What if no German Unrestricted Sub Warfare, Zimmerman Note intercept, US DoW on Germany in 1917?

[stevep]

Jul 13, 2024 18:22:22 GMT raharris1973 said:

Jul 13, 2024 14:41:12 GMT stevep said:

As such if the alliance does continue its likely that there would be no naval agreement.  If there is a treaty then its likely that limits will be much larger in terms of both total and individual tonnage because of the size of the US ships probably already in the process of entering service.  However going to be difficult to square the circle because Japan will want to build a lot more, larger ships to close the gap on the US which will in turn increase the demands on Britain to produce more. 

Really good points.

Difficult to square a "whole bunch" of circles indeed!

And, if the US is saying it is hell-bent on building Navy second to none, without specific dismantlement of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, how is the USA reacting to the concept I've proposed that the Entente sets up post war as the alternative to the League of Nations? The Quadripartite Alliance of Britain-Japan-France-Italy? The Quad World directorate, does Washington see it as less menacing, because it is not a specifically Anglo-Japanese deal "pincering" the USA in the Pacific and Atlantic, or does the USA just see it as an Anglo-Japanese alliance by another name, actually made a little worse by inclusion of the nontrivial French with their Atlantic, Caribbean, and Asia-Pacific assets, and the Italians?

 a) A lot would depend on the nature of this organisation and also how its seen in the US.  If its an actual alliance, rather than something like OTL UN then it would be perceived with hostility by the US as many would claim it could only be directed at them.  This happened with the OTL AJA despite that being true and that this QA is primarily concerned with keeping Germany 'down' and the budding USSR 'out'.  If its something more like an earlier UN or something strong LoN then I would expect the powers to invite all/most other powers to join with the USSR as an exception but I suspect that the US would refuse.  Having avoided entry into WWI it could be a significant level of paranoia about 'Europe/the Old World ganging up on them and American exceptionalism being strengthened compared to OTL.  Possibly the best input here could come from some of our US members?

  It will depend on the exact nature of the organisation, possibly how much concern there is about the USSR inside the US, how US internal policy is going on and a load of other things.  For instance having had a slightly longer war and with as you suggest a strong incentive to keep to the 'land fit for heroes' idea Britain, needing to meet the costs of this and war debts changes policies away from a laissez faire mentality and especially introduces an earlier imperial tariff system.  Despite the fact that the US already has tariffs - and get a lot of government revenue from them - along with just about every other nation its likely to be protested in in US as a barrier to their trade.  It would also possibly put Canada in an awkward position diplomatically as while Britain would offer it a favourable place in such as organisation as OTL in the 1930's that would in those conditions cause tension with the US with with Canada has a lot of trade and interaction so Canada might seek to maintain economic neutrality if it can but that could be awkward and divisive, especially with the recent Canadian involvement in WWI.

  One other thought occurs to me here.  OTL during the Greeco-Turkish war after initial lukewarm support France and Italy increasing opposed Greek expansion as it was seen as a British influenced state.  If there's a clearer alliance here with possibly discussions of common interests and also possibly a more belligerent - at least in verbal terms US against them all is there a possibility that they won't switch to indirect aid to the Turks here? 

Do the Americans insist on building to the combined naval strengths of all 4 of the Quad powers?

b)  that would depend on the circumstances but the navalists - both in the USN and also the associated industrial interests - would be happy to push such ideas.  Since the French and Italian navies are a lot weaker than the RN or the IJN plans this wouldn't be a massive expansion of the desired fleet.  Although you raise a good point above about there probably being additional concerns about French possessions inside the Americas adding to their concerns.

  At this point I believe the UK is still the primary trading partner in much of S America, in part because its a better market - along with Europe generally - than the US as the latter heavily protects its own primary producers against imports from such areas.  There could be a fair amount of maneuvering for influence in the region in coming decades.

Would a widening of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, that does not actually reduce Tokyo and London's commitments to each other, or change them, but goes through a name change to a wider Quadripartite Alliance with the other two major Entente parties left standing at the end of the war, pacify American politicians, or enflame them?

c)  If its a clear defensive alliance it will inflame them, or at least most of them.  Probably also if a looser system like a proto-UN is there and the US is invited to join but rejects this.  In the latter case you might get some cooler heads seeking to calm things down.

Will the Partisan affiliation of the American politicians at this point in time matter for the question?

d)  Their politicians so most will seek to push their own agenda/interests whether that is to escalate or reduce tension.  Ditto to a degree in Europe if the US becomes belligerent but having their primary interests in Euro-Asia, having just gone through the Great War and being a multi-national alliance there's going to be far more people seeking to ease tensions rather than worsen then,

Furthermore, regarding practical building issues, the Americans can try to build to a four power standard, though they can kiss many presumed tax cuts goodbye in the 20s.

e)  Well they will probably be worse off than OTL, especially if they expand things further to match new Anglo-Japanese construction and Franco-Italian forces.  However they will have some benefits.

i)  Their avoided their OTL military involvement and the resulting spending while the debts of the European powers - due to a longer war - will be larger.

ii)  OTL the US started a massive programme of merchant shipping production including ideas such as concrete ships - which proved a massive waste of resources.  This also by flooding the post-war market depressed prices somewhat although US merchant shipping policies meant their shipping was generally not competitive outside US controlled markets.  If this doesn't occur here then that would save the US a hell of a lot of money.  Remember a person on a naval board who has a lot of research in world trade in this period arguing that apart from the longer term impact this was a lot more expensive than the planned 1916 programme.

iii)  If there's no pandemic that will save a lot of lives and since many were in the prime of life - which was an oddity in a pandemic - that would also boost the US economy.

The Japanese would have ambitions, in the absence of a deal, to build up a great deal, and then have huge difficulties in execution after the Kanto earthquake. Actually, a combination of an overly forward Siberian policy, no naval deal, high naval building, and trying to resume as much as possible even while doing naval construction, finally topped off near the end of the decade by a joint intervention in China with Britain against the KMT-CCP United Front, could bring forward many accumulated social strains in China by the middle 1930s. With navalism, militarism and its hardships imposed on taxpayer and draftee unchecked, and not done in a defiant unilateral way, but as a henchman of white imperialists, Japan may be ripe for the outbreak of *left-leaning* mutinous disorder, perhaps with some resemblance to the Spanish Civil War, or the late stages of the Portuguese Empire in the 70s, that mixes classic Communist worker, peasant, tenant-farmer, and soldier sailor discontent, also with Pan-Asianism (why we working with Nigel Whitey instead of *with* the Chinese Nationalists and Proletarians?).

f)  Its going to be a very complex and difficult time for Japan, especially if it tries to meet the desires of both its army and navy.  Plus as you say an intervention alongside Britain and possibly other European powers in China against a united KMT/CCP would have both economic and internal political issues.

