WI: no October Revolution, impact on ww2?

[stevep]

Sept 21, 2024 20:42:56 GMT Max Sinister said:

Y'know, a TL where there's no October Revolution, Russia still drops out, and Germany wins in the west would be something new. I don't stop you from writing it.

If you do it, you may consider the other Allies invading Russia - just as they did during the Russian Civil War.

  By this time its pretty impossible for Germany to win in the west, even if Russia drops out out totally. 

  By the other allies do you mean Germany and what's left of their allies?  If somehow the Germans pulled off a shock victory the western powers are going to be in no position to defend their independence - at least for those on the continent and possibly Britain as well - let alone intervene in Russia.  However a militaristic imperial Germany and what's left of its allies could well seek to.

[stevep]

Sept 21, 2024 20:03:10 GMT ewellholmes said:

Something else I feel compelled to point out is that, up to this point, my comments have concerned a situation in which the Russian Republic remains in the war fighting into 1918. I don't see any way this is possible, given the increasing unpopularity of the war and the fact its Entente partners-especially the United States-tied material and financial aid to the continuation of Russian offensive efforts against the Germans and said offensives undermined the regime itself.

To transition to a defensive posture was also politically unstable, as doing such in the Spring of 1917 very nearly led to a separate peace forced from the bottom upwards. Following the February Revolution, mass fraternization broke out across the front and pressure from the Soldier's and Worker's Soviets to make peace was becoming a serious concern in the RPG. Holger Afflerbach's On the Knife Edge explains that time thusly:

The new democratic government of Russia, led by Prince Lvov, feared German hegemony and therefore wanted to continue the war, while the Workers' and Soldiers' Council was calling for peace. This led to very mixed messages from Russia in the following months. On 22 March 1917, the new Foreign Secretary, Pavel Milyukov, declared: 'For us, a decisive victory is essential: the annihilation of Imperial Germany, without whose defeat our ideals cannot be truly established, is today more necessary and important than ever.'12 The idea of continuing to fight on the side of the Allies thus didn't immediately lose its credibility in the following months. It also seemed possible that the Russian revolution and the new style of government, which in its political ideals was now strongly aligned to the west, could even revive the Russians' motivation to fight. Many Russian liberals hoped that the new democratic spirit of the nation would inspire its soldiers in the same way as the revolutionary movement in France had done at the end of the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, however, it also seemed possible that Russia would exit the war and leave Germany with one fewer opponent. The new government wanted peace, partly because it could not simply ignore the wishes of the population. On 9 April 1917, only three days after the USA's declaration of war on Germany, the provisional Russian government announced that it wanted to establish a long-term peace on the basis of the right to self determination and that it did not want to rule over any other peoples.13This was followed on 14 April by a resolution of the Workers' and Soldiers'Council in favour of a broad peace agreement without annexations or war indemnities – this was also adopted for the official programme of the German Social Democrats on 19 April.14

However, the desire for peace did not result in immediate peace negotiations, because the Russian government could not bring itself to make a clear and open peace offer. One significant reason for this was that the western Allies were doing everything possible to keep Russia in the war and continued to reject any suggestion of peace negotiations. This had various implications, as seen for example in the disastrous advice provided to the American Foreign Secretary, Lansing, by the American expert on Russia,George Kennan. Kennan said that the USA should not support the Workers'and Soldiers' representatives, who advocated the idea of a 'peace without annexations or war indemnities', but rather should side with those who wanted to continue the war to a victorious conclusion.15 A further factor was the Russians' fear of becoming diplomatically isolated in the case of a peace agreement with the Central Powers, as it was clear that such a development would lead Russia's former allies to turn their backs on it. Germany would then be able to concentrate its efforts in the west and would stand a good chance of winning there, leaving Russia standing alone on the continent against the intimidating and arrogant German colossus.16

This assumption gave the Russian leaders pause for thought. At times, however, it looked as if peace would be pushed through from below. In spring 1917 the battles on the Eastern Front mostly abated and there was some fraternisation between the soldiers. During the weeks around Easter 1917, the action along large sections of the front practically came to a stop.17 At the same time, a concerted propaganda effort on the part of the Central Powers to promote peace was very well received by the Russian soldiers.18 This state of affairs continued until 23 April, when Ludendorff gave the command to resume the practice of firing on any Russian soldiers who left their trenches,19 most likely with the aim of increasing pressure on the Russian leaders to enter into conventional peace negotiations.

Making peace would secure the RPG and remove the main cause of the October Revolution, fulfilling the thread title and is also the most plausible way to achieve it.

  Of course this falls down because the German government definitely wanted annexations and war indemnities.  It didn't want other people to have the right to self-determination either which is shown by its continued desire for annexations and elsewhere puppet governments.  Hence any serious approach by the Russian government would at best be met by evasion, if not outright rejection.  By this time apart from the designs of the German leadership many on both sides had bought into the sunken costs fallacy. 

  Rejection of any peace proposal would harden Russian opinion as would any new offensive, which is likely to come once Germany rejects terms or if Russia makes no terms but simply sits on the defensive.  This would incite even more resistance.  OTL war weariness was increased by the determination of the PG to not only continue the war but also to launch offensives.  Here with the Germans rejecting peace or simply launching offensives then that will harden Russian opinion for resistance in defensive of their homeland and people.  Lenin and his cronies will be undermined so any coup attempt by their is likely to be later if at all and all the time the Germans are struggling in the east time is running out for them in the west.

