What if no German Unrestricted Sub Warfare, Zimmerman Note intercept, US DoW on Germany in 1917?

[stevep]

Aug 11, 2024 13:11:06 GMT Max Sinister said:

ewellholmes , just two things:

1. Why pointing at the North Sea where Britain and Germany might have been equals, if in the rest of the oceans, the Allies reign pretty supreme?

2. Your facts are hard it seems, but the quotes of famous people... they might have exaggerated a bit.

As for a suggestion: Couldn't the Brits and French sell some colonies in the Americas and the Pacific to the US to pay?

  Agree with your points but on the last one I would say unlikely.  The US had had an interest in overseas expansion at the start of the century but there was always an isolationist element in the US and that was a good chunk of Wilson's appeal.  I can't see him being interested in any such possession unless they were strategically valuable to the US and then he would probably want them at bargain basement prices so its unlikely to be an option for any significant further trade.

[ewellholmes]

Aug 11, 2024 13:11:06 GMT Max Sinister said:

ewellholmes , just two things:

1. Why pointing at the North Sea where Britain and Germany might have been equals, if in the rest of the oceans, the Allies reign pretty supreme?

Because the War would be decided in that sector. If the High Seas Fleet becomes supreme in that region, they can cut the LOCs to France, collapsing the French and the BEF. It also enables them to better strangle British commerce.

2. Your facts are hard it seems, but the quotes of famous people... they might have exaggerated a bit.

Which in particular? The British are drawn mostly from the joint report of the War Government, which was not released to the public and used to plan war planning going forward.

As for a suggestion: Couldn't the Brits and French sell some colonies in the Americas and the Pacific to the US to pay?

This was floated, but there was no American interest. 1910s America didn't have much interest in overwhelming Black territories like Jamaica or the Bahamas for racial reasons, as well as the fact they were money pits rather than makers like they had been centuries earlier during the Sugar trade.

[ewellholmes]

Aug 10, 2024 13:52:41 GMT stevep said:

a)  Ah I thought it was a weird statement for you to make.  Note however that Prussia was in peril because its territories were being overrun by three great powers.  Reductions in British subsidies made this worse but the issue was material.  Britain and France have powerful armies in place with untouched moral and are producing the vast majority of their own equipment and munitions.  Their moral is still strong and the French especially realised the costs of defeat.  Similarly Prussia didn't win so much as simply survive.

The French Army famously mutinied in the Spring of 1917, and part of the solution to that state of affairs was the French limiting offensives until the AEF would arrive, something that would never come here. Indeed, the mere idea that the Americans were coming, with huge numbers of fresh divisions, was a major morale boost for all of the Entente and played a role in the new Russian government also deciding to carry on, in addition to the prospect of American financial aid to sustain the war effort. So, I do not agree with the idea they have untouched morale.

As for their production, it was actually dependent on the Americans. Specifically for the British in 1917, 33% of all shell cases and 29% of all aero-engines were actually imports from the Americans. Much of the rest of French and British production was dependent on American raw materials, especially iron ore or completed steel. Likewise, what kept the workers for those steel mills and other war plants fed was American food, with Britain importing 62% of its grain from the United States in 1917.

b)  Yes the vast majority of the oil came from the US.  In part because it was the world's greatest producer and also because it was the most convenient supplier, just across the Atlantic.  As pointed out in your last post after losing 5 tanker they started convoying them. It also states that Italy was less reliant because it was more convenient to supply it from British controlled oil fields.  In the following discussion I have rounded to the nearest 0.1M tons for simplicity.

As you yourself show, however, even taking every bit of oil from the British Empire and Persia still isn't even enough to meet British demand, nevermind France, Italy, etc.

In 1918 allied demand totals some 9.1M tons.  In that period areas under British control total India [actually Burma], the rest of the empire and Persia total 1.1M + 0.9M + 1.1M coming to 3.1M whereas occupied Romania and Galicia come to 1.2M and 0.7M = 1.9M.  As such allied controlled oil exceeds that to the CPs even assuming that all Romanian oil goes to the CPs.  Plus while Romania had recovered from the initial German invasion and occupation in 1916-17, note that in 1917 it only produced 57,000 tons according to some sources British intelligence operations had managed to drastically cripple shipment up the Danube, which was how it was moved.

Fair enough, I forgot to include India in the Entente total. Specifically for the Central Powers though, they had the advantage of interior lines meaning they could use railways in a way the Entente could not, while Germany was the only one that had a large fleet to consume oil.

 

In late 1916 which is when the current situation at the PoD Galician production is marginally higher than in 1916 giving a CP total of 2.1M tons.  Again this assumes of course that all Romanian oil is being supplied to Germany which was the case while under occupation but is not necessarily the case in 1916.  I don't know what the total allied consumption in 1916 was but assume it was lower than in 1918 since with the US as a belligerent and the U boats defeated there is less restrictions on importing from them.  Also would the allied consumption include some going to the US or at least used by US forces being shipped to Europe and training/fighting there, US fleet operating with the RN and the like.

The Turkish Straits were blocked in 1916, while Bulgaria had entered the war the Austro-Hungarians had overrun Serbia; Rumania had lost its ability to supply the Anglo-French in 1914. The U.S. supplied its own forces and mostly sent coal powered battleships to Britain until late 1918, due to fuel shortages in the UK.

  Its noted that allied production from its own controlled sources went up from 2.4M to 3.1M tons between 1916-1918 despite oil from the US continuing to be available.  That could be because of the political costs of US imports or because U boats made this more costly than allied controlled sources or some other factors but suggests that if the US ended trade then some efforts could be made.  Ditto possibly with other suppliers. 

