Germany Goes East first in 1914, British politics aspects only discussion

[raharris1973]

So I want to discuss once again an old standby.

Germany goes east first in 1914, not doing an offensive campaign in the west, and not violating Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality. Germany is hoping to avoid altogether, and at the very least significantly delay, any British participation in the war against Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary while these two Central Powers absolutely manhandle Serbia and settle the Balkans to their satisfaction and sharply defeat the Russians, at least throwing them out of Poland and Lithuania and buffering Austrian Galicia.

However what I would like to focus on in this thread, pretty much to this exclusion of other sub-topics, is British Cabinet and Parliamentary politics about handling the war in Europe, or entering it.

So I absolutely do not wish to debate or discuss the (im)plausibility of the Germans making the strategic decision written above, and will ignore posted commentary along those lines. I am mostly uninterested, at this moment and in this thread, in the probable course of military campaigns on mainland Europe on the German and Austrian borders with Russia, the Balkans, and the Franco-German border.

If you happen to have any posted commentary on French Presidential, Cabinet or Parliamentary politics, or Belgian, affected by this PoD, I may be interested.

The other postulate or ground rule I have is that the Liberal Cabinet, as consistuted in the early days of August 1914, will not declare war on Germany pursuing this east first course of action, and leaving Belgian territory inviolate, and that also does not send its fleet units into the English Channel for anti-French operations. [and Germany complies with that naval restriction] I postulate that any attempt by Asquith or Grey or any other Cabinet member to obtain a declaration of war, brings about a sufficient number of objecting Liberal Minister resignations to bring down the Cabinet and force a new election.

That said,

A) How long could a Liberal Asquith Cabinet refraining from declaring war in 1914 for many weeks while the CP attack east and south and the French attack east, remain in power without being forced to face an election?

A1) Would Grey resign over Britain remaining a non-belligerent?

A2) Who else would resign from the Cabinet over Britain remaining a non-belligerent, and would that number be sufficient to force a new election?

B) How soon (measured in days) could an election be held, and who would win the majority, Conservative, Liberal, or a forced Coalition?

C) In a spot election campaign, would the Conservative Party campaign, basically undivided, on a platform of 'Go to war with Germany, yesterday, for God, King, Country, the Empire, the Royal Navy, and the sacred Balance of Power'? [insert whatever slogan you may wish - poor little Serbia or our Gallant Gallic guypals would do as well]

D) How soon (measured in days) would the new Commons be filled and Cabinet selected?

E) If a Conservative majority Cabinet or Conservative-led coalition (presumably dominated by 'go to war with Germany' voices) would new Cabinet both inevitably, and promptly declare war on Germany? Or would there be time for the new Cabinet to deliberate, for Parliament to debate, or to form second thoughts, or to respond to second thoughts about entering the war if such emerged from public opinion, newspapers, or new backbenchers?

Since I'm not quite familiar with Parliamentary mechanics, procedure and tactics, and each individual in play, I can't be precise about timelines, but my honest ballpark estimate of the military situation that any British government, old or new, would be observing, anywhere from one week to the three months from the start of the conflict in August, would have the following features:

1. No belligerent's capital would be occupied or seriously menaced besides Belgrade
2. No belligerent would have surrendered, with the possible exception of Serbia
3. No belligerent's Army would have suffered a final, decisive, annihilating blow, except possibly Serbia
4. France would be attacking into German Alsace-Lorraine, but suffering heavy losses (and inflicting heavy ones too) while making ever more meagre returns; or this may have shift to the Germans counter-attacking, to the Germans at most successful having repelling the French back over their own frontier, but with the German counter-offensive now making ever more meagre returns
5. Russian losses would be no more than one or two armies of several
6. Russian territorial losses would be limited primarily to Congress Poland and perhaps some of Lithuania, with core Russia and Ukraine scarcely touched

To most neutral observers, in other words, the war map would not show an image of Teutonic arms sweeping all before them, but instead a grind of fairly evenly matched foes, in a tight grapple.

Interventionists, and Anti-Interventionists in the UK, I imagine, will interpret that, and its meaning, or lack of it, for the balance of power and other British interests, as they will. I'm inclined to seeing the even matching and tight grapple make British intervention seem *less* urgent while the battlefield losses make the war uglier and less glamorous and attractive. But that may be my 21st century detachment talking. It's not like domino theories, jumping to conclusions, panic, and manic policy improvisations haven't happened before, so interventionists could somehow use all the same circumstances to say why Britain must leap in to break the tie.

Thanks for reading, those of you still with me. 

