Re-run - a 20 year old ISOT scenario of mine:North America ISOT 1791-1891

[raharris1973]

What if the North American continent of 1891 disappears and is replaced by the North America of 1791 -

Read carefully- I said the North American "continent" of 1891 is replaced, so this means just the mainland and all the minor tidal islands within that 12 mile nautical limit are replaced with their 1791 versions.  All the the other continents of the world, and Oceania, including South America and Hawaii, and the Caribbean Islands, and Bermuda, and Newfoundland and the Canadian Arctic islands, remain in their 1891 form.

It is 1791 USA, British North America (mainland), Ruperts Land, Russian Alaska, Oregon Country, Spanish New Spain, from Oregon and Texas down to Costa Rica, British Honduras (Belize) and British Nicaragua (Miskito coast), and Spanish New Granadan Panama, and Spanish Florida and Luisiana that are brought forward from 1791 I believe.

How does the world of 1891 react?

What effect does this have on the world economy of the time and all the people who would have emigrated to the USA?

How does the Washington Administration deal with its new environment? What about the governing authorities in Canada, Russian Alaska and the Viceroyalty of New Spain, and orphaned local governors of the other other Spanish colonies.

Note that the South America (mostly independent republics) and Caribbean islands of 1891 (mostly European colonies except for Haiti and the Dominican Republic), remain.

[raharris1973]

One prediction: Russian, Argentine and Australian grain farmers and livestock ranchers make a bundle

The quickest economic effect is that Russia, Argentina and Australia make alot of profit selling grain to substitute from the now untilled American plains.
In Russia in the short-term though it could easily lead to food shortages for the poor as the food is going to British people who can pay for it.

On the one hand this could provide capital for further investment and development, on the other hand, it could skew comparative advantage so much that Russian manufacturing ends up being less developed - an agricultural variant of "Dutch disease"

Egypt and India's profit margin from cotton increases too.

1790s America is just not going to be an attractive destination for the types of people who emigrated in OTL's 1890-1920 era. They mostly moved to urban environments which won't exist. Some Northern Europeans , like Germans who still had some capital and were looking to farm, might go to the US and pioneer, but I wouldn't expect Jewish, Italian and Polish workers to move to George Washington's USA. Look for those people to end up staying home, and moving to Argentina, Brazil, and the remaining British Dominions in the southern hemisphere.

A further development I expect:

After the "change" US deep-sea fishermen, returning to port are likely to be the first to find out.

Correction: The Colombians are the first to notice, because the ISOT border is in their Panamanian province.

As the "change" is digested, the European powers, with support from the US diplomatic staff abroad, make a deal to temporarily recognize the 1792 jurisdictions, with the exception of Canada, under British soveriegnty.

Britain *could* attack and conquer the USA if it gears up for it, but all the continental powers say it would mean war, and the French and Russians could cause hassles on the colonial frontiers of Britain, and slip some modern arms to the Americans. Besides, there's no political consensus within Britain about just up and taking over North America, and both sides of the Atlantic are curious about each other.

The West European's biggest immediate concern is to replace American produce. There is a cotton shortage, but the wheat shortage is even more severe. So, with the British leading, they aim to increase food production in North America even while they use alternate sources to make up shortfalls. Grain is more profitable than cotton in the 1790s USA.

Hamilton's protectionist policies are hosed, and he knows it. In the near-term, the USA needs to support European needs and import European manufactures it can afford if it is to acquire late nineteenth century technology.

After a year or two, exposure to modern European electoral systems leads to pressure in USA to expand the franchise.

The Europeans have a problem with slavery in the USA, although they don't have much of a problem with racism. They may support a compensated emancipation program, or buy slaves for labor contracts in the non-European parts of the empire where they used it. Alternatively, they may picture east Florida as a place to set up a freedmen colony that can be used as grain, fruit and cattle country.

IF the European status quo arrangement begins to fall out, it's over what should happen to the Spanish North American territories. The Germans probably want a piece of something, the plains, or California, or Mexico. Britain can totally keep them out with its navy, but it has to play its alliance cards right, so that it doesn't end up at war with too many enemies at once, without the benefit of the US and Canadian resources in needed to win in OTL's WWI.

As for the USA territories, I'm inclined to think that the demand for agricultural production won't actually speed up the settlement of the Northwest and Mississippi territories so much as improve the efficiency of agriculture in the existing states. There is the most money to be made closest to where European freighters come to pick up imports, so Americans' economic incentives are vastly changed and encourage them to cling closer to the coast. Improved medical care over the coming decades also ends up resulting in a decreased American birthrate.

Lots of US contributions to the 20th century are taken away, but there are substitute inventors in other countries so that a 1960s level of technology is pretty certain to exist in ATL's 2004. Most of the time, Europe is the alternate inventor, but in aircraft, Brazil leads the way initially.

In terms of balance of power politics, Germany and Russia have a much bigger shot at world power over the course of the 20th century.

By 2004 Australia, Argentina and Brazil are much more relatively prosperous compared to OTL. The USA is stuck in an Argentina-like rut for being so far behind and so dependent on agriculture. Canada is a bit more advantaged from more extensive British support. Mexico is hard to guess at. Britain probably funds the Panama canal in the early 20th century. Japanese immigrants probably take over Hawaii eventually and may move into Mexican California in large numbers.

A sense of comparative populations:

To get a sense of relative proportion in this world, the 1791 USA (boxed into its 1783-1803 borders east of the Mississippi, south of the Great Lakes and Canada, and north of Spanish Florida) had a total enumerated population just short of 4 million - number in the 3.9 millions. I don't have figures for Canada, the west, Mexico and Central America at the time. Just under 700k of the population were slaves, and just under 60k people were nonwhite free persons, I am assuming black or mixed race but not members of unenumerated Amerindian tribes/nations "not taxed". en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1790_United_States_census

Comparing that with some 1900 population figures of some neighboring countries by population, which would not be super far off in terms of greater size from the 1891 populations -

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population_in_1900

Jamaica 1900 had 720,000. Trinidad and Tobago had 320,000. Cuba had 1.6 million. Puerto Rico 983,000. Dominican Republic 600k, British Guyana 300k. French Guiana 24k. Dutch Guiana / Surinam - 86k. Venezuela - 2.5 million. Colombia - 4.15 million. Brazil - 17.98 million. Cape Colony - 2.5 million. Sierra Leone - 1 million. Liberia - 641,000.

In terms of great Atlantic powers, metro UK had 45.5 million, metro France (sans Algerie) 39.8 million, Germany 67.6 million, Italy 33 million, Spain 18.5 million, Russia - 136 million, Japan - 33 million.

[stevep]

   Very interesting scenario. As well as food and other primary products there will be the question of replacing 1891 US considerable industrial output with Germany probably being in the best place in many areas given their already considerable industrial base, although other powers could play a role in the longer term.

  Given its pretty much peak period for imperial expansion I have a feeling that there will be land grabs by many nations from Europe, possibly also from Japan who could well seek to secure at least Hawaii where there is a sizeable Japanese settler community.  The American planters who have pretty much taken over the islands will be left without support from the 1791 US as its pretty much impotent here.  Russia will definitely want to keep its previous Alaskan colony, although its probably as much a costly drain as before.

  Unfortunately its the year after Wilhelm II 'dropped the pilot' by sacking Bismarck else I think some conference to decide partition would be likely, but that might still occur or it could even trigger a massive war although with who on which sides being unclear.  Britain would have a huge advantage outside Europe if its not totally isolated but would play a much smaller role in any European conflict.

  Assuming this doesn't occur I suspect Britain would seek to secure OTL Canada, along with possibly the Oregon territory also a guarantee of the US borders and maintaining its 1791 interests but just about everything else could be up for grabs.  You have all the OTL continental US west of the Mississippi plus Florida and from Mexico to Panama inclusive on the mainland which would be in play and given its status in 1891 I doubt that Spain would get much of this, although it might get most of modern Mexico.  That leaves France, Germany and possibly lesser roles for Austria and Russia and Britain south of those areas.  - Might actually think Britain could insist on more here as still most of the OTL modern continental US to be shared out. The big areas might be the Mississippi valley western parts, the Texas region and California although how important the latter two in 1891 I'm not sure?  Plus the bits of the isthmus south of Mexico, although their of relatively little value, especially in their 1791 form unless someone decides Panama or Nicaragua for a possible canal could be useful?  1791 US might object when it learns what its 1891 borders were but given its very limited resources its likely to be told to keep quiet and accepts its able to keep its current claim.

