WI: no October Revolution, impact on ww2?

[ewellholmes]

Sept 18, 2024 16:54:39 GMT stevep said:

  Are you talking about a peace conference at an earlier date because if things continue til late 1918 I can't see the CP allies not being in a state of collapse?  Also the continually tightening blockade, especially once the US is in the war will have its impact.

Yes, I'm suggesting Germany pulls back to the Hindenburg Line in June or July of 1918 when it was suggested to do such within OHL and open peace talks. This is assuming the Russian Republic remains in the war into 1918, and thus the Germans are unable to conduct force transfers that made offensives past Operation Georgette possible.

  The German army will have been defeated in its attempt to win a final decisive victory and there will be allied offensives coming while they would also have avoided a lot of the heavy casualties that they suffered OTL in spring 1918.  They will be able to withdraw back to the Hindenburg Line but that failure will hurt moral and the allies will attack.  They might well wait a bit longer until the US forces are available in greater numbers as time is now clearly on their side.  Fighting will be heavy as with casualties, especially for the inexperienced Americans but the Hindenburg Line will fall as it did OTL.

  If I read the map right your suggesting that Germany will accept the loss of most of the Posen area to a new Polish state and of Alsace-Lorraine to France.  Coupled presumably with withdrawal from other occupied areas.  That's a huge admission of failure by the regime so it will probably prompt either major political reform and/or a lot of unrest.  Also the German allies are going to definitely go down but a lot would depend on the exact circumstances.

It's still a much better outcome than historical and major reform had already been promised by the Kaiser in the Easter Pledges of 1917.

[stevep]

Sept 18, 2024 20:44:58 GMT lukedalton said:

Sept 17, 2024 22:21:32 GMT ewellholmes said:

The OTL German offer at Versailles was, in private, not considered ridiculous by anyone except perhaps the French; Lloyd George actually wrote it gave him pause in terms of the actual treaty and John Maynard Keynes thought it was the best peace treaty wrote. 

With that said, we are not dealing with the situation of OTL May 1919 but something far different. None of Germany's allies have been defeated as they were by October of 1918, nor is Germany itself in revolutionary chaos. The German Army has yet to be defeated and, assuming the pullback to the Hindenburg Line is undertaken, is in a well fortified defensive position rather than over-extended and exhausted as it was after the Second Battle of the Marne historically. There's no question at this point that Germany will lose, but the capacity of Berlin to drag things out for longer and at a greater cost to the Entente is there and will inform calculations. Perhaps something like this could be the end result of that:

Let's see Austria-Hungary army lack basically everything (first of all food) and at the moment is trying to concentrate everything they have left for launching a final attack to Italy hoping to knock it out of the war...and even if it succeed ITTL it will not leave the war, Bulgaria already think about leaving the war even because is ravaged by famine, so while not beaten her ally are not really in any shape to continue the war.


The German plan include:
- referendum for Alsace-Lorraine
- giving Posen to the Polish state as the zone is a polish majority but more importantly because it's poor, Silesia that's also a polish majority it will be kept due to the coal but with great generosity it will have somekind of autonomy (whatever it mean)
- No port for the new polish state but also very generously it will have special privilege (whatever it mean) in the custom area (this united to the term above mean that the new polish state is basically a German puppet due to necessity)
- No reparation between state at max Germany will agree to reparation to private in belgium
- the colonies back to her as mandate
- general disarmament for everyone involved in the war
- a referendum with Austria for an Union (that include south Tyrol, part of Slovenia an the Sudetenland)
This is not a negotiated peace, this is snatching victory from the jaws of defeat i don't know if Lloyd George of Keynes really said that but if they have really do it...they were totally moron or wanted France out of the game of power in Europe; for anyone sane it's not acceptable because it will leave Germany in a much much more stronger position that she was at the beginning of the war in relations with everyone in the continent

  While part of upper Silesia was predominantly Polish and hence went to the new Polish republic after OTT Versailles treaty most of it was majority German at this date.  However I wouldn't be surprised at the rest of the details being accurate. 

  OTL Keynes was deeply critical of the peace terms as too harsh although later he changed his mind on that viewpoint.

[ewellholmes]

Sept 18, 2024 20:44:58 GMT lukedalton said:

Let's see Austria-Hungary army lack basically everything (first of all food) and at the moment is trying to concentrate everything they have left for launching a final attack to Italy hoping to knock it out of the war...and even if it succeed ITTL it will not leave the war, Bulgaria already think about leaving the war even because is ravaged by famine, so while not beaten her ally are not really in any shape to continue the war.

Sure, but the fact that's in the future is precisely the point; they have yet to collapse.

The German plan include:
- referendum for Alsace-Lorraine

Which everyone, including the Germans, knew would result in a vote for France; this was understood and recognized as a face saving gesture and consistent with the right to self-determination as expressed in Wilson's 14 points.

- giving Posen to the Polish state as the zone is a polish majority but more importantly because it's poor, Silesia that's also a polish majority it will be kept due to the coal but with great generosity it will have somekind of autonomy (whatever it mean)

Silesia also voting to remain with Germany IOTL and, again, being consistent with the 14 Points.