[Max Sinister]

Sept 21, 2024 22:19:29 GMT stevep said:

Sept 21, 2024 20:42:56 GMT Max Sinister said:

Y'know, a TL where there's no October Revolution, Russia still drops out, and Germany wins in the west would be something new. I don't stop you from writing it.

If you do it, you may consider the other Allies invading Russia - just as they did during the Russian Civil War.

  By this time its pretty impossible for Germany to win in the west, even if Russia drops out out totally. 

  By the other allies do you mean Germany and what's left of their allies?

No, I meant the Brits, French, Italians, Japanese, US, not to forget the Czechoslovakian Legion. As IOTL.

[stevep]

Sept 21, 2024 23:50:04 GMT Max Sinister said:

Sept 21, 2024 22:19:29 GMT stevep said:

  By this time its pretty impossible for Germany to win in the west, even if Russia drops out out totally. 

  By the other allies do you mean Germany and what's left of their allies?

No, I meant the Brits, French, Italians, Japanese, US, not to forget the Czechoslovakian Legion. As IOTL.

  With the exception of the Japanese and US none are going to be in any position to do such in this scenario and them moving against a democratic government would be difficult politically.

[ewellholmes]

Sept 21, 2024 22:14:01 GMT stevep said:

a)  The point is that the US, and public opinion across the west would expect the same rules to be applied to Germany as well and their unlikely to trust the German imperial government to keep their word.  There's going to be strong pressure to continue the war until there's evidence that the Germans will abide by any decision.

And the Germans were fine with that; the issue IOTL was that the 14 Points and its follow ons were not fairly enacted for both sides which was noted as an issue by multiple officials. As far as war pressure, again, no; the German offer in December of 1917 was enough to create the political pressure within the United States that forced Wilson had to clarify his war aims via the 14 Points. 

b)  Ah that was when a totally defeated Germany was desperately trying to do anything it could to moderate feelings in the allied camp.  Which you will note they had no intent of carrying out.  Here your talking about a Germany that for some reason is willing to make such concessions in 1917 when it seems much stronger - which is far less likely.  Apart from my doubt that the allies would make peace at this point because they can't rely on the Germans to abide by any agreement once the alliance reduces its forces.  More likely they continue fighting as their just getting stronger while Germany and its allies are falling away.

I'm rather confused as to what this is referring to, especially given we were talking about Mid-1918 and not 1917?

c)  Yes if they keep all that territory, some of which is in contradiction of Wilson's proposals remember, they should be even me able to pay reparations.

Nothing within the proposal is in contradiction of Wilson's proposals. The Germans were prepared to cede Alsace-Lorraine and Posen, which were clearly not ethnically German. 

d)  So your saying that Germany will make an offer but expect the allies to accept something smaller when the bulk of the damage and destruction has already been done?  That's about as likely as imperial Germany from what they see as a position of strength making such an offer in the 1st place.

Rather, I'm expecting the Germans to offer a peace deal in Mid-1918 and then at the peace conference negotiate for something smaller than what was enforced OTL. The entire British delegation thought the sum was too high and a result of French hatred including Churchill, not a well known friend of Germany to be sure. The U.S. delegation also had reservations and issues with the deal. 

[ewellholmes]

Sept 21, 2024 22:40:07 GMT stevep said:

  Of course this falls down because the German government definitely wanted annexations and war indemnities.  It didn't want other people to have the right to self-determination either which is shown by its continued desire for annexations and elsewhere puppet governments.  Hence any serious approach by the Russian government would at best be met by evasion, if not outright rejection.  By this time apart from the designs of the German leadership many on both sides had bought into the sunken costs fallacy. 

Not at all, the issue rested with the RPG rather than the Germans. The Reichstag even passed a binding resolution that tied the hands of OHL in July of 1917, in order to prevent their desire for annexations from getting in the way of achieving peace. From Afflerbach:

The new democratic government of Russia, led by Prince Lvov, feared German hegemony and therefore wanted to continue the war, while the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council was calling for peace. This led to very mixed messages from Russia in the following months. On 22 March 1917, the new Foreign Secretary, Pavel Milyukov, declared: ‘For us, a decisive victory is essential: the annihilation of Imperial Germany, without whose defeat our ideals cannot be truly established, is today more necessary and important than ever.’12 The idea of continuing to fight on the side of the Allies thus did not immediately lose its credibility in the following months. It also seemed possible that the Russian revolution and the new style of government, which in its political ideals was now strongly aligned to the west, could even revive the Russians’ motivation to fight. Many Russian liberals hoped that the new democratic spirit of the nation would inspire its soldiers in the same way as the revolutionary movement in France had done at the end of the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, however, it also seemed possible that Russia would exit the war and leave Germany with one fewer opponent. The new government wanted peace, partly because it could not simply ignore the wishes of the population. On 9 April 1917, only three days after the USA’s declaration of war on Germany, the provisional Russian government announced that it wanted to establish a long-term peace on the basis of the right to self-determination and that it did not want to rule over any other peoples.13 This was followed on 14 April by a resolution of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in favour of a broad peace agreement without annexations or war indemnities – this was also adopted for the official programme of the German Social Democrats on 19 April.14

Further:

Within Russia, opinion was divided. While the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council wanted a peace without annexations or war indemnities,20 the government stuck to its plan of continuing the war. In May, there was a cabinet reshuffle: the pro-Entente Milyukov stepped down and Alexander Kerensky, who would soon become a dominant figure in the government, became Minister of War and the Navy.21 However, even Kerensky wanted to continue the war. The Russian government could not bring itself to consider agreeing a separate peace with the Central Powers, despite the fact that at this point in time the German government’s conditions would have been relatively favourable.22 On 15 May 1917, Bethmann said in the Reichstag that the German government would certainly be prepared to accept the Russian proposal of peace on the basis of national self-determination. He continued by explaining that it was ‘self-evident that those of us who share the desire not to destroy any long-term future relationship do not obstruct the Russian proposal by making excessive demands that are incompatible with the freedom and will of the people and would only sow among the Russian people the seed for new hostilities’.23

In short, if the RPG had advanced a serious peace offer, the Germans would've accepted it.

Rejection of any peace proposal would harden Russian opinion as would any new offensive, which is likely to come once Germany rejects terms or if Russia makes no terms but simply sits on the defensive.  This would incite even more resistance.  OTL war weariness was increased by the determination of the PG to not only continue the war but also to launch offensives.  Here with the Germans rejecting peace or simply launching offensives then that will harden Russian opinion for resistance in defensive of their homeland and people.  Lenin and his cronies will be undermined so any coup attempt by their is likely to be later if at all and all the time the Germans are struggling in the east time is running out for them in the west.

Just like the German rejection at Brest-Litovsk rallied Soviet opinion and lead them to defeat Operation Faustschlag?

[stevep]

Sept 22, 2024 15:58:24 GMT ewellholmes said:

Sept 21, 2024 22:40:07 GMT stevep said:

  Of course this falls down because the German government definitely wanted annexations and war indemnities.  It didn't want other people to have the right to self-determination either which is shown by its continued desire for annexations and elsewhere puppet governments.  Hence any serious approach by the Russian government would at best be met by evasion, if not outright rejection.  By this time apart from the designs of the German leadership many on both sides had bought into the sunken costs fallacy. 

Not at all, the issue rested with the RPG rather than the Germans. The Reichstag even passed a binding resolution that tied the hands of OHL in July of 1917, in order to prevent their desire for annexations from getting in the way of achieving peace. From Afflerbach:

The new democratic government of Russia, led by Prince Lvov, feared German hegemony and therefore wanted to continue the war, while the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council was calling for peace. This led to very mixed messages from Russia in the following months. On 22 March 1917, the new Foreign Secretary, Pavel Milyukov, declared: ‘For us, a decisive victory is essential: the annihilation of Imperial Germany, without whose defeat our ideals cannot be truly established, is today more necessary and important than ever.’12 The idea of continuing to fight on the side of the Allies thus did not immediately lose its credibility in the following months. It also seemed possible that the Russian revolution and the new style of government, which in its political ideals was now strongly aligned to the west, could even revive the Russians’ motivation to fight. Many Russian liberals hoped that the new democratic spirit of the nation would inspire its soldiers in the same way as the revolutionary movement in France had done at the end of the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, however, it also seemed possible that Russia would exit the war and leave Germany with one fewer opponent. The new government wanted peace, partly because it could not simply ignore the wishes of the population. On 9 April 1917, only three days after the USA’s declaration of war on Germany, the provisional Russian government announced that it wanted to establish a long-term peace on the basis of the right to self-determination and that it did not want to rule over any other peoples.13 This was followed on 14 April by a resolution of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in favour of a broad peace agreement without annexations or war indemnities – this was also adopted for the official programme of the German Social Democrats on 19 April.14

Further:

Within Russia, opinion was divided. While the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council wanted a peace without annexations or war indemnities,20 the government stuck to its plan of continuing the war. In May, there was a cabinet reshuffle: the pro-Entente Milyukov stepped down and Alexander Kerensky, who would soon become a dominant figure in the government, became Minister of War and the Navy.21 However, even Kerensky wanted to continue the war. The Russian government could not bring itself to consider agreeing a separate peace with the Central Powers, despite the fact that at this point in time the German government’s conditions would have been relatively favourable.22 On 15 May 1917, Bethmann said in the Reichstag that the German government would certainly be prepared to accept the Russian proposal of peace on the basis of national self-determination. He continued by explaining that it was ‘self-evident that those of us who share the desire not to destroy any long-term future relationship do not obstruct the Russian proposal by making excessive demands that are incompatible with the freedom and will of the people and would only sow among the Russian people the seed for new hostilities’.23

In short, if the RPG had advanced a serious peace offer, the Germans would've accepted it.

Rejection of any peace proposal would harden Russian opinion as would any new offensive, which is likely to come once Germany rejects terms or if Russia makes no terms but simply sits on the defensive.  This would incite even more resistance.  OTL war weariness was increased by the determination of the PG to not only continue the war but also to launch offensives.  Here with the Germans rejecting peace or simply launching offensives then that will harden Russian opinion for resistance in defensive of their homeland and people.  Lenin and his cronies will be undermined so any coup attempt by their is likely to be later if at all and all the time the Germans are struggling in the east time is running out for them in the west.

Just like the German rejection at Brest-Litovsk rallied Soviet opinion and lead them to defeat Operation Faustschlag?

  Your basically ignored just about everything I pointed out and repeating what your said before on the idea that there was a serious movement for a 'fair' peace in Germany that had enough people in power willing to support rather than reject it.