Looking forward to your responses!

[stevep]

  raharris1973 ,

  Ultimately Britain could well enter the war if one side or the other looks like winning an overwhelming victory and also from an early stage it will probably seek to secure a cease-fire at least, if only because such a war is very bad for trade and commerce, which is probably more important for Britain than any other of the great power.  However I do agree that its unlikely that any such trigger for Britain to join the conflict would be at least several months down the line and probably not until 1915.

  However there is one vital issue with the POD in terms of when Germany makes this decision and how soon and how clearly is Russia especially aware of it?  Because there's a world of difference between Russia performing the OTL 1914 operations and being very badly trashed as a result with the bulk of the German army in the east or being aware of Germany's strike east plan and reacting too it.  This would mean that they would:

a)  Not need to rush forces into offensive operations against Germany, which saw their 1st and 2nd armies destroyed in E Prussia as they don't need to take pressure off a badly beleaguered France

b)  Should with any intelligence - which admittedly isn't a certainty given the Russian [mis-]leadership at the time - have been updating the ancient fortifications and planning on boosting any and all defensive positions in Russian Poland and related areas.  Alternatively they might decide on a fighting retreat from the region, deciding that against the bulk of the Austro-German army they need to withdraw into the east straining CP supply lines.

  I mention this because it greatly affects how the war goes for the main players and in turn that affects the impact on politics in Britain on the war.  However admittedly probably not greatly within the 1st 6 months or so of the war other than the possible impact when Turkey joins the CPs.  [Although even that isn't certain as if Britain doesn't take over ships being built for 3rd parties, including capital ships for Chile and Turkey that might prompt a Turko-Greek war which could tie up the empire for a while].

  However on the main course of the issue - political events inside Britain.

1)  I suspect that Grey won't resign although possibly Churchill might, or even cross back into the Tory benches.  Grey probably realises he's better off continuing in post as he can influence things both in Britain and abroad.

2)  I doubt the Liberal party will lose power quickly.  The 1911 Parliament Act both greatly restricted the power of the Lords to block decisions in Parliament and reduced the maximum duration of Parliaments from 7 to 5 years but seems to have had an exception for the current parliament as it says in the above that an election would be due in 1916.  The Liberals have a small lead and are dependent on the Irish 'Nationalists' while as well as not entering the war they have the extremely contentious issue of a Dublin Parliament and whether this is forced on Ulster or not.

3)  Unless the war looks like ending in a clear/overwhelming victory for the CPs very quickly the big issue for most people in Britain will be the Irish Home Rule bill.  This is deeply opposed by the unionists in the north, much of the Tory party and some chunks of the army with some officers making clear they would refuse to force Ulster into such an agreement.  This could mean civil war in Ireland and serious division in mainland Britain and distract Britain fatally from events on the continent.  However there is the possibility of a peaceful settlement as at one stage Redmond - the leader of the main Nationalist party and the Unions did come to an agreement which would give the latter an effective veto on legislation they would find unacceptable but one of the smaller nationalists parties objected and since Redmond want all parties in agreement he rejected the deal.

  The Home Rule bill is pretty certain to be passed.  However without an agreement with the unionists majority in the north its likely to get violent and that could send things in all sorts of direction.  If the Tory party does force an early election and manage to win they are almost certain to drop the bill and then your likely to have the Irish majority deeply angry so things could get even worse.

4)  Assuming that the Irish issue is settled without serious conflict then the other issues affecting British decision on the war, assuming no later attack on Belgium by either side, would be the relative perceived costs of joining or not joining the war.  The longer it continues with relative stalemate and huge casualties the greater the incentive to 'stay the hell out of it'.  However as its likely that the CPs will increasingly gain the upper hand, especially if joined by Turkey and Italy stays neutral and given the stance of Wilhelm II and the military its unlikely they would settle for a limited victory.

5)  The other thing might be how the UK responds militarily.  There's bound to be some increase in military spending with a massive shooting war across the channel but possibly a pause in new naval construction after what's already under way as Germany will be having to cut back its own construction.  There are likely to be military observers in France and possibly on the eastern front but how much they will learn and how much their superiors will listen would be big issues.  Also does Germany try a USW approach?  I suspect not initially as that would be a big incentive for Britain to enter the war against them.

  Anyway initial ideas.

  Steve

[Max Sinister]

Sebastian Haffner (you know I like him) wrote in his book about Imperial Germany's seven big mistakes in WW1 that as late as in late July, the majority of the British cabinet was against entering the war, and several members threatened to step back even for comparably minor pro-Entente decisions (forgot the details).

