Germany Goes East first in 1914, British politics aspects only discussion

[stevep]

May 10, 2023 17:22:37 GMT lordroel said:

May 10, 2023 17:12:27 GMT Max Sinister said:

Obviously, they thought that way in the early days of the war (and before it). The Luxembourg invasion weakened their position already, and then...

Haffner expressed it that way: Initially they hoped that there might be no war; or between A-H and Serbia only; if not that, Germany wouldn't join; if they did, they wouldn't invade France; if they did, not through Belgium; if they did, with Belgium's approval... pretty many Ifs, but at the end of the day irrelevant because of what happened.

So would Germany invading Luxembourg only get a British responds, what would Belgium do, and would France react by requesting to be allowed into Belgium in order to move into Luxembourg.

  As I understand it, including the fact that Luxembourg was less vital to Britain and the differences in the treaty guarantees concerning the new powers.

a)  Britain would probably issue a diplomatic protest and no more.  - Although if Germany was making its main attack in the east and seeking to keep the western front as short and limited as possible, at least for the moment would they still occupy Luxembourg?

b)  Belgium would almost certainly hunker down.  It doesn't want to be drawn into this bloodbath and especially not as would be likely, become a battleground.

c)  Well if changes in German plans are made some years before - which seems the most likely option - its possible that France might see enough differences that they would consider that.  However think its more likely that as OTL their - initially at least - France was determined to respect Belgium neutrality.  I doubt this would change in the short term as it would put France into a bad light diplomatically and especially if Britain has stayed officially neutral this would be even more important.  Its only if/when their attacks into Alsace_Lorraine founder with heavy casualties and Russia is getting plummeted that France might seek to do this to bypass the German defensive lines.  However since both Belgium and Britain are likely to oppose such a move if suggested by Paris whether it would lead to an attempted opposed invasion or not would be a question.  I.e. in the face of such opposition the government could well veto any such military proposal.

[nomommsen]

May 11, 2023 13:24:56 GMT stevep said:

May 10, 2023 17:22:37 GMT lordroel said:

So would Germany invading Luxembourg only get a British responds, what would Belgium do, and would France react by requesting to be allowed into Belgium in order to move into Luxembourg.

  As I understand it, including the fact that Luxembourg was less vital to Britain and the differences in the treaty guarantees concerning the new powers.

a)  Britain would probably issue a diplomatic protest and no more.  - Although if Germany was making its main attack in the east and seeking to keep the western front as short and limited as possible, at least for the moment would they still occupy Luxembourg?

b)  Belgium would almost certainly hunker down.  It doesn't want to be drawn into this bloodbath and especially not as would be likely, become a battleground.

c)  Well if changes in German plans are made some years before - which seems the most likely option - its possible that France might see enough differences that they would consider that.  However think its more likely that as OTL their - initially at least - France was determined to respect Belgium neutrality.  I doubt this would change in the short term as it would put France into a bad light diplomatically and especially if Britain has stayed officially neutral this would be even more important.  Its only if/when their attacks into Alsace_Lorraine founder with heavy casualties and Russia is getting plummeted that France might seek to do this to bypass the German defensive lines.  However since both Belgium and Britain are likely to oppose such a move if suggested by Paris whether it would lead to an attempted opposed invasion or not would be a question.  I.e. in the face of such opposition the government could well veto any such military proposal.

ad a)

The british goverment didn't 'protest' against the german occupation of Luxembourg despite being asked for some 'intervention' by the Luxembourg goverment between the occupation on 2nd August and after declaration of war against Germany at midnight 4th to 5th August.

And ... rather no, for a defenseive position staying east of the Our-valley - most of the german-luxembourg border - would be much more advantageous.

ad b)

fully agree

ad c)

... couldn't you be somewhat more ... specific?

... some years before - which seems the most likely option ...

How long ago should/could such priorisation happen? ... by what means and persons? ... and become public? ... enough to influence miliotary planners elsewhere?

Wouldn't this already influence the whole run-up of events towards the Great War?

However ... actually the germans HAD for quite some years reasonable East First plans despite the numerous franko-german diplomatic 'clashes' (with participation of british diplomacy). ... but they didn't really influenced french war planning.

The change from the more defensive Plan XVI of Victor-Constant Michel to the more offensive Plan XVII of Joffre came solely from french military infighting with the adoption of the doctrine "attaque à outrance!!". IIRC one of its main representatives (dunno if Foch or Loyzeau de Grandmaison) said something like:

    It doesn't count what the enemy is doing, all that count is you are attacking.

And in this sense

It wouldn't count what the germans would plan or intend, only that France attack - in conjunction with its eastwern partner - counts.

[stevep]

May 11, 2023 15:02:02 GMT nomommsen said:

May 11, 2023 13:24:56 GMT stevep said:

  As I understand it, including the fact that Luxembourg was less vital to Britain and the differences in the treaty guarantees concerning the new powers.

a)  Britain would probably issue a diplomatic protest and no more.  - Although if Germany was making its main attack in the east and seeking to keep the western front as short and limited as possible, at least for the moment would they still occupy Luxembourg?

b)  Belgium would almost certainly hunker down.  It doesn't want to be drawn into this bloodbath and especially not as would be likely, become a battleground.

c)  Well if changes in German plans are made some years before - which seems the most likely option - its possible that France might see enough differences that they would consider that.  However think its more likely that as OTL their - initially at least - France was determined to respect Belgium neutrality.  I doubt this would change in the short term as it would put France into a bad light diplomatically and especially if Britain has stayed officially neutral this would be even more important.  Its only if/when their attacks into Alsace_Lorraine founder with heavy casualties and Russia is getting plummeted that France might seek to do this to bypass the German defensive lines.  However since both Belgium and Britain are likely to oppose such a move if suggested by Paris whether it would lead to an attempted opposed invasion or not would be a question.  I.e. in the face of such opposition the government could well veto any such military proposal.

ad a)

The british goverment didn't 'protest' against the german occupation of Luxembourg despite being asked for some 'intervention' by the Luxembourg goverment between the occupation on 2nd August and after declaration of war against Germany at midnight 4th to 5th August.