  On the last point the Bolsheviks, having done what they could to destroy the Russian army were in no condition, especially after their own military coup and then overthrowing the elected government that followed to really oppose the Germans plus they weren't helped by Trotsky's insane neither fight nor make peace idea.  Not to mention how many on the right and centre they had aliened by their actions.  

  A Russian government that has stated it would stand on the defensive until the army has been rebuilt and then has been attacked by the Germans has a much better chance of rallying a sizeable proportion of the population to the cause, as they did initially.  I'm not saying they will fight well but their likely to fight a lot harder and more successfully than the Bolsheviks will and hence tie down the Germans more than OTL.  Especially if the reason the Bolshevik coup doesn't occur is because something has happened to say prevent Lenin and his cronies getting back to Russia - say the sealed train doesn't reach Russia for whatever reason or Lenin is caught when there's an attempt to arrest him - then a lot of the Bolshevik propaganda against the war may well be avoided.

  I find it strange that an event which makes things worse for Germany you see as a way of enabling them to break out of their desperate position and secure a dominant status in Europe.

[ewellholmes]

Sept 22, 2024 21:26:09 GMT stevep said:

Your basically ignored just about everything I pointed out and repeating what your said before on the idea that there was a serious movement for a 'fair' peace in Germany that had enough people in power willing to support rather than reject it.

Because what I said is correct and I provided citations to prove it? If the Chancellor and the overwhelming majority of the Reichstag supporting a peace deal isn't sufficient for you, then what exactly is the standard of proof for you?

On the last point the Bolsheviks, having done what they could to destroy the Russian army were in no condition, especially after their own military coup and then overthrowing the elected government that followed to really oppose the Germans plus they weren't helped by Trotsky's insane neither fight nor make peace idea. Not to mention how many on the right and centre they had aliened by their actions.

All of which would still be factors here, given the Soldier's Councils had already voted for and repeatedly signaled a desire for peace while the urban workers would still be starving. At this point, given they had already publicly stated a desire not to govern other peoples, there was nothing left to fight for other than to impale themselves on the demands of their allies.

A Russian government that has stated it would stand on the defensive until the army has been rebuilt and then has been attacked by the Germans has a much better chance of rallying a sizeable proportion of the population to the cause, as they did initially. I'm not saying they will fight well but their likely to fight a lot harder and more successfully than the Bolsheviks will and hence tie down the Germans more than OTL.

Which is impossible to do because their Allies had tied continued funding for their war effort to offensive action, and were consistently pushing them to do offensive actions. Likewise, if they stay on the defensive, mass fraternization had already broke out and the Soldiers were increasingly, as Afflerbach noted, responding positively to peace propaganda from the Central Powers.

Especially if the reason the Bolshevik coup doesn't occur is because something has happened to say prevent Lenin and his cronies getting back to Russia - say the sealed train doesn't reach Russia for whatever reason or Lenin is caught when there's an attempt to arrest him - then a lot of the Bolshevik propaganda against the war may well be avoided.

The Soldier's Councils had already voted in favor of peace by the time Lenin had arrived back in Russia IOTL.

I find it strange that an event which makes things worse for Germany you see as a way of enabling them to break out of their desperate position and secure a dominant status in Europe.

Because your position is unsupported by any historical evidence and relies on claims you have yet to demonstrate the veracity of? Russia dropping out of the war in 1917 is very obviously a net benefit to the Germans, too, although I notably haven't elucidated on what the outcome of that would be in my opinion either, just noted it obviously shifts the balance of power to the Germans.

[stevep]

Sept 22, 2024 21:56:40 GMT ewellholmes said:

Sept 22, 2024 21:26:09 GMT stevep said:

Your basically ignored just about everything I pointed out and repeating what your said before on the idea that there was a serious movement for a 'fair' peace in Germany that had enough people in power willing to support rather than reject it.

Because what I said is correct and I provided citations to prove it? If the Chancellor and the overwhelming majority of the Reichstag supporting a peace deal isn't sufficient for you, then what exactly is the standard of proof for you?

On the last point the Bolsheviks, having done what they could to destroy the Russian army were in no condition, especially after their own military coup and then overthrowing the elected government that followed to really oppose the Germans plus they weren't helped by Trotsky's insane neither fight nor make peace idea. Not to mention how many on the right and centre they had aliened by their actions.

All of which would still be factors here, given the Soldier's Councils had already voted for and repeatedly signaled a desire for peace while the urban workers would still be starving. At this point, given they had already publicly stated a desire not to govern other peoples, there was nothing left to fight for other than to impale themselves on the demands of their allies.

A Russian government that has stated it would stand on the defensive until the army has been rebuilt and then has been attacked by the Germans has a much better chance of rallying a sizeable proportion of the population to the cause, as they did initially. I'm not saying they will fight well but their likely to fight a lot harder and more successfully than the Bolsheviks will and hence tie down the Germans more than OTL.

Which is impossible to do because their Allies had tied continued funding for their war effort to offensive action, and were consistently pushing them to do offensive actions. Likewise, if they stay on the defensive, mass fraternization had already broke out and the Soldiers were increasingly, as Afflerbach noted, responding positively to peace propaganda from the Central Powers.  [c]

Especially if the reason the Bolshevik coup doesn't occur is because something has happened to say prevent Lenin and his cronies getting back to Russia - say the sealed train doesn't reach Russia for whatever reason or Lenin is caught when there's an attempt to arrest him - then a lot of the Bolshevik propaganda against the war may well be avoided.

