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Post by halferking on May 1, 2023 15:39:03 GMT
Your link hasn't worked. I think Grey tried his best but eventually gave up. ... strange ... link from here works fine for me ... lordroel ?
... what about did he gave up ? ... ITTL or IOTL ?
I think the hyperlink was incomplete the ‘k’ in look was not included in the address… I say gave up, but it was more like accepting the inevitability of events. Grey recognised that the time for diplomacy was over, and that the country was hurtling full steam towards open conflict. His health was also deteriorating apparently, he was nearly driven blind by the stress and the workload. He left office in December 1916. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on May 1, 2023 15:41:24 GMT
His health was also deteriorating apparently, he was nearly driven blind by the stress and the workload. He left office in December 1916. The United Kingdom not able to enter the war to support France against Germany if they behave and do not invade Belgium most likely will also not be good for his health i assume. |
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nomommsen
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Post by nomommsen on May 1, 2023 17:37:22 GMT
... strange ... link from here works fine for me ... lordroel ?
... what about did he gave up ? ... ITTL or IOTL ?
I think the hyperlink was incomplete the ‘k’ in look was not included in the address… I say gave up, but it was more like accepting the inevitability of events. Grey recognised that the time for diplomacy was over, and that the country was hurtling full steam towards open conflict. His health was also deteriorating apparently, he was nearly driven blind by the stress and the workload. He left office in December 1916. oke ... have tried to 'remake' the link. ... hope it works now |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 1, 2023 19:08:49 GMT
I think the hyperlink was incomplete the ‘k’ in look was not included in the address… I say gave up, but it was more like accepting the inevitability of events. Grey recognised that the time for diplomacy was over, and that the country was hurtling full steam towards open conflict. His health was also deteriorating apparently, he was nearly driven blind by the stress and the workload. He left office in December 1916. oke ... have tried to 'remake' the link. ... hope it works now
It's working fine now.  |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 1, 2023 21:41:45 GMT
Has anybody actually looked at why Russia first was considered sheer lunacy by the German WWI general staff?  That is a 1,200 mile march by horse. You can forget the railroads. The Russian width gauges are different, the roadbeds are completely substandard as to drainage and the last time I looked, the Germans had never heard of the Colorado snow plow, which was a US locomotive designed to operate in the Rocky Mountains in winter. Now look at France.    Nice marching weather, relatively firm ground, with the best railroad system on Earth, with the same gauges the Germans use; and it is only 300 miles by horse; if the French tear up the tracks. That looks doable on paper. The Germans did it once before, when they were a disorganized alliance of petty states in 1872; so they "know" it can be done. Russia is a big "nein" by comparison. The Germans have to win a short war. If it goes longer than 1 year, then they are in big trouble. Those were their 1914 planning assumptions. The assumptions were "correct". It is not their general staff's fault that the Kaiser was an idiot, their generals in the field. were idiots, and that they; the field generals, ridiculously overestimated the physical condition of their mostly fat out of shape draftee infantry or the patriotic fervor of the FRENCH. These items should have been known to the British at the time, especially by Kitchener, who was giving Asquith rotten advice. But then, post hoc is always after the blinkers are shot off, and the AAR "I told you so's" get written by the blame passers. CYNICAL Miletus |
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nomommsen
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Post by nomommsen on May 2, 2023 5:38:54 GMT
The Germans have to win a short war. If it goes longer than 1 year, then they are in big trouble. Those were their 1914 planning assumptions. The assumptions were "correct". ...These items should have been known to the British at the time, especially by Kitchener, who was giving Asquith rotten advice. ad 1) ... well ... there were numerous warnings and assumptions contrary to since Moltke the Elder. Even Moltke the Minor from time to time (up until spring 1914) was contemplating ... or rather fearing for numerous reasons (not at least of the military's role bcomming obsolete if a war as such couldn't be lead anymore with some prospect of success) the danger and probability of some multi-year war.
And ... IMHO the actual 4 years plus the war lasten IOTL 'proves' that such assumptions were incorrect.
ad 2) IIRC correctly it was Kitchener who advise Asquith on some breakfast before turning to his boat to get back to Ehypt (aka before any decisions of the cabinet) that it wonn't be the first but the last million of men thrown into battle that would count. ... and that beforer that the UK should build up such a "million".
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 2, 2023 6:09:19 GMT
ad 1) ... well ... there were numerous warnings and assumptions contrary to since Moltke the Elder. Even Moltke the Minor from time to time (up until spring 1914) was contemplating ... or rather fearing for numerous reasons (not at least of the military's role becoming obsolete if a war as such couldn't be lead anymore with some prospect of success) the danger and probability of some multi-year war. Fairly good series of arguments, let me see if I can massage them, since they are "accurate" but subject to interpretation. A long war for the Germans meant a war of more than 2 campaigning seasons. That it could mean 4 campaigning seasons was unknown to the Germans or anyone else, since the idea of cohort exhaustion was not well understood. I will mention this one when I get to Kitchener.