- No port for the new polish state but also very generously it will have special privilege (whatever it mean) in the custom area (this united to the term above mean that the new polish state is basically a German puppet due to necessity)

Which was the exact deal given to Czechoslovakia via Hamburg IOTL with no issues.

- No reparation between state at max Germany will agree to reparation to private in belgium

The Germans actually included reparations pretty explicitly but worked it out such that it would be less onerous and avoid causing economic disruption.

- the colonies back to her as mandate

Under League oversight, albeit. Perhaps this was too much, but that's the whole point of a peace conference; to haggle on these things.

- general disarmament for everyone involved in the war

Again, something Wilson and others were advocating too.

- a referendum with Austria for an Union (that include south Tyrol, part of Slovenia an the Sudetenland)

Again, entirely consistent with Wilson's 14 Points.

This is not a negotiated peace, this is snatching victory from the jaws of defeat i don't know if Lloyd George of Keynes really said that but if they have really do it...they were totally moron or wanted France out of the game of power in Europe; for anyone sane it's not acceptable because it will leave Germany in a much much more stronger position that she was at the beginning of the war in relations with everyone in the continent

By losing Alsace-Lorraine, it's Danish and Polish areas and being disarmed, surrounded by Entente allies on all sides with a reparations scheme to prevent her from re-arming?

[lukedalton]

Sept 18, 2024 22:46:28 GMT ewellholmes said:

This is not a negotiated peace, this is snatching victory from the jaws of defeat i don't know if Lloyd George of Keynes really said that but if they have really do it...they were totally moron or wanted France out of the game of power in Europe; for anyone sane it's not acceptable because it will leave Germany in a much much more stronger position that she was at the beginning of the war in relations with everyone in the continent

By losing Alsace-Lorraine, it's Danish and Polish areas and being disarmed, surrounded by Entente allies on all sides with a reparations scheme to prevent her from re-arming?

The reparation scheme is basically paying spare change to private in Belgium while North France has been litteraly devastated sure that will not create economic disruption in Germany and it will not prevent her to rearm it will make France uncapable to rebuild and getting Austria greatly greatly greatly offset the loss of AL and the Danish and Polish area and ITTL Germany is not surrounded by Entente ally, Poland is basically a German puppet in this scenario due to economic necessity. Czech? In the same position only even worse in strategic term

Silesia: OTL part of her was given immediately to Poland, the referendum was for the border area, some decided for Poland and some for Germany the fight and trouble was for the exact division due to the economic importance and the ethnic composition. ITTL Germany keep everything and simple decide to give some autonomy again whatever that mean

The OTL deal with Czech is pretty different from anyt ITTL deal with Poland, the first is a defeated nation who need to abide to the treaty terms on penance of sanctions and military intervention, the second is a  great power controlling the only port of a nation and decide to give 'special privilege' that basically mean everything and nothing but the assumption is that she can revocke them as pleasure and i doubt that there will be diplomatic consequences.

The entire premise is unacceptable for anyone that had a working brain as leave Germany as the major power of the continent while put the other in economic and political instability; there is no way that any type of French government can accept this treaty.

The Wilsonian point as showed in reality were not something that had been used in favor of Germany or any defeated nation and at this stage the Entente can simple sit and defend while the blockade do his job, there is no incentive for anyone to even entertain the idea to consider this proposal seriously and the Entente already planned to continue the war on 1919

[stevep]

Sept 18, 2024 22:46:28 GMT ewellholmes said:

Sept 18, 2024 20:44:58 GMT lukedalton said:

Let's see Austria-Hungary army lack basically everything (first of all food) and at the moment is trying to concentrate everything they have left for launching a final attack to Italy hoping to knock it out of the war...and even if it succeed ITTL it will not leave the war, Bulgaria already think about leaving the war even because is ravaged by famine, so while not beaten her ally are not really in any shape to continue the war.

Sure, but the fact that's in the future is precisely the point; they have yet to collapse.

The German plan include:
- referendum for Alsace-Lorraine

Which everyone, including the Germans, knew would result in a vote for France; this was understood and recognized as a face saving gesture and consistent with the right to self-determination as expressed in Wilson's 14 points.

- giving Posen to the Polish state as the zone is a polish majority but more importantly because it's poor, Silesia that's also a polish majority it will be kept due to the coal but with great generosity it will have somekind of autonomy (whatever it mean)

Silesia also voting to remain with Germany IOTL and, again, being consistent with the 14 Points.

- No port for the new polish state but also very generously it will have special privilege (whatever it mean) in the custom area (this united to the term above mean that the new polish state is basically a German puppet due to necessity)

Which was the exact deal given to Czechoslovakia via Hamburg IOTL with no issues.

- No reparation between state at max Germany will agree to reparation to private in belgium

The Germans actually included reparations pretty explicitly but worked it out such that it would be less onerous and avoid causing economic disruption.

- the colonies back to her as mandate

Under League oversight, albeit. Perhaps this was too much, but that's the whole point of a peace conference; to haggle on these things.