The Soldier's Councils had already voted in favor of peace by the time Lenin had arrived back in Russia IOTL. [d]

I find it strange that an event which makes things worse for Germany you see as a way of enabling them to break out of their desperate position and secure a dominant status in Europe.

Because your position is unsupported by any historical evidence and relies on claims you have yet to demonstrate the veracity of? Russia dropping out of the war in 1917 is very obviously a net benefit to the Germans, too, although I notably haven't elucidated on what the outcome of that would be in my opinion either, just noted it obviously shifts the balance of power to the Germans. [e]

a)  What I've said in the past.  The people in power actually showing a serious interest in a peace without annexation.  Not a Parliament with minimal powers in what was effectively a military dictatorship.  The civilians only had a say when the military had totally failed, the country was in open revolt in many areas and the army wanted the civilians in charge for the defeat so they could be blamed.

b)  Totally wrong.  If the Germans are seeking to attack deep into Russian/Ukrainian territory and clearly still intent on conquest then there's a hell of a lot to fight for. 

c)  A lot of the soldiers were willing to fight anyway regardless of that propaganda.  Here they have even more incentive to do so as the German attacks show that they were lying about peace.  It should be noted that fraternization works both ways.  German forces were also affected and here more so as its their leaders that have decided to continue attacking.

d)  Some had but the main spread of anti-war feeling was after the revolution and if there's no disastrous offensive and Lenin and his cronies are blocked then the effect is greatly reduced.

e)  Again factually wrong.  My position is totally supported by history.  Also your misreading the TL.  The issue is not that Russia makes peace, but that the October coup doesn't occur.  Your trying to warp the scenario for your desired German victory regardless of the evidence.

[nomommsen]

Sept 21, 2024 22:14:01 GMT stevep said:

a)  The point is that the US, and public opinion across the west would expect the same rules to be applied to Germany as well and their unlikely to trust the German imperial government to keep their word.  There's going to be strong pressure to continue the war until there's evidence that the Germans will abide by any decision.

... once again you implicate some ... 'exceptional untrustworthiness' of the german goverment.

The imperial german goverment was not less trustworthy than any other esp. Great Power of that time with their handling of treaties, secret treaties, secret 'agreements' etc..

They were kept and broken and 'reinterpreted' as fitting to the moment by EVERY power claiming the 'legality' of their doing by own-advantge biased, narrow-minded nitpicking on wordings or formalities.

Seems you're projecting Hitlers perceived dealing with treaties on the German Realm. Though ... "by the letters" - an interpretion of treaties conceded to non-german powers ... and in times back to the ... "meaning" of an agreement insted - there were rather few direct violations of treaties, i.e. :

SPOILER: Click to show

{Munich}
The object of the Munich agreement - the Czechosslovakian Republik didn't existed anymore having declared itself independant

SPOILER: Click to show

{Rheinland-remilitarization}
As a 'violation' of the Locarno-treatiy ... it could also be argued by 'narrow' interpretation of its wording it was already broken due to the newly signed franco-russian and Czechosslovakian-russian treaties of mutual assistence

aside the by everyone then already expecte 'lifting' of the miliotary clauses of the ToV. Expected even by french politicians though they ofc fighted it teeth'n'nails.

However ... I'm asking myself if I should report some open anti-german nationalistic chauvinism ... not at least due its repeated occurence.

[stevep]

Sept 23, 2024 11:31:02 GMT nomommsen said:

Sept 21, 2024 22:14:01 GMT stevep said:

a)  The point is that the US, and public opinion across the west would expect the same rules to be applied to Germany as well and their unlikely to trust the German imperial government to keep their word.  There's going to be strong pressure to continue the war until there's evidence that the Germans will abide by any decision.

... once again you implicate some ... 'exceptional untrustworthiness' of the german goverment.

The imperial german goverment was not less trustworthy than any other esp. Great Power of that time with their handling of treaties, secret treaties, secret 'agreements' etc..

They were kept and broken and 'reinterpreted' as fitting to the moment by EVERY power claiming the 'legality' of their doing by own-advantge biased, narrow-minded nitpicking on wordings or formalities.

Seems you're projecting Hitlers perceived dealing with treaties on the German Realm. Though ... "by the letters" - an interpretion of treaties conceded to non-german powers ... and in times back to the ... "meaning" of an agreement insted - there were rather few direct violations of treaties, i.e. :

SPOILER: Click to show

{Munich}
The object of the Munich agreement - the Czechosslovakian Republik didn't existed anymore having declared itself independant

SPOILER: Click to show

{Rheinland-remilitarization}
As a 'violation' of the Locarno-treatiy ... it could also be argued by 'narrow' interpretation of its wording it was already broken due to the newly signed franco-russian and Czechosslovakian-russian treaties of mutual assistence

aside the by everyone then already expecte 'lifting' of the miliotary clauses of the ToV. Expected even by french politicians though they ofc fighted it teeth'n'nails.

However ... I'm asking myself if I should report some open anti-german nationalistic chauvinism ... not at least due its repeated occurence.