  Since the islands are excluded not sure what slavery was in mainland Spanish N America at this stage so it could be just the relatively small number of black slaves in the US, although ending that policy would upset a lot of the elites ruling the current US.

  Anyway late here so have to think more about this. 

[stevep]

   Right thought things over a bit more given the additional time.

  In terms of territory I agree that Russia would keep its Alaskan lands and Japan very likely takes Hawaii.  I think there is probably support for recognising the US with its 1791 borders, especially since as you say there would be a vested interest in several powers to get that region and especially its already settled areas up to speed agricultural production.  Also Britain will claim all of 1891 Canadian territories.  Possibly also putting in a bid for the Oregon region although that might be challenged by Spain - ineffectively - and Russia.  Britain will also state a claim to British Honduras/Belize and probably its 1791 interests in the Mosquito coast region but might be willing to give up the latter as while Britain has a presence in 1791 by 1891 it had formally withdrawn.  One question here.  Given your parameters I think Vancouver Island would affected and be in its unsettled 1791 version rather than its settled 1891 form?

  What happens to the rest is unclear as I can't see 1891 Spain being powerful enough to maintain its domination - actual or theoretic - of the rest of the continent but who claims what and how this is settled out, by war or negotiation or a mixture of the two would be up to the circumstances. 

1)  In terms of the rump US I see a number of issues and factors.

a)  As you say the locals will 1st become aware of events when uptime sailors start arriving at their ports.  Most of those will probably be Americans, fishermen, whalers and coastal merchants who were far enough off shore to not be affected.  Others will be migrants and longer ranged seamen in trans-Atlantic ships which will probably have more shock impact from their appearance but may have issues as many could be too large for the docking facilities of the time and some may even run aground given they could be expecting dredged channels or other facilities for modern ships.  Also they could find issues with getting supplies, especially food and fuel and with confusion as to what has happen - most won't know the rest of the world is unaffected so they won't be sure where they could go.  This could mean a lot of up-timers seeking to land and possibly being turned away, which could cause a lot of suffering and damage relations between the 1791 US and others.

b)  This lack of ports will handicap chances for improving agricultural production in both the US and Canada, as will internal infrastructure, or lack of.  Without railways and waterways its going to be physically difficult to get tool, fertilizer and the like in and grain out.  This is without any issues with the US seeking to prevent their country being overrun or too greatly influenced by the new world they find themselves in.

c)  Once they find out they along with the rest of the continent have been propelled forward and what the N America their replaced was like many could feel that their country has been dealt a bitter blow.  Their now very backwards compared to the world they knew and will quickly realise that the 1891 borders the up-timers talk about are likely to be denied them.  Not to mention some of the demands being made on them by the 1891 world.  This could cause both hostility towards the 1891 world and also a feeling of being deserted by god.  Which could have a big impact.

d)  As well as many European migrants being less eager to go to this 1791 US I suspect an even bigger issues would be the desire of the Americans to keep them out.  While the issues with infrastructure will delay things for a while I can't see the 1791 US being willing to accept hundreds of thousands of migrants per year, especially from either Britain - still seen as the former colonial world - or from southern and eastern Europe with radically different cultures.  Their going to fear their new republic will be swamped by foreigners.  This was already a growing issue in 1891 US with ~70M people but with only about 4M in the 1791 world the incentive will be much greater.  - OTL you had the Know Nothings in the 1850's and your likely to see something at least as strong here.

e)  Slavery is going to be a big issue.  Its not only economically and socially important across much of the country and a big factor for many of the powerful figures in the infant US but given a probable resentment at the domination of the new foreign world there's likely to be a determination not to accept such a dictation.  Also many will argue that its essential for producing the food and cotton the outside world is so eager for.  Not to mention what happens with all the freed blacks which many Americans won't want competing themselves for jobs for.  I think some homeland in the rest of N America is likely but where it will be and under what circumstances slaves will be freed would need to be decided.

  A number of the above factors, especially points d) and e) are likely to see the rump US as feeling embittered and hostile to the world they find themselves in, which could restrict their ability to adopt to the new world.

2)  Canada - I would see Britain seeking to take over all of the territory of 1891 Canada and possibly some others as they would have the best access to some areas, especially if Vancouver Island stays in its 1891 status.  Also with Newfoundland also in it 1891 status that not only gives an important foothold but with the trans-Atlantic cable landing there they have a considerable advantage in terms of information contact with the rest of the world.  Also there will be some information about the nature of the country with waterways, mineral and agricultural resources, the best path for railways etc.

  This coupled with the early 1791 settlements already in place and under British rule, albeit a vastly different monarchy - late Queen Victoria rather than mid King George III I think you could see, once the infrastructure is in place, a steady movement of population, especially from Britain but also via Britain into Canada.  The 1791 white settlers there will face being swamped but also a more liberal set of rights and potentially much better living conditions as new opportunities and industries become available.  Unfortunately the size of the influx is likely to be less good for the Indian population who are likely to be hit by disease, social changes and demands for land at a much quicker rate than OTL.

  Your likely to see some spread southwards as well into lands in the upper Mississippi and possibly also into the US's NW Territories, although this could be less friendly than OTL if there are attempts at large scale settlement.  On the other hand there is an existing fur trade in the region and that could make for a more friendly relationship.

  One other group that's likely to lose out with this large scale level of settlement would be the French Canadians as their likely to be swamped and rapidly outnumbered even inside Quebec province, unless the government [Canadian or British] is willing to reserve the bulk of the land in Quebec to them.  Even so their likely to become heavily outnumbered.  One thought that occurred to me, although possibly not likely is a group of French Quebecois basically try and emulate the Boers and seek to establish a 'homeland' deep in the interior.  However its doubtful this would seem that practical as with modern [for 1891] technology it will be clear that the British and other groups will be closing in on them.

3)  Louisiana - The western part of this is still Spanish in 1791 but thinly settled by Europeans with an history of French rule for much of its period.  Coupled with this is the vital importance of control of the New Orleans area as it in turn controls trade along the Mississippi basin and also between that region and the rest of the world.  Your likely to see at least the Americans and the French seeking to control the region, if not other people.  I can't see the Americans succeeding due to the technological issues they will have, even 1891 Spain being able to heavily outclass them. 

  The one single power, because of its naval superiority, which could claim the entire western basin would be the UK.  However as you say that's likely to see widespread opposition from the other great powers.  Also given the economic ideas dominant in the time I can't see the UK being that eager for this. - Although I do noticed that in 1891 it was the Tories rather than the Liberals in charge, albeit only until 1892. 

  I wonder if there would be a proposal somewhat similar to the Congo Free Trade zone in the Mississippi basin, at least for unimpeded trade along the river and its tributaries?  Although how that would work with no territorial agreements or would the basin be partitioned into regions for different nations?

4) Texas - this would be relatively unimportant at this period I think as other than cattle it has no massive resources, its oil and gas not been known or of great value in 1891.  This might end up staying under Spanish rule or going to a relatively minor power as a region for settlement - say Italy or A-H?

5)  California - This would be seen as much more important for one particular reason, i.e. everybody in 1891 knows of the gold found in the 1840's and that its still there and unclaimed now.  As such I think this could be seen as a much bigger prize and hence going to one of the greater power, probably Britain, France or Germany in any agreed partition.

6)  Mexico - I was thinking this would be relatively unimportant but do recall it had a fair amount of mineral wealth in ~1800 but that was devastated by the wars that occurred as Mexico won its independence from Spain.  Hence its possible that it would be a bigger prize here, although whether Spain or any other country could hold it against a growing desire for independence.  Spain might have the best chance given its common culture but would need a more liberal approach to the government of the colony.

7)  The rest of the Central American region - down to the border with Colombian Panama.  This is probably seen as relatively unimportant given its limited resources and the issue of disease with only really the idea of a trans-isthmus canal giving it greater potential value.