- general disarmament for everyone involved in the war

Again, something Wilson and others were advocating too.

- a referendum with Austria for an Union (that include south Tyrol, part of Slovenia an the Sudetenland)

Again, entirely consistent with Wilson's 14 Points.

This is not a negotiated peace, this is snatching victory from the jaws of defeat i don't know if Lloyd George of Keynes really said that but if they have really do it...they were totally moron or wanted France out of the game of power in Europe; for anyone sane it's not acceptable because it will leave Germany in a much much more stronger position that she was at the beginning of the war in relations with everyone in the continent

By losing Alsace-Lorraine, it's Danish and Polish areas and being disarmed, surrounded by Entente allies on all sides with a reparations scheme to prevent her from re-arming?

a)  That depends on when this occurs.  Also an Austria-Hungary that hasn't collapsed doesn't really fit in with where your talking about much of Austria itself being annexed to Germany and independent if smaller than OTL Polish and Czech states.

b)  The OTL reparations for damage to civilian property were pretty reasonable as they were stretched out over nearly 40 years, til 1956 IIRC.  However the German government sought to avoid paying despite having the strongest economy left in Europe with the lack of any significant material destruction.  Here it sounds like Germany is seeking to pay far less and probably again will evade what it can.

c)  Since Germany did what it could OTL to evade disarmament restrictions and here there are no/few controls to check whether it does or not I think the German position compared to a stricken Russia and a France physically devastated by war is going to be significantly stronger and with very little in the way of reparations and largely undamaged industry Germany will be in a distinctly stronger position compared to 1914.

  I suspect what will happen is that the allies, including of course the US will seek to put actual restraints on German military capacity and that the German leadership will reject this so the war continues until Germany follows its allies into defeat.

[ewellholmes]

Sept 20, 2024 14:53:20 GMT lukedalton said:

The reparation scheme is basically paying spare change to private in Belgium while North France has been litteraly devastated sure that will not create economic disruption in Germany and it will not prevent her to rearm it will make France uncapable to rebuild and getting Austria greatly greatly greatly offset the loss of AL and the Danish and Polish area and ITTL Germany is not surrounded by Entente ally, Poland is basically a German puppet in this scenario due to economic necessity. Czech? In the same position only even worse in strategic term

With respect, I don't think you've actually read the German proposals:

Germany is ready to make the payments incumbent upon her according to the peace program
agreed upon, up to the maximum sum of 100 billion marks gold, of which 20 billion marks gold are
to be paid by May 1, 1926, the other 80 billion marks gold in annual sums without interest. These
sums are in principle to represent a percentage fixed according to the revenue of the Empire and the
German States. The quota will approach the former budget of peace times. For the first ten years, it
shall not exceed a billion marks gold. The German taxpayer shall not be taxed less than the most
highly taxed taxpayer among those represented on the Commission of Reparations. 

100 Billion in gold Reichsmarks is spare change? In addition to that:

Germany is ready to put all her economic force at the service of reconstruction. She desires to
collaborate by her work in the reconstruction of the ravaged districts of Belgium and the North of
France. For the deficit in the production of the mines destroyed in the North of France she will
furnish as high as 20 million tons of coal for the first five years, 8 million tons a year for the next five
years. Germany will facilitate other deliveries of coal to France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxemburg.
Moreover, Germany is ready to furnish important quantities of benzol, coal tar, sulphuric ammonia
and dye-stuffs, and pharmaceutical products.

Nor did the Anglo-Americans find these unreasonable in private. In fact, it made David Lloyd George reconsider the entire scheme they were proposing:

The British and the Americans, by contrast, were impressed.
Henry Wilson, no friend of the Germans, wrote in his diary: “The
Boches have done exactly what I forecast—they have driven a coach
and four through our Terms, and then have submitted a complete
set of their own, based on the 14 points, which are much more
coherent than ours.” At that moment, the separatists in the
Rhineland, with support from some of the French military, staged a
futile bid for independence. On June 1 placards went up in several
cities along the Rhine. Where they were not immediately torn down
by angry crowds, they met with a profound silence. Attempts to
seize government offices failed ignominiously Brockdorff-Rantzau
immediately sent a strong protest to Clemenceau. On June 2 Wilson
and Lloyd George showed Clemenceau reports they had received
from their own generals in the Rhineland complaining about French
intrigues. Lloyd George suggested that the Allies might have to
rethink their fifteen-year occupation of the Rhineland.10

Cite is Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, by Margaret MacMillian.

Silesia: OTL part of her was given immediately to Poland, the referendum was for the border area, some decided for Poland and some for Germany the fight and trouble was for the exact division due to the economic importance and the ethnic composition. ITTL Germany keep everything and simple decide to give some autonomy again whatever that mean

The Upper Silesian plebiscite didn't occur until 1921 and the final division took until 1923. The end result was that the district as a whole voted for Germany, with 707,605 votes cast for Germany and 479,359 for Poland. It wasn't unreasonable for the Germans, given that, to request to retain the district and offer autonomy to mollify the Poles. Britain agreed, which is why they fought for the plebiscite to occur, for the record.