  I'm saying it as I see it.  The German imperial government had gotten itself into the mindset that only military strength mattered and that treaties could be broken when convenient.  That's why they got themselves into such an almighty mess by 1914 and decided on war and the use of military force to try and retrieve the situation.  Other powers took actions at times which breached their moral-treaty commitments but not as frequently as the German one of the time. 

  As I have repeatedly made clear my hostility is toward the military/aristocratic regime and its behaviour.  I think there were many civilians who meant well but until the imperial then military governments were defeated that they were able to exert real power.  Nationalist chauvinism was definitely a good definition of them, even if of a rather blinkered type but there was a lot of it about at the time.  Unfortunately there are signs that its coming back in many parts of Europe. 

[ewellholmes]

Sept 23, 2024 9:44:55 GMT stevep said:

a)  What I've said in the past.  The people in power actually showing a serious interest in a peace without annexation.  Not a Parliament with minimal powers in what was effectively a military dictatorship.  The civilians only had a say when the military had totally failed, the country was in open revolt in many areas and the army wanted the civilians in charge for the defeat so they could be blamed.

Except for the fact this characterization is wrong? The Reichstag retained significant power in policy making via it's control of the purse strings, as did the Chancellor, who was able to command the H-L clique to leave Berlin during the Spring debates. If not, one wonders why Ludendorff felt his hands had been tied by the civilians that they would have to accept a treaty offer if extended.

b)  Totally wrong.  If the Germans are seeking to attack deep into Russian/Ukrainian territory and clearly still intent on conquest then there's a hell of a lot to fight for. 

Except for the fact this didn't happen IOTL.

c)  A lot of the soldiers were willing to fight anyway regardless of that propaganda.  Here they have even more incentive to do so as the German attacks show that they were lying about peace.  It should be noted that fraternization works both ways.  German forces were also affected and here more so as its their leaders that have decided to continue attacking.

Except the Germans would only be attacking if the Russians reject terms, just as they did in February of 1918 IOTL? Likewise, one wonders why if fraternization works both ways, why the Russian Army crumbled over the course of 1917 and the Germans didn't.

d)  Some had but the main spread of anti-war feeling was after the revolution and if there's no disastrous offensive and Lenin and his cronies are blocked then the effect is greatly reduced.

The Russian Soldier's Council voted in favor of peace in April of 1917. Lenin was not even in Russia yet and the Bolshevik Revolution was in November of 1917, over six months after the initial votes in favor of peace.

e)  Again factually wrong.  My position is totally supported by history.  Also your misreading the TL.  The issue is not that Russia makes peace, but that the October coup doesn't occur.  Your trying to warp the scenario for your desired German victory regardless of the evidence.

As I've said, I cannot see anyway you can avoid the October Revolution without having Russia leave the war to address the underlying causes of said revolution; there is a reason the message "Peace, Land and Bread" was resonating with Russians at this time. You and others noted this earlier in the thread, so I thinks it's unreasonable to act like I've pulled this out of thin air.

With that said, can you please point me to what post you provided evidence and what, exactly, was the evidence of?

[stevep]

Sept 23, 2024 22:36:54 GMT ewellholmes said:

Sept 23, 2024 9:44:55 GMT stevep said:

a)  What I've said in the past.  The people in power actually showing a serious interest in a peace without annexation.  Not a Parliament with minimal powers in what was effectively a military dictatorship.  The civilians only had a say when the military had totally failed, the country was in open revolt in many areas and the army wanted the civilians in charge for the defeat so they could be blamed.

Except for the fact this characterization is wrong? The Reichstag retained significant power in policy making via it's control of the purse strings, as did the Chancellor, who was able to command the H-L clique to leave Berlin during the Spring debates. If not, one wonders why Ludendorff felt his hands had been tied by the civilians that they would have to accept a treaty offer if extended.

b)  Totally wrong.  If the Germans are seeking to attack deep into Russian/Ukrainian territory and clearly still intent on conquest then there's a hell of a lot to fight for. 

Except for the fact this didn't happen IOTL. 

c)  A lot of the soldiers were willing to fight anyway regardless of that propaganda.  Here they have even more incentive to do so as the German attacks show that they were lying about peace.  It should be noted that fraternization works both ways.  German forces were also affected and here more so as its their leaders that have decided to continue attacking.

Except the Germans would only be attacking if the Russians reject terms, just as they did in February of 1918 IOTL? Likewise, one wonders why if fraternization works both ways, why the Russian Army crumbled over the course of 1917 and the Germans didn't.  [c]

d)  Some had but the main spread of anti-war feeling was after the revolution and if there's no disastrous offensive and Lenin and his cronies are blocked then the effect is greatly reduced.

The Russian Soldier's Council voted in favor of peace in April of 1917. Lenin was not even in Russia yet and the Bolshevik Revolution was in November of 1917, over six months after the initial votes in favor of peace. [d]

e)  Again factually wrong.  My position is totally supported by history.  Also your misreading the TL.  The issue is not that Russia makes peace, but that the October coup doesn't occur.  Your trying to warp the scenario for your desired German victory regardless of the evidence.

As I've said, I cannot see anyway you can avoid the October Revolution without having Russia leave the war to address the underlying causes of said revolution; there is a reason the message "Peace, Land and Bread" was resonating with Russians at this time. You and others noted this earlier in the thread, so I thinks it's unreasonable to act like I've pulled this out of thin air. [e]

With that said, can you please point me to what post you provided evidence and what, exactly, was the evidence of?

a)  That is your argument but the parliament was often ignored until the finals stages of the collapse.

b)  To quote from the link you posted.

