Quicker US victory over Japan in WW2

[simon darkshade]

Should you wish to continue that tangent, please PM me so we don’t go off topic further. I’m always interested in discussing economic history.

Your final point is correct. Should Japan be defeated by, say, mid 1944, then it is possible that the end of the war in Europe would be slightly accelerated. This would save *some* blood and treasure, but for a decisive saving, then there need to be different choices made to wrap things up by Christmas ‘44. That is not impossible, but a different scenario to this one.

[lordroel]

Apr 14, 2023 9:51:00 GMT simon darkshade said:

Should you wish to continue that tangent, please PM me so we don’t go off topic further. I’m always interested in discussing economic history.

Your final point is correct. Should Japan be defeated by, say, mid 1944, then it is possible that the end of the war in Europe would be slightly accelerated. This would save *some* blood and treasure, but for a decisive saving, then there need to be different choices made to wrap things up by Christmas ‘44. That is not impossible, but a different scenario to this one.

Mid 1944, so to late to see US Marines to storm the beaches of Normandy.

[simon darkshade]

I don’t think that there are drivers for a significant USMC combat deployment to the ETO. Setting aside interservice rivalry issues that are cited as surface level explanations, the TOE of Marine units was a bit light on for Europe. You’d be more likely to see some of the ‘Pacific divisions’ of the US Army used in the ETO, if there was a significantly early finish in the Pacific.

[lordroel]

Apr 14, 2023 10:25:37 GMT simon darkshade said:

I don’t think that there are drivers for a significant USMC combat deployment to the ETO. Setting aside interservice rivalry issues that are cited as surface level explanations, the TOE of Marine units was a bit light on for Europe. You’d be more likely to see some of the ‘Pacific divisions’ of the US Army used in the ETO, if there was a significantly early finish in the Pacific.

But moving them takes time i assume, so it will be a while before they can be used in the ETO.

[raharris1973]

Apr 9, 2023 23:59:14 GMT miletus12 said:

Ichigo was as much the failure to get supply to Chiang's forces as it was the Japanese Army burning up 1943 production to mount their 1944 offensives.  

Unpacking this comment -

Would the accelerated successes in the war at sea from 1942 have dented Japanese production for 1943?

China was the American ally in about the worst position in the world to be supplied by the other Allies. Would accelerated successes in the war at sea from 1942 have sped in any meaningful way the Burma campaign and thus the opening of the Ledo or Burma Roads, which OTL took so long to open? Or possibly opened a SLOC across the Pacific to the South China Sea to South China by about the beginning of 1945, before ICHIGO was over and had done all its damage?

[stevep]

Apr 21, 2023 0:44:22 GMT raharris1973 said:

Apr 9, 2023 23:59:14 GMT miletus12 said:

Ichigo was as much the failure to get supply to Chiang's forces as it was the Japanese Army burning up 1943 production to mount their 1944 offensives.  

Unpacking this comment -

Would the accelerated successes in the war at sea from 1942 have dented Japanese production for 1943?

China was the American ally in about the worst position in the world to be supplied by the other Allies. Would accelerated successes in the war at sea from 1942 have sped in any meaningful way the Burma campaign and thus the opening of the Ledo or Burma Roads, which OTL took so long to open? Or possibly opened a SLOC across the Pacific to the South China Sea to South China by about the beginning of 1945, before ICHIGO was over and had done all its damage?

  I can't see the former as the US was:

a)  Paying at least some attention to the more serious crisis in Europe which lead to the Europe First Policy

b)  In the Pacific there was the navy pushing for the long approach across the Pacific and the army, chiefly MacArthur, pushing for a return to the Philippines, which once SE Asia was lost was an even longer route. 

c)  With the Med closed, the Atlantic still bitterly contested and no easy supply route from the US - which would have to supply the materials if not the manpower for an earlier liberation of Burma to reopen the Burma road - it would be a huge logistical task to drive the Japanese from the region.  Much easier to supply the Chinese once its done compared to flying in ;over the hump' but you would need to make sure sufficient supplies reached them rather than so much going to a US strategic air force operating from inside China, which was the initial trigger for Ichigo.

  The latter might be an option but it still needs a long advance via either route and the liberating of either the Philippines or Taiwan to get a route through to mainland China and then probably the capture of a port as I think Japan had control of the main ones. 

[raharris1973]

Apr 21, 2023 14:43:16 GMT stevep said:

Apr 21, 2023 0:44:22 GMT raharris1973 said:

Unpacking this comment -

Would the accelerated successes in the war at sea from 1942 have dented Japanese production for 1943?

China was the American ally in about the worst position in the world to be supplied by the other Allies. Would accelerated successes in the war at sea from 1942 have sped in any meaningful way the Burma campaign and thus the opening of the Ledo or Burma Roads, which OTL took so long to open? Or possibly opened a SLOC across the Pacific to the South China Sea to South China by about the beginning of 1945, before ICHIGO was over and had done all its damage?