The OTL deal with Czech is pretty different from anyt ITTL deal with Poland, the first is a defeated nation who need to abide to the treaty terms on penance of sanctions and military intervention, the second is a  great power controlling the only port of a nation and decide to give 'special privilege' that basically mean everything and nothing but the assumption is that she can revocke them as pleasure and i doubt that there will be diplomatic consequences.

Indeed, the Germans are offering a much better deal to Poland than the Czechs got. Instead of one port, they promised the Poles three; equally, all of these contentions could be made about the Czech deal but instead it worked out fine:

As far as territorial questions are concerned, Germany takes rank, without restrictions, on the
ground of Wilson’s program. She renounces her rights of sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine, but
desires a free plebiscite. She gives to Poland the greater part of Posnania, the territories indisputably
inhabited by Poles and the capital of Posen. She is ready to insure to the Poles by the cession of free
ports at Danzig, Koenigsberg and Memel, by a chart governing navigation on the Vistula and by
special treaties regarding railways, free and certain access to the sea without international guarantees.
Germany is ready to insure the economic supply of France in coal, especially from the Saar coal field,
until restoration of the French mines. The parts of Schleswig which have a Danish majority will be
given to Denmark after a plebiscite. Germany requests that the right of self-determination be also
respected in favor of the Germans of Austria and Bohemia. She is ready to put all her colonies under
the administration in common of the League of Nations, if she is recognized as mandatory for the
latter.

Again, the Allies didn't think this as unreasonable either in private, especially the British.

The entire premise is unacceptable for anyone that had a working brain as leave Germany as the major power of the continent while put the other in economic and political instability; there is no way that any type of French government can accept this treaty.

Apparently no one in the British establishment, including Winston Churchill, had a brain then:

Lloyd George was in fact rethinking the whole treaty. He was
well aware that, in the long run, it was not in Britain’s best
interests to have a weak and possibly revolutionary Germany at the
heart of Europe. It also did not seem to be in his own political
interest. In a by-election in Central Hull, the candidate advocating
“a good, an early and non-revengeful peace” crushed the coalition
candidate. His closest colleagues warned that the British public
would not support a harsh treaty. The detailed German comments
on the treaty, which the Allies received on May 30, echoed many of
the concerns that Lloyd George had discussed with his British
colleagues. The deputy prime minister, Bonar Law, found the
German objections “in many particulars very difficult to answer.”
Lloyd George agreed. The Germans were in effect saying to the
Allies: “You have a set of principles which, when they suit you, you
apply, but which, when they suit us, you put by.”1083

Further:

Sufficiently disturbed by all this, Lloyd George called the
British empire delegation together on June 1. Several key ministers
from the British government, including Austen Chamberlain, the
chancellor of the exchequer; Montagu, the secretary of state for
India; and Churchill, secretary of state for war, who had come over
from London the night before, joined the meeting. Smuts made an
impassioned speech. The peace terms “would produce political and
economic chaos in Europe for a generation and in the long run it
would be the British Empire which would have to pay the penalty.”
There was, he added, “far too much of the French demands in that
settlement.” There was a general murmur of agreement. “The hatred
of France for Germany,” said Churchill, “was something more than
human.” General Botha, the prime minister of South Africa, who
rarely spoke, reminded them that it was the anniversary of the day,
seventeen years ago, when he and Lord Milner had signed the peace
that ended the Boer War. “On that occasion it was moderation
which had saved South Africa for the British Empire, and he hoped
on this occasion that it would be moderation which would save the
world.” The meeting unanimously authorized Lloyd George to go
back to the Council of Four and ask for modifications of the terms
on Germany’s frontiers with Poland, on reparations, on the
Rhineland occupation and on the scores of smaller but irritating
“pin pricks.” In addition, he would request a promise to Germany
that it could enter the League of Nations soon.10

The Wilsonian point as showed in reality were not something that had been used in favor of Germany or any defeated nation and at this stage the Entente can simple sit and defend while the blockade do his job, there is no incentive for anyone to even entertain the idea to consider this proposal seriously and the Entente already planned to continue the war on 1919

Which, as both American and British participants at OTL Versailles noted, was a diplomatic and moral issue for them as Bonar Law in particular pointed out.


As for our Summer 1918 ATL, there is no ability to rely on that; the British and French were under just as much political pressure to bring about a speedy end to the war as the Germans. The entire reason Wilson had to issue the 14 Points in the Winter of 1917-1918 was because peace overtures from the Central Powers were undermining him and David Lloyd George politically, requiring them both to come out and combat allegations of war mongering. Haig, himself a proponent of a peace deal, noted that morale in the BEF depended upon the perception they were fighting to liberate France and Belgium; refusing a German peace offer addressing those concerns would make the continuation of the war impossible. This was a sentiment shared by others too. 

[ewellholmes]

Sept 20, 2024 20:04:43 GMT stevep said:

a)  That depends on when this occurs.  Also an Austria-Hungary that hasn't collapsed doesn't really fit in with where your talking about much of Austria itself being annexed to Germany and independent if smaller than OTL Polish and Czech states.