  In terms of other factors:

8)  One thing that did occurred to me is that the bulk of the Irish diaspora, in the US and Canada has largely disappeared.  There will still be migration from Ireland along with an existing presence still in Australia but the bulk of the population that formed the modern diaspora is no longer there.

9 - I would agree that with the loss of 1891 N American's industrial and technological base there will be a delay in technological development but I doubt it would cause the ~40 loss your suggesting.  You still have the European technological base and the new potential for N America to be settled and developed again, this time with different circumstances.  With 1891 technology, populations and knowledge its likely to be done within 3-4 decades and a fractured N America could lead to more competition than OTL.  Coupled with continued development in the rest of the world I think the gap would be a lot closer and its not impossible that TTL by the modern day could even be ahead of OTL.

10)  As well as the agricultural, cotton and industrial impact on the world in the short term at least there's also going to be a big fiscal one.  Britain especially and also France and Belgium I think to a lesser degree have lost a lot of investments in N America and that's going to cause possibly a period of fiscal instability if not crisis.  How the financial markets, especially in Britain react to this?  Also with the need to redevelop N America again there's going to be demands for a lot of money for investment.  Especially if there's a partition of the bulk of the interior you could see other countries investing overseas, at least in their colonial regions.

11)  I have the feeling that US cotton will not regain its OTL dominance as it would take a lot of investment to reach the OTL 1860, let alone 1890 sort of levels, even ignoring the lack of a massive slave labour force - even if there is a move to a sharecropping culture earlier.  Development has already been occurring in India and Egypt and it might be more practical to increase investment in those rather than a lot of time and work in the southern US.

12)  Agree that in the shorter term Germany especially will be the biggest winner with its largest economic rival disappearing and also Russia as the easiest option for expanding agricultural and possibly mineral production to make up the shortfall from N America.  The latter would require a fair amount of investment which Russia lacks and given relations between Russia and Britain that could be an issue.  Therefore there might be an option for an earlier and more developed Franco-Russia alliance, at least economic or possibly a Russo-German one although Wilhelm and longer term German-Russian rivalry could be an issue there.

  Anyway initial thoughts on some ideas that occur.

[raharris1973]

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

9 - I would agree that with the loss of 1891 N American's industrial and technological base there will be a delay in technological development but I doubt it would cause the ~40 loss your suggesting.

Blame it on the thinking of a still immature, insufficiently jaded or worldly, still overly nationalistic "kid" of barely thirty years old .  I told you the scenario and comments were old.

[stevep]

Aug 6, 2024 2:15:35 GMT raharris1973 said:

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

9 - I would agree that with the loss of 1891 N American's industrial and technological base there will be a delay in technological development but I doubt it would cause the ~40 loss your suggesting.

Blame it on the thinking of a still immature, insufficiently jaded or worldly, still overly nationalistic "kid" of barely thirty years old .  I told you the scenario and comments were old.

  Ah I didn't realise the text was original rather than having been updated from an old idea.  Your still a young whipper-snapper to me unfortunately.

[raharris1973]

Aug 4, 2024 18:48:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

A sense of comparative populations:

To get a sense of relative proportion in this world, the 1791 USA (boxed into its 1783-1803 borders east of the Mississippi, south of the Great Lakes and Canada, and north of Spanish Florida) had a total enumerated population just short of 4 million - number in the 3.9 millions. I don't have figures for Canada, the west, Mexico and Central America at the time. Just under 700k of the population were slaves, and just under 60k people were nonwhite free persons, I am assuming black or mixed race but not members of unenumerated Amerindian tribes/nations "not taxed". en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1790_United_States_census

Comparing that with some 1900 population figures of some neighboring countries by population, which would not be super far off in terms of greater size from the 1891 populations -

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population_in_1900

Jamaica 1900 had 720,000. Trinidad and Tobago had 320,000. Cuba had 1.6 million. Puerto Rico 983,000. Dominican Republic 600k, British Guyana 300k. French Guiana 24k. Dutch Guiana / Surinam - 86k. Venezuela - 2.5 million. Colombia - 4.15 million. Brazil - 17.98 million. Cape Colony - 2.5 million. Sierra Leone - 1 million. Liberia - 641,000.

In terms of great Atlantic powers, metro UK had 45.5 million, metro France (sans Algerie) 39.8 million, Germany 67.6 million, Italy 33 million, Spain 18.5 million, Russia - 136 million, Japan - 33 million.

Only this part was a 2024 add-on from a middle-aged man. The rest was from 2004.

[raharris1973]

Interesting set of responses stevep:

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

  In terms of territory I agree that Russia would keep its Alaskan lands and Japan very likely takes Hawaii. 

Sure. I think so.

Over in the other place, some people were pointing to Britain's easy ability to take Alaska through force majeure (naval I guess, or they might not have realized Canada was being back timed too) and predicting a Hawaiian Kingdom as independent and possibly British protected.

I think in time Japan could *capture* Hawaii through immigration. The downtime Americans certainly could not, and the uptime expat Americans certainly could not lord it over the natives the same way as historical. Japanese emigration to Hawaii was fairly new, although rapid as of 1890. The islands may still attract it and find alternate sources of investment and employment, but ironically, the loss of further Yankee plantation investment (for pineapples and sugar) could *depress* the proximate cause of Japanese immigration to the islands by reducing jobs in those sectors.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

I think there is probably support for recognising the US with its 1791 borders, especially since as you say there would be a vested interest in several powers to get that region and especially its already settled areas up to speed agricultural production. 

I mean, the only country with a plausible historic claim on 1791 USA and decent physical access is the British Empire. It had the naval and military capable, military technology, military professionals and Sepoys, to route 18th century Americans. But I think they'd gotten over the American War of Independence by 1891, and might have by then held George Washington in as solid esteem as King George, and any of the PMs of the day. Plus a campaign to reclaim the 1791 USA for Britain, would be just the thing to make Britain look like a gratuitous a$$hole in the eyes of other European powers, who were trading partners of Britain, but not allies and fairly envious. The French, Germans, Russians, would all rush to cry foul and protest and say Britain should say off the Americans. For similar reasons, I'd doubt the French would renew claims to the old New France, East Louisiana lands between the Mississippi River, Great Lakes and Alleghenies, aside from them being landlocked.

What Britain would most want from that patch of eastern North America would be a ramp up of food and natural resource (mainly mineral) production at all deliberate speed, and that would all be unobjectionable to the rest of Europe, if not an active desire for heavily urbanized, food scarce countries.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

1)  In terms of the rump US I see a number of issues and factors.

a)  As you say the locals will 1st become aware of events when uptime sailors start arriving at their ports.  Most of those will probably be Americans, fishermen, whalers and coastal merchants who were far enough off shore to not be affected.  Others will be migrants and longer ranged seamen in trans-Atlantic ships which will probably have more shock impact from their appearance but may have issues as many could be too large for the docking facilities of the time and some may even run aground given they could be expecting dredged channels or other facilities for modern ships.  Also they could find issues with getting supplies, especially food and fuel and with confusion as to what has happen - most won't know the rest of the world is unaffected so they won't be sure where they could go.  This could mean a lot of up-timers seeking to land and possibly being turned away, which could cause a lot of suffering and damage relations between the 1791 US and others.

b)  This lack of ports will handicap chances for improving agricultural production in both the US and Canada, as will internal infrastructure, or lack of.  Without railways and waterways its going to be physically difficult to get tool, fertilizer and the like in and grain out.  This is without any issues with the US seeking to prevent their country being overrun or too greatly influenced by the new world they find themselves in.

This is a bunch of good practical points.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

c)  Once they find out they along with the rest of the continent have been propelled forward and what the N America their replaced was like many could feel that their country has been dealt a bitter blow.  Their now very backwards compared to the world they knew and will quickly realise that the 1891 borders the up-timers talk about are likely to be denied them.  Not to mention some of the demands being made on them by the 1891 world.  This could cause both hostility towards the 1891 world and also a feeling of being deserted by god.  Which could have a big impact.