  I can't see the former as the US was:

a)  Paying at least some attention to the more serious crisis in Europe which lead to the Europe First Policy

b)  In the Pacific there was the navy pushing for the long approach across the Pacific and the army, chiefly MacArthur, pushing for a return to the Philippines, which once SE Asia was lost was an even longer route. 

c)  With the Med closed, the Atlantic still bitterly contested and no easy supply route from the US - which would have to supply the materials if not the manpower for an earlier liberation of Burma to reopen the Burma road - it would be a huge logistical task to drive the Japanese from the region.  Much easier to supply the Chinese once its done compared to flying in ;over the hump' but you would need to make sure sufficient supplies reached them rather than so much going to a US strategic air force operating from inside China, which was the initial trigger for Ichigo.

  The latter might be an option but it still needs a long advance via either route and the liberating of either the Philippines or Taiwan to get a route through to mainland China and then probably the capture of a port as I think Japan had control of the main ones. 

It sounds like you are presuming argument is that the Americans/Allies would devote more effort to the China Burma India theater - hence why you bring up all the, quite sensible, arguments about why the Americans/Allies would not do that, because of higher priorities.

But that wasn’t the basis of my question/argument. I wasn’t supposing they would allocate an additional soldier, airplane, ship or gallon of gasoline for the front. On the contrary, my presupposition was that fuel and supply shortages inflicted on the Japanese through the better US sub campaign with good torpedoes and mines would be the thing limiting the *Japanese* level of effort on the mainland, especially offensively, due to denial of fuel and other supplies.

[stevep]

Apr 21, 2023 17:52:48 GMT raharris1973 said:

Apr 21, 2023 14:43:16 GMT stevep said:

  I can't see the former as the US was:

a)  Paying at least some attention to the more serious crisis in Europe which lead to the Europe First Policy

b)  In the Pacific there was the navy pushing for the long approach across the Pacific and the army, chiefly MacArthur, pushing for a return to the Philippines, which once SE Asia was lost was an even longer route. 

c)  With the Med closed, the Atlantic still bitterly contested and no easy supply route from the US - which would have to supply the materials if not the manpower for an earlier liberation of Burma to reopen the Burma road - it would be a huge logistical task to drive the Japanese from the region.  Much easier to supply the Chinese once its done compared to flying in ;over the hump' but you would need to make sure sufficient supplies reached them rather than so much going to a US strategic air force operating from inside China, which was the initial trigger for Ichigo.

  The latter might be an option but it still needs a long advance via either route and the liberating of either the Philippines or Taiwan to get a route through to mainland China and then probably the capture of a port as I think Japan had control of the main ones. 

It sounds like you are presuming argument is that the Americans/Allies would devote more effort to the China Burma India theater - hence why you bring up all the, quite sensible, arguments about why the Americans/Allies would not do that, because of higher priorities.

But that wasn’t the basis of my question/argument. I wasn’t supposing they would allocate an additional soldier, airplane, ship or gallon of gasoline for the front. On the contrary, my presupposition was that fuel and supply shortages inflicted on the Japanese through the better US sub campaign with good torpedoes and mines would be the thing limiting the *Japanese* level of effort on the mainland, especially offensively, due to denial of fuel and other supplies.

  No my initial argument was that some factor meant that the allies held onto Malaya and the DEI or at least the key western regions of them - which would therefore deny Japan the supplies that it went to war for.  In that case not only is it that much weaker but the logical location from which allied offensive would best start would be that region as its a lot closer to the Philippines and China - with say Borneo as the obvious stepping stone towards both of them.  Its a lot closer than slogging in from the Solomon's or across the western Pacific and in the latter case wouldn't need to wait for the Essex class to enter service in numbers as land based air could carry much of the load of air cover.  Furthermore in such a scenario its quite likely that Burma holds as well in which case the Burma road stays open throughout the conflict, enabling much larger amounts of resources to reach China by that route.

  Plus I wouldn't say that internal power struggles between the US army and the USN was a sensible argument.

[raharris1973]

Apr 21, 2023 21:52:38 GMT stevep said:

Apr 21, 2023 17:52:48 GMT raharris1973 said:

It sounds like you are presuming argument is that the Americans/Allies would devote more effort to the China Burma India theater - hence why you bring up all the, quite sensible, arguments about why the Americans/Allies would not do that, because of higher priorities.

But that wasn’t the basis of my question/argument. I wasn’t supposing they would allocate an additional soldier, airplane, ship or gallon of gasoline for the front. On the contrary, my presupposition was that fuel and supply shortages inflicted on the Japanese through the better US sub campaign with good torpedoes and mines would be the thing limiting the *Japanese* level of effort on the mainland, especially offensively, due to denial of fuel and other supplies.