Nor was I suggesting that, he brought up the OTL German counter-proposal as basis for a treaty here in the ATL I'm proposing.

b) The OTL reparations for damage to civilian property were pretty reasonable as they were stretched out over nearly 40 years, til 1956 IIRC.  However the German government sought to avoid paying despite having the strongest economy left in Europe with the lack of any significant material destruction.  Here it sounds like Germany is seeking to pay far less and probably again will evade what it can

They really weren't, which the entire British delegation agreed and is why David Lloyd George at the end fought to get that changed. Indeed, Keynes had his most popular book get published over this exact issue.

c) Since Germany did what it could OTL to evade disarmament restrictions and here there are no/few controls to check whether it does or not I think the German position compared to a stricken Russia and a France physically devastated by war is going to be significantly stronger and with very little in the way of reparations and largely undamaged industry Germany will be in a distinctly stronger position compared to 1914.

Keyword being OTL; entirely different circumstances. Given Germany hasn't been militarily defeated here, I do think it's likely efforts to push through serious military disarmament is likely to fail for both sides.

I suspect what will happen is that the allies, including of course the US will seek to put actual restraints on German military capacity and that the German leadership will reject this so the war continues until Germany follows its allies into defeat.

That's not politically possible at this stage, if the Germans address the chief issue of France and Belgium. Douglas Haig himself said this and the entire reason Wilson spent 1918 expanding upon the 14 Points was because the Allies had to be seen as offering a just and fair peace. They'd already faced domestic pressure the previous winter for refusing the German Christmas Offer for a general peace conference. 

[stevep]

Sept 20, 2024 23:30:38 GMT ewellholmes said:

Sept 20, 2024 20:04:43 GMT stevep said:

a)  That depends on when this occurs.  Also an Austria-Hungary that hasn't collapsed doesn't really fit in with where your talking about much of Austria itself being annexed to Germany and independent if smaller than OTL Polish and Czech states.

Nor was I suggesting that, he brought up the OTL German counter-proposal as basis for a treaty here in the ATL I'm proposing.

b) The OTL reparations for damage to civilian property were pretty reasonable as they were stretched out over nearly 40 years, til 1956 IIRC.  However the German government sought to avoid paying despite having the strongest economy left in Europe with the lack of any significant material destruction.  Here it sounds like Germany is seeking to pay far less and probably again will evade what it can

They really weren't, which the entire British delegation agreed and is why David Lloyd George at the end fought to get that changed. Indeed, Keynes had his most popular book get published over this exact issue.

c) Since Germany did what it could OTL to evade disarmament restrictions and here there are no/few controls to check whether it does or not I think the German position compared to a stricken Russia and a France physically devastated by war is going to be significantly stronger and with very little in the way of reparations and largely undamaged industry Germany will be in a distinctly stronger position compared to 1914.

Keyword being OTL; entirely different circumstances. Given Germany hasn't been militarily defeated here, I do think it's likely efforts to push through serious military disarmament is likely to fail for both sides.

I suspect what will happen is that the allies, including of course the US will seek to put actual restraints on German military capacity and that the German leadership will reject this so the war continues until Germany follows its allies into defeat.

That's not politically possible at this stage, if the Germans address the chief issue of France and Belgium. Douglas Haig himself said this and the entire reason Wilson spent 1918 expanding upon the 14 Points was because the Allies had to be seen as offering a just and fair peace. They'd already faced domestic pressure the previous winter for refusing the German Christmas Offer for a general peace conference. 

point b)  A book which Keynes later admitted he had been wrong about.  Given the anger at Germany and Austria for the war they had started and prolonged that long with massive levels of destruction of civilian areas there was little scope for them to get off as lightly as your suggesting while other nations suffered the consequences.

point c)  Germany isn't defeated if for some reason the allies give in short of an inevitable victory, which seems most unlikely.  Plus you were arguing that somehow Germany would be forced to demilitarized and the allied powers would still be level with substantial forces.

point d)  Except that while they might offer something to Belgium in terms of reparations their doing virtually nothing for France which has suffered massive levels of devastation, in many cases deliberate, most noticeably in the original withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line.

[ewellholmes]

Sept 20, 2024 23:56:11 GMT stevep said:

point b) A book which Keynes later admitted he had been wrong about. Given the anger at Germany and Austria for the war they had started and prolonged that long with massive levels of destruction of civilian areas there was little scope for them to get off as lightly as your suggesting while other nations suffered the consequences.

It's not as I suggest, because we have the documents from OTL Versailles which show the entire British delegation getting cold feet over the whole affair. More relevant to the ATL I'm proposing, we also have Haig's statements on the morale of the BEF from early 1918, in that the men could be convinced to fight on to free France and Belgium, but could not be expected to sacrifice further for much more than that. David Lloyd George and Wilson both had already been under intense domestic pressure that Winter for rejecting the Kühlmann peace offer given it had the appearance of the Entente war mongering. 

point c) Germany isn't defeated if for some reason the allies give in short of an inevitable victory, which seems most unlikely. Plus you were arguing that somehow Germany would be forced to demilitarized and the allied powers would still be level with substantial forces.