  To be honest, even if butterflies mean there's no great depression in TTL I doubt Japan will get to that stage as something will give before then.  I can't see the 8:8 programme completed, at least not without a marked delay in its completion once the 1923 quake occurs and with a probably expensive commitment in Siberia as well.  How things develop I don't know but I find it very difficult to see Japan staying strong that long if they have both those commitments active.

Just a stream of thought, or a brainstorm. The pendulum doesn't need to swing the way it did in our world.

g)  Very true.  There's very little that isn't ASB that could be ruled out given the butterflies.  Added a couple of issues that came to mind in the above discussions.

[raharris1973]

Jul 14, 2024 14:19:44 GMT stevep said:

  One other thought occurs to me here.  OTL during the Greeco-Turkish war after initial lukewarm support France and Italy increasing opposed Greek expansion as it was seen as a British influenced state.  If there's a clearer alliance here with possibly discussions of common interests and also possibly a more belligerent - at least in verbal terms US against them all is there a possibility that they won't switch to indirect aid to the Turks here? 

Very unique thought I had not considered, along with the others you bring up. Interesting.

It brings up a tangent. If Paris and London truly are "pushed" into more collaboration and coordination, and away from backstabbing and mutual undermining......cooperating against Turkey and holding them to the Asian side of the straits could just be "the tip of the iceberg".

-If coordination is indeed effective, possibly they could coordinate their policies in the Arab world, and not try to exacerbate each other's trouble with natives - Britain having ties with Syrian-Lebanese dissidents, France with Palestinian and Iraqi ones. To some extent, each of them used the other as a "foil" in justifying their own rule over their Arab mandates. They were more or less saying, "hey, you need us, or those awful frogs [or tommies] will really steal your lunch, my friend Hassan". If London and Paris went more lockstep, there would be less asylum and encouragement for each other's rebels. But they wouldn't be able to use the "foil" trick and the Arabs may hate them more unitedly. But should be easier to suppress. Good book on this - Line in the Sand.

-The Holy Grail of Franco-British cooperation would be if the two could come to a true consensus on punishment, handling, and containment of Germany, and stick to the same page for several decades in a row, without separating. So that they agree how much of Germany should be occupied for how long. How much, if any, should be broken off into a separate state. How much Germany must pay in reparations, and what the right thing to do is, if Germany is not paying - so no splitting over matters like the Ruhr occupation. And if this could be extended into common approaches on policy towards Poland and Czechoslovakia and how to handle Germany's *eastern* borders in advance and the USSR's western borders, so much the better. But this is asking a lot of both governments, to make hard decisions about hard, and *expensive* potentially bloody and risky commitments, where it is easier to put off definitive decisions until the moment crisis makes it inescapable.

[stevep]

Jul 14, 2024 16:21:50 GMT raharris1973 said:

Jul 14, 2024 14:19:44 GMT stevep said:

  One other thought occurs to me here.  OTL during the Greeco-Turkish war after initial lukewarm support France and Italy increasing opposed Greek expansion as it was seen as a British influenced state.  If there's a clearer alliance here with possibly discussions of common interests and also possibly a more belligerent - at least in verbal terms US against them all is there a possibility that they won't switch to indirect aid to the Turks here? 

Very unique thought I had not considered, along with the others you bring up. Interesting.

It brings up a tangent. If Paris and London truly are "pushed" into more collaboration and coordination, and away from backstabbing and mutual undermining......cooperating against Turkey and holding them to the Asian side of the straits could just be "the tip of the iceberg".

-If coordination is indeed effective, possibly they could coordinate their policies in the Arab world, and not try to exacerbate each other's trouble with natives - Britain having ties with Syrian-Lebanese dissidents, France with Palestinian and Iraqi ones. To some extent, each of them used the other as a "foil" in justifying their own rule over their Arab mandates. They were more or less saying, "hey, you need us, or those awful frogs [or tommies] will really steal your lunch, my friend Hassan". If London and Paris went more lockstep, there would be less asylum and encouragement for each other's rebels. But they wouldn't be able to use the "foil" trick and the Arabs may hate them more unitedly. But should be easier to suppress. Good book on this - Line in the Sand.

-The Holy Grail of Franco-British cooperation would be if the two could come to a true consensus on punishment, handling, and containment of Germany, and stick to the same page for several decades in a row, without separating. So that they agree how much of Germany should be occupied for how long. How much, if any, should be broken off into a separate state. How much Germany must pay in reparations, and what the right thing to do is, if Germany is not paying - so no splitting over matters like the Ruhr occupation. And if this could be extended into common approaches on policy towards Poland and Czechoslovakia and how to handle Germany's *eastern* borders in advance and the USSR's western borders, so much the better. But this is asking a lot of both governments, to make hard decisions about hard, and *expensive* potentially bloody and risky commitments, where it is easier to put off definitive decisions until the moment crisis makes it inescapable.

  Well OTL the Treaty of Sevres gave Britain, France and Italy zones of influence in Anatolia and neighbouring areas, which can be seen in this map here.  This gives France a good slice of SE Anatolia which could link up with their mandates in Syria and possibly also allow some sort of Kurdish protectorate if they so chooses.  Italy would have a huge area in southern central and western Anatolia.  Britain gets influence in two smaller regions, one far to the SE and far more importantly control of the straits.  OTL those were zones of influence and if there's no LoN equivalent there won;t be a mandate system so would suspect that the areas outside Anatolia would be formal colonies?  [Not sure that with the situation that as well as the Quad Alliance your talking about there wouldn't be some attempt at an international system being set up.  The same drivers are in place with the only real difference is that the US is probably still isolationist and didn't take part in the war.].