  No my initial argument was that some factor meant that the allies held onto Malaya and the DEI or at least the key western regions of them - which would therefore deny Japan the supplies that it went to war for.  In that case not only is it that much weaker but the logical location from which allied offensive would best start would be that region as its a lot closer to the Philippines and China - with say Borneo as the obvious stepping stone towards both of them.  Its a lot closer than slogging in from the Solomon's or across the western Pacific and in the latter case wouldn't need to wait for the Essex class to enter service in numbers as land based air could carry much of the load of air cover.  Furthermore in such a scenario its quite likely that Burma holds as well in which case the Burma road stays open throughout the conflict, enabling much larger amounts of resources to reach China by that route.

  Plus I wouldn't say that internal power struggles between the US army and the USN was a sensible argument.

Oops, I had lost that thread. 

[stevep]

Apr 21, 2023 22:29:21 GMT raharris1973 said:

Apr 21, 2023 21:52:38 GMT stevep said:

  No my initial argument was that some factor meant that the allies held onto Malaya and the DEI or at least the key western regions of them - which would therefore deny Japan the supplies that it went to war for.  In that case not only is it that much weaker but the logical location from which allied offensive would best start would be that region as its a lot closer to the Philippines and China - with say Borneo as the obvious stepping stone towards both of them.  Its a lot closer than slogging in from the Solomon's or across the western Pacific and in the latter case wouldn't need to wait for the Essex class to enter service in numbers as land based air could carry much of the load of air cover.  Furthermore in such a scenario its quite likely that Burma holds as well in which case the Burma road stays open throughout the conflict, enabling much larger amounts of resources to reach China by that route.

  Plus I wouldn't say that internal power struggles between the US army and the USN was a sensible argument.

Oops, I had lost that thread. 

  No problem.

[miletus12]

Apr 21, 2023 22:29:21 GMT raharris1973 said:

But that wasn’t the basis of my question/argument. I wasn’t supposing they would allocate an additional soldier, airplane, ship or gallon of gasoline for the front. On the contrary, my presupposition was that fuel and supply shortages inflicted on the Japanese through the better US sub campaign with good torpedoes and mines would be the thing limiting the *Japanese* level of effort on the mainland, especially offensively, due to denial of fuel and other supplies.

My objection to that sensible observation is that the USN has to break into the Sea of Japan to really affect internal Japanese trade with mainland Asia as well as assert a strong denial presence in the South China Sea, to bring about the conditions speculated.

Those two bodies of water are incredibly dangerous, straited, defensive ASW minefield applied, and SHALLOW for diesel electric boats of the era. The Japanese had good air cover and presence, at least of small ASW ships and aircraft in both seas from mid 1941 until about 1943. It would be difficult, even with good torpedoes for a GATO or BALAO to operate in those waters where a U-class British or O-class Dutch submarine would be more agile, and faster diving. Not until American boats were equipped with bottom fathometers and mine detecting sonar, could the Americans contemplate extended persistent denial operations. That would be a war lesson. I anticipate it would still be 1943 at the earliest that those two seas could be reliably interdicted.

[Max Sinister]

After reading Kershaw's "Fateful Choices", there's some obvious PoD: If the US government had managed to warn the troops in Pearl Harbor about the starting war, instead of trying to use Western Union(!) - while there were actually safe connections...

I still do believe that one shouldn't ascribe to malice what can be explained by plain incompetence.

[miletus12]

May 3, 2023 14:11:17 GMT Max Sinister said:

After reading Kershaw's "Fateful Choices", there's some obvious PoD: If the US government had managed to warn the troops in Pearl Harbor about the starting war, instead of trying to use Western Union(!) - while there were actually safe connections...

I still do believe that one shouldn't ascribe to malice what can be explained by plain incompetence.

Kershaw's scholarship is situationally and time sloppy.

I have come to the actual conclusion that you could give Kimmel and Short a whole week's warning: short of evacuating the fleet back to San Diego, the disaster still happens.  
 
The air garrison still is slaughtered and the infrastructure is still damaged. The only thing you could do, is reduce the cost in lives to half and save a few obsolete gun ships.

To really affect the outcome, you have to POD into material and leadership mistakes all the way back to 1898. I am covering that situation here.  

I will be quoting this, post in that thread.

=============================================

Or you could read this thread for something even more comprehensive before 1898.

[Max Sinister]

Here's a suggestion from "If the Allies had fallen" that sounds quite good: Use B-29s (as Kenney and King had wanted) to strike from Northern Australia against the East Indies - Japan's only source for oil. Of course, the time window isn't that big and may even shrink further.

[lordroel]

May 6, 2023 19:32:43 GMT Max Sinister said:

Here's a suggestion from "If the Allies had fallen" that sounds quite good: Use B-29s (as Kenney and King had wanted) to strike from Northern Australia against the East Indies - Japan's only source for oil. Of course, the time window isn't that big and may even shrink further.

Are B-25s, B-24s and maybe B-17s good for that role, the B-29s should focus on Japan due longer distance to fly.