My arguments were in the context of the OTL peace deal, given he brought it up. As for the ATL deal here, I would direct you to Wilson's entire policy platform in 1918. Let's start with the first and most famous:

President Wilson’s Four Principles, 11 February 1918

I. Each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

II. Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power.

III. Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states.

IV. All well defined national aspiration shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or peculating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

Then:

President Wilson's "Four Ends" of 4 July 1918

I. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

II. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

III. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honour and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern states in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

IV. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

And finally:

President Wilson’s "Five Particulars" of 27 September 1918

I. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

II. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

III. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

IV.There can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested by the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

V. All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

I've already covered the British angle extensively in my reply to Luke Dalton, and I would encourage you to read that.

point d) Except that while they might offer something to Belgium in terms of reparations their doing virtually nothing for France which has suffered massive levels of devastation, in many cases deliberate, most noticeably in the original withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line.

Again, I've already shown that was not the case as they were offering 100 billion in gold Reichsmarks in reparations and extensive material aid for reconstruction:

Germany is ready to put all her economic force at the service of reconstruction. She desires to
collaborate by her work in the reconstruction of the ravaged districts of Belgium and the North of
France. For the deficit in the production of the mines destroyed in the North of France she will
furnish as high as 20 million tons of coal for the first five years, 8 million tons a year for the next five
years. Germany will facilitate other deliveries of coal to France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxemburg.
Moreover, Germany is ready to furnish important quantities of benzol, coal tar, sulphuric ammonia
and dye-stuffs, and pharmaceutical products.

[stevep]

Sept 21, 2024 1:08:03 GMT ewellholmes said:

Sept 20, 2024 23:56:11 GMT stevep said:

point b) A book which Keynes later admitted he had been wrong about. Given the anger at Germany and Austria for the war they had started and prolonged that long with massive levels of destruction of civilian areas there was little scope for them to get off as lightly as your suggesting while other nations suffered the consequences.

It's not as I suggest, because we have the documents from OTL Versailles which show the entire British delegation getting cold feet over the whole affair. More relevant to the ATL I'm proposing, we also have Haig's statements on the morale of the BEF from early 1918, in that the men could be convinced to fight on to free France and Belgium, but could not be expected to sacrifice further for much more than that. David Lloyd George and Wilson both had already been under intense domestic pressure that Winter for rejecting the Kühlmann peace offer given it had the appearance of the Entente war mongering. 

point c) Germany isn't defeated if for some reason the allies give in short of an inevitable victory, which seems most unlikely. Plus you were arguing that somehow Germany would be forced to demilitarized and the allied powers would still be level with substantial forces.

My arguments were in the context of the OTL peace deal, given he brought it up. As for the ATL deal here, I would direct you to Wilson's entire policy platform in 1918. Let's start with the first and most famous:

President Wilson’s Four Principles, 11 February 1918

I. Each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

II. Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power.

III. Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states.

IV. All well defined national aspiration shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or peculating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

Then:

President Wilson's "Four Ends" of 4 July 1918

I. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

II. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

III. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honour and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern states in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

IV. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

And finally:

President Wilson’s "Five Particulars" of 27 September 1918

I. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

II. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

III. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

IV.There can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested by the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

V. All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

I've already covered the British angle extensively in my reply to Luke Dalton, and I would encourage you to read that.

point d) Except that while they might offer something to Belgium in terms of reparations their doing virtually nothing for France which has suffered massive levels of devastation, in many cases deliberate, most noticeably in the original withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line.

Again, I've already shown that was not the case as they were offering 100 billion in gold Reichsmarks in reparations and extensive material aid for reconstruction:

Germany is ready to put all her economic force at the service of reconstruction. She desires to
collaborate by her work in the reconstruction of the ravaged districts of Belgium and the North of
France. For the deficit in the production of the mines destroyed in the North of France she will
furnish as high as 20 million tons of coal for the first five years, 8 million tons a year for the next five
years. Germany will facilitate other deliveries of coal to France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxemburg.
Moreover, Germany is ready to furnish important quantities of benzol, coal tar, sulphuric ammonia
and dye-stuffs, and pharmaceutical products.

  I notice your selectively highlighting some of Wilson's statements and then assuming those are aimed at the allies rather than also Germany.  Plus of course the last set "5 particulars" were rejected by the American people anyway so was quickly dead in the water.

  That's the 1st I've heard of any willingness to to contribute to reconstruction by providing free coal and other materials to France, Italy and others while they recover.  Also of course that gives benefits to Germany as well supplying a market for its own coal industry.

  Given their offering 100B Reichsmarks  in reparation its interesting that OTL:

Between 1919 and 1932, Germany paid less than 21 billion marks in reparations, mostly funded by foreign loans that Adolf Hitler reneged on in 1933.