But since Germany went on to occupy Luxemburg, declare war on Russia + France, and invade Belgium, they really made things easy for the British hawks.

(Personally I do think that going East would have been the smarter solution for the CPs, but I'm not in charge of WW1.)

[lordroel]

Apr 21, 2023 0:28:18 GMT raharris1973 said:

So I want to discuss once again an old standby.

Germany goes east first in 1914, not doing an offensive campaign in the west, and not violating Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality. Germany is hoping to avoid altogether, and at the very least significantly delay, any British participation in the war against Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary while these two Central Powers absolutely manhandle Serbia and settle the Balkans to their satisfaction and sharply defeat the Russians, at least throwing them out of Poland and Lithuania and buffering Austrian Galicia.

However what I would like to focus on in this thread, pretty much to this exclusion of other sub-topics, is British Cabinet and Parliamentary politics about handling the war in Europe, or entering it.

So I absolutely do not wish to debate or discuss the (im)plausibility of the Germans making the strategic decision written above, and will ignore posted commentary along those lines. I am mostly uninterested, at this moment and in this thread, in the probable course of military campaigns on mainland Europe on the German and Austrian borders with Russia, the Balkans, and the Franco-German border.

If you happen to have any posted commentary on French Presidential, Cabinet or Parliamentary politics, or Belgian, affected by this PoD, I may be interested.

The other postulate or ground rule I have is that the Liberal Cabinet, as consistuted in the early days of August 1914, will not declare war on Germany pursuing this east first course of action, and leaving Belgian territory inviolate, and that also does not send its fleet units into the English Channel for anti-French operations. [and Germany complies with that naval restriction] I postulate that any attempt by Asquith or Grey or any other Cabinet member to obtain a declaration of war, brings about a sufficient number of objecting Liberal Minister resignations to bring down the Cabinet and force a new election.

That said,

A) How long could a Liberal Asquith Cabinet refraining from declaring war in 1914 for many weeks while the CP attack east and south and the French attack east, remain in power without being forced to face an election?

A1) Would Grey resign over Britain remaining a non-belligerent?

A2) Who else would resign from the Cabinet over Britain remaining a non-belligerent, and would that number be sufficient to force a new election?

B) How soon (measured in days) could an election be held, and who would win the majority, Conservative, Liberal, or a forced Coalition?

C) In a spot election campaign, would the Conservative Party campaign, basically undivided, on a platform of 'Go to war with Germany, yesterday, for God, King, Country, the Empire, the Royal Navy, and the sacred Balance of Power'? [insert whatever slogan you may wish - poor little Serbia or our Gallant Gallic guypals would do as well]

D) How soon (measured in days) would the new Commons be filled and Cabinet selected?

E) If a Conservative majority Cabinet or Conservative-led coalition (presumably dominated by 'go to war with Germany' voices) would new Cabinet both inevitably, and promptly declare war on Germany? Or would there be time for the new Cabinet to deliberate, for Parliament to debate, or to form second thoughts, or to respond to second thoughts about entering the war if such emerged from public opinion, newspapers, or new backbenchers?

Since I'm not quite familiar with Parliamentary mechanics, procedure and tactics, and each individual in play, I can't be precise about timelines, but my honest ballpark estimate of the military situation that any British government, old or new, would be observing, anywhere from one week to the three months from the start of the conflict in August, would have the following features:

1. No belligerent's capital would be occupied or seriously menaced besides Belgrade
2. No belligerent would have surrendered, with the possible exception of Serbia
3. No belligerent's Army would have suffered a final, decisive, annihilating blow, except possibly Serbia
4. France would be attacking into German Alsace-Lorraine, but suffering heavy losses (and inflicting heavy ones too) while making ever more meagre returns; or this may have shift to the Germans counter-attacking, to the Germans at most successful having repelling the French back over their own frontier, but with the German counter-offensive now making ever more meagre returns
5. Russian losses would be no more than one or two armies of several
6. Russian territorial losses would be limited primarily to Congress Poland and perhaps some of Lithuania, with core Russia and Ukraine scarcely touched

To most neutral observers, in other words, the war map would not show an image of Teutonic arms sweeping all before them, but instead a grind of fairly evenly matched foes, in a tight grapple.