And ... rather no, for a defenseive position staying east of the Our-valley - most of the german-luxembourg border - would be much more advantageous.

ad b)

fully agree

ad c)

... couldn't you be somewhat more ... specific?

... some years before - which seems the most likely option ...

How long ago should/could such priorisation happen? ... by what means and persons? ... and become public? ... enough to influence miliotary planners elsewhere?

Wouldn't this already influence the whole run-up of events towards the Great War?

However ... actually the germans HAD for quite some years reasonable East First plans despite the numerous franko-german diplomatic 'clashes' (with participation of british diplomacy). ... but they didn't really influenced french war planning.

The change from the more defensive Plan XVI of Victor-Constant Michel to the more offensive Plan XVII of Joffre came solely from french military infighting with the adoption of the doctrine "attaque à outrance!!". IIRC one of its main representatives (dunno if Foch or Loyzeau de Grandmaison) said something like:

    It doesn't count what the enemy is doing, all that count is you are attacking.

And in this sense

It wouldn't count what the germans would plan or intend, only that France attack - in conjunction with its eastwern partner - counts.

  On point c) I can't be more specific because we're talking about an assumption that Germany will drastically change their military policy, which OTL they [thought anyway] they had good reasons for.  Because of the huge complexity of organising such a massive option I doubt it would be a last minute operation.  Personally I've never heard of plans for an eastern attack after Schlieffen original memo was taken as the basis for operations but would be interested to know more please.

[nomommsen]

May 11, 2023 17:58:21 GMT stevep said:

May 11, 2023 15:02:02 GMT nomommsen said:

  On point c) I can't be more specific because we're talking about an assumption that Germany will drastically change their military policy, which OTL they [thought anyway] they had good reasons for.  Because of the huge complexity of organising such a massive option I doubt it would be a last minute operation.  Personally I've never heard of plans for an eastern attack after Schlieffen original memo was taken as the basis for operations but would be interested to know more please.

That's ... quite some order ...

Unfortunatly our knowledge of the deployment plans or "Aufmarschanweisungen" are not as thorough as we might wish.

The archive containing them in detail burnt down in 1945 after some air attack.

All we have are some 'side-notes' in personal remembrances, the rather general discussions in literature about the Schlieffen-plan before WW 1 - i.e. there was at its time an almost as 'epica' described publication 'war between Friedrich v.Bernhardie (against Schlieffen) and then (and still ?) famous and on military history specialiased historian Hans Delbrück (pro-Schlieffen).

And ... famous/infamous document RH61/96 at the War Hisrory Center of the Army.

Which contents some 171 sheets of notes as it seems for some 'study' someonme was conducting about former deployment plans between the wars. It was the - or one - basis for the controversial Terence Zuber publication "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan" he amended with "The Real German War Plan, 1904-1914" and his "German War Planning, 1891-1914: Sources and Interpretations". The last containing said document RH61/96 which unfortunatly for us is alreayd somewhat 'selective' in i.e. not containing hinted at differeing deployment-alternatives in Schlieffens days.

This can also be found in THE counterpublication to Zuber "The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives ..."

By'n large IMHO its a -though rather elaborate and educative - controversy about 'labelling' only: was the war plan as executed in 1914 a 'Schlieffen-Plan' or not.

---

But for your 'order'

Said document i.e. contains some deploymentplans of Schlieffen, i.e. for the deployment-periodes of 1901-02 or 1902-03 in which he orders two deployments to be prepared:

• one for the case war-in-the-west-and-ev.also-east
• one for the case war-in-the-east-and-ev.-also-west  
  

which divided available forces on a 3 to 4 armies basis either weighted more in the west or the east.

But you asked for post-Schlieffen times.

Moltkes the Minors deployment-plans of the mobilization periods 1906-07 to 1908-1909 also had 2 'variants'

• one for war-in-the-west-only

        actually ALL available troops against Fraance with only some borderguards in the east

• one for war-in-the-west-plus-east

        what I call the "Moltke-Plan" with only 1 Army in the East and 7 armies against France

        (This can already bee seen as the "Moltke-Plan"/"Schlieffen-Plan-Iteration" as executed IOT in 1914)

But ... for the period of 1909-10, 1910-11, 1911-12, 1912-13 there were fully elaborated TWO deployment plans from the Great GeneralStaff under Molkte the Minor, for the period of 1913-14 at least a 'study' for an eastern deployment.

Theses were an "Aufmarsch I"

    in case of war against France from the start

and an "Aufmarsch II"

    in case of war against Russia from the start

While Aufmarsch I was more or less said "Moltke-Plan" with varying size of the 'borderguarding' army in the east.

Then Aufmarsch II more or less divided the available forces in half to the eastern front against Russia as well as the western front against France. ... but there were two iterations depending on 'political' circumstances aka if and when France might come in

1. in case France stays completly out the western half would come to reinfiorce the russian front after some 2-3 weeks
   
2. in case France comes in rather early - within the first 2-3 weeks- they would fight against the french troops invading anywhere through Lorrain or Alsac or both or even 'around' Metz-Diedenhofen through Luxembourg/southern Ardennes

Only for the mobilization period 1914-15 there weren't any prepared plans or even a study for such anymore.