  OTL of course other than Britain having a presence in the straits I don't think much of the zones inside Anatolia were taken up with any seriousness and you ended up with the war between the Greeks and Turks but with the former supported by Britain and the other powers rather lukewarm.  Then the Greeks had what looked like a winning position screwed up by regime change and the other powers, fearing too much British influence over Greece gave some back-hand support to the Turks.  This lead to a disastrous Greek defeat and when the British government sought to safeguard Constantinople and the straits there was neither internal or international support for the stand.  - Another factor here was the ongoing crisis in Ireland which absorbed a lot of British resources, militarily, fiscally and politically.  I can't see that changes much and could possibly even be worse.

  Here a lot depends on what changes and what doesn't.  You could see anything from a Greek defeat as OTL and the brutal expulsion of the sorted Christians from Anatolia, including the occupation of the designated Armenian state although after the 1915-16 genocide its unclear how many Armenians were left in that region.  Or at the other extreme Anatolia is partitioned as in the map above possibly with direct Greek rule replacing British and some Italians across much of western Anatolia.  [The latter might be an issue although if Italy has decided to take over its zone then that could be excluded from any war.  Most of the population in the zones would be Turkish - or Kurdish in the SE but it would make for a significantly different politically history for the region.

PS  - Sorry forgot about the last point of what happens with Germany.  A lot will depend on the peace and whether the British especially will be willing to commit to long term military support of France and Belgium - possibly also other nations in a wider alliance system as a check against both Germany and the USSR.  In turn also on how the treaty differs without a US presence at Versailles as to how concerned some neighbours are about their security and how Britain responds to those concerns.  I've put forward some ideas that might happen, whether good or bad for the actual stability of Europe and the wider world.  What happens and doesn't I don't know.

[stevep]

  raharris1973 ,

   In terms of what happens with the USN designs in this period please see here, which looks at some of the work done on their BC designs. With no US entry into the war its likely that earlier designs will enter service and you definitely won't have the Stanley Goodall visit and input on what the RN had learnt in WWI.  The US navy is likely to build some fairly large and with the BCs - which were their initial design of ships - very fast ships but their going to have marked shortcomings, especially in terms of protection and if they do stick with a 35kt design be very, very expensive.

  Steve

[ewellholmes]

End result is Entente collapse in total in 1918 probably.

[raharris1973]

Jul 30, 2024 23:42:43 GMT ewellholmes said:

End result is Entente collapse in total in 1918 probably.

OK, an assessment at odds with most of the calculations by others in the thread.   Do you wish to elaborate in more detail what specifically will be dooming the Entente in 1918, specifically considering they will be facing less intensive enemy U-Boat tactics over 1917-1918?

[ewellholmes]

Aug 3, 2024 23:02:16 GMT raharris1973 said:

Jul 30, 2024 23:42:43 GMT ewellholmes said:

End result is Entente collapse in total in 1918 probably.

OK, an assessment at odds with most of the calculations by others in the thread.   Do you wish to elaborate in more detail what specifically will be dooming the Entente in 1918, specifically considering they will be facing less intensive enemy U-Boat tactics over 1917-1918?

You know me, I'm used to being the odd man out lol. 

Specifically for U-Boat tactics alone, I'm not sure that's the case. British shipbuilding in 1917 consisted of 1.16 million tons and in 1918 it was 1.35 million tons. Even under Prize Rules, the U-Boats were able to sink 1,298,000 tons from October of 1916 to January of 1917. Averaged out, that comes to ~325,000 tons a month. From January of 1917 to January of 1918, this would've resulted in 3,894,000 tons lost to U-Boat action. In other words, From October of 1916 to January of 1918 in this ATL, total tonnage lost would've been 5,192,000! This prompted Admiral Beatty to remark on January 27th-four days before the start of USW-that the question of the war was now whether the Germans would blockade the British to peace before the Royal Navy could do the same to the Germans.

Outside of U-Boats, I generally take the joint report of the British Government at face value. The Command of Gold Reversed: American Loans to Britain, 1915-1917 by John Milton Cooper, Jr., Pacific Historical Review , May, 1976, Vol. 45, No. 2 (May, 1976), pp. 209-230:

The American retaliatory legislation also prompted the British government in September and October 1916 to initiate its first comprehensive inquiry into dependence upon American trade. Up to that time, the Treasury, War Trade Advisory Council, and Ministry of Munitions had separately studied the situation. The suggestion for a broad review of British dependence first came on September 5, 1916, from Richard Sperling, a clerk in the American Section of the Foreign Office. Sperling proposed the review as a preliminary step toward counterretaliatory measures. The suggestion found favor with his superiors, and on September 13, the Foreign Secretary asked for representatives of other ministries to meet with members of his department in order to "ascertain definitely how far this country is dependent financially and commercially on the United States... ." Delays ensued, and not until October 3 did an interdepartmental committee from the Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade, Admiralty, Board of Agriculture, Ministry of Munitions, War Office, and Colonial Office meet to review the American situation.'3

The interdepartmental committee made a shocking discovery. The chairman, Lord Eustace Percy of the Foreign Office, reported, ". .. it developed at once at the conference that there was really nothing to deliberate about because our dependence was so vital and complete in every respect that it was folly even to consider reprisals." The committee had found that in food, raw materials, and particularly steel, "American supplies are so necessary to us that reprisals, while they would produce tremendous distress in America, would also practically stop the war." Even worse, in order to finance the war orders, the Treasury had to "find something over ?2,000,000 sterling a day in New York." By March 1917, British reserves of gold and securities would be gone. "Now, in these circumstances," wrote Percy, "our job is not merely to maintain decently friendly relations with the United States, but to keep sentiment in America so sweet that it will lend us practically unlimited money." No record was kept of the discussion that produced those conclusions, but it is not hard to guess what happened at the meeting. The Treasury representative to the committee was Keynes, and Percy's comments on finance recapitulated views that Keynes had often expressed. Not only was Keynes the best in-formed person about the American situation on the committee, but throughout his adult life the economist's quick mind and ready turn of phrase made him excel in swaying small groups of experts. The interdepartmental committee, it would seem, furnished an ideal forum for the Treasury's brilliant Cassandra.'4