Yes and no - The supernatural event, and finding out they are backward, weak, and reachable with advanced weapons will certainly be frightening. Learning that the USA was destined to win a great deal of land, but that future could be blocked off. I think that will only trouble very few and rare elite enthusiasts of the international strategic "game", in their contemplative moments. For most people, most of the time, even pretty educated ones, it will be a case of 'easy come, easy go'. We can't lose a big land empire we never had. Some say we were destined to get all this land to the Pacific ...and Arctic... in a mere century, and now we do not have it. We can predict nothing, maybe we will get it, maybe we will not. May God bless us.

The demands on them that will rankle many, many Americans, especially in the south, but also in port cities, will be international intolerance for the transatlantic slave trade - and intolerance of US domestic slavery. There will be moral objectors to both practices already in the USA. But, the US will feel bullied by the vehemence of the objections and any economic sanctions or manipulation or diplomatic intervention Britain or other "concerned powers" will use to try to end both practices. Likewise for any condemnation of treatment of the Amerindians, which they may complain at least when it leads to cross-border refugee movement.

Would Britain and Europe and South America demand abolition of slavery in the USA, and New Spain on pain of invasion? Probably not. But a multitude of pressures short of war are likely. And the uptime states will have zero tolerance, zero, for the slave trade at sea, which the Americans expected to remain legal until 1808. And should any American slaver captains in antique boats evade detection and make it to the African coast to try to buy human cargo, they'd be liable for arrest and imprisonment by the European directed colonial authorities onshore enforcing the slave trade ban reemphasized by the Congress of Berlin. That is the change that will feel most "cold turkey" and abrupt to the deep southern colonies.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

d)  As well as many European migrants being less eager to go to this 1791 US I suspect an even bigger issues would be the desire of the Americans to keep them out.  While the issues with infrastructure will delay things for a while I can't see the 1791 US being willing to accept hundreds of thousands of migrants per year, especially from either Britain - still seen as the former colonial world - or from southern and eastern Europe with radically different cultures.  Their going to fear their new republic will be swamped by foreigners.  This was already a growing issue in 1891 US with ~70M people but with only about 4M in the 1791 world the incentive will be much greater.  - OTL you had the Know Nothings in the 1850's and your likely to see something at least as strong here.

I am going to respectfully disagree that the nativism factor will be a bigger problem for migration flows to the USA than simple loss of reasons to migrate.

Few were migrating to the USA to homestead or farm any longer. The greatest category of migrants, people looking for industrial work, have no jobs to go to. The streets of America aren't paved with gold. They're paved with horse manure. When there are streets at all. The downtime USA will attract certain kinds of foreign merchant, businessman, and gawking foreign tourist, the kind of person from Britain or Europe who can afford the bed accommodation an 18th century town or frontier society can provide while roughing it on holiday for a few weeks before going back to civilization, but "teeming masses" won't be seeing a sustainable working class life for themselves in this America until a decade or two more of economic and infrastructure and cultural and technological "uplift" to Atlantic world "standards" is achieved.

Also, given America's delayed developmental level, unlike OTL, where more recent and exotic immigrants operated at lower economic rungs vacated by rising native born, the opposite would probably be occurring, with native-born disproportionately being in lower capitalization farming, lower technology craftsmanship, lower skilled labor, and immigrants tending to be more people from abroad who bring capital or expertise in technology, engineering, professions, that adds needed value to American development and commands premium pay rates and a high standard of living and housing in America. Americans resenting immigrants may be looking up at more prosperous ones rather than down at more impoverished ones.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

e)  Slavery is going to be a big issue.  Its not only economically and socially important across much of the country and a big factor for many of the powerful figures in the infant US but given a probable resentment at the domination of the new foreign world there's likely to be a determination not to accept such a dictation.  Also many will argue that its essential for producing the food and cotton the outside world is so eager for.  Not to mention what happens with all the freed blacks which many Americans won't want competing themselves for jobs for.  I think some homeland in the rest of N America is likely but where it will be and under what circumstances slaves will be freed would need to be decided.

Agree it's a big issue, and partly covered above. The most abrupt change the Americans and New Spain will face will be the end of the international/oceanic slave trade, which the world will simply not tolerate. The rest of the world will similarly put heavy pressure, moral, diplomatic, possibly economic to bring slavery to an end domestically as well. Slavery might have been completely done in the assorted remaining colonies of BNA by 1791 in OTL. If not, the House of Commons/Governor-General makes it so.

1891 Britons and Europeans, while being anti-chattel slavery, will likely not take military action solely to free the slaves of America, nor enforce racial equality at gunpoint nor oppose solutions involving compensated emancipation or resettlement of freepeople from the states where they were enslaved. None of those latter two steps would scandalize their sensibilities like they would 21st century people, but seem like potentially pragmatic bargains.

Some form of an international buyout of the slaveowners of America, followed by a resettlement of freed slaves elsewhere, is probable in the decade or so after the ISOT. The resettlement could be a gold or platinum plated 'back to Africa' assisted migration, or a significantly less expensive migration to much closer ex-slave societies of the English-speaking Caribbean. Least expensive of all, could be if Spain could be persuaded to accepted the resettlement of the American freedpeople in their Florida colony, or if the United States could set aside the Mississippi territory, south of Tennessee and west of Georgia, those parts not specifically allocated to the Creek, Chickasaw and Choctaw natives, as a reserve for African-American freepeople.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

Britain will also state a claim to British Honduras/Belize and probably its 1791 interests in the Mosquito coast region but might be willing to give up the latter as while Britain has a presence in 1791 by 1891 it had formally withdrawn. 

Britain might want to hold on to its Mosquito coast claim at least long enough to use it as leverage to get a concession to build a Nicaraguan isthmian Canal. Especially since it needs to restart the just completed Canadian-Pacific railway all over again from scratch.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

One question here.  Given your parameters I think Vancouver Island would affected and be in its unsettled 1791 version rather than its settled 1891 form?

. Yeah Vancouver would be the 1791 version.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

2)  Canada - I would see Britain seeking to take over all of the territory of 1891 Canada and possibly some others as they would have the best access to some areas, especially if Vancouver Island stays in its 1891 status.  Also with Newfoundland also in it 1891 status that not only gives an important foothold but with the trans-Atlantic cable landing there they have a considerable advantage in terms of information contact with the rest of the world.  Also there will be some information about the nature of the country with waterways, mineral and agricultural resources, the best path for railways etc.

  This coupled with the early 1791 settlements already in place and under British rule, albeit a vastly different monarchy - late Queen Victoria rather than mid King George III I think you could see, once the infrastructure is in place, a steady movement of population, especially from Britain but also via Britain into Canada.  The 1791 white settlers there will face being swamped but also a more liberal set of rights and potentially much better living conditions as new opportunities and industries become available.  Unfortunately the size of the influx is likely to be less good for the Indian population who are likely to be hit by disease, social changes and demands for land at a much quicker rate than OTL.

  Your likely to see some spread southwards as well into lands in the upper Mississippi and possibly also into the US's NW Territories, although this could be less friendly than OTL if there are attempts at large scale settlement.  On the other hand there is an existing fur trade in the region and that could make for a more friendly relationship.

  One other group that's likely to lose out with this large scale level of settlement would be the French Canadians as their likely to be swamped and rapidly outnumbered even inside Quebec province, unless the government [Canadian or British] is willing to reserve the bulk of the land in Quebec to them.  Even so their likely to become heavily outnumbered.  One thought that occurred to me, although possibly not likely is a group of French Quebecois basically try and emulate the Boers and seek to establish a 'homeland' deep in the interior.  However its doubtful this would seem that practical as with modern [for 1891] technology it will be clear that the British and other groups will be closing in on them.

Agree with this for the most part. A thing about Canada is that the British have all the rights of way figured out for the Canadian -Pacific railway, but need to start the damn thing over. I think the British will be will and able to invest in this as a frontier, and won't be afraid to upgrade infrastructure to make it attractive to contemporary immigrants, and basically swamp the downtime population with contemporary people. As such, Canada will be much more "modern" than the USA or New Spain.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

3)  Louisiana - The western part of this is still Spanish in 1791 but thinly settled by Europeans with an history of French rule for much of its period.  Coupled with this is the vital importance of control of the New Orleans area as it in turn controls trade along the Mississippi basin and also between that region and the rest of the world.  Your likely to see at least the Americans and the French seeking to control the region, if not other people.  I can't see the Americans succeeding due to the technological issues they will have, even 1891 Spain being able to heavily outclass them. 