  This was out of OTL:

The Treaty of Versailles (signed in 1919) and the 1921 London Schedule of Payments required the Central Powers to pay 132 billion gold marks (US$33 billion at the time) in reparations to cover civilian damage caused during the war. This figure was divided into three categories of bonds: A, B, and C. Of these, Germany was required to pay towards 'A' and 'B' bonds totaling 50 billion marks (US$12.5 billion) unconditionally. The payment of the remaining 'C' bonds was interest-free and without any specific schedule for payment, instead being contingent on the Weimar Republic's eventual ability to pay, as was to be assessed at some future point by an Allied committee.

  I find it strange that a largely unreconsytructed imperial Germany would actually be willing to live up to such offers, especially when there was no capacity to even attempt to enforce such payments if Germany decided to renege.

[ewellholmes]

Sept 21, 2024 10:31:39 GMT stevep said:

I notice your selectively highlighting some of Wilson's statements and then assuming those are aimed at the allies rather than also Germany.

Because we know they were indeed directed at both the Allies and the Germans? If you feel I've left anything out, by all means cite it.

Plus of course the last set "5 particulars" were rejected by the American people anyway so was quickly dead in the water.

The entire Treaty of Versailles was also.

That's the 1st I've heard of any willingness to to contribute to reconstruction by providing free coal and other materials to France, Italy and others while they recover. Also of course that gives benefits to Germany as well supplying a market for its own coal industry.

It's pulled directly from the German counter-proposal from May of 1919; I would recommend you read it in full. The coal was to be given free as reparations as well, it should be noted.

Given their offering 100B Reichsmarks in reparation its interesting

The retention of the Saar and Upper Silesia does a lot. It's also how they structured the loans that won private praise.

I find it strange that a largely unreconsytructed imperial Germany would actually be willing to live up to such offers, especially when there was no capacity to even attempt to enforce such payments if Germany decided to renege.

I agreed, but it's unlikely for Imperial Germany in this ATL to have to pay a reparations total that high. The British and even the Americans had reservations and Germany here can enforce its interests much more effectively than Weimar Germany could IOTL.

[ewellholmes]

Something else I feel compelled to point out is that, up to this point, my comments have concerned a situation in which the Russian Republic remains in the war fighting into 1918. I don't see any way this is possible, given the increasing unpopularity of the war and the fact its Entente partners-especially the United States-tied material and financial aid to the continuation of Russian offensive efforts against the Germans and said offensives undermined the regime itself.

To transition to a defensive posture was also politically unstable, as doing such in the Spring of 1917 very nearly led to a separate peace forced from the bottom upwards. Following the February Revolution, mass fraternization broke out across the front and pressure from the Soldier's and Worker's Soviets to make peace was becoming a serious concern in the RPG. Holger Afflerbach's On the Knife Edge explains that time thusly:

The new democratic government of Russia, led by Prince Lvov, feared German hegemony and therefore wanted to continue the war, while the Workers' and Soldiers' Council was calling for peace. This led to very mixed messages from Russia in the following months. On 22 March 1917, the new Foreign Secretary, Pavel Milyukov, declared: 'For us, a decisive victory is essential: the annihilation of Imperial Germany, without whose defeat our ideals cannot be truly established, is today more necessary and important than ever.'12 The idea of continuing to fight on the side of the Allies thus didn't immediately lose its credibility in the following months. It also seemed possible that the Russian revolution and the new style of government, which in its political ideals was now strongly aligned to the west, could even revive the Russians' motivation to fight. Many Russian liberals hoped that the new democratic spirit of the nation would inspire its soldiers in the same way as the revolutionary movement in France had done at the end of the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, however, it also seemed possible that Russia would exit the war and leave Germany with one fewer opponent. The new government wanted peace, partly because it could not simply ignore the wishes of the population. On 9 April 1917, only three days after the USA's declaration of war on Germany, the provisional Russian government announced that it wanted to establish a long-term peace on the basis of the right to self determination and that it did not want to rule over any other peoples.13This was followed on 14 April by a resolution of the Workers' and Soldiers'Council in favour of a broad peace agreement without annexations or war indemnities – this was also adopted for the official programme of the German Social Democrats on 19 April.14

However, the desire for peace did not result in immediate peace negotiations, because the Russian government could not bring itself to make a clear and open peace offer. One significant reason for this was that the western Allies were doing everything possible to keep Russia in the war and continued to reject any suggestion of peace negotiations. This had various implications, as seen for example in the disastrous advice provided to the American Foreign Secretary, Lansing, by the American expert on Russia,George Kennan. Kennan said that the USA should not support the Workers'and Soldiers' representatives, who advocated the idea of a 'peace without annexations or war indemnities', but rather should side with those who wanted to continue the war to a victorious conclusion.15 A further factor was the Russians' fear of becoming diplomatically isolated in the case of a peace agreement with the Central Powers, as it was clear that such a development would lead Russia's former allies to turn their backs on it. Germany would then be able to concentrate its efforts in the west and would stand a good chance of winning there, leaving Russia standing alone on the continent against the intimidating and arrogant German colossus.16

This assumption gave the Russian leaders pause for thought. At times, however, it looked as if peace would be pushed through from below. In spring 1917 the battles on the Eastern Front mostly abated and there was some fraternisation between the soldiers. During the weeks around Easter 1917, the action along large sections of the front practically came to a stop.17 At the same time, a concerted propaganda effort on the part of the Central Powers to promote peace was very well received by the Russian soldiers.18 This state of affairs continued until 23 April, when Ludendorff gave the command to resume the practice of firing on any Russian soldiers who left their trenches,19 most likely with the aim of increasing pressure on the Russian leaders to enter into conventional peace negotiations.