At the end of October 1916, the Foreign Office circulated three sets of documents from the committee to the Cabinet. These included a resolution against reprisals, a memorandum by Percy urging conciliation toward the United States, and papers on British dependence by different departments. The most incisive arguments came in the Treasury paper prepared by Keynes. Dwindling stocks of gold and securities could meet less and less of the financial requirements, he noted. More and more money would therefore have to come from loans. But loans carried great dangers. "A statement," Keynes warned, "from the United States executive deprecating or disapproving of such loans would render their flotation in sufficient volume a practical impossibility." Even official approval, he further warned, might not be enough. "The sums which this country will require to borrow in the United States of America in the next six to nine months are so enormous, amounting to several times the national debt of that country, that it will be necessary to appeal to every class and section of the investing public." Keynes's conclusion was chilling: "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that In a few months time the American executive and the American public will be in a position to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more dearly than them.""5

[stevep]

   Well in terms of U boats the quick solution would be convoys, at least for international trade. Most of the sinking numerically were on coastal shipping, fishing boats and the like but the big trade shipments were in relatively few shipments of larger boats. The arguments against them OTL were that convoys were less efficient because of the time taken in organising them and convoys being tied to the speed of the slowest ships, plus probably dispersal at the destination, questions of whether civilian captains would be adequately skilled to keep in a convoy, whether the RN could spare the escorts and that it was a defensive measure rather than the aggressive moves that the RN had preferred.

  Of course if a lot of ships are being sunk that's a hell of a lot more of a loss than a small percentage cost loss in terms of delays in speed.  It was shown OTL that most captains were quite capable of staying in convoys.  Finding escorts could be more of an issue but in a crisis the fleet would have to take some risks, or simply stay in port more.  Similarly with the idea that convoying was defensive.  Its actually the best way of drawing subs to escorts.

  IIRC convoys started to be general in international trade about half way through 1917 and drastically cut down losses to subs.  This would be far more effective against subs using prize rules as that means a sub, which is vulnerable on the surface would have to expose its for a prolonged period to sink with gunfire merchants, even without any time to allow crews to escape which with even a single destroyer about is likely to be fatal to them.  I suspect the response would be sub commanders going to USW regardless of instructions from Berlin which would cause more losses but also a diplomatic storm for Germany.  Similarly with sinkings after dispersal I suspect that any sinkings inside US territorial waters would similarly not go down well with Washington.

  In terms of funding and imports from the US things are more difficult.  Germany did fund all its needs by internal savings/loans from the population albeit that the was probably a post-war economic disaster waiting to happen.  - It might have been an additional reason why the German government in the early 20's was willing to go for hyper-inflation as it largely wiped out that internal debt.  However Britain could have done something similar in a crisis as well as doing as much import substitution as possible, switching to alternative sources where they can.  Although it would take more shipping because of the distance places like Argentina, S Africa and Australia could produce at least some of the foodstuff that OTL was imported from the US because of its closer distance.  Similarly with trying to cut consumption things could be done.  Britain had new steel works under construction and TTL the allies don't need to produce weapons to equip the US forces that came to Europe.  The big issues would probably be food and oil.

  One other factor here is a pull one for the US.  Their companies are making a lot of money from the war, both in supplying allied countries and also in having easier markets while the Europeans are pre-occupied by war.  There's going to be a lot of losers if the US government decides to cut of trade with the allies rather than allow loans.

  Its not going to be easy but governments in a total war, especially with the survival of their nations at stake, not to mention the sunken costs fallacy probably at play can do a hell of a lot to keep fighting and despite the increasing collapse of the Russian state in the east the CPs are also in a dire way.  I would still expect the allies to win through although it might means more losses all round.

[ewellholmes]

Aug 4, 2024 11:41:10 GMT stevep said:

   Well in terms of U boats the quick solution would be convoys, at least for international trade. Most of the sinking numerically were on coastal shipping, fishing boats and the like but the big trade shipments were in relatively few shipments of larger boats. The arguments against them OTL were that convoys were less efficient because of the time taken in organising them and convoys being tied to the speed of the slowest ships, plus probably dispersal at the destination, questions of whether civilian captains would be adequately skilled to keep in a convoy, whether the RN could spare the escorts and that it was a defensive measure rather than the aggressive moves that the RN had preferred.

Of course if a lot of ships are being sunk that's a hell of a lot more of a loss than a small percentage cost loss in terms of delays in speed.  It was shown OTL that most captains were quite capable of staying in convoys.  Finding escorts could be more of an issue but in a crisis the fleet would have to take some risks, or simply stay in port more.  Similarly with the idea that convoying was defensive.  Its actually the best way of drawing subs to escorts.

IIRC convoys started to be general in international trade about half way through 1917 and drastically cut down losses to subs.  This would be far more effective against subs using prize rules as that means a sub, which is vulnerable on the surface would have to expose its for a prolonged period to sink with gunfire merchants, even without any time to allow crews to escape which with even a single destroyer about is likely to be fatal to them.  I suspect the response would be sub commanders going to USW regardless of instructions from Berlin which would cause more losses but also a diplomatic storm for Germany.  Similarly with sinkings after dispersal I suspect that any sinkings inside US territorial waters would similarly not go down well with Washington.

Problem is the convoy system is non-viable without American entry. The U.S. DoW immediately added roughly ~100 destroyers to the Entente total, which is why convoys were able to start becoming a thing in the Summer-Fall of 1917. Even more deadly for the Entente is that, without access to American oil, the Royal Navy is effectively wiped off the board. In 1914, the Royal Navy had 212 Destroyers. Of these, the following are oil powered:

HMS Swift
Tribal-class (12)
Acorn-Class (20)
Acheron-class (23)
Acasta-class (20)
Laforey-class (20)
Admiralty M-class (2)

At 98 ships, this constitutes nearly half of all available destroyers in 1914. Note, I'm just counting the ones that were operational in 1914, with all other destroyers under construction, such as the the two remaining Laforey and the 83 Admiralty M ships also being oil powered. The crisis also doesn't end with the destroyers, but extends to the rest of the fleet too. The eight vessels of the Arethusa-class and the two of the C-class completed in 1914 means that half of the Royal Navy's light cruisers in 1914 are also oil powered. The newly arrived Queen Elizabeth class battleships as well as the Revenge class are also oil powered, meaning the newest and most powerful battleships of the Royal Navy are now removed from the board.

In effect, not only is convoying not possible, the naval balance in the North Sea is now almost even between the Imperial German Navy and Royal Navy. The Home Fleet still has a slight edge in numbers, but the HSF has more modern, powerful units with the QEs and Revenge class off the board for the British. The lack of escorts also means the Home Fleet would be very, very exposed to German U-Boats in the event of a sortie effort to challenge an HSF sortie.