And ... IMHO the actual 4 years plus the war lasten IOTL 'proves' that such assumptions were incorrect. That depends on how you define the gray area between; If it goes longer than 1 year, then they are in big trouble. and that final defeat. The American Civil War is what we study in our history as an example of manpower and resources exhaustion. By 1862, Robert E. Lee knew the Confederacy was in irredeemable trouble. The blockade bit in and the land elements of the "Anaconda Plan" started to work. Given that I regard Winfield Scott to be the finest practical strategist of the 19th century, it could be argued that it would take the rank amateurs of WWI a bit of time to figure out that the same kind of strangulation elements his plan applied, that killed the Confederacy, would doom Imperial Germany as well. Compare:  to  It is not as if the British were ignorant of how it was supposed to work. They did it to NAPOLEON. They sort of understood it (The Pitts), and knew that it would take years of effort to accomplish, as a combination of literally murdering and maiming every man of fighting age on land who the "enemy" could draft, while strangling the enemy's ability to make or import implements of war, or even food after their agriculture collapsed, by denying the use of the sea, It meant the enemy's inevitable defeat by exhaustion of the means to make and sustain war. Napoleon ran out of fighting men, war materials, money and food. The British did not. IRC correctly it was Kitchener who advise Asquith on some breakfast before turning to his boat to get back to Ehypt (aka before any decisions of the cabinet) that it wonn't be the first but the last million of men thrown into battle that would count. ... and that beforer that the UK should build up such a "million". I assume you mean "Egypt" in the case of Kitchener? But to the point: British generals tended to be rather callous about casualties, before Montgomery taught them WWII better, so Kitchener's era attitude and remarks, while regrettable, were understandable. It was what he knew. What Kitchener meant as he explained it to Asquith with his rotten advice, was that in the age of rapid fire artillery and machine guns, and soon to be invoked trench warfare, the side that had more men to throw away and more ammunition to shoot off to kill those enemy men on the other side, would ultimately win, because the other losing side would have exhausted their fighting manpower cohorts in dead and maimed soldiers no longer able to fight. He forgot that naval part about this kind of warfare, where the enemy civilians would starve to death, freeze to death and die of diseases because they could not clothe, feed, medicate or warm themselves. |
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Post by simon darkshade on May 2, 2023 10:06:27 GMT
Drifting off topic.
The observation on the *why* a Russia first offensive plan doesn’t make sense for Germany in the pre WW1 period, as contained in Miletus’s first post, is a valid one and correct to boot.
If the war goes longer than a year, then it is correct that Germany would be in trouble. At that point, it switches to an attritional struggle as well as being a more serious war to the knife. This isn’t to say that Germany collapses, but after September 1915 (ie 12 months after kick off), they had the following offensives:
- Verdun
- Romania (minor role)
- Spring Offensive 1918
However, let us not drift too far from the topic to a general free for all on WW1.
Simon’s view: If Germany goes East, then Britain finds another way/another casus belli. Once the war starts, the cause is ultimately not that important.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 2, 2023 12:16:51 GMT
Drifting off topic. The observation on the *why* a Russia first offensive plan doesn’t make sense for Germany in the pre WW1 period, as contained in Miletus’s first post, is a valid one and correct to boot. If the war goes longer than a year, then it is correct that Germany would be in trouble. At that point, it switches to an attritional struggle as well as being a more serious war to the knife. This isn’t to say that Germany collapses, but after September 1915 (ie 12 months after kick off), they had the following offensives: - Verdun - Romania (minor role) - Spring Offensive 1918 However, let us not drift too far from the topic to a general free for all on WW1. Simon’s view: If Germany goes East, then Britain finds another way/another casus belli. Once the war starts, the cause is ultimately not that important.
Would largely agree. Apart from the petty anti-British comments we're gotten used to miletus12's analysis is correct. Russia can be defeated in its border regions if it stands and fights there and possibly easily if it hasn't upgraded its outdated defences. However unless you have an unexpected collapse of Russian will that only gives a limited victory and hence, limited gains. Germany both wanted and desired a decisive victory to cripple the ability of other continental powers to resist future German threats for the foreseeable future.
If Russia, before or after early heavy defeats withdraws inland and doesn't collapse in morale terms - which OTL needed 3 years of heavy casualties, largely in costly attacks on CP defences to take pressure off their western allies so is unlikely here then Germany is facing a serious problem, especially if Britain does join the conflict and hence a reliable blockade is practical. There are no real air or motorised transport, especially at the start of the war and provided Russia can seriously prevent/hinder German use of the few railways that needs masses of horse drawn wagons carrying just about everything east with heavy losses. One of the crippling factors that prompted the collapse of German agriculture in the war was that as well as insufficient attention to civilian needs by the military leadership they stripped agriculture not only of many of its best manpower but also much of the horses that did the heavy work. Trying to advance deep into the Russian interior while the latter still have the will to fight will be hugely costly all around. Napoleon's army had a better position as it was far, far less dependent on heavy loads hauled across hundreds of miles. Even OTL the advance from Riga to the approaches of Petrograd was only really possible in 1917/18 due to the collapse of the Russian army.