Interventionists, and Anti-Interventionists in the UK, I imagine, will interpret that, and its meaning, or lack of it, for the balance of power and other British interests, as they will. I'm inclined to seeing the even matching and tight grapple make British intervention seem *less* urgent while the battlefield losses make the war uglier and less glamorous and attractive. But that may be my 21st century detachment talking. It's not like domino theories, jumping to conclusions, panic, and manic policy improvisations haven't happened before, so interventionists could somehow use all the same circumstances to say why Britain must leap in to break the tie.

Thanks for reading, those of you still with me. 

Looking forward to your responses!

Have you ever read the AH novel called Gray Tide in the East: An alternate history of the first World War:

August 1, 1914, Berlin: Kaiser Wilhelm II cancels the German invasion of Belgium over the objections of his generals, sending his armies East against Russia instead of West to France, and sets off a chain of events that will radically change the course of modern history.

[stevep]

Apr 22, 2023 7:21:12 GMT Max Sinister said:

Sebastian Haffner (you know I like him) wrote in his book about Imperial Germany's seven big mistakes in WW1 that as late as in late July, the majority of the British cabinet was against entering the war, and several members threatened to step back even for comparably minor pro-Entente decisions (forgot the details).

But since Germany went on to occupy Luxemburg, declare war on Russia + France, and invade Belgium, they really made things easy for the British hawks.

(Personally I do think that going East would have been the smarter solution for the CPs, but I'm not in charge of WW1.)

  I would agree.  Even after the German invasion of Belgium which had both treaty and security concerns for Britain a small number of minister - think it was 2 or 3 still insisted on resigning over the British dow. 

  The comparatively minor pro-Entente decisions could have including things such as declaring it wouldn't tolerate German warships entering the English Channel - or something like that.  It hence protected the French north coast from any raids but could be argued as having some validity in terms of how important the channel was to British shipping and the high probability of neutral ships [which would include a lot of British ones] coming under attack in such a congested waterway.

[raharris1973]

Apr 22, 2023 8:46:43 GMT lordroel said:

Have you ever read the AH novel called Gray Tide in the East: An alternate history of the first World War:

August 1, 1914, Berlin: Kaiser Wilhelm II cancels the German invasion of Belgium over the objections of his generals, sending his armies East against Russia instead of West to France, and sets off a chain of events that will radically change the course of modern history.

Heard of it. Knew it was about this subject.

Never read it.

Did you?

Was its handling of British politics detailed, and interesting, and convincing, to you?

You can summarize it under a spoiler if you wish.

I can tell by your excerpt that the novel takes a PoD that Germany switches to go east at the last minute at the demand of the Kaiser, which would set up different circumstances with different results compared to a scenario where 'east-first' had been Germany's plan or one of equal likelihood with west-first all along.

[lordroel]

Apr 22, 2023 22:02:21 GMT raharris1973 said:

I can tell by your excerpt that the novel takes a PoD that Germany switches to go east at the last minute at the demand of the Kaiser, which would set up different circumstances with different results compared to a scenario where 'east-first' had been Germany's plan or one of equal likelihood with west-first all along.

Yep the Kaiser makes it clear, he is the one to decide what the Imperial Army does, and so in the novel they go East.

[nomommsen]

Apr 21, 2023 14:33:16 GMT stevep said:

...  However there is the possibility of a peaceful settlement as at one stage Redmond - the leader of the main Nationalist party and the Unions did come to an agreement which would give the latter an effective veto on legislation they would find unacceptable but one of the smaller nationalists parties objected and since Redmond want all parties in agreement he rejected the deal. ...

 

Hi there ... first post here ... though ... the one or other might know me from the other ... "alternate.history"-elephant on the web

Dear stevep

would you be able to name your source(s) on(for the above?

I would be glad reading something about it, esp. like when these discussions between redmond and Carson (?) and/or some Tory politicians from London (?) took place. Could perhaps been some 'inspiration' for Asquith when brooding over whatever new amendment for the Home Rule Bill after the failed Buckingham Palace Conference.

I assume the "smaller nationalist parties" were rather factions wihtin the nationalist movement ? ... like the Irisch Republican Brotherhod or Sinn Feinn or ... or do you mean the one even parliamentary party "All For Ireland" ?

Thx for your efforts in advance and at least for tzhis rather interesting splinter of info on this topic.

[lordroel]

Apr 29, 2023 11:09:44 GMT nomommsen said:

Apr 21, 2023 14:33:16 GMT stevep said:

...  However there is the possibility of a peaceful settlement as at one stage Redmond - the leader of the main Nationalist party and the Unions did come to an agreement which would give the latter an effective veto on legislation they would find unacceptable but one of the smaller nationalists parties objected and since Redmond want all parties in agreement he rejected the deal. ...