In terms of funding and imports from the US things are more difficult.  Germany did fund all its needs by internal savings/loans from the population albeit that the was probably a post-war economic disaster waiting to happen.  - It might have been an additional reason why the German government in the early 20's was willing to go for hyper-inflation as it largely wiped out that internal debt.  However Britain could have done something similar in a crisis as well as doing as much import substitution as possible, switching to alternative sources where they can.  Although it would take more shipping because of the distance places like Argentina, S Africa and Australia could produce at least some of the foodstuff that OTL was imported from the US because of its closer distance.  Similarly with trying to cut consumption things could be done.  Britain had new steel works under construction and TTL the allies don't need to produce weapons to equip the US forces that came to Europe.  The big issues would probably be food and oil.

The Entente very well could try to destroy their economies via hyper-inflation, but the issue is that the U.S. did not and would not accept purchases in their own currencies anyway; all loans were secured via collateral, either in the form of Gold or American-based securities. As the Joint Report of the British Government said, there was no alternatives to the United States from which purchasing could be done:

The interdepartmental committee made a shocking discovery. The chairman, Lord Eustace Percy of the Foreign Office, reported, ". .. it developed at once at the conference that there was really nothing to deliberate about because our dependence was so vital and complete in every respect that it was folly even to consider reprisals." The committee had found that in food, raw materials, and particularly steel, "American supplies are so necessary to us that reprisals, while they would produce tremendous distress in America, would also practically stop the war." Even worse, in order to finance the war orders, the Treasury had to "find something over ?2,000,000 sterling a day in New York." By March 1917, British reserves of gold and securities would be gone. "Now, in these circumstances," wrote Percy, "our job is not merely to maintain decently friendly relations with the United States, but to keep sentiment in America so sweet that it will lend us practically unlimited money." No record was kept of the discussion that produced those conclusions, but it is not hard to guess what happened at the meeting. The Treasury representative to the committee was Keynes, and Percy's comments on finance recapitulated views that Keynes had often expressed. Not only was Keynes the best in-formed person about the American situation on the committee, but throughout his adult life the economist's quick mind and ready turn of phrase made him excel in swaying small groups of experts. The interdepartmental committee, it would seem, furnished an ideal forum for the Treasury's brilliant Cassandra.'4

At the end of October 1916, the Foreign Office circulated three sets of documents from the committee to the Cabinet. These included a resolution against reprisals, a memorandum by Percy urging conciliation toward the United States, and papers on British dependence by different departments. The most incisive arguments came in the Treasury paper prepared by Keynes. Dwindling stocks of gold and securities could meet less and less of the financial requirements, he noted. More and more money would therefore have to come from loans. But loans carried great dangers. "A statement," Keynes warned, "from the United States executive deprecating or disapproving of such loans would render their flotation in sufficient volume a practical impossibility." Even official approval, he further warned, might not be enough. "The sums which this country will require to borrow in the United States of America in the next six to nine months are so enormous, amounting to several times the national debt of that country, that it will be necessary to appeal to every class and section of the investing public." Keynes's conclusion was chilling: "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that In a few months time the American executive and the American public will be in a position to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more dearly than them.""5​

One other factor here is a pull one for the US.  Their companies are making a lot of money from the war, both in supplying allied countries and also in having easier markets while the Europeans are pre-occupied by war.  There's going to be a lot of losers if the US government decides to cut of trade with the allies rather than allow loans.

We don't have to speculate on this point because in November of 1916, Wilson cut off the possibility of unsecured loans via the Federal Reserve. The Deluge by Adam Tooze, Pages 51-55:

Throughout October 1916 the banking house J. P. Morgan was in urgent discussions with the British and the French over the future of Allied finance. For their next season of campaigning, the Entente proposed to raise at least 1.5 billion dollars. Realizing the enormity of these sums, J. P. Morgan sought reassurance both from the Federal Reserve Board and from Wilson himself. None was forthcoming.3 As Election Day on 7 November approached, Wilson began drafting a public statement to be delivered by the governor of the Federal Reserve Board warning the American public against committing any more of their savings to Entente loans.4 On 27 November 1916, four days before J. P. Morgan planned to launch the Anglo-French bond issue, the Federal Reserve Board issued instructions to all member banks. In the interest of the stability of the American financial system, the Fed announced that it no longer considered it desirable for American investors to increase their holdings of British and French securities.

As Wall Street plunged and sterling was offloaded by speculators, J. P. Morgan and the UK Treasury were forced into emergency purchasing of sterling to prop up the British currency. 5 At the same time the British government was forced to suspend support of French purchasing.6 The Entente's entire financing effort was in jeopardy. In Russia in the autumn of 1916 there was mounting resentment at the demand by Britain and France that it should ship its gold reserves to London to secure Allied borrowing. Without American assistance it was not just the patience of the financial markets but the Entente itself that would be put at risk.7 As the year ended, the war committee of the British cabinet concluded grimly that the only possible interpretation was that Wilson meant to force their hand and put an end to the war in a matter of weeks. And this ominous interpretation was reinforced when London received confirmation from its ambassador in Washington that it was indeed the President himself who had insisted on the strong wording of the Fed's note.​

Its not going to be easy but governments in a total war, especially with the survival of their nations at stake, not to mention the sunken costs fallacy probably at play can do a hell of a lot to keep fighting and despite the increasing collapse of the Russian state in the east the CPs are also in a dire way.  I would still expect the allies to win through although it might means more losses all round.

"Our financial agents tell us in effect that, by the use of every available device, and possibly at the cost of postponing payments by bank overdrafts, we shall still be solvent on 31st March [1917]. They cannot tell us how this result is to be achieved, but they hope and believe it will be possible."

This is the British Treasury saying every means they have is only enough to get them to April, with nothing left past that. Too Proud To Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality by Patrick Devlin, from which this is quoted, also includes the following on the state of the French:

"France had in October [1916] completely exhausted her gold and dollar resources, and in order to finance her American expenditures for the next six months needed at least £40,000,000 [about $200 million at 1916 exchange rates] from the British Treasury in addition to the sums already promised."