Kitchener made mistakes, especially in terms of relying on traditional laissez-faire economics, which coupled with the dilapidated state of much of Britain's heavy industry in 1914 helped in the shell crisis that all combatants faced. However he correctly recognised that it would be a long and very costly war, which few other military leaders did, at least from the start. He actually wanted something like a light version of the US policy - waiting until everybody else is exhausted before committing any real forces to ground combat but knew that because of the pressure on France that wasn't possible. His actual words IIRC was that the last million men would decide that war and they would be his 'New Army' of fresh recruits going into battle.
I'm not sure, if Germany were to go east and avoid infringing Belgium neutrality, that Britain would find it easy to get into the war. Possibly the Turkish closing of the straits and attacks on Russia or then the Armenian genocide - assuming as is rather likely that still occurs - might be a trigger but its going to be politically difficult to get the same level of unity for the war. Plus without the German invasion of Belgium Irish nationalist support would be markedly less and Ireland is likely to be an even bigger source of discontent than OTL despite its special privileges.
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Post by simon darkshade on May 2, 2023 12:56:28 GMT
I don't think it would be an easy or simplistic task, but it wouldn't be a truly egregious task. Consider the breakdown of the Treaty of Amiens and the subsequent British casus belli for their DoW on France.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 2, 2023 15:09:09 GMT
If Russia, before or after early heavy defeats withdraws inland and doesn't collapse in morale terms - which OTL needed 3 years of heavy casualties, largely in costly attacks on CP defences to take pressure off their western allies so is unlikely here then Germany is facing a serious problem, especially if Britain does join the conflict and hence a reliable blockade is practical. There are no real air or motorised transport, especially at the start of the war and provided Russia can seriously prevent/hinder German use of the few railways that needs masses of horse drawn wagons carrying just about everything east with heavy losses. One of the crippling factors that prompted the collapse of German agriculture in the war was that as well as insufficient attention to civilian needs by the military leadership they stripped agriculture not only of many of its best manpower but also much of the horses that did the heavy work. Trying to advance deep into the Russian interior while the latter still have the will to fight will be hugely costly all around. Napoleon's army had a better position as it was far, far less dependent on heavy loads hauled across hundreds of miles. Even OTL the advance from Riga to the approaches of Petrograd was only really possible in 1917/18 due to the collapse of the Russian army. See MAP.   Now imagine, that you are the master of the world ocean in 1914, and you can ship all the rifles, artillery and ammunition that Russia needs to stay in the war. Imagine that your admirals and generals actually know geography and economics? Imagine your politicians know their Napoleonic Wars? Imagine that? Staying on topic, WHY does Britain need to bleed away a million men in France? Ship 3 billion pounds sterling worth of munitions and supplies to Russia, send them a few competent generals, if you can find any, to teach them how to fight the proper way. *(The only high command who were worse in 1914 were the Germans, matched by the imbecilic 1917 Americans. M.), and let the WWI Russians be the anvil, as the Napoleonic era British used them. Then play defense everywhere else until the British and mainly FRENCH technologists figure out the airplane and the tank and (British) sea-power does its siege work. It was not that hard. Because it was done in actual history twice. |
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Post by simon darkshade on May 2, 2023 15:16:01 GMT
Apart from the fact that Murmansk wasn’t a port or linked with a railhead in 1914? Or there being a railway across Persia?  |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 2, 2023 15:18:28 GMT
Consider the breakdown of the Treaty of Amiens and the subsequent British casus belli for their DoW on France. Exactly. If it was not Belgian neutrality in 1914, then it could have been a dispute in Africa or some dispute with free trade, which is a good excuse to start a war with Germany. The difficult thing is the hard sell. Maybe the danger posed by an HSF sweep into the Channel or the North Sea could be the excuse? |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 2, 2023 15:22:13 GMT
Apart from the fact that Murmansk wasn’t a port or linked with a railhead in 1914? Or there being a railway across Persia? You actually think that there was anything useful there in 1941? See MAP.   There is more than one way to pluck that goose. There was a rail-line from a Norwegian port that could reach as far as Russian Finland. The Germans figured it out about 26 years later, as did Churchill who could open a Baedecker in 1940. |
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Post by simon darkshade on May 2, 2023 15:48:25 GMT
Point is that they did build it, but it took until ~1916 to get the port built, connected by rail and up and running. There absolutely was a port and railway there is 1941.
The Sweden/Norway map is both drifting and grasping at a few straws, given that there would need to be a big old rail building programme in Finland to support any massive shipping through neutral Narvik. The simpler option was Murmansk, but this isn’t an instant panacea. This influenced part of the background rationale for the Dardanelles idea.
Thanks for the Baedeker, by the way. I’ll have to have a look in July when I have some spare time.
In 1914, they didn’t have the 3 billion in arms, nor a viable sealink to Russia. Even if they had both, Russia was sufficiently buggered up that it couldn’t work as a Napoleonic anvil.
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