But ... the former deployments-plans may somewhat help to understand Moltkes claim on 1st August (see i.e. his memoirs "Erinnerungen") before the Kaiser that the troops can be transported to the east AFTER they have been deployed to the west. ... only forgetting that in his plans for it they were ordered to stay in garrision to wait for whatever final destination.

Sry fro this wall of writing but ... there have been whole library sections written about. I tink I still stay somewhat behind that much of writing

[stevep]

May 12, 2023 6:52:08 GMT nomommsen said:

May 11, 2023 17:58:21 GMT stevep said:

  On point c) I can't be more specific because we're talking about an assumption that Germany will drastically change their military policy, which OTL they [thought anyway] they had good reasons for.  Because of the huge complexity of organising such a massive option I doubt it would be a last minute operation.  Personally I've never heard of plans for an eastern attack after Schlieffen original memo was taken as the basis for operations but would be interested to know more please.

That's ... quite some order ...

Unfortunatly our knowledge of the deployment plans or "Aufmarschanweisungen" are not as thorough as we might wish.

The archive containing them in detail burnt down in 1945 after some air attack.

All we have are some 'side-notes' in personal remembrances, the rather general discussions in literature about the Schlieffen-plan before WW 1 - i.e. there was at its time an almost as 'epica' described publication 'war between Friedrich v.Bernhardie (against Schlieffen) and then (and still ?) famous and on military history specialiased historian Hans Delbrück (pro-Schlieffen).

And ... famous/infamous document RH61/96 at the War Hisrory Center of the Army.

Which contents some 171 sheets of notes as it seems for some 'study' someonme was conducting about former deployment plans between the wars. It was the - or one - basis for the controversial Terence Zuber publication "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan" he amended with "The Real German War Plan, 1904-1914" and his "German War Planning, 1891-1914: Sources and Interpretations". The last containing said document RH61/96 which unfortunatly for us is alreayd somewhat 'selective' in i.e. not containing hinted at differeing deployment-alternatives in Schlieffens days.

This can also be found in THE counterpublication to Zuber "The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives ..."

By'n large IMHO its a -though rather elaborate and educative - controversy about 'labelling' only: was the war plan as executed in 1914 a 'Schlieffen-Plan' or not.

---

But for your 'order'

Said document i.e. contains some deploymentplans of Schlieffen, i.e. for the deployment-periodes of 1901-02 or 1902-03 in which he orders two deployments to be prepared:

• one for the case war-in-the-west-and-ev.also-east
• one for the case war-in-the-east-and-ev.-also-west  
  

which divided available forces on a 3 to 4 armies basis either weighted more in the west or the east.

But you asked for post-Schlieffen times.

Moltkes the Minors deployment-plans of the mobilization periods 1906-07 to 1908-1909 also had 2 'variants'

• one for war-in-the-west-only

        actually ALL available troops against Fraance with only some borderguards in the east

• one for war-in-the-west-plus-east

        what I call the "Moltke-Plan" with only 1 Army in the East and 7 armies against France

        (This can already bee seen as the "Moltke-Plan"/"Schlieffen-Plan-Iteration" as executed IOT in 1914)

But ... for the period of 1909-10, 1910-11, 1911-12, 1912-13 there were fully elaborated TWO deployment plans from the Great GeneralStaff under Molkte the Minor, for the period of 1913-14 at least a 'study' for an eastern deployment.

Theses were an "Aufmarsch I"

    in case of war against France from the start

and an "Aufmarsch II"

    in case of war against Russia from the start

While Aufmarsch I was more or less said "Moltke-Plan" with varying size of the 'borderguarding' army in the east.

Then Aufmarsch II more or less divided the available forces in half to the eastern front against Russia as well as the western front against France. ... but there were two iterations depending on 'political' circumstances aka if and when France might come in

1. in case France stays completly out the western half would come to reinfiorce the russian front after some 2-3 weeks
   
2. in case France comes in rather early - within the first 2-3 weeks- they would fight against the french troops invading anywhere through Lorrain or Alsac or both or even 'around' Metz-Diedenhofen through Luxembourg/southern Ardennes

Only for the mobilization period 1914-15 there weren't any prepared plans or even a study for such anymore.

But ... the former deployments-plans may somewhat help to understand Moltkes claim on 1st August (see i.e. his memoirs "Erinnerungen") before the Kaiser that the troops can be transported to the east AFTER they have been deployed to the west. ... only forgetting that in his plans for it they were ordered to stay in garrision to wait for whatever final destination.

Sry fro this wall of writing but ... there have been whole library sections written about. I tink I still stay somewhat behind that much of writing

  Very interesting thanks.  I agree that Zuber seemed to be driving down a blind alley in that whether it was developed from/inspired by Schlieffen's notes and proposals or not there was definitely a plan for a pretty much all out attack in the west.  It might be technically correct not to name it after Schlieffen but in terms of actual facts on the ground the primary aim for the German army was to go west.

  Looked up the wiki entries for Bernhardie and Delbruck and interesting characters but there's not a lot on them.  Local libraries are pretty poor nowadays unfortunately and my will for digging up details is not what it was.

  Interesting details.  If I read correctly there was an option for sending forces east in Aufmarsch II but that for the 1914-15 mobilization period there weren't any prepared plans or studies as to how to achieve this?  That this may have been what Moltke may have been referring to on 1st August but he seems to have forgotten that the half meant to go west would have stayed in barracks in France stayed neutral and then sent east from barracks rather than being sent west and then eastwards?  Please tell me if I'm misreading what you say here.

  I would suspect given the size of the French army and its alliance with Russia that Germany would probably deploy say a couple of armies westwards as a precaution against a French attack in a war with Russia and probably have to keep at least part of that force there indeterminately.  However assuming the historical 8 armies if you have 2 in the west and 1 in central reserve that would still leave 5 for offensive actions against Russia which would have greatly compromised the Russian position and avoided the hammering the Austrian army took historically in 1914.  In this case, if the Russians had foreknowledge of this then only a defensive stance, either in fortified positions if they have time or falling back would have been the only rational option.  -  This of course assumes that our definition of rational applies to the armies and political leadership of the time.