 

Hi there ... first post here ... though ... the one or other might know me from the other ... "alternate.history"-elephant on the web

Welcome aboard.

[stevep]

Apr 29, 2023 11:09:44 GMT nomommsen said:

Apr 21, 2023 14:33:16 GMT stevep said:

...  However there is the possibility of a peaceful settlement as at one stage Redmond - the leader of the main Nationalist party and the Unions did come to an agreement which would give the latter an effective veto on legislation they would find unacceptable but one of the smaller nationalists parties objected and since Redmond want all parties in agreement he rejected the deal. ...

 

Hi there ... first post here ... though ... the one or other might know me from the other ... "alternate.history"-elephant on the web

Dear stevep

would you be able to name your source(s) on(for the above?

I would be glad reading something about it, esp. like when these discussions between redmond and Carson (?) and/or some Tory politicians from London (?) took place. Could perhaps been some 'inspiration' for Asquith when brooding over whatever new amendment for the Home Rule Bill after the failed Buckingham Palace Conference.

I assume the "smaller nationalist parties" were rather factions wihtin the nationalist movement ? ... like the Irisch Republican Brotherhod or Sinn Feinn or ... or do you mean the one even parliamentary party "All For Ireland" ?

Thx for your efforts in advance and at least for tzhis rather interesting splinter of info on this topic.

  Sorry about the delay but had a rugby match to watch.

  I recall seeing something on wiki and did think it was one of the national parties which had MPs and could have been the All For Ireland party.  Do recall a map that showed the split in Ireland at the time and think they were a party holding areas in the Munster region mainly.

  However thought it was under Redmond's wiki entry and looking through that the only entry I can see which fits was during the 1917-18 Convention shortly before his death and I thought what I was remembering was something earlier, before WWI.  What I can find is

An Irish Convention of around one hundred delegates sat from July and ended in March 1918. Up until December 1917 Redmond used his influence to have a plan which had been put forward by the Southern Unionist leader Lord Midleton, accepted. It foresaw All-Ireland Home Rule with partial fiscal autonomy (until after the war, without customs and excise). All sides, including most Ulster delegates, wavered towards favouring agreement. Already ailing while attending the convention, his health permanently affected by an accident in 1912, Redmond also suffered assault on the street in Dublin by a crowd of young Sinn Féin supporters on his way to the convention,[1] which included C.S. 'Todd' Andrews. On 15 January, just when he intended to move a motion on his proposal to have the Midleton plan agreed, some nationalist colleagues—the prominent Catholic Bishop O'Donnell and MP Joseph Devlin—expressed doubts. Rather than split the nationalist side, he withdrew his motion. A vital chance was lost.[34]

  Sorry I can't be more helpful.  I'm not a trained historial so I tend to remember what I've read but not in detail as to where.

[nomommsen]

Hope you've done well and come out of your match without too many bruises. ... though ... isn't this the games reason?

However ...
So this weas during the Irish Convention after the Easter Rising.
... thought/hoped there might have been such considerations before the outbreak of the war and postponement/killing of Home Rule.

THX anyway

[raharris1973]

Here is one guy's take from another board.

What, in your view, is he missing about the strategic or political thinking of British Ministers and Departments, Cabinet, and Parliamentarians, if he is indeed missing anything:

Skallagrim: If Germany commits to an East First strategy and, as per the OP, wants to avoid or at least delay British entry into the war, then we may safely assume that Germany will refrain from decaring war on France and Belgium on August 3rd. This is what prompted Britain to declare war the next day, after first issuing an ultimatum, and in this case, such declarations of war on Germany's part would obviously be counter-productive (and in fact completely insane).

The fact that Britain issued an ultimatum in OTL is telling. They didn't declare war right away, and didn't even tell Germany not to fight France, but ordered the Germans to back out of Belgium immediately. Certainly, there were many in British politics who wanted war with Germany; but without a good reason, it would be a damned hard sell. With the invasion of Belgium, Germany handed then the perfect justification.

If Germany goes East First, then the sequence of events is as follows:

First, Russia tells Austria that if it goes to war with Serbia, it'll be at war with Russia as well. This ensures that everybody knows there's going to be a larger war unless Austria backs down. Austria doesn't back down. Austria declares war on Serbia on July 28th, and in doing so, is from that moment on also at war with Russia. On August 1st, Germany declares war on Russia, honouring its alliance with Austria.