Russian forces were unable to put up any serious resistance due to the turmoil of the Russian Revolution and subsequent Russian Civil War. The armies of the Central Powers therefore captured huge territories in Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine, forcing the Bolshevik government of Russia to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

  I.e. this was long after the point we're talking about and without the OTL PG offensives or a prolonged period of Bolshevik propaganda, which was strengthened by those same offensives.  If the PG elections on a purely defensive stance a lot of that motive is undermined.

c)  It was.  There was growing concern about the ideas developing on the eastern front and the impact on morale of the troops.  It was just that with many forces in the west not as strongly affected and it took repeated defeats in 1918, plus the realisation in the initial victories of how poorly they were being supplied compared to the allies for their morale to start to crumble.

  Ironically the Germans in 1918 did pretty much what we both agree the Russians did OTL in 1917, expensive and disastrous offensives that gravely weakened an already strained military.  In they had simply defended in the west and made serious offers of peace then either the victory would have been more costly for the allies in terms of dead and wounded - that remark because the 1918 spring successes took large numbers of POWs - or the US especially with inexperienced forces taking heavy losses might have been increasingly unwilling despite Wilson's determination, to fight to a clear and decisive victory.

d)  One group of soldiers said that as noticed before.  Many of the military were still willing to fight, especially in defence of their homeland until heavy defeats and propaganda persuaded them to give up.

e)  I honestly can't remember you saying that before - that the PG would only survive if it made peace - so if you did sorry but there's been a lot of stuff written and you keep coming back to points that have been addressed so its difficult keeping track of everything.  Its a point that I and others I think disagree on but your argument the Russia must submit to Germany to free up forces for a larger offensive in the west is a distraction from the main scope of the thread.  Its also doubtful whether if it did occur it would have the impact your assuming.

[ewellholmes]

Sept 24, 2024 11:18:30 GMT stevep said:

a)  That is your argument but the parliament was often ignored until the finals stages of the collapse.

Which is not true in this context nor have you demonstrated this anywhere.

b)  To quote from the link you posted.

So you concede that rallying Russian resistance is context dependent, rather than just a matter of "Germans advance, popular resistance revives"?

I.e. this was long after the point we're talking about and without the OTL PG offensives or a prolonged period of Bolshevik propaganda, which was strengthened by those same offensives.  If the PG elections on a purely defensive stance a lot of that motive is undermined.

Except for the fact their allies, in particular the Americans, had tied further financial and material aid to launching said offensives, which you have yet to explain how this changes.

c)  It was.  There was growing concern about the ideas developing on the eastern front and the impact on morale of the troops.  It was just that with many forces in the west not as strongly affected and it took repeated defeats in 1918, plus the realisation in the initial victories of how poorly they were being supplied compared to the allies for their morale to start to crumble.

Pretty crazy they continued to fight for almost two more years and decisively defeated Russia in the Winter of 1917-1918 in the middle of that period, while the Russian Army, as you noted, had melted away by that time.

  Ironically the Germans in 1918 did pretty much what we both agree the Russians did OTL in 1917, expensive and disastrous offensives that gravely weakened an already strained military.  In they had simply defended in the west and made serious offers of peace then either the victory would have been more costly for the allies in terms of dead and wounded - that remark because the 1918 spring successes took large numbers of POWs - or the US especially with inexperienced forces taking heavy losses might have been increasingly unwilling despite Wilson's determination, to fight to a clear and decisive victory.

The Germans did extend peace offers, as I've already said multiple times, which forced Wilson to issue the 14 Points and David Lloyd George to aggressively defend his policies in the UK itself. By January of 1918, the French Army was having to detail divisions to crush internal riots over the refusal to at least sound out the terms while Haig, in conference with King George V, stated his view that the morale of the BEF was dependent on their belief they were fighting to preserve the integrity of France and the independence of Belgium; the men had no interest in fighting over a French Strasbourg or an Italian Trieste. If the Germans made an explicit offer to abandon France and Belgium in full, which Haig greatly feared, he doubted they could refuse it and this was his concern. As it just so happens, Max Hoffman (among others) were pressing to do exactly that.

With that said, the Germans could also do in this ATL what they weren't able to do OTL; have massive numbers of Eastern Front divisions in the West by the onset of their ATL offensives. Take Amiens and Hazebrouck, the war is over in a decisive victory. OTL, they got within seven miles of the former and four miles of the latter; there is a reason Haig issued the "Backs to the Wall" message. IOTL, the Germans were able to transfer ~50 divisions over the course of 1918, but most arrived Operation Michael and after the start of Georgette. Here, without the need to garrison a massive Empire in the East, the Germans can probably transfer closer to 80 Divisions. Of note is that, by May of 1917, 68 Divisions of the French Army are in mutiny. This reinforced German ATL Offensive can thus target the British in the Summer and Fall of 1917 without worry of the French.

d)  One group of soldiers said that as noticed before.  Many of the military were still willing to fight, especially in defence of their homeland until heavy defeats and propaganda persuaded them to give up.