  The other question, if there were earlier plans for splitting the German army even if they were somewhat moribund by 1914 how clear was the understanding in both France and Russia of the situation they might face.  The French leadership - and I think the Russians as well - were pretty certain that the vast bulk would be committed against France and the French made two bad errors, both over-estimating their own abilities to make progress in Alsace-Loraine and not understanding how big a sweep through Belgium was planned.  If Germany had had more detailed plans for a split or primarily eastern war still active then whatever intelligence sources the French and Russians possessed could have caused them some dilemmas as to what to do until it was clear which way Germany was striking and with how much.

[nomommsen]

May 12, 2023 13:27:22 GMT stevep said:

  Very interesting thanks.  I agree that Zuber seemed to be driving down a blind alley in that whether it was developed from/inspired by Schlieffen's notes and proposals or not there was definitely a plan for a pretty much all out attack in the west.  It might be technically correct not to name it after Schlieffen but in terms of actual facts on the ground the primary aim for the German army was to go west.

  Looked up the wiki entries for Bernhardie and Delbruck and interesting characters but there's not a lot on them.  Local libraries are pretty poor nowadays unfortunately and my will for digging up details is not what it was.

  Interesting details.  If I read correctly there was an option for sending forces east in Aufmarsch II but that for the 1914-15 mobilization period there weren't any prepared plans or studies as to how to achieve this?  That this may have been what Moltke may have been referring to on 1st August but he seems to have forgotten that the half meant to go west would have stayed in barracks in France stayed neutral and then sent east from barracks rather than being sent west and then eastwards?  Please tell me if I'm misreading what you say here.

...

I have to confess such knowledge about more than 120 years old german publicatory battles as between Bernhardie and Delbrück are kinda ... 'nerd'-knowledge not truly a 'common' base available.

But after diggin' into this topic for about 35 years plus ...

And: YES You've read it right.

On arrival of the famous/infamous telegram of Lichnowsky promissing an english proposal for neutrality of the UK as well as of France during a german-russian conflict at the ... "Crown-counsil" deciding on full mobilization on 1st August, the Kaiser ordered 'his troops to ber turned to the East'.

Moltke strongly opposed this and 'offered' in the end that the troops might be sent east AFTER having been deployed to their planned western detraining points.

This somewhat resembles the former plans which contained this possibility. But in them it was planned that the troops earmarked for the western borders would at first STAY after mobilization at their garrisons and not been carried around.

However. it wasn't in the given situation a truly 'thought through' proposal.

... being quite shocked by his Kaisers comments Moltke was very probably in this situation not truly able to 'think through' anything.

[halferking]

May 1, 2023 7:40:30 GMT nomommsen said:

Apr 30, 2023 21:09:40 GMT halferking said:

... then the resignation of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, ...

I somehow wonder why so many people seem to assume that Grey would resign undoubtly if he woudn't get an "Everything for France (even has to be in the basket as well) !" between 1st and 3rd August 1914 on 4th August the latest.

I had started a disuccion about that early this year (you might have a look ) and its outcome was rather ... different.

I should also not been forgotten to what condition he connected his thread of resignation:

        "... out-and-out and uncompromising policy of non-intervention ..."

At 2nd August at least the "doves" - or most of them - were already well prepared to make some concessions and setting up triggerpoints (like violation of belgian integrety in from minister to minister varying severeness).

With making such concession to Grey - though the germans clearly fullfill ITTL the demands regarding Belgium - maybe including a 'demiklitarization' of the channel (enforced by the RN) would IMHO well fullfill Greys demands as stated above.

Sir Edward was authorised “…to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power…” to the French government. On the face of it this is a clearly worded statement of intent, but in practice it’s not exactly clear what it is Great Britain was offering to do.


Germany had reliable information that the French would violate Belgian neutrality therefore Great Britain would have to give a lot to assuage German concerns i.e., if the Germans cannot conduct hostile operations against their enemy in the west, then the French would not be allowed to use Belgium.


Obviously, no one will go for that unless Great Britain committed to personally ensuring Belgian neutrality - perhaps stationing troops in country.


Could Grey marshal enough support in the Cabinet to commit to defending the western and northern coasts of France whilst at the same time neutralise any advantage France would have to attack Germany through Belgium.


I don’t see an argument for that though. The Royal Navy was more than capable of taking on the German Navy, which IOTL was ineffective, so there really is no need to guarantee security for France. If Great Britain declares war on Germany, then the Royal Navy can neutralise any threat from the German Navy.

[575]

Regarding Naval matters as have been discussed on p.5 and the above post - should Adm. Souchon deciding still to go for the French transfer of North African troops trigger British intervention?

According to an old magazine article by Richard Humble:
BC Goeben and LC Breslau had been in the Med since 1913. As a response the RN sent off a BC Squadron to shadow the German ships. The French plan for war included transfer (as was the case 1939) of the North African Army (19. Corps - 4. Divisions) to Metropolitan France. French Adm. de Lapeyrére decided to convoy the Troop Transports by the French Battle Fleet in the Med.
Adm. Souchon had coaled in Brindisi on 30. July 1914 and then sailed on through Messines Strait north of Sicily and then west.
On 3. August 1914 Adm. Souchon get a telegrammen ordering him to go the Turkey as the British had seized the Turk Dreadnoughts. Before turning east Adm. Souchon decided to shell the French NA Ports of Bône and Phillippeville which was shelled on the 4.
The German ships was spotted by RN BC Indomitable at 10,30 AM heading east and the RN ships following though awaiting orders from London pending the expiry of the British ultimatum to Germany.

