King's orders - then it was finally able to make a substantial contribution to the most important battle in the entire war.

  As pointed out War Plan Orange was a solely US plan, ignoring events elsewhere,  It won't gain a day in the victory against Japan because it relies on massive forces that currently aren't in existence and a long period of advance before it can threaten the supply lines that Japan depends on.  Stop them getting those resources in the 1st place achieves the primary aim of the OP even if it doesn't pander to some fragile egos.

[stevep]

Apr 6, 2023 2:09:14 GMT belushitd said:

Have the US start the two ocean navy a year earlier. The limiting factor in the US advance across the Pacific wasn't the strength of the Japanese Navy, it was the lack of aircraft carriers and cargo ships / tankers.

If you get the shipyards in the US to start the buildup a year earlier, you can possibly move the commissioning dates of the first tranche of Essex carriers a year earlier. Of course, that means that the triggering event to shock the politicians into action would have to be the German annexing of Czechoslovakia, so maybe a year and a quarter earlier, since the triggering event in @ was the fall of France.

Of course, I'm not sure exactly how that would work with the slips in the yards at the time. Additional shifts could be hired and put to work to complete existing construction early, but I don't know if you'd actually get a full year advancement of the Essex class carriers.

In the long run, you might see Kentucky and Illinois completed, rather than construction being halted. But, then again, maybe not. The Montanas still probably never see steel cut.

Kicking the merchant shipping into high gear probably wouldn't happen much earlier than in @, as the triggering event for that was the losses to submarines in late 39 and early 40. You might be able to save a fair number of ships due to having additional escorts from the earlier Two Ocean Navy ships available to prevent the second "happy time" off the east and gulf coasts of the US, which would mean the existing ships wouldn't get sunk as quickly, leaving them available to haul cargo to support the Pacific advances.

Belushi TD

  If you could do this it would help although given hostility towards rearmament and also political hostility towards Roosevelt its going to take some doing.  However your still going to have a big task in terms of pushing resources and technology that much earlier and without a fighting war and shocks like the fall of western Europe to drive the sense of crisis.  Such a programme is going to seem to many too much like the US 1916 programme.  A massive expansion of the navy without a clear need and only benefiting assorted business interests.

  Also you need to have the manpower and resources to occupy a lot of land before you can really threaten Japanese supply lines.  Similarly its doubtful if the B-29's could be completed much earlier although possible B-17s and B-24s could be used for the fire-bombing of Japanese cities once their close enough and the Japanese air defence is denuded enough.

[miletus12]

Apr 6, 2023 7:20:37 GMT DMZ said:

I see no reason why anything could have been changed before the start of the war. Building up the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Force and Two Ocean Navy Act would have been as IOTL.

The amount of resources might be the same, but emphasis or tweaking of what was important could have been altered.  The million dollar ice cream budget could have been spent on weapon proofs, for example.  

As soon as PH, some "little" changes could have been of huge impact.

Pearl Harbor was too late. The mistakes were in effect. 

The first is taking into account the war declaration to put into alert airfields in Philippines and launch retaliation raid on Formosa. It could have disrupted the initial Japanese attack and extended the American-Philipos resistance, leading to a

"Germany First!"

That decision of Germany first was a sound one based on the political indices. Stalin was the bigger mass-murderer, but the Russians were technologically incompetent (or at least more incompetent than the Hitler led Germans) and had thus far restricted their stupidity to inside Russia. It was only their alliance with Germany first and then later with the Anglo-Amerocans that allowed them to export their murderous "socialist" imperialism beyond their own borders. With Hitler, you received genocide as an export commodity and that "trade commodity" (sarcasm) had to be stopped at all costs. The Japanese, under Hirohito / Tojo,  were more run of the mill 19th century racist colonial imperialist idiots, who were along for that fascist ride to ruin.    

There was no chance FDR would have assigned more ressources to Pacific War, even if Hitler didn't have declared war to USA. FDR would have find a way to start the fight with Germany, probably with a sunk US destroyer by an U-Boot (or vice versa).

His Gulf of Tonkin action was already planned to happen somewhere near Iceland in the Denmark Strait where Task Force I was expected to encounter a German raider.

Anyway, there were plenty of ressources in the Pacific Ocean Theatre and choosing Nimitz strategy to invade Formosa instead of the Philippines after the island hopping through Micronesia would have given earlier a closer plateform to bomb Japan and a base to threaten either Japan and China coast, allowing USA to help TKS and KMT to repel Japanese from the southern China. The supply lines would have been cut between Japan and SE Asia as well as with Pilippines invasion but also communication lines between Japan and China would have been theatened as well with bombers in addition to the submarines historically used.

Formosa is a land warfare geographic nightmare with rugged hilly terrain just dotted with caves. The Taiwanese were an unknown quantity. They could fight against the Americans.  There were also 300,000 Japanese on the island before Pearl Harbor. It was estimated it would take a half million Americans a whole YEAR to clean it out.  The Philippine Islands was a lot easier and that objective had Filipinos in that nation who were dedicated to gaining their freedom. Better to fight where you know the situation.   

IMHO, having Nimitz as single commander in the POT from the beginning would have eased the definition of the strategy and speed up the Japan blockade.

That depends. The British tried unified command with Wavell (From Iraq to Malaya) in 1940-1942 and found it was structurally impractical.  There is some sense in taking that gigantic puzzle problem of half of the world ocean and separating it out into smaller manageable subsets.  Plus FDR had to neutralize the "stage actor". (MacArthur.).

Taking into account the British experience against U-Boots in the Atlantique to impose convoys in American waters from the very beginning of the war would also have saved a lot of ressources and eased the ramp up of the American power overseas, including in the POT.

I actually agree that convoy (As the Americans did in WWI and the British failed to do until it was almost too late.), was necessary. It was more a lack of escorts, suitable aircraft, (Lend Lease) and misallocation of resources during the 1939-1941 period that led to the Drumbeat disaster. Unlike the British who, were ineffectual for that same period, after the Americans adjusted their resources, it took them a year to stabilize both sides of the North Atlantic. I would argue, that past March 1943, that the Americans still did not allocate enough aircraft for long range maritime patroi. The Canadians harped on this resource as being necessary to drive the U-boats down and deny them coastal operating areas. The bomber barons, be they British or American, refused to release enough long endurance Liberators to meet the minimum needs right through to the end of the war.