And... that's it. France may be assumed to join Russia's side very soon, but the French government was in disarray throughout July, and only declared war on the Central Powers on August 12th. Let's assume it still does so. At this point, France is escalating a shit-fight in Eastern Europe into a broader conflict. Its reasons for doing so are clear, but not automatically sympathetic to an outside observer. Looking at this, Britain isn't going to be very happy to just jump into the fray. Unlike in OTL, Germany can't be cast as the obvious aggressor. To a lot of people, it'll look like France spoiling for a re-match after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. "Sounds like a French problem to me, mate."

Overall, Britain is going to be more sympathetic to France and Russia, but won't actually join the war over this. It's going to be more wait-and-see. And what is seen, soon enough, is pretty clear: France throwing its soldiers into the meat-grinder in return for little to no gains. That's not an incentive to join. (Meanwhile, France has two options: either try to break through in Elsaß-Lothringen, which is frankly hopeless, or pressure/invade Belgium in the hope that the German forces can be encircled, which is both doubtful and makes future British support far less likely.)

The British position, I'm pretty sure, will be to call for peace negotiations in London. Getting everybody to agree to peace with honour is really the only sensible move here.

Given the circumstances, it may even be possible to make it happen. Simple deal. France gets to keep the Francophone bits of Elsaß-Lothringen, which it has presumably occupied. Germany, having been able to dedicate more troops in the East, will have occupied the Polish heartland, and this is separated from Russia to become an independent country, where Germany can also dump all Polish dissidents from within its own borders. Russia has occupied Galicia-Lodomeria, and keeps it. Serbia gets screwed over, and the Austrians get to exact their vengeance there.

Everybody goes home by Christmas, and Britain never even gets entangled in the war. But nobody gets an overwhelming victory, and the balance of power doesn't change meaningfully. Britain has made no enemies, having actually facilitated a pretty reasonable outcome.

(Now, would everyone be amenable to that outcome? It seems to me that Germany and Austria would be, but Russia and France would object. The result of that is that Germany and Austria can just say "offer's on the table, yours to take". This makes them reasonable, and makes France and Russia the ones perpetuating the war. Which makes British intervention on their side very unlikely...)

In the end, by not fighting, Britain will be the biggest winner of all. And under these circumstances, that'll be far more clear than it was in OTL.

[nomommsen]

Skallagrim sayeth:
If Germany commits to an East First strategy and, as per the OP, wants to avoid or at least delay British entry into the war, then we may safely assume that Germany will refrain from decaring war on France and Belgium on August 3rd. This is what prompted Britain to declare war the next day, after first issuing an ultimatum, and in this case, such declarations of war on Germany's part would obviously be counter-productive (and in fact completely insane).

The fact that Britain issued an ultimatum in OTL is telling. They didn't declare war right away, and didn't even tell Germany not to fight France, but ordered the Germans to back out of Belgium immediately. Certainly, there were many in British politics who wanted war with Germany; but without a good reason, it would be a damned hard sell. With the invasion of Belgium, Germany handed then the perfect justification.
...

This IMO clearly shows that - whatever reasons the cabinet members including esp. Grey, Asquith and the other alleged 'hawks' might or might have moved to ... 'accept' the war option IOTL - they rendered it necessary to have a proper casus belli to present (and not only some obscure press duck).
Without such a reason ... 'just for the sake of the Entente'? ... with all the other topics at home?

...France may be assumed to join Russia's side very soon, but the French government was in disarray throughout July, and only declared war on the Central Powers on August 12th. Let's assume it still does so. At this point, France is escalating a shit-fight in Eastern Europe into a broader conflict. Its reasons for doing so are clear, but not automatically sympathetic to an outside observer. Looking at this, Britain isn't going to be very happy to just jump into the fray. Unlike in OTL, Germany can't be cast as the obvious aggressor. To a lot of people, it'll look like France spoiling for a re-match after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. "Sounds like a French problem to me, mate."
...

Also ... with France declaring war against Germany not before 12th August - as Isvolszky was lectured by Poincaré at night from 1st to 2nd August - and public reactions as mentioned and enough time for the 'usual' british topics (suffragtes, Home Rule, miner unionists, land reform, budget of 1914 etc.) to come back to the fore in this about fortnight the political arithmetics and priorities would have considerably shifted or moved at least.

[stevep]

Apr 29, 2023 17:14:27 GMT nomommsen said:

Hope you've done well and come out of your match without too many bruises. ... though ... isn't this the games reason?

However ...
So this weas during the Irish Convention after the Easter Rising.
... thought/hoped there might have been such considerations before the outbreak of the war and postponement/killing of Home Rule.