No, the majority of Soldier's Councils voted in favor of peace in April of 1917 as I said, before Lenin had even arrived in Russia. If you have proof this was only a minority, then let's see your evidence because I've already provided Afflerbach showing this is false.

e)  I honestly can't remember you saying that before - that the PG would only survive if it made peace - so if you did sorry but there's been a lot of stuff written and you keep coming back to points that have been addressed so its difficult keeping track of everything.  Its a point that I and others I think disagree on but your argument the Russia must submit to Germany to free up forces for a larger offensive in the west is a distraction from the main scope of the thread.  Its also doubtful whether if it did occur it would have the impact your assuming.

With the context of the thread OP, Russia making peace in the Spring of 1917 is the only way I can see the Russian Republic being maintained, which is what they asked. The OP also asked what the ramifications of that would be and it is my belief that Russia making peace in 1917 would result in a German victory, given the ability to transfer dozens of Divisions to the Western Front at a time when the Anglo-French were exceedingly weak.

If you don't agree, you're under no obligation to respond; you might recall you started this conversation by replying to me originally.

[stevep]

Sept 24, 2024 21:57:21 GMT ewellholmes said:

Sept 24, 2024 11:18:30 GMT stevep said:

a)  That is your argument but the parliament was often ignored until the finals stages of the collapse.

Which is not true in this context nor have you demonstrated this anywhere.

b)  To quote from the link you posted.

So you concede that rallying Russian resistance is context dependent, rather than just a matter of "Germans advance, popular resistance revives"?

I.e. this was long after the point we're talking about and without the OTL PG offensives or a prolonged period of Bolshevik propaganda, which was strengthened by those same offensives.  If the PG elections on a purely defensive stance a lot of that motive is undermined.

Except for the fact their allies, in particular the Americans, had tied further financial and material aid to launching said offensives, which you have yet to explain how this changes.

c)  It was.  There was growing concern about the ideas developing on the eastern front and the impact on morale of the troops.  It was just that with many forces in the west not as strongly affected and it took repeated defeats in 1918, plus the realisation in the initial victories of how poorly they were being supplied compared to the allies for their morale to start to crumble.

Pretty crazy they continued to fight for almost two more years and decisively defeated Russia in the Winter of 1917-1918 in the middle of that period, while the Russian Army, as you noted, had melted away by that time.

  Ironically the Germans in 1918 did pretty much what we both agree the Russians did OTL in 1917, expensive and disastrous offensives that gravely weakened an already strained military.  In they had simply defended in the west and made serious offers of peace then either the victory would have been more costly for the allies in terms of dead and wounded - that remark because the 1918 spring successes took large numbers of POWs - or the US especially with inexperienced forces taking heavy losses might have been increasingly unwilling despite Wilson's determination, to fight to a clear and decisive victory.

The Germans did extend peace offers, as I've already said multiple times, which forced Wilson to issue the 14 Points and David Lloyd George to aggressively defend his policies in the UK itself. By January of 1918, the French Army was having to detail divisions to crush internal riots over the refusal to at least sound out the terms while Haig, in conference with King George V, stated his view that the morale of the BEF was dependent on their belief they were fighting to preserve the integrity of France and the independence of Belgium; the men had no interest in fighting over a French Strasbourg or an Italian Trieste. If the Germans made an explicit offer to abandon France and Belgium in full, which Haig greatly feared, he doubted they could refuse it and this was his concern. As it just so happens, Max Hoffman (among others) were pressing to do exactly that.

With that said, the Germans could also do in this ATL what they weren't able to do OTL; have massive numbers of Eastern Front divisions in the West by the onset of their ATL offensives. Take Amiens and Hazebrouck, the war is over in a decisive victory. OTL, they got within seven miles of the former and four miles of the latter; there is a reason Haig issued the "Backs to the Wall" message. IOTL, the Germans were able to transfer ~50 divisions over the course of 1918, but most arrived Operation Michael and after the start of Georgette. Here, without the need to garrison a massive Empire in the East, the Germans can probably transfer closer to 80 Divisions. Of note is that, by May of 1917, 68 Divisions of the French Army are in mutiny. This reinforced German ATL Offensive can thus target the British in the Summer and Fall of 1917 without worry of the French.

d)  One group of soldiers said that as noticed before.  Many of the military were still willing to fight, especially in defence of their homeland until heavy defeats and propaganda persuaded them to give up.

No, the majority of Soldier's Councils voted in favor of peace in April of 1917 as I said, before Lenin had even arrived in Russia. If you have proof this was only a minority, then let's see your evidence because I've already provided Afflerbach showing this is false.

e)  I honestly can't remember you saying that before - that the PG would only survive if it made peace - so if you did sorry but there's been a lot of stuff written and you keep coming back to points that have been addressed so its difficult keeping track of everything.  Its a point that I and others I think disagree on but your argument the Russia must submit to Germany to free up forces for a larger offensive in the west is a distraction from the main scope of the thread.  Its also doubtful whether if it did occur it would have the impact your assuming.

With the context of the thread OP, Russia making peace in the Spring of 1917 is the only way I can see the Russian Republic being maintained, which is what they asked. The OP also asked what the ramifications of that would be and it is my belief that Russia making peace in 1917 would result in a German victory, given the ability to transfer dozens of Divisions to the Western Front at a time when the Anglo-French were exceedingly weak.

If you don't agree, you're under no obligation to respond; you might recall you started this conversation by replying to me originally.

  On the last point I didn't start this conversation but replied to statements made by you.

  Your continuing to make assumptions I think are unrealistic and putting words in my mouth so I think this distraction from the thread OP is now pointless.