  The one single power, because of its naval superiority, which could claim the entire western basin would be the UK.  However as you say that's likely to see widespread opposition from the other great powers.  Also given the economic ideas dominant in the time I can't see the UK being that eager for this. - Although I do noticed that in 1891 it was the Tories rather than the Liberals in charge, albeit only until 1892. 

  I wonder if there would be a proposal somewhat similar to the Congo Free Trade zone in the Mississippi basin, at least for unimpeded trade along the river and its tributaries?  Although how that would work with no territorial agreements or would the basin be partitioned into regions for different nations?

Interesting - The Congo Free State/free trade zone as one possible model for the Mississippi governance and Louisiana. I think this type of solution would be most popular with the weakest powers like the USA or those weaker at colonial power projection, like Germany, Italy, or Belgium. Whereas, the Spanish could have a starting position arguing - "hey, it's ours", and the French could argue for a right of first refusal, and the British would have the easiest time just waltzing in.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

4) Texas - this would be relatively unimportant at this period I think as other than cattle it has no massive resources, its oil and gas not been known or of great value in 1891.  This might end up staying under Spanish rule or going to a relatively minor power as a region for settlement - say Italy or A-H?

5)  California - This would be seen as much more important for one particular reason, i.e. everybody in 1891 knows of the gold found in the 1840's and that its still there and unclaimed now.  As such I think this could be seen as a much bigger prize and hence going to one of the greater power, probably Britain, France or Germany in any agreed partition.

6)  Mexico - I was thinking this would be relatively unimportant but do recall it had a fair amount of mineral wealth in ~1800 but that was devastated by the wars that occurred as Mexico won its independence from Spain.  Hence its possible that it would be a bigger prize here, although whether Spain or any other country could hold it against a growing desire for independence.  Spain might have the best chance given its common culture but would need a more liberal approach to the government of the colony.

Interesting speculations, that basically because of industrial/strategic power shifts, Northern European countries, or maybe Italy or Austria - but not Spain, could end up with parcels of these former Spanish territories.

Aug 5, 2024 19:20:49 GMT stevep said:

11)  I have the feeling that US cotton will not regain its OTL dominance as it would take a lot of investment to reach the OTL 1860, let alone 1890 sort of levels, even ignoring the lack of a massive slave labour force - even if there is a move to a sharecropping culture earlier.  Development has already been occurring in India and Egypt and it might be more practical to increase investment in those rather than a lot of time and work in the southern US.

Don't forget the growing cotton belt of the southern Russian empire - Azerbaijan on the Black Sea, southern Central Asia.

[stevep]

a)   Your probably right about lack of interest being more important than the hostility of the down-timers as the 1791 US as I hadn't thought that through completely but think both factors will be important.  Coupled with lingering distrust of Britain the scope for migration to the US in the early years is likely to be low.  On the other hand there is some infrastructure in the 1791 US, at least in the settled areas compared to the rest of N America, at least north of the New Spain/Mexico core territories.  There is a measure of government and law and order which will be rather backwards compared to newer colonies after the latter are set up.  So there could be some interest from parts of Europe.  However its going to be very small compared to OTL and as the rest of the continent fills up, probably much faster than OTL its going to be interesting how the rump US develops.

b)  Would agree that the western opposition to slavery will be a big issue for the US and possibly for New Spain although not sure how much there was in the latter.  Just checking and this wiki section on slavery in the Americas has some more details.  One point I had overlooked was the extensive use of slavery by pre-Columbian cultures, extending in many tribes to the times it was suppressed by western powers, and it also mentions that there was a level of slavery in the Spanish colonies and that despite attempts by authorities in the colonies to restrict it and remove some if the worst excesses but they were often ignored by local slave owners.

  There is a chart showing the estimated number of African slaves taken to Americas by 1800.  Not too surprised given our naval dominance during much of this period it seems to have been Britain that transported the most slaves although elsewhere I have seen it suggested that the Portuguese shipped more.  - That could be because Portugal and then its offspring Brazil maintained slavery and hence probably the slave trade longer and hence their post-1800 figures made up the difference or it could be using different sources.

  I don't think there was much African slavery in OTL Canada, although slavery by native tribes could be an issue.  There was such in British Honduras but that's likely to be ended by a compensation scheme similarly to that used in 1833.  Also did read once that due to the continued threat from neighbouring Spanish colonies owners and slaves had a fairly moderate relationship as they needed to work together to survive so that when slavery ended it was largely without opposition although how accurate that was I don't know.  There might be more of an issue in the Mosquito coast region as that's not a formal British colony.

  I think the reaction in an already somewhat traumatized US to the opposition to slavery, which many including most of those in positions of power view as a natural policy and one important to their economy and culture could be strong.  Agree that none of the updated powers would be willing to use force to end slavery although their likely to take a stern line on any slavers attempting to ply their trade in W Africa, especially in areas that are now western colonies.  There will be political and economic pressure which will probably put the US's back up further in the short term.  

  In Spanish Puerto Rico and Cuba slavery was abandon in 1873 and 1886respectively which would suggest that Spain would oppose continued slavery in the 1791 colonies but Spain was in a state of political flux during this period and also they might be reluctant to push the issue if it imperiled their ability to regain control over them.  As such not sure how things would go here.

  In terms of a western European buy out of slaves in the affected area I'm not sure how likely that might be.  It would mean at least some of the nations agreeing to make a substantial payment to the slave owners, which depending on the total number of slaves could be substantial.  Given the economic turmoil that the ISOT has already caused there could be reluctance to do that and if one or two nations make a proposal they could find the attitude of others is "OK then you pay the full costs".  If some such deal is made however I think any homeland would be outside the 1791 US as given their resentment to being pressurised to end slavery and the admittedly theoretical loss of lands west of the Mississippi so I suspect it will be somewhere in those lands rather than to the east.  Plus you have the question of slaves outside the US and can't see it being willing to offer homes to them inside its territory if they were freed.

c)  Good point on the possible connection between a Nicaraguan canal and the desire to redevelop Canada's infrastructure.  It would be a lot easier if that can be done from both ends and that in turn would be helped by markedly easier connection between Europe - where the industrial and demographic base is - and the Pacific coast for work from the western end.  I'm not sure how long it would take to construct such a canal and as I mentioned Britain would have something of a capital crisis with the loss of so many overseas investments.

  However agree that with the resources and information available to Britain its likely that Canada will be developed more quickly than the US or the Spanish colonies, which could also attract a lot of non-British as well as British migrants and is likely to mean that if no agreement is made for areas to the south an overflow from a rapidly developing Canada could change the situation on the ground there.  A lot will depend on what happens in the Mississippi valley especially.

d)  The reason I think that Britain would support some sort of free trade zone in the trans-Mississippi area would be for the same reason they supported the Congo Free Trade Zone.  The Liberals and to a lesser degree the Conservatives had bought into the twin ideas of free trade [even in a deeply protectionist world] and laissez faire economic policies.  As such whenever another power colonized a portion of Africa or Asia British traders found themselves at a disadvantage compared to traders from the new ruling power.  This was despite traders from all nations having free access to Britain itself and all its colonies.  As such establishing the Congo FTZ was seen as a way of avoiding British merchants being penalized. 

  Ignoring the fact that both those ideas were bad ones and there was increasing evidence of this by 1891, let alone 1914-18 it continued to a strong factor in British policy and I could see the British government seeing some form of this for the Mississippi basin area, if not a wider area as the best way ahead.  If other nations blocked this they would still push, probably with more success for at least free use of the Mississippi by all nations as otherwise whoever has the New Orleans region has such a domination of trade throughout the entire zone.  This might be favourable to some of the lesser powers who would otherwise lose out to the more powerful ones.

  Of course such an idea could be rejected by the other major powers in which case I think the preferred approach would be some deal on partition of territories, which would probably include all the OTL 1891 western US along with some measures for powers with inland territories to have secure access to them.