THX anyway

  Oh I'm definitely not playing.  Between age, laziness and cowardice I would want to avoid that.  Plus the match in question was the Women's 6 Nations decider between England and France so I definitely wouldn't be available for that game.

[stevep]

Apr 29, 2023 19:42:05 GMT raharris1973 said:

Here is one guy's take from another board.

What, in your view, is he missing about the strategic or political thinking of British Ministers and Departments, Cabinet, and Parliamentarians, if he is indeed missing anything:

Skallagrim: If Germany commits to an East First strategy and, as per the OP, wants to avoid or at least delay British entry into the war, then we may safely assume that Germany will refrain from decaring war on France and Belgium on August 3rd. This is what prompted Britain to declare war the next day, after first issuing an ultimatum, and in this case, such declarations of war on Germany's part would obviously be counter-productive (and in fact completely insane).

The fact that Britain issued an ultimatum in OTL is telling. They didn't declare war right away, and didn't even tell Germany not to fight France, but ordered the Germans to back out of Belgium immediately. Certainly, there were many in British politics who wanted war with Germany; but without a good reason, it would be a damned hard sell. With the invasion of Belgium, Germany handed then the perfect justification.

If Germany goes East First, then the sequence of events is as follows:

First, Russia tells Austria that if it goes to war with Serbia, it'll be at war with Russia as well. This ensures that everybody knows there's going to be a larger war unless Austria backs down. Austria doesn't back down. Austria declares war on Serbia on July 28th, and in doing so, is from that moment on also at war with Russia. On August 1st, Germany declares war on Russia, honouring its alliance with Austria.

And... that's it. France may be assumed to join Russia's side very soon, but the French government was in disarray throughout July, and only declared war on the Central Powers on August 12th. Let's assume it still does so. At this point, France is escalating a shit-fight in Eastern Europe into a broader conflict. Its reasons for doing so are clear, but not automatically sympathetic to an outside observer. Looking at this, Britain isn't going to be very happy to just jump into the fray. Unlike in OTL, Germany can't be cast as the obvious aggressor. To a lot of people, it'll look like France spoiling for a re-match after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. "Sounds like a French problem to me, mate."

Overall, Britain is going to be more sympathetic to France and Russia, but won't actually join the war over this. It's going to be more wait-and-see. And what is seen, soon enough, is pretty clear: France throwing its soldiers into the meat-grinder in return for little to no gains. That's not an incentive to join. (Meanwhile, France has two options: either try to break through in Elsaß-Lothringen, which is frankly hopeless, or pressure/invade Belgium in the hope that the German forces can be encircled, which is both doubtful and makes future British support far less likely.)

The British position, I'm pretty sure, will be to call for peace negotiations in London. Getting everybody to agree to peace with honour is really the only sensible move here.

Given the circumstances, it may even be possible to make it happen. Simple deal. France gets to keep the Francophone bits of Elsaß-Lothringen, which it has presumably occupied. Germany, having been able to dedicate more troops in the East, will have occupied the Polish heartland, and this is separated from Russia to become an independent country, where Germany can also dump all Polish dissidents from within its own borders. Russia has occupied Galicia-Lodomeria, and keeps it. Serbia gets screwed over, and the Austrians get to exact their vengeance there.

Everybody goes home by Christmas, and Britain never even gets entangled in the war. But nobody gets an overwhelming victory, and the balance of power doesn't change meaningfully. Britain has made no enemies, having actually facilitated a pretty reasonable outcome.

(Now, would everyone be amenable to that outcome? It seems to me that Germany and Austria would be, but Russia and France would object. The result of that is that Germany and Austria can just say "offer's on the table, yours to take". This makes them reasonable, and makes France and Russia the ones perpetuating the war. Which makes British intervention on their side very unlikely...)

In the end, by not fighting, Britain will be the biggest winner of all. And under these circumstances, that'll be far more clear than it was in OTL.