Further, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page by Burton J. Hendrick puts it succinctly:

"It should always be remembered, however, that Great Britain was financing not only herself, but her Allies, and that the difficult condition in which she now found herself was caused by the not too considerate demands of the nations with which she was allied in the war. Thus by April 6, 1917, Great Britain had overdrawn her account with JP Morgan to the extent of $400,000,000 and had no cash available with which to meet this overdraft. This obligation had been incurred in the purchase of supplies, both for Great Britain and for the Allied governments; and securities, largely British-owned stocks and bonds, had been deposited to protect the bankers. The money was now coming due; if the obligations were not met, the credit of Great Britain in this country would reach the vanishing point. Though at first there was a slight misunderstanding about this matter, the American government finally paid this overdraft out of the proceeds of the First Liberty Loan. This act saved the credit of the Allied countries. The first danger that threatened, the isolation and starvation of Great Britain, was therefore overcome."

Finally, what of the French situation with regards to oil?

"On 11 December Bérenger reported that France was dependent on its Allies for supplies and transport of oil. Three days later Clemenceau attended a meeting of the Comité Général du Pétrole. The immediate need was for tanker tonnage to bring oil to France; the next day Clemenceau issued a plea to President Wilson for extra tanker tonnage. There was a risk that a 'shortage of gasoline would cause the sudden paralysis of our armies and drive us all into an unacceptable peace.' French stocks of gasoline were currently 28,000 tons, compared with a target minimum of 44,000 and consumption of 30,000 tons per month. Wilson must get the US oil companies to allocate an additional 100,000 tons of tankers to France. These could come from the Pacific and from new construction. Clemenceau's final lines to Wilson were: "There is for the Allies a question of public salvation. If they are determined not to lose the war, the fighting French must, by the hour of supreme Germanic blow, have large supplies of gasoline which is, in the battle of tomorrow, as necessary as blood."

[stevep]

   Then as I say the US economy is going to take a hit as it cuts itself off from a lot of markets. 

  Yes a lot of the existing establishment, which was deeply set in their way and probably unwilling to consider drastic changes.  However how many cases can you state of nations, let alone coalitions which, have suffered total economic collapse when facing a war for their independence as states while still controlling the vast bulk of their territories and resources?  The suggestion that the US deciding not to trade with the EPs will mean their automatic collapse I find difficult to accept.  They still have massive economic resources and while their capacity to wage full scale war will be impacted but I can't see it collapsing totally.  Nor even enough that the Germans will get the crushing victory they desire.  The allies are still in a much better condition than the Germans by this period.  They are going to face a lot of economic issues but I see no basis for a total collapse as you seem to be suggesting.

[ewellholmes]

Aug 8, 2024 18:46:44 GMT stevep said:

   Then as I say the US economy is going to take a hit as it cuts itself off from a lot of markets. 

Historically the U.S. had a downturn after World War I anyway between 1920-1921, so no real change in broad strokes IF that does happen. I'm sincerely doubtful it will, however, because the bubble that formed in the American economy was mostly a function of 1917-1919, when the U.S. undertook it's own efforts and funded that of its Allies. In other words, the bubble is much smaller so it popping will also be much less painful than historical. I could argue on this further, but it's kinda besides the purpose of this thread.

Yes a lot of the existing establishment, which was deeply set in their way and probably unwilling to consider drastic changes.

There was no drastic changes possible to make up for the fact the United States of America in the 1910s produced 70% of Global Oil production domestically and controlled another 10% via its companies in Mexico. You could replace the existing ruling classes in the UK and France with whomever you want, but they could not make oil appear to replace that of the United States, hence why the French said access to that would decide whether the French Army collapsed or not.

However how many cases can you state of nations, let alone coalitions which, have suffered total economic collapse when facing a war for their independence as states while still controlling the vast bulk of their territories and resources.

This has happened numerous times in history, most famously when Russia pulled out of the Seven Years War in the 1700s which allowed Prussia to survive and eek out a victory of sorts despite being mostly occupied by that point.

The suggestion that the US deciding not to trade with the EPs will mean their automatic collapse I find difficult to accept. They still have massive economic resources and while their capacity to wage full scale war will be impacted but I can't see it collapsing totally.  Nor even enough that the Germans will get the crushing victory they desire.  The allies are still in a much better condition than the Germans by this period.  They are going to face a lot of economic issues but I see no basis for a total collapse as you seem to be suggesting.

You don't have to take my word for it because the British and French Governments directly said they would collapse and the Germans would achieve decisive results in the case of the French. France had run out of gold and collateral to finance its war effort by August of 1916 and Britain was running out of its means by the Spring of 1917 according to its own internal analysis; Germany and its allies, as we know historically, made it into October-November of 1918, a year and half longer than the Entente would've been able to via American support.

If one side is able to show up and the other isn't, for over a year, that's a decisive victory by default for the former.

[stevep]

Aug 9, 2024 5:09:40 GMT ewellholmes said:

Aug 8, 2024 18:46:44 GMT stevep said:

   Then as I say the US economy is going to take a hit as it cuts itself off from a lot of markets. 

Historically the U.S. had a downturn after World War I anyway between 1920-1921, so no real change in broad strokes IF that does happen. I'm sincerely doubtful it will, however, because the bubble that formed in the American economy was mostly a function of 1917-1919, when the U.S. undertook it's own efforts and funded that of its Allies. In other words, the bubble is much smaller so it popping will also be much less painful than historical. I could argue on this further, but it's kinda besides the purpose of this thread.

Yes a lot of the existing establishment, which was deeply set in their way and probably unwilling to consider drastic changes.

There was no drastic changes possible to make up for the fact the United States of America in the 1910s produced 70% of Global Oil production domestically and controlled another 10% via its companies in Mexico. You could replace the existing ruling classes in the UK and France with whomever you want, but they could not make oil appear to replace that of the United States, hence why the French said access to that would decide whether the French Army collapsed or not.

However how many cases can you state of nations, let alone coalitions which, have suffered total economic collapse when facing a war for their independence as states while still controlling the vast bulk of their territories and resources.

This has happened numerous times in history, most famously when Russia pulled out of the Seven Years War in the 1700s which allowed Prussia to survive and eek out a victory of sorts despite being mostly occupied by that point.

The suggestion that the US deciding not to trade with the EPs will mean their automatic collapse I find difficult to accept. They still have massive economic resources and while their capacity to wage full scale war will be impacted but I can't see it collapsing totally.  Nor even enough that the Germans will get the crushing victory they desire.  The allies are still in a much better condition than the Germans by this period.  They are going to face a lot of economic issues but I see no basis for a total collapse as you seem to be suggesting.