So according to the previous discussion will Adm Souchon linger in the Western Med to find the French Troop Transports thus experience a battle with the French Battle Fleet (as far as I could dig up almost all French Dreadnoughts and Pre-Dreadnoughts would be in the Med) which could end up with Goeben sunk.

Would the RN get the Green light to protect French shipping? Richard Humble doesn't mention any such and from the RN dispositions it doesn't look like so.

A general sortie at the outbreak of War of the Goeben Squadron accompanied by the A-H 1. and 2. Battlesquadrons to intercept the French Troop Transports a possibility? I haven't come across such plans but they might be out there.
I expect such to be a serious concern for the British should it materialize but of course also the French due to the objective. It may have some effect upon Italy AND Turkey according to results.

[nomommsen]

May 12, 2023 13:27:22 GMT stevep said:

...

  I would suspect given the size of the French army and its alliance with Russia that Germany would probably deploy say a couple of armies westwards as a precaution against a French attack in a war with Russia and probably have to keep at least part of that force there indeterminately.  However assuming the historical 8 armies if you have 2 in the west and 1 in central reserve that would still leave 5 for offensive actions against Russia which would have greatly compromised the Russian position and avoided the hammering the Austrian army took historically in 1914.  In this case, if the Russians had foreknowledge of this then only a defensive stance, either in fortified positions if they have time or falling back would have been the only rational option.  -  This of course assumes that our definition of rational applies to the armies and political leadership of the time.

...

I can well agree with your thoughts about the distribution of german armies in case of an "East-First" appoach. Depending on the more detailed distribution (i.e. would there be also a ... 'silesian' army moving (generaly) parallell to the upper Vistula towards Iwangorod or 'all for east-prussia alone') I can also agree with your assumption of much less a lost of A-H in such a timeline.

... but ... what might have changed with russian foreknowledge ... at which point gathered?

The russian 'choice' for their deployment plan 1912 with its iterations A(Austria) and G(Germany) was made in spring 1912. And both plans wer actually agressive/offensive ones with only a somewhat differring objective for one army only.
At that time the german Great General Staff was still sporting an "East-First" deployment plan as well as a western one for the last 3-4 years.

But the russian plan didn't show any relation to this knowledge. Would need to introduce an IOTL not existant spy or similar ...

And again I can only agree to your doubting - compared to todays understanding - on the 'rationality' of STAVKAs decision making processes at this time.

[nomommsen]

May 12, 2023 13:27:22 GMT stevep said:

...

  The other question, if there were earlier plans for splitting the German army even if they were somewhat moribund by 1914 how clear was the understanding in both France and Russia of the situation they might face.  The French leadership - and I think the Russians as well - were pretty certain that the vast bulk would be committed against France and the French made two bad errors, both over-estimating their own abilities to make progress in Alsace-Loraine and not understanding how big a sweep through Belgium was planned.  If Germany had had more detailed plans for a split or primarily eastern war still active then whatever intelligence sources the French and Russians possessed could have caused them some dilemmas as to what to do until it was clear which way Germany was striking and with how much.

The french military leadership as well as the russian were pre-war informed from the same sources about german plans as the germans of russian and french plans. That is what was published in press and books - aka the in-fights about doctrine, strategy and tactics ("Bayonetts before bullets")between militaries rather openly conducted - and might have been deductable from unconcealable 'hints' as i.e. what kind of railways or railstations might be opened where from reports of consularic personnel, interviewed traders and sometimes even for it specially 'employed' travellers.

So far I never came across a notion of any 'special' sources of informations from i.e. secret documents like from agents or spies (the often made mention about the up to 6th/7th Augustat STAVKA incomming information of what german troops IOTL entering what trains ... same had the germans from said above sources).

But ... even if someone had nailed such documents present until 1913 on the heads of french or russian planners ...

I don't think they would have changed much if anything in their preparations. Both were driven in their military planning by the doctrine and believe of ATTACK! which had in both cases 'just' came to the forefront in 1912:
    in France the change from Michel to Joffre 

    in Russia the adoption of Plan 1912

[nomommsen]

May 12, 2023 21:31:54 GMT halferking said:

Sir Edward was authorised “…to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power…” to the French government. On the face of it this is a clearly worded statement of intent, but in practice it’s not exactly clear what it is Great Britain was offering to do.


Germany had reliable information that the French would violate Belgian neutrality therefore Great Britain would have to give a lot to assuage German concerns i.e., if the Germans cannot conduct hostile operations against their enemy in the west, then the French would not be allowed to use Belgium.


Obviously, no one will go for that unless Great Britain committed to personally ensuring Belgian neutrality - perhaps stationing troops in country.


Could Grey marshal enough support in the Cabinet to commit to defending the western and northern coasts of France whilst at the same time neutralise any advantage France would have to attack Germany through Belgium.


I don’t see an argument for that though. The Royal Navy was more than capable of taking on the German Navy, which IOTL was ineffective, so there really is no need to guarantee security for France. If Great Britain declares war on Germany, then the Royal Navy can neutralise any threat from the German Navy.

From what I've read so far a number of other cabinet members decribed in their remembrances, letters and diary-entries the assurance to be given to Cambon on 2nd August as only encompassing the french northern coast and the channel.

The 'comming through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against french coasts (also its Atlantic-coast ?) or shipping (anywhere globally ?)' as he informed the british ambassador in Paris Bertie were additions made by Grey on his very and only own account.

However, this was still not the 'commitment' the french diplomacy wanted (clear and definite military participation). It was a raffirmation of french coastal security on the northern coast as intended and assumed by the exchange of letters of December 1912 regarding the role distribution for the french fleet the mediterrainian for the british fleet the North Sea.