  Another question of course would be who would be considered to have a seat at such a conference.  Definitely Britain, Germany and France and probably also Austria, Italy and Russia.  Perhaps Spain and 1791 US although the former could decide to try and claim the core of New Spain/Mexico for historical reasons and that be accepted and the US could be told to accept what you have, especially if its being awkward - to 1891 eyes - over slavery.  You could have some smaller powers, including possibly Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal and Greece at the most I suspect.  Japan might put in a bid and possibly the Ottoman empire but I can't see them being admitted to the 'club'.

e)  I didn't think the central Asia region became a significant player until the Soviet period but if it was starting in the late 19thC that is an interesting option.

 

[raharris1973]

“If some such deal is made however I think any homeland would be outside the 1791 US as given their resentment to being pressurised to end slavery and the admittedly theoretical loss of lands west of the Mississippi so I suspect it will be somewhere in those lands rather than to the east. Plus you have the question of slaves outside the US and can't see it being willing to offer homes to them inside its territory if they were freed.

c) Good point on the possible connection between a Nicaraguan canal and the desire to redevelop Canada's infrastructure. It would be a lot easier if that can be done from both ends and that in turn would be helped by markedly easier connection between Europe - where the industrial and demographic base is - and the Pacific coast for work from the western end. I'm not sure how long it would take to construct such a canal and as I mentioned Britain would have something of a capital crisis with the loss of so many overseas investments.”

There are some projects that 1891 colonial powers, like Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal might be interested in buying out 1791 downtime American slaves, especially prime age men *for*. Not as *slaves* mind you but for fixed mid term labor or service contracts.

For example, Britain to hire a mass workforce for an Isthmian canal project in Nicaragua starting from the Miskito coast- in this way that country might become a “homeland”. Or France might do a similar buy-up for an isthmian canal project in Panama.

Or, for prime age men who seem suitable, the British may see southern plantations in the USA as a fine source of “Sepoys” to use inexpensively throughout the empire. The French may want to buy people willing to pay back costs serving as Legionnaires. Those who survive to retirement could send to buy relatives freedom and settle in this or that colony like Sierra Leone, Gold Coast or the cape colony for Britain, or Gabon for France. Colonialists might see these people being from America and non-native as a feature, not a bug, when employing them for colonial policing or low level administrative duties.

[raharris1973]

Aug 7, 2024 17:55:04 GMT stevep said:

Coupled with lingering distrust of Britain the scope for migration to the US in the early years is likely to be low.

Not that there was high-volume immigration from anywhere to the newly independent USA in OTL, but there was some, with Britain being a prominent source country as well as France and Netherlands and Germany. And hostility and desired to exclude people for being British really wasn't a feature of the era.

When there was, briefly, an Alien Act in the late 1790s in the Adams Administration, it did not exclude immigrants, but it slowed the naturalization process to weaken potential *political influence* of immigrants, not limit their presence in the economy. And the target in mind of the Federalist supporters of the law was not Englishmen, but Frenchmen whom they suspected of excessively "zealous" and "atheistic" "Red" French revolutionary Republicanism or Jacobinism.

Aug 7, 2024 17:55:04 GMT stevep said:

b)  Would agree that the western opposition to slavery will be a big issue for the US and possibly for New Spain although not sure how much there was in the latter.

Slavery was legal in New Spain throughout its colonial period until independence, but it was not as pervasive as in Portugal or the Caribbean colonies of Northern European states. It was pretty pervasive, first of Indians, then of Africans, in the early 1500s Spanish Caribbean, declined there in the 1600s and 1700s as the focus shifted off the Spanish Caribbean, and revived after 1800 with the Haitian revolution and removal of Haitian competition.

In mainland New Spain, African born slaves were often used in the mines, sometimes in coastal lowland crop raising, and in craft occupations. But there were often pathways to manumission for oneself or one's children, especially mixed children. African slaves were never the core backbone of the mainland agricultural labor force in mainland Mexico and points north, nor Central America. Except a bit in southern French Louisiana. Many Afro-New Spaniards' transitions out of slavery began with service in Colonial militia or as garrison soldiers. The needs of both sides, independence revolutionaries, and Spanish Crown loyalist forces, for soldiers, united with ideological trends to truly doom slavery in mainland Spanish America.

Aug 7, 2024 17:55:04 GMT stevep said:

I think the reaction in an already somewhat traumatized US to the opposition to slavery, which many including most of those in positions of power view as a natural policy and one important to their economy and culture could be strong.  Agree that none of the updated powers would be willing to use force to end slavery although their likely to take a stern line on any slavers attempting to ply their trade in W Africa, especially in areas that are now western colonies.  There will be political and economic pressure which will probably put the US's back up further in the short term.  

  In Spanish Puerto Rico and Cuba slavery was abandon in 1873 and 1886respectively which would suggest that Spain would oppose continued slavery in the 1791 colonies but Spain was in a state of political flux during this period and also they might be reluctant to push the issue if it imperiled their ability to regain control over them.  As such not sure how things would go here.

  In terms of a western European buy out of slaves in the affected area I'm not sure how likely that might be.  It would mean at least some of the nations agreeing to make a substantial payment to the slave owners, which depending on the total number of slaves could be substantial. 

Well that would be kind of sad if uptime 1891 countries complaints and condemnations of slavery and probable actions against the international slave trade mainly just upset American slaveholders and Americans in general and increased their stubbornness and ultimately caused the 1891 British and Europeans to back off from the job of completing an emancipation program one way or another through buyouts, merciless sanctions or embargoes, or whatever it takes.

[stevep]

Aug 15, 2024 20:07:56 GMT raharris1973 said:

“If some such deal is made however I think any homeland would be outside the 1791 US as given their resentment to being pressurised to end slavery and the admittedly theoretical loss of lands west of the Mississippi so I suspect it will be somewhere in those lands rather than to the east. Plus you have the question of slaves outside the US and can't see it being willing to offer homes to them inside its territory if they were freed.

c) Good point on the possible connection between a Nicaraguan canal and the desire to redevelop Canada's infrastructure. It would be a lot easier if that can be done from both ends and that in turn would be helped by markedly easier connection between Europe - where the industrial and demographic base is - and the Pacific coast for work from the western end. I'm not sure how long it would take to construct such a canal and as I mentioned Britain would have something of a capital crisis with the loss of so many overseas investments.”

There are some projects that 1891 colonial powers, like Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal might be interested in buying out 1791 downtime American slaves, especially prime age men *for*. Not as *slaves* mind you but for fixed mid term labor or service contracts.

For example, Britain to hire a mass workforce for an Isthmian canal project in Nicaragua starting from the Miskito coast- in this way that country might become a “homeland”. Or France might do a similar buy-up for an isthmian canal project in Panama.

Or, for prime age men who seem suitable, the British may see southern plantations in the USA as a fine source of “Sepoys” to use inexpensively throughout the empire. The French may want to buy people willing to pay back costs serving as Legionnaires. Those who survive to retirement could send to buy relatives freedom and settle in this or that colony like Sierra Leone, Gold Coast or the cape colony for Britain, or Gabon for France. Colonialists might see these people being from America and non-native as a feature, not a bug, when employing them for colonial policing or low level administrative duties.

  That might be an interesting idea, with Britain, or possibly a Germany under new Kaiser Wilhelm II being interested in such developments, both for economic advantages and with Wilhelm's case possibly also prestige.  Which could be a safer path for the world than the OTL more militaristic route to prestige although that's still likely to be an issue with the tensions in Europe at the time.  If Panama is part of the 1791 area its an option although with both Spanish occupation in 1791 and 1891 probably seeking to maintain that it could be more complex.  Although that would also be an issue with the Nicaragua canal as Spain holds the western sections of the route.  Also I think OTL a lot of the manpower for the Panama canal was hired from the British Caribbean colonies.

  I would be less sure of them being used as Sepoys or police in colonial parts of Africa, at least for the British although it might be an attractive idea for the French.  Especially with much of their African colonies being predominantly Muslim and often Arabic a predominantly Christian black African element is likely to be seen as more loyal to the French as they would be seen as alien by the Muslim populations.