You don't have to take my word for it because the British and French Governments directly said they would collapse and the Germans would achieve decisive results in the case of the French. France had run out of gold and collateral to finance its war effort by August of 1916 and Britain was running out of its means by the Spring of 1917 according to its own internal analysis; Germany and its allies, as we know historically, made it into October-November of 1918, a year and half longer than the Entente would've been able to via American support.

If one side is able to show up and the other isn't, for over a year, that's a decisive victory by default for the former.

  That's not at all similar.  Prussia managed to survive and maintain its gains from the early war of the Austrian Succession but was seriously strained, hence a more cautious Frederick in his later years.  It didn't end with Prussian troops marching in victory through the streets of Paris or Vienna.

  On the oil issue one of the few things Churchill got right in his early career was supporting the establishment of a British concession in Iran, which was specifically targeted at providing a secure source for the RN as it transited to oil fueling.  Get a decent convoy system in the Med and/or a successful barrage in the Strait of Otranto and the Med is pretty secure for movement to France and then via convoy to Britain.  You might have to reduce sailing by the oil fueled elements of the fleet but how knowledgeable will the Germans be about the level of that and when the fleet will have restricted sailing would mean taking a hell of a risk for any raids on British coastal ports.  In comparison the CPs have far less access to world oil supplies.

  All powers, possibly most of all Britain had made considerable changes in their society to meet the demands of the war.  Britain had greatly expanded its heavy industry base after decades of decay along with building up a chemical industry from scratch and massively expanding their munitions capacity.  Your not going to see the entire entente's military vaporizing just because the US has decided to ban trade with them.  As you yourself said the US will see a significant market loss as they will stop selling to the EPs, which they have been sending a lot.

[ewellholmes]

Aug 9, 2024 13:41:37 GMT stevep said:

  That's not at all similar.  Prussia managed to survive and maintain its gains from the early war of the Austrian Succession but was seriously strained, hence a more cautious Frederick in his later years.  It didn't end with Prussian troops marching in victory through the streets of Paris or Vienna.

Nor was the claim that either, but rather that the withdrawal of Russia turned completely turned the situation around for Prussia. Frederick went from his armies destroyed and nation mostly occupied to effectively winning the war, despite the vast majority of Austrian and French territory never being occupied by his armies.

Given the situation in early 1917 is even better for the Germans and their allies than that which Frederick was in...

On the oil issue one of the few things Churchill got right in his early career was supporting the establishment of a British concession in Iran, which was specifically targeted at providing a secure source for the RN as it transited to oil fueling.  Get a decent convoy system in the Med and/or a successful barrage in the Strait of Otranto and the Med is pretty secure for movement to France and then via convoy to Britain.  You might have to reduce sailing by the oil fueled elements of the fleet but how knowledgeable will the Germans be about the level of that and when the fleet will have restricted sailing would mean taking a hell of a risk for any raids on British coastal ports.

Except for the fact the British were already using Persia and it was only sufficient to meet 8% of their needs.



Now you can compare it to Global Production at the time:



There is no alternative to the United States in Global oil markets at this time. As for your suggestion about the British Navy:

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord, informed the War Cabinet on 24 May that naval oil stocks amounted to less than three month's supply. Five large tankers had been sunk during the last month. The cruising of the Grand Fleet had consequently been restricted. In early June Tothill said in a memorandum that: '[t]he situation as regards oil is critical. Under present circumstances, oilers must be considered the most valuable vessels afloat. They should be convoyed.' On 30 June he warned the War Cabinet that stocks of naval oil fuel had fallen because of delays in the completion of tankers, losses of tankers, greater activity by oil burning vessels and an increase in the number of warships burning oil. Further supplies of oil had been requested from the USA, but had not yet been received. Long was in contact with Lord Northcliffe, Head of the British War Mission to the USA, over this issue. In Britain the construction and repair of tankers had been speeded up. The speed of oil-burning warships had been restricted, 'except in the gravest emergency and except in the Southern part of the North Sea.' Fleet movements were to be as restricted as much as possible. Tankers were to be convoyed both on route to and from Britain and on coastal passage and to be escorted in the submarine area. The number of tankers with the Fleet was to be reduced to the minimum possible number. Oil fuel was being imported from America in the double bottoms of cargo ships. Home production was being increased; this could have only a small impact in the immediate future.

In comparison the CPs have far less access to world oil supplies.

Actually they have access to Romania and Galicia as shown in the above charts, which together produced more than the British Empire and Persia combined in 1918.

All powers, possibly most of all Britain had made considerable changes in their society to meet the demands of the war.  Britain had greatly expanded its heavy industry base after decades of decay along with building up a chemical industry from scratch and massively expanding their munitions capacity.  Your not going to see the entire entente's military vaporizing just because the US has decided to ban trade with them. 

Indeed, the British did all of that because of their access to the American market, which provided the funding and raw materials to make that expansion possible. Without said access, as the joint report of every department of the British Government said in their own words, their war effort would indeed collapse. The French, as I have shown, also said exactly the same given their dependence on the United States was just as strong as that of Britain.

As you yourself said the US will see a significant market loss as they will stop selling to the EPs, which they have been sending a lot.

Actually I did not say that all, and specifically outlined why I think it would not be that big of a hit. What I did say was that if it happened, it would be a short affair just as it was historically and thus no real change for the United States. I'm rather unconvinced the U.S. would experience anything more than a shallow recession in fact and that is debatable given domestic demand would be strong here and thus provide an off ramp for U.S. commodities to exit the boom.

[stevep]

Aug 10, 2024 8:00:16 GMT ewellholmes said:

Aug 9, 2024 13:41:37 GMT stevep said:

  That's not at all similar.  Prussia managed to survive and maintain its gains from the early war of the Austrian Succession but was seriously strained, hence a more cautious Frederick in his later years.  It didn't end with Prussian troops marching in victory through the streets of Paris or Vienna.

Nor was the claim that either, but rather that the withdrawal of Russia turned completely turned the situation around for Prussia. Frederick went from his armies destroyed and nation mostly occupied to effectively winning the war, despite the vast majority of Austrian and French territory never being occupied by his armies.

Given the situation in early 1917 is even better for the Germans and their allies than that which Frederick was in...