Also in the eyes of at least the majority of the british cabinet it was enough a demonstration and proove of goodwill towards the french owing to their 'entente cordiale'.



... may I know where from you have the germans "reliable information" of french violation of belgian neutrality?
The stating it in their note to the belgian goverment on the ultimatum to let their troops pass was ... (at best) questionably founded on intelligence at that time (regardless the intelligence they gathered about such actual events during the war by interviewing french PoWs) and rather some ... conceived excuse.

IOTL the yet unconfirmed notion of the german ambassador to London Lichnowsky of Grey 'making an opening' fro neutrality on 1st August was enough to let Kaiser Bill, Bethmann-Hollweg and at least also Tirpitz IMMEDIATLY jump on it and cancel - at least for the moment - any mobilization against the western borders. They even ordered the withdraw of troops already ahving entered Luxembourg. ... not much of 'assuage' needed IMHO ...
By then it was already clear to the german - as well as the french - politicians that Belgium was some 'bone-of-content' for the british goverment. In case of its non-participation it seems clear that noone - including France - was to violate Belgium or face 'consequences' by HM Goverment.

... stationing troops in Belgium? Noone wanted it - the least the belgian goverment - as it would have been a breach of 'beloved' treaty of 1848 guaranteering Belgiums integrity by one of its signatars.


The 'need to guarantee security to France' was political and diplomatical an more than urging need.
And with it it would stll enable Britain to stay out of military participation.
Asked about 'accepting' the british demand of german demilitarization of the channel ... even Tirpitz almost immediatly agreed to. ... and that was still before the british ultimatum and DoW of 4th August.

[nomommsen]

May 13, 2023 8:14:38 GMT 575 said:

Regarding Naval matters as have been discussed on p.5 and the above post - should Adm. Souchon deciding still to go for the French transfer of North African troops trigger British intervention?

According to an old magazine article by Richard Humble:
BC Goeben and LC Breslau had been in the Med since 1913. As a response the RN sent off a BC Squadron to shadow the German ships. The French plan for war included transfer (as was the case 1939) of the North African Army (19. Corps - 4. Divisions) to Metropolitan France. French Adm. de Lapeyrére decided to convoy the Troop Transports by the French Battle Fleet in the Med.
Adm. Souchon had coaled in Brindisi on 30. July 1914 and then sailed on through Messines Strait north of Sicily and then west.
On 3. August 1914 Adm. Souchon get a telegrammen ordering him to go the Turkey as the British had seized the Turk Dreadnoughts. Before turning east Adm. Souchon decided to shell the French NA Ports of Bône and Phillippeville which was shelled on the 4.
The German ships was spotted by RN BC Indomitable at 10,30 AM heading east and the RN ships following though awaiting orders from London pending the expiry of the British ultimatum to Germany.

So according to the previous discussion will Adm Souchon linger in the Western Med to find the French Troop Transports thus experience a battle with the French Battle Fleet (as far as I could dig up almost all French Dreadnoughts and Pre-Dreadnoughts would be in the Med) which could end up with Goeben sunk.

Would the RN get the Green light to protect French shipping? Richard Humble doesn't mention any such and from the RN dispositions it doesn't look like so.

A general sortie at the outbreak of War of the Goeben Squadron accompanied by the A-H 1. and 2. Battlesquadrons to intercept the French Troop Transports a possibility? I haven't come across such plans but they might be out there.
I expect such to be a serious concern for the British should it materialize but of course also the French due to the objective. It may have some effect upon Italy AND Turkey according to results.

Seems in Mr. Humbles article some informations are lacking (for some more comprhensive and detailes information you might have a look here. ... pls don't be deterred by the 'conspiracy' in the subtitle. The author means with it rather a conspiracy of combined inaptitude of the british side )

He i.e. forgets to mention that Goeben and Breslau only 'met' on 2nd August in harbour of Messina where they coaled.

There and then - on 2nd August - Souchon received the info of already commenced histilities with Russia, war with France as certain and Great Britain 'very probable hostile'. ... and no further orders on what to do. Only then he began to make plans of his own aka bombarding the french northafrican coast.

At night from 2nd to 3rd August he 'slipped' out of harbour then taking western course. While Admiral v.Tirpitz as well as Admiral v.Pohl (this doubling only once again illustrating the chaotic command structure of the german navy then) sent their order to Suchon for heading to Constantinople ASAP already in the morning, Souchon though having learnt of the war broken out between Germany and France didn't received it due to jamming by the british navy only rather shortly at night before opening fire on the french coast.

Also ... the seizure of the turkish battleships had nothing to do with the hasty decision of kaiser Bill, v.Pohl and v.Tirpitz to order Souchon to Constantinople. The german Ambassodor at the Porte Wangenheim had alreayd requested Souchons comming for 'supporting' his negotiations about an alliance on 31st July which was refuse by Kaiser Bill on counsil of Tirpitz and Pohl on 1st August.

Only after they had learned of the signing of the alliance early morning 3rd August they sent their orders to Souchon.

Of the seizure of the turkish battleships they didn't know anything at that moment.

ITTL the telegram Souchon would receive on 2nd August would probably tell him of hostilities with Russia already commenced, for the moment at least no war with France in sight, Great Britain neutral and guarding/guaranteering french military inactivity. ... and agin possibly no orders for what to do.

Therefore Souchon would very likely NOT decide on some action against France yet. May be he would try intalian unbenevolent 'hospitality' at Messina a wee bit longer in getting more coal aboard. At 3rd August he might still linger in the West Med but wihtout much of a goal possobly orientate himself more on a southern cours at/around Malta for having easier options to go west (against Fracne)or east (entering Adria at last for more thorough maintenance of his boilers).