  The 1793/94 invention and patenting of Eli Whitney's cotton gin which made it a lot easier to process cotton and prompted the rapid expansion of cotton plantations in the following decades hasn't occurred yet so I think slavery in the US was seen as a dying activity and if some measure removed its workforce from the southern US before this happened that could be reasonably acceptable to the US.  However you might have to get in quick before such an invention occurred or was leaked to the down-time world.

  I think for political reasons any such buy-out would have to include most if not all women and children held as slaves else their future could be pretty grim.

 

[stevep]

Aug 16, 2024 1:56:42 GMT raharris1973 said:

Aug 7, 2024 17:55:04 GMT stevep said:

Coupled with lingering distrust of Britain the scope for migration to the US in the early years is likely to be low.

Not that there was high-volume immigration from anywhere to the newly independent USA in OTL, but there was some, with Britain being a prominent source country as well as France and Netherlands and Germany. And hostility and desired to exclude people for being British really wasn't a feature of the era.

When there was, briefly, an Alien Act in the late 1790s in the Adams Administration, it did not exclude immigrants, but it slowed the naturalization process to weaken potential *political influence* of immigrants, not limit their presence in the economy. And the target in mind of the Federalist supporters of the law was not Englishmen, but Frenchmen whom they suspected of excessively "zealous" and "atheistic" "Red" French revolutionary Republicanism or Jacobinism.

Aug 7, 2024 17:55:04 GMT stevep said:

b)  Would agree that the western opposition to slavery will be a big issue for the US and possibly for New Spain although not sure how much there was in the latter.

Slavery was legal in New Spain throughout its colonial period until independence, but it was not as pervasive as in Portugal or the Caribbean colonies of Northern European states. It was pretty pervasive, first of Indians, then of Africans, in the early 1500s Spanish Caribbean, declined there in the 1600s and 1700s as the focus shifted off the Spanish Caribbean, and revived after 1800 with the Haitian revolution and removal of Haitian competition.

In mainland New Spain, African born slaves were often used in the mines, sometimes in coastal lowland crop raising, and in craft occupations. But there were often pathways to manumission for oneself or one's children, especially mixed children. African slaves were never the core backbone of the mainland agricultural labor force in mainland Mexico and points north, nor Central America. Except a bit in southern French Louisiana. Many Afro-New Spaniards' transitions out of slavery began with service in Colonial militia or as garrison soldiers. The needs of both sides, independence revolutionaries, and Spanish Crown loyalist forces, for soldiers, united with ideological trends to truly doom slavery in mainland Spanish America.

Aug 7, 2024 17:55:04 GMT stevep said:

I think the reaction in an already somewhat traumatized US to the opposition to slavery, which many including most of those in positions of power view as a natural policy and one important to their economy and culture could be strong.  Agree that none of the updated powers would be willing to use force to end slavery although their likely to take a stern line on any slavers attempting to ply their trade in W Africa, especially in areas that are now western colonies.  There will be political and economic pressure which will probably put the US's back up further in the short term.  

  In Spanish Puerto Rico and Cuba slavery was abandon in 1873 and 1886respectively which would suggest that Spain would oppose continued slavery in the 1791 colonies but Spain was in a state of political flux during this period and also they might be reluctant to push the issue if it imperiled their ability to regain control over them.  As such not sure how things would go here.

  In terms of a western European buy out of slaves in the affected area I'm not sure how likely that might be.  It would mean at least some of the nations agreeing to make a substantial payment to the slave owners, which depending on the total number of slaves could be substantial. 

Well that would be kind of sad if uptime 1891 countries complaints and condemnations of slavery and probable actions against the international slave trade mainly just upset American slaveholders and Americans in general and increased their stubbornness and ultimately caused the 1891 British and Europeans to back off from the job of completing an emancipation program one way or another through buyouts, merciless sanctions or embargoes, or whatever it takes.

a)  There wasn't a massive flow of mitigation to the US in 1791 nor any great capacity for it but there was in 1891.  In fact quite possibly one of the 1st signs that 1791 N America will have of the change would be large iron/steel liners arriving in their ports with vast - to the 1791 world - numbers of migrants seeking a new home in the region.  They will be rejected of course but there is a massive infrastructure set up to move migrants from Europe, generally via the UK into N America.  Some will still seek to come and what the US attitude would be would be unclear.  The 1791 US was as you say socially and politically conservative and are unlikely to want many migrants from outside their British-German core of current populations.  Especially since such migrants will frequently be fair more radical than what the Americans are used to.  They might want more people from the 1891 world to boost their population and also technical knowledge or they might fear being swamped by 'hordes' of foreigners.  Of course there is still the rule that only people born as US citizens can hold the Presidency - don't think there are written restrictions on other posts - but could still be a concern.

  Given that infrastructure in place its likely that the flow of migrants will go elsewhere.  Which would mean either Canada with upgrades to port and other infrastructure - although whether both the Canadians Anglo's and French and possibly the 1891 British would want the colony quite possibly being swamped by much greater numbers of people largely from eastern or southern Europe.  Or longer trips to other 1891 sources, such as the southern cone of S America, S Africa or Australia, or possibly French Algeria for some populations.  I do suspect that the much greater distances involved is likely to cut the OTL levels of migrations so more people will be staying in Italy, the Balkans and much of eastern Europe which is likely to have political and economic affects there.

b)  Thanks for the info about New Spain.  That does sound like that area could well be fairly easy when it comes to moving to end slavery.  At least once the status of the region is established.

c)  That would definitely be an issue if it went that way for the 1791 US.  Hopefully some of the ideas you suggest in your other post could provide a solution but I suspect the bulk of the white population might oppose sizeable numbers of free blacks competing for land and jobs.  That's why I think not only a buy out but also the moving of the freed slaves outside 1791 US territories would be important to get its acceptance of an emancipation programme.  Coupled with the impact of the US finding out further westward expansion will be blocked - even if none of this was happening by 1791 other than in areas seen by agreement with the main European powers as US territory I think there's going to be a lot of resentment about the 1891 world and its 'interference'.

[raharris1973]

Aug 16, 2024 14:51:54 GMT stevep said:

  That might be an interesting idea, with Britain, or possibly a Germany under new Kaiser Wilhelm II being interested in such developments, both for economic advantages and with Wilhelm's case possibly also prestige.  Which could be a safer path for the world than the OTL more militaristic route to prestige although that's still likely to be an issue with the tensions in Europe at the time.  If Panama is part of the 1791 area its an option although with both Spanish occupation in 1791 and 1891 probably seeking to maintain that it could be more complex.  Although that would also be an issue with the Nicaragua canal as Spain holds the western sections of the route.  Also I think OTL a lot of the manpower for the Panama canal was hired from the British Caribbean colonies.

Good points - Germany had a good start on much of its colonial empire by this point, except in Qingdao and Micronesia. Obviously Britain did in 1891, but it still had more spots on the map to "fill in pink".

The early 1890s also seemed to be a calming period of tensions *within* mainland Europe's regions and borders, even as the Franco-Russian alliance solidified, with most European powers expansionisms redirected to continents outside of Europe, and ditto for their internecine rivalries. Primitivization of North America should do nothing to discourage this. The Russians can add back their revived downtime sovereignty over Alaska onto their 1890s Pacific and Far East expansionism. Of course they could face rivalry in the decade or so ahead, this time from Japan, or British North America.

Since 1891 is still 7 years ahead of the 1898 Spanish American War, and 4 years ahead of even renewed Cuban rebellion, Spain still holds Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean and the Philippines and Micronesia (except for the Marshalls) in the Pacific. It is therefore in a geographic position to use its uptime 1891 bases in Cuba to reassert authority over downtime Spanish administrations in New Spain (Greater Mexico and Central America, New Granada's Panama province), Luisiana and Florida, even if other, stronger wealthier powers of the time are in a decent position to bully Spain for territorial or economic concessions or special rights or compel "joint economic ventures" perhaps like Isthmian Canals in either Nicaragua or Panama. Another contender for 1791 Panama would be the 1891 Republic of Colombia.

So the bottom line, if Britain, or France, or any other Northern European power wants to push through an Isthmian canal, it is not so simple as wishing for it and investing money and hiring labor, they also need to diplomatically or forcefully gain Spanish or Colombia acceptance of a joint project on the land or seize the territory from any one of them first before they can get started on such a project.