Making peace would secure the RPG and remove the main cause of the October Revolution, fulfilling the thread title and is also the most plausible way to achieve it.

[Max Sinister]

Y'know, a TL where there's no October Revolution, Russia still drops out, and Germany wins in the west would be something new. I don't stop you from writing it.

If you do it, you may consider the other Allies invading Russia - just as they did during the Russian Civil War.

[ewellholmes]

Sept 21, 2024 20:42:56 GMT Max Sinister said:

Y'know, a TL where there's no October Revolution, Russia still drops out, and Germany wins in the west would be something new. I don't stop you from writing it.

Worth noting Tirpitz (Of the Pan-German League Ultra-Nationalist fame) and the Navy faction in Germany had been advocating into 1916 a separate status quo antebellum peace in the East in order to focus on the West. The Navy, for obvious reasons, really wanted Belgium and more colonies to extend their global reach and German commerce, while Tirpitz and his clique viewed the Anglo-French as ideological enemies while the Tsarist regime, rather less so for obvious reasons. 

In 1917, based on the internal political wrangling in both Germany and Russia, it's likely the deal would've been a neutral Poland between them as a buffer and probably German support for the same in the Baltics but with no real way of forcing that issue. Given a free hand in the West, it's likely Italy would be knocked out by Caporetto while in the West the Germans would avoid having to withdraw into the Hindenburg Line. This gives the ATL 1918 Spring Offensive vastly more forces to work with and also advanced positions to attack out of, greatly increasing its effectiveness and likely achieving its goals thus ending the war in a Central Powers victory.

Of course, with France already having mutinies in April of 1917, it's always possible the Russians bowing out forces the remaining Entente powers to do the same politically.

If you do it, you may consider the other Allies invading Russia - just as they did during the Russian Civil War.

In the Winter of 1917-1918 the Entente was already having to fight off charges of war mongering and doing this would only increase that domestic discontent. Equally, Russia isn't in Post-Revolutionary chaos here and still has an intact army to contest such meanwhile the Germans are preparing for a "Super-Spring Offensive" which will require all hands on deck to oppose.

[stevep]

Sept 21, 2024 19:53:51 GMT ewellholmes said:

Sept 21, 2024 10:31:39 GMT stevep said:

I notice your selectively highlighting some of Wilson's statements and then assuming those are aimed at the allies rather than also Germany.

Because we know they were indeed directed at both the Allies and the Germans? If you feel I've left anything out, by all means cite it.

Plus of course the last set "5 particulars" were rejected by the American people anyway so was quickly dead in the water.

The entire Treaty of Versailles was also.

That's the 1st I've heard of any willingness to to contribute to reconstruction by providing free coal and other materials to France, Italy and others while they recover. Also of course that gives benefits to Germany as well supplying a market for its own coal industry.

It's pulled directly from the German counter-proposal from May of 1919; I would recommend you read it in full. The coal was to be given free as reparations as well, it should be noted.

Given their offering 100B Reichsmarks in reparation its interesting

The retention of the Saar and Upper Silesia does a lot. It's also how they structured the loans that won private praise. [c]

I find it strange that a largely unreconsytructed imperial Germany would actually be willing to live up to such offers, especially when there was no capacity to even attempt to enforce such payments if Germany decided to renege.

I agreed, but it's unlikely for Imperial Germany in this ATL to have to pay a reparations total that high. The British and even the Americans had reservations and Germany here can enforce its interests much more effectively than Weimar Germany could IOTL. [d]

a)  The point is that the US, and public opinion across the west would expect the same rules to be applied to Germany as well and their unlikely to trust the German imperial government to keep their word.  There's going to be strong pressure to continue the war until there's evidence that the Germans will abide by any decision.

b)  Ah that was when a totally defeated Germany was desperately trying to do anything it could to moderate feelings in the allied camp.  Which you will note they had no intent of carrying out.  Here your talking about a Germany that for some reason is willing to make such concessions in 1917 when it seems much stronger - which is far less likely.  Apart from my doubt that the allies would make peace at this point because they can't rely on the Germans to abide by any agreement once the alliance reduces its forces.  More likely they continue fighting as their just getting stronger while Germany and its allies are falling away.

c)  Yes if they keep all that territory, some of which is in contradiction of Wilson's proposals remember, they should be even me able to pay reparations.

d)  So your saying that Germany will make an offer but expect the allies to accept something smaller when the bulk of the damage and destruction has already been done?  That's about as likely as imperial Germany from what they see as a position of strength making such an offer in the 1st place.