The britsh ships might still bedome ordered to further shadow Souchon who likely would still try to escape their watch when ordered towards Constantinople. But I don't see any miliotary action here comming up.

[stevep]

May 12, 2023 21:31:54 GMT halferking said:

May 1, 2023 7:40:30 GMT nomommsen said:

I somehow wonder why so many people seem to assume that Grey would resign undoubtly if he woudn't get an "Everything for France (even has to be in the basket as well) !" between 1st and 3rd August 1914 on 4th August the latest.

I had started a disuccion about that early this year (you might have a look ) and its outcome was rather ... different.

I should also not been forgotten to what condition he connected his thread of resignation:

        "... out-and-out and uncompromising policy of non-intervention ..."

At 2nd August at least the "doves" - or most of them - were already well prepared to make some concessions and setting up triggerpoints (like violation of belgian integrety in from minister to minister varying severeness).

With making such concession to Grey - though the germans clearly fullfill ITTL the demands regarding Belgium - maybe including a 'demiklitarization' of the channel (enforced by the RN) would IMHO well fullfill Greys demands as stated above.

Sir Edward was authorised “…to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power…” to the French government. On the face of it this is a clearly worded statement of intent, but in practice it’s not exactly clear what it is Great Britain was offering to do.


Germany had reliable information that the French would violate Belgian neutrality therefore Great Britain would have to give a lot to assuage German concerns i.e., if the Germans cannot conduct hostile operations against their enemy in the west, then the French would not be allowed to use Belgium.


Obviously, no one will go for that unless Great Britain committed to personally ensuring Belgian neutrality - perhaps stationing troops in country.


Could Grey marshal enough support in the Cabinet to commit to defending the western and northern coasts of France whilst at the same time neutralise any advantage France would have to attack Germany through Belgium.


I don’t see an argument for that though. The Royal Navy was more than capable of taking on the German Navy, which IOTL was ineffective, so there really is no need to guarantee security for France. If Great Britain declares war on Germany, then the Royal Navy can neutralise any threat from the German Navy.

  What reliable information?  France had plans to counter a German invasion of Belgium, which they expected and knew Germany planned OTL and were able to do so by moving into part of southern Belgium after the Germany invasion.  However they made sure they kept out of Belgium territory and even withdrew their forces some way back from the Belgium border to avoid any risk of either an accident or German claims of such intent.  This sounds more like the sort of propaganda too common in the war on all sides but especially probably the Germans to excuse their own actions.

  Since Germany viewed Britain as an hostile power and Belgium wanted its neutrality respected I doubt either would be willing to suggest a British force in Belgium, even if London was willing.  Belgium I also believe was fairly confident of its modern fortifications at Liege and other locations to hold until aid could reach them if they were attacked.

  The German navy in 1914 was a significant threat to Britain and its local interests.  As new construction entered service in the next couple of years the balance tilted towards the RN although as Jutland showed there were significant weaknesses in the RN force including doctrine, training and tactics as well as material.  However once the bulk of the German forces outside the North Sea were hunted down the real threat was always the subs, albeit that leading figures on both sides didn't realise that yet.

[halferking]

May 13, 2023 9:42:57 GMT nomommsen said:

May 12, 2023 21:31:54 GMT halferking said:

Sir Edward was authorised “…to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power…” to the French government. On the face of it this is a clearly worded statement of intent, but in practice it’s not exactly clear what it is Great Britain was offering to do.


Germany had reliable information that the French would violate Belgian neutrality therefore Great Britain would have to give a lot to assuage German concerns i.e., if the Germans cannot conduct hostile operations against their enemy in the west, then the French would not be allowed to use Belgium.


Obviously, no one will go for that unless Great Britain committed to personally ensuring Belgian neutrality - perhaps stationing troops in country.


Could Grey marshal enough support in the Cabinet to commit to defending the western and northern coasts of France whilst at the same time neutralise any advantage France would have to attack Germany through Belgium.


I don’t see an argument for that though. The Royal Navy was more than capable of taking on the German Navy, which IOTL was ineffective, so there really is no need to guarantee security for France. If Great Britain declares war on Germany, then the Royal Navy can neutralise any threat from the German Navy.

From what I've read so far a number of other cabinet members decribed in their remembrances, letters and diary-entries the assurance to be given to Cambon on 2nd August as only encompassing the french northern coast and the channel.

The 'comming through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against french coasts (also its Atlantic-coast ?) or shipping (anywhere globally ?)' as he informed the british ambassador in Paris Bertie were additions made by Grey on his very and only own account.

However, this was still not the 'commitment' the french diplomacy wanted (clear and definite military participation). It was a raffirmation of french coastal security on the northern coast as intended and assumed by the exchange of letters of December 1912 regarding the role distribution for the french fleet the mediterrainian for the british fleet the North Sea.

Also in the eyes of at least the majority of the british cabinet it was enough a demonstration and proove of goodwill towards the french owing to their 'entente cordiale'.



... may I know where from you have the germans "reliable information" of french violation of belgian neutrality?
The stating it in their note to the belgian goverment on the ultimatum to let their troops pass was ... (at best) questionably founded on intelligence at that time (regardless the intelligence they gathered about such actual events during the war by interviewing french PoWs) and rather some ... conceived excuse.

IOTL the yet unconfirmed notion of the german ambassador to London Lichnowsky of Grey 'making an opening' fro neutrality on 1st August was enough to let Kaiser Bill, Bethmann-Hollweg and at least also Tirpitz IMMEDIATLY jump on it and cancel - at least for the moment - any mobilization against the western borders. They even ordered the withdraw of troops already ahving entered Luxembourg. ... not much of 'assuage' needed IMHO ...
By then it was already clear to the german - as well as the french - politicians that Belgium was some 'bone-of-content' for the british goverment. In case of its non-participation it seems clear that noone - including France - was to violate Belgium or face 'consequences' by HM Goverment.