On the oil issue one of the few things Churchill got right in his early career was supporting the establishment of a British concession in Iran, which was specifically targeted at providing a secure source for the RN as it transited to oil fueling.  Get a decent convoy system in the Med and/or a successful barrage in the Strait of Otranto and the Med is pretty secure for movement to France and then via convoy to Britain.  You might have to reduce sailing by the oil fueled elements of the fleet but how knowledgeable will the Germans be about the level of that and when the fleet will have restricted sailing would mean taking a hell of a risk for any raids on British coastal ports.

Except for the fact the British were already using Persia and it was only sufficient to meet 8% of their needs.



Now you can compare it to Global Production at the time:



There is no alternative to the United States in Global oil markets at this time. As for your suggestion about the British Navy:

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord, informed the War Cabinet on 24 May that naval oil stocks amounted to less than three month's supply. Five large tankers had been sunk during the last month. The cruising of the Grand Fleet had consequently been restricted. In early June Tothill said in a memorandum that: '[t]he situation as regards oil is critical. Under present circumstances, oilers must be considered the most valuable vessels afloat. They should be convoyed.' On 30 June he warned the War Cabinet that stocks of naval oil fuel had fallen because of delays in the completion of tankers, losses of tankers, greater activity by oil burning vessels and an increase in the number of warships burning oil. Further supplies of oil had been requested from the USA, but had not yet been received. Long was in contact with Lord Northcliffe, Head of the British War Mission to the USA, over this issue. In Britain the construction and repair of tankers had been speeded up. The speed of oil-burning warships had been restricted, 'except in the gravest emergency and except in the Southern part of the North Sea.' Fleet movements were to be as restricted as much as possible. Tankers were to be convoyed both on route to and from Britain and on coastal passage and to be escorted in the submarine area. The number of tankers with the Fleet was to be reduced to the minimum possible number. Oil fuel was being imported from America in the double bottoms of cargo ships. Home production was being increased; this could have only a small impact in the immediate future.

In comparison the CPs have far less access to world oil supplies.

Actually they have access to Romania and Galicia as shown in the above charts, which together produced more than the British Empire and Persia combined in 1918.

All powers, possibly most of all Britain had made considerable changes in their society to meet the demands of the war.  Britain had greatly expanded its heavy industry base after decades of decay along with building up a chemical industry from scratch and massively expanding their munitions capacity.  Your not going to see the entire entente's military vaporizing just because the US has decided to ban trade with them. 

Indeed, the British did all of that because of their access to the American market, which provided the funding and raw materials to make that expansion possible. Without said access, as the joint report of every department of the British Government said in their own words, their war effort would indeed collapse. The French, as I have shown, also said exactly the same given their dependence on the United States was just as strong as that of Britain.

As you yourself said the US will see a significant market loss as they will stop selling to the EPs, which they have been sending a lot.

Actually I did not say that all, and specifically outlined why I think it would not be that big of a hit. What I did say was that if it happened, it would be a short affair just as it was historically and thus no real change for the United States. I'm rather unconvinced the U.S. would experience anything more than a shallow recession in fact and that is debatable given domestic demand would be strong here and thus provide an off ramp for U.S. commodities to exit the boom.

a)  Ah I thought it was a weird statement for you to make.  Note however that Prussia was in peril because its territories were being overrun by three great powers.  Reductions in British subsidies made this worse but the issue was material.  Britain and France have powerful armies in place with untouched moral and are producing the vast majority of their own equipment and munitions.  Their moral is still strong and the French especially realised the costs of defeat.  Similarly Prussia didn't win so much as simply survive.

b)  Yes the vast majority of the oil came from the US.  In part because it was the world's greatest producer and also because it was the most convenient supplier, just across the Atlantic.  As pointed out in your last post after losing 5 tanker they started convoying them. It also states that Italy was less reliant because it was more convenient to supply it from British controlled oil fields.  In the following discussion I have rounded to the nearest 0.1M tons for simplicity.

  In 1918 allied demand totals some 9.1M tons.  In that period areas under British control total India [actually Burma], the rest of the empire and Persia total 1.1M + 0.9M + 1.1M coming to 3.1M whereas occupied Romania and Galicia come to 1.2M and 0.7M = 1.9M.  As such allied controlled oil exceeds that to the CPs even assuming that all Romanian oil goes to the CPs.  Plus while Romania had recovered from the initial German invasion and occupation in 1916-17, note that in 1917 it only produced 57,000 tons according to some sources British intelligence operations had managed to drastically cripple shipment up the Danube, which was how it was moved.

  In late 1916 which is when the current situation at the PoD Galician production is marginally higher than in 1916 giving a CP total of 2.1M tons.  Again this assumes of course that all Romanian oil is being supplied to Germany which was the case while under occupation but is not necessarily the case in 1916.  I don't know what the total allied consumption in 1916 was but assume it was lower than in 1918 since with the US as a belligerent and the U boats defeated there is less restrictions on importing from them.  Also would the allied consumption include some going to the US or at least used by US forces being shipped to Europe and training/fighting there, US fleet operating with the RN and the like.

  Its noted that allied production from its own controlled sources went up from 2.4M to 3.1M tons between 1916-1918 despite oil from the US continuing to be available.  That could be because of the political costs of US imports or because U boats made this more costly than allied controlled sources or some other factors but suggests that if the US ended trade then some efforts could be made.  Ditto possibly with other suppliers. 

  The allies would have to make cut backs in use which would require a less active fleet, especially if priority was given to destroyers on convoy duty and probably a somewhat small air force but the latter is still likely to considerably exceed the size of the German air force.  The coal fleet could maintain the fleet in being while the oil fueled ships could have a reserve for if the HSF ever came out in strength.

  Its not going to be easy but I see no basis that reductions in oil would cause a total allied collapse.  Even assuming that other things go as badly as in 1917, especially with the Russian collapse.

  We could agree to differ here as we could be flogging the proverbial deceased equine.

[Max Sinister]

ewellholmes, just two things:

1. Why pointing at the North Sea where Britain and Germany might have been equals, if in the rest of the oceans, the Allies reign pretty supreme?

2. Your facts are hard it seems, but the quotes of famous people... they might have exaggerated a bit.

As for a suggestion: Couldn't the Brits and French sell some colonies in the Americas and the Pacific to the US to pay?