On Africa, 1891, here I have a picture of the colonial situation:       [Didn't seem to work - image-handling really seems to suck here, and upload file just bumps the page from bottom to top - really frustrating.]

www.flickr.com/photos/22187058@N03/53929386538/in/photostream/lightbox/

I would be less sure of them being used as Sepoys or police in colonial parts of Africa, at least for the British although it might be an attractive idea for the French. Especially with much of their African colonies being predominantly Muslim and often Arabic a predominantly Christian black African element is likely to be seen as more loyal to the French as they would be seen as alien by the Muslim populations.

French Sub-Saharan Africa had stuff around Senegal, coastal Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon-Congo at this time, while missing many of the interior Sahara desert and Savanna connective spaces.

Of course, I am missing one of the simplest options in terms of sovereign countries likely willing to offer a home to freed American slaves from 1791, men, women, and children alike.  The Republic of Liberia, already a sovereign state as of 1891, and politically dominated by Americo-Liberians. There's a more than 50/50 chance they would see mass migration by several hundred thousand Americans as a positive, reinforcing their broadly defined (cultural and religious and language) control over the land and their corner of the African coast. The chance of them not accepting it could come from worry about new arrivals dwarfing their own numbers and diluting their elite personal status and control.  The thing is Liberia would could not afford the buy-out price or ransom of the American slaves and would have to find its way to a partnership with financially more prosperous western powers to pay for the buy-outs and cost of passage.

I think for political reasons any such buy-out would have to include most if not all women and children held as slaves else their future could be pretty grim.

I think to the extent any governments with parliamentary/representative government systems funded buy-outs, even if they included labor or military service obligations for men, they could end up being softened with a "humanitarian rider" to also buy out wives, children or female next of kin of the men. "Light "supporting work related to kitchen or seamstress or nursing services could be found for the women, slaveowners in America would have little interest in retaining young children without slave mothers. Wives in many white American households would object to their husbands simultaneously selling abroad all the male butlers and field hands and keeping attractive young female slaves of childbearing age around the house. 

[raharris1973]

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

a)  There wasn't a massive flow of mitigation to the US in 1791 nor any great capacity for it but there was in 1891.  In fact quite possibly one of the 1st signs that 1791 N America will have of the change would be large iron/steel liners arriving in their ports with vast - to the 1791 world - numbers of migrants seeking a new home in the region. 

Yes, I guess this will be a big, undeniable problem for the first two months or so, after "the event", until news spreads widely back to British and European continental ports that the USA and Canada everyone was expecting to find simply is not there, at which point planned passenger voyages and ticket sales will start to drop off drastically overall, and shipping companies will start trying to advertise other locations to send migrants and tourists, unaffected by the change, like the Antipodes, Cuba, and South America. With their rapid drop in volume and sales, they will have to probably reduce ticket prices quite a bit even for these longer distance trips to keep a decent amount of traffic going.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

They will be rejected of course but there is a massive infrastructure set up to move migrants from Europe, generally via the UK into N America.

Well, that will depend what skills and assets they bring, what money or legal tender they have that downtime Americans in the ports can use to buy new wonderful things that show up in bug new, shiny freight cargo ships, and all that. Cultural differences, accent differences will be noticed, but the ports of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore already had aspects of pan-European polyglotness to them, that will keep most interactions pragmatic and based on what kind of money people can make off of each other.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

Some will still seek to come and what the US attitude would be would be unclear. 

Sure, but it will soon become clear that there are no railroads in this country. Roads are crappy in general. The cities are crowding up fast. Plumbing is poor. There is no electric light (for those who experienced it in their European ports of exit or hometowns) no telephones or telegraphs. Land is cheap, but usually if you venture far from the roads, and machinery is primitive and expensive. There are no factories hiring scores of people at a time to build rails, masses of steel, or steel buildings. Wages for digging canals with simple shovels are not great. So the feedback loop to Europe will suggest that America is better suited for the migrant who is not looking for a job in an industry or established community, but one prepared to homestead on a rough and insecure frontier, or one with enough capital and equipment and technical skills to start a business to create new local jobs, markets, and demand for late 19th century style goods and services.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

The 1791 US was as you say socially and politically conservative and are unlikely to want many migrants from outside their British-German core of current populations. 

But they'll take them in reasonable doses if they are bringing wealth and jobs in and not overwhelming local communities. At least that should be the feeling for the first decade or so. Even in the American west, for the first decade or two, the positive novelty and usefulness of the Chinese presence was most noted by white commentators before envy, suspicion, and resentment became the dominant themes.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

They might want more people from the 1891 world to boost their population and also technical knowledge or they might fear being swamped by 'hordes' of foreigners.

These will indeed be the two competing forces. Local elite attitudes will set the tone for how different local communities react, as will whether foreigners are seen as displacing people who were doing well or OK, versus bringing prosperity for all, or to places depressed since the revolution.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

Given that infrastructure in place its likely that the flow of migrants will go elsewhere.

Definitely yes - The closest locations to the USA coast with solid infrastructure for ships of the 1890s, though still not nearly as developed in the interior, would be port towns like Havana, Cuba, San Juan Puerto Rico, the shores of Colombia, and Caracas Venezuela. One needs to go further to find countries with a greater abundance of land in the temperate zone, rail infrastructure, port infrastructure, good agriculture and mining sector, and that means to southern Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, the Cape Colony and some parts of the Boer Republics, French Algeria, Australia, and New Zealand.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

Which would mean either Canada with upgrades to port and other infrastructure - although whether both the Canadians Anglo's and French and possibly the 1891 British would want the colony quite possibly being swamped by much greater numbers of people largely from eastern or southern Europe. 

Canada is good, but it is not an immediate replacement. It needs a good 3-5 years of crash infrastructure investment, no doubt British sourced primarily. I think it can be done, and it has the advantage, unlike the USA, of being under direct British sovereignty to help it along. Local Canadians, especially the Francophones, will have their opinions about being swamped. London might take a little heed, but not too much. London could and likely would also give immigration preference first to its own subjects from the British Isles, English, Welsh, Scots, and Irish, above European third country nationals.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

Or longer trips to other 1891 sources, such as the southern cone of S America, S Africa or Australia, or possibly French Algeria for some populations. 

Yes, I've laid out the antipodes and southern cone and Algeria as getting bigger relative slices of the emigration pie.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

I do suspect that the much greater distances involved is likely to cut the OTL levels of migrations so more people will be staying in Italy, the Balkans and much of eastern Europe which is likely to have political and economic affects there.

And also, a sizeable slice of the "would have emigrated to America" simply stays in their home countries, but fairly often moving from countryside to city within them.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

b)  Thanks for the info about New Spain.  That does sound like that area could well be fairly easy when it comes to moving to end slavery.  At least once the status of the region is established.

Yeah, I don't think it would be hard for the powers in general, or even Spain mostly alone, to enforce a sunset/abolition of slavery in the downtime colonies on the North American mainland. The most recalcitrant areas would be mostly Francophone Creoles of southern Luisiana, the greater Mexico and Central America areas should not be too hard. Had 1791 South America come along, some parts like Venezuela and Peru and its mining districts might have posed some challenges, but they are not present here.

Aug 16, 2024 15:27:56 GMT stevep said:

Hopefully some of the ideas you suggest in your other post could provide a solution but I suspect the bulk of the white population might oppose sizeable numbers of free blacks competing for land and jobs.

Yeah, I don't think that competition will happen much, or be allowed to happen. Already free people of color, free black people will likely be allowed to remain where established, and possibly unite with formerly enslaved spouses, children, parents. But in areas, especially southern and deeper southern, where the white population worries about becoming outnumbered, emigration would be a condition of manumission.
The south would really start to face a crisis of labor shortages, even though even family wheat and corn and hog farmers, and cattle ranchers (South Carolina was cattle country before rice and cotton) could get decent prices on the international market for their products on former plantation land. Many of the last slaves to be let go, or those who would be most "encouraged" to stay, possibly as formally free people for hire under contract would likely be middle-aged housekeepers, maids, nannies, people used around the house for that and eldercare.