... stationing troops in Belgium? Noone wanted it - the least the belgian goverment - as it would have been a breach of 'beloved' treaty of 1848 guaranteering Belgiums integrity by one of its signatars.


The 'need to guarantee security to France' was political and diplomatical an more than urging need.
And with it it would stll enable Britain to stay out of military participation.
Asked about 'accepting' the british demand of german demilitarization of the channel ... even Tirpitz almost immediatly agreed to. ... and that was still before the british ultimatum and DoW of 4th August.

The assurance given by His Majesty’s Government would allow Germany to ship weapons, supplies and troops through the English Channel and into the Mediterranean Sea unopposed and that situation would be unacceptable to the French government but given the wording used it is not clear as to what would happen if Paris initiated operations against German shipping in the designated areas.


Berlin would argue that they were defending themselves and therefore any action taken could not be considered hostile.


Paris would argue that retaliatory actions taken by the Germans were hostile and therefore would rely on the assurance of British naval protection.


Could London find a moral argument to intervene on behalf of the French after all the term “hostile operations” was not defined, but on the other hand the assurance was only conditional on Germany initiating attacks on the French coastline and shipping.


In a communique from Sir Edward Goschen, the Ambassador to Berlin, he explained Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg’s conditions for British neutrality. Berlin understood, rightly or wrongly, that London would not tolerate the occupation of French territory, so von Bethmann Hollweg sought to assure Asquith ministry that “in the event of a victorious war, Germany aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France…” however “His Excellency said that it would not be possible for him to give such assurance as regards colonies…”


The British response was if you take her colonies France would be much diminished power on the world stage and therefore effectively subject to the whims of the German government so it would be as if Germany had occupied France any way.


In reference to Belgium the Chancellor was not able to state what “operations Germany might be forced by the actions of France, but he could state that, provided Belgium did not take sides against Germany, her integrity would be respected after the conclusion of war…” The 1839 Treaty of London placed an obligation on the Great Powers to recognise Belgian neutrality and London made it clear that she had a moral obligation to uphold Belgium’s right. The treaty however gave Belgium the right to determine what shape neutrality would take. Brussels took a strict neutrality policy but were able to change that approach.


Is there argument to be made for Belgium to be less attached to their strict neutrality policy. Obviously, they would never agree to German troops on their soil let alone transit through their territory as this would invoke French counter measures and place the country at the heart of the conflict. What if they agreed to Great Britain stationing troops in the country to guarantee neutrality.


London could be seen to be pleasing everyone and no-one, but such an arrangement would be within British policy – keep trade routes open as much as possible. Troops in Belgium would be within the scope of the 1839 Treaty. A clearer assurance given to Paris detailing exactly what action Great Britain would take in the event of German attacks. The problematic issue would be addressing Germany’s territorial ambitions, which IATL could possibly be satiated if the victorious Germans keep hold of their colonies in Africa and were allowed to expand these territories of course at the expense of France.

[halferking]

May 13, 2023 13:20:05 GMT stevep said:

May 12, 2023 21:31:54 GMT halferking said:

Sir Edward was authorised “…to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power…” to the French government. On the face of it this is a clearly worded statement of intent, but in practice it’s not exactly clear what it is Great Britain was offering to do.


Germany had reliable information that the French would violate Belgian neutrality therefore Great Britain would have to give a lot to assuage German concerns i.e., if the Germans cannot conduct hostile operations against their enemy in the west, then the French would not be allowed to use Belgium.


Obviously, no one will go for that unless Great Britain committed to personally ensuring Belgian neutrality - perhaps stationing troops in country.


Could Grey marshal enough support in the Cabinet to commit to defending the western and northern coasts of France whilst at the same time neutralise any advantage France would have to attack Germany through Belgium.


I don’t see an argument for that though. The Royal Navy was more than capable of taking on the German Navy, which IOTL was ineffective, so there really is no need to guarantee security for France. If Great Britain declares war on Germany, then the Royal Navy can neutralise any threat from the German Navy.

  What reliable information?  France had plans to counter a German invasion of Belgium, which they expected and knew Germany planned OTL and were able to do so by moving into part of southern Belgium after the Germany invasion.  However they made sure they kept out of Belgium territory and even withdrew their forces some way back from the Belgium border to avoid any risk of either an accident or German claims of such intent.  This sounds more like the sort of propaganda too common in the war on all sides but especially probably the Germans to excuse their own actions.

  Since Germany viewed Britain as an hostile power and Belgium wanted its neutrality respected I doubt either would be willing to suggest a British force in Belgium, even if London was willing.  Belgium I also believe was fairly confident of its modern fortifications at Liege and other locations to hold until aid could reach them if they were attacked.

  The German navy in 1914 was a significant threat to Britain and its local interests.  As new construction entered service in the next couple of years the balance tilted towards the RN although as Jutland showed there were significant weaknesses in the RN force including doctrine, training and tactics as well as material.  However once the bulk of the German forces outside the North Sea were hunted down the real threat was always the subs, albeit that leading figures on both sides didn't realise that yet.

The Germans were willing to secure British neutrality, unfortunately their belief that France would use Belgian territory to attack Germany meant that they could not give London the assurance she needed – recognition of Belgian neutrality. Indeed Germany had proposed a policy of ‘Benign Neutrality’ where Belgium would let German troops transit through their territory. Belgium had a strict policy of neutrality, so they dismissed this proposal.

The Battle of Jutland was indecisive and both sides a heavy price in terms of life lost. Great Britain however was able to take control and launch a blockade of Germany which contributed to the collapse of the country.