  Well as you may be aware that poster and me do not see eye to eye and I have serious questions on his judgement on a number of issues.  He seems well read in some areas but rather odd judgement and interpretation here.  However my opinion is:

a) France will support Russia because it has to else its very isolated.  If I recall it had already made commitments to Russia to this effect.  It should be noted that OTL see here, that France refused a German demand for its neutrality in a CP war with Russia and ordered a general mobilization but delayed a dow on Germany.  Germany declared war on France on the 3rd of August so Skallagrim's mention that France 'only declared war on the CPs on the 12th August sounds odd.  Possibly a formal dow by Paris was delayed by then but long before that the two countries were in a shooting war.  Here timings might be somewhat different and a lot depends on what plans France has with the knowledge that Russia will be taking the initial blows.  I would expect an attack on Alsace-Lorraine which is likely to be as disastrous for France as OTL but may not be with different tactics, I.e. if they realise they need a lot more heavy artillery to crack German fortifications rather than simply throwing men at them.

b)  In the proposed scenario, with Germany striking east and not invading Belgium then Britain is markedly less likely to join the conflict quickly and not without more cabinet resignations that OTL.  However the wiki page cited above mentions:

At a meeting on 29 July, the British cabinet had narrowly decided its obligations to Belgium under the 1839 Treaty of London did not require it to oppose a German invasion with military force. However, this was largely driven by Prime Minister Asquith's desire to maintain unity; he and his senior Cabinet ministers were already committed to support France, the Royal Navy had been mobilised and public opinion was strongly in favour of intervention.[57] On 31 July, Britain sent notes to Germany and France, asking them to respect Belgian neutrality; France pledged to do so, Germany did not reply

  It depends on how significant the lack of German attacks in the west - presumably not attacking Luxembourg either? - would be on both public opinion and the opinion of the Liberal cabinet as the forces and the Tory party were supportive of war with Germany.

  If Britain does stay out I would expect it to declare the Channel closed to combatant warships, other than those of the French but probably denying them access to the North Sea.  This was part of an agreement to protect France's northern coastline and also important to avoiding conflict in the Channel which was so important to British shipping.  Relations with Germany, already tense because of the German building programme and openly spoken intent of challenging the RN will be heightened but a lot will depend on what naval tactics Germany deploys.  Attempts to enter the Channel with warships or early use of USW are likely to cause a strong reaction from Britain.

c)  What Skallagrim does not mention but is very important is what the Russia plan is in this scenario.  Its likely that as OTL the broad details of the German plans will be known so Russia will be more on the defensive.  How early they realise this and what measures they adapt are important here.  Instead of boosting railways in the salient formed by Russian controlled Poland they could concentrate on boosting the antiquated fortifications and/or have plans for a withdrawal deeper into the interior.  Its unlikely they will be as aggressive against Austria because they will need the bulk of their quickly deployable forces to oppose the Germans.

d)  I would agree that Britain will call for negotiations but am doubtful that either side early on will be interested.  Austria will want to crush Serbia, Germany will want a clear victory against its continental opponents as otherwise it just pushes the feared point when a Franco-Russian alliance is too powerful for them to defeat down the line a bit.  France will want to 'regain' Alsace-Lorraine and Russian intentions in this scenario would be unclear other than to protect Serbia and expand their influence in eastern Europe.  I can't see early interest in peace on either side and definitely Germany won't be interested in conceding any part of A-L. 

  Also he seems to expect Serbia to be crushed a lot quicker than OTL - for whatever reasons is unclear.  Similarly with both Russia and Austria accepting loss of territories to Germany and Austria respectively.  This sounds rather dubious to me.  Neither the CPs or the Franco-Russian bloc are happy with no significant change in the status co.  Also Turkey is still likely to join the CPs, possibly earlier than OTL - unless the securing of the two dreadnoughts Britain is building for them doesn't occur in which case you might get a Greco-Turkish war.  However would expect events as OTL and once Turkey has joined the CPs I doubt they will accept anything other than the decisive crushing victory Berlin especially desired.

e)  As such I would expect a longer war, at least 18 months or so and unless the Germans overreach themselves deep in Russia - which they might well do if the Russians are careful - the CPs will start looking for a massive victory which is likely to force British intervention against them, or the threat of that to prompt a less decisive but still clear CP victory.

ei)  If Britain is drawn into the conflict a lot would depend on both what has happened in Ireland and also what preparations Britain has made for such a war as well as the position of the two alliances at that point.  Its likely to still be a long war, possibly even longer than OTL and things could go either way.

eii)  If the threat of British entry does make the CPs accept a more moderate peace then a lot would depend on how much the assorted combatants have suffered and what social and political changes occur in the assorted nations after the war ends.  Its likely to be followed by another conflict, quite possibly in a decade or so as none of the continental powers will be happy with the results.

  I suspect the most likely result is something along the line of ei as I can't see the German leadership having committed itself to a decisive victory settling for a lesser one that leaves France and Russia as potentially able to match German power in the near future.  Especially since as this conflict goes on the future viability of the Austrian empire will be uncertain.

  There are a lot of other issues to be considered as I've mentioned before but that is the path I would most likely expect.