It was actually a reflection of increased consumption on the part of the Entente, rather than replacement. Earlier I linked a chart which shows foreign purchases of oil increased from 95% of British purchasing in 1917 to 97% in 1918.

  The allies would have to make cut backs in use which would require a less active fleet, especially if priority was given to destroyers on convoy duty and probably a somewhat small air force but the latter is still likely to considerably exceed the size of the German air force.  The coal fleet could maintain the fleet in being while the oil fueled ships could have a reserve for if the HSF ever came out in strength.

The German air force was large and actually had managed to achieve air control over the Channel in 1917, they just couldn't utilize it given the limitations of the technology then. As for cuts, the British had already reduced fleet movements and placed speed restrictions on oil burning vessels. If they're only responding with coal powered vessels, than the Germans have a definite advantage in both speed and quality of ships, as well as the fact there are not enough destroyers to screen both commerce as well as the Home Fleet if it sorties. U-Boats would tear them up before the High Seas Fleet engages them.

  Its not going to be easy but I see no basis that reductions in oil would cause a total allied collapse.  Even assuming that other things go as badly as in 1917, especially with the Russian collapse.

  We could agree to differ here as we could be flogging the proverbial deceased equine.

The problem is it's not just oil, but also virtually all raw materials of note. American food supplies is what prevented Britain, France and Italy from collapsing into starvation in 1917-1918, American ores kept their factories running and American finance kept them from defaulting and their Armies in the field.

We will have to agree to disagree here, because I feel the historical record is clear on what happens in the event of American neutrality in the Great War.

[stevep]

Aug 12, 2024 16:13:51 GMT ewellholmes said:

Aug 11, 2024 13:11:06 GMT Max Sinister said:

ewellholmes , just two things:

1. Why pointing at the North Sea where Britain and Germany might have been equals, if in the rest of the oceans, the Allies reign pretty supreme?

Because the War would be decided in that sector. If the High Seas Fleet becomes supreme in that region, they can cut the LOCs to France, collapsing the French and the BEF. It also enables them to better strangle British commerce.

2. Your facts are hard it seems, but the quotes of famous people... they might have exaggerated a bit.

Which in particular? The British are drawn mostly from the joint report of the War Government, which was not released to the public and used to plan war planning going forward.

As for a suggestion: Couldn't the Brits and French sell some colonies in the Americas and the Pacific to the US to pay?

This was floated, but there was no American interest. 1910s America didn't have much interest in overwhelming Black territories like Jamaica or the Bahamas for racial reasons, as well as the fact they were money pits rather than makers like they had been centuries earlier during the Sugar trade.

  The channel wasn't the North Sea.  The Germans are going to be taken a real risk trying to send surface forces into the former.  They would have to pass from German ports, past the Netherlands then into the Dover straits with guns on both sides and minefields then to where the transport routes are.  Followed by having to get all the way back to Germany, which for any ships damaged or low on fuel would be a serious problem.  Given the distances involved and the fact that Britain was tracking German radio signals there's a very good chance that the convoys will be suspended briefly so the Germans cause a mild disruption in return for marked, possibly heavy losses.

[stevep]

  ewellholmes ,

   Food I would admit is a different matter.  I was replying to the question of oil because that's what you decided to mention.  In terms of other material issues the allied superiority in materials, few of which came from the US, was large enough that their still going to outmatch the CP's despite Germany over-militarizing so much that they were devouring their own economy.  Plus in TTL their not going to have to supply large amounts of equipment and supplies to the USEF.

  The French mutinies/strikes were against badly planned and reckless attacks and the way the French forces had been treated.  Many had had no leave since the war begin for instance.  Petain managed to get a lot of those issues resolved and while some actions were actual mutinies most were actually more strikes with the willingness to still fight to defend France against Germany but not to take part in such attacks. 

  A lot will depend on how all the players react to the differing circumstances with Germany not going to USW again, presumably avoiding its other errors as well - i.e. the Zimmerman telegram, the sabotage operations against US industry, the operations against shipping in US coastal waters etc.  Then the US not joining the war and deciding to ban trade with the allied powers.

  Anyway as I said I can't see us agreeing on the full results of those changes.

  Steve

[ewellholmes]

Aug 12, 2024 21:41:52 GMT stevep said:

  The channel wasn't the North Sea.  The Germans are going to be taken a real risk trying to send surface forces into the former.  They would have to pass from German ports, past the Netherlands then into the Dover straits with guns on both sides and minefields then to where the transport routes are.  Followed by having to get all the way back to Germany, which for any ships damaged or low on fuel would be a serious problem.  Given the distances involved and the fact that Britain was tracking German radio signals there's a very good chance that the convoys will be suspended briefly so the Germans cause a mild disruption in return for marked, possibly heavy losses.

This exact scenario was a nightmare for the Anglo-French in 1916-1918, and comes up in their planning a lot. From Page 139-141 of The German Offensives of 1918, by David T. Zabecki:

After 1916 submarines, mines, coastal artillery, and naval aviation were the German Navy's only effective weapons in the West. Had these assets been directed against the BEF's lines of communications (LOCs) in the Channel in coordination with a focused attack ground attack against the BEF's rail network, the British might well have been forced to withdraw from the Continent. The German submarine threat against their sea LOCs was a constant concern to the British, and one of the objectives behind the bloody battle of Passchendaele was to clear the Channel coast of the U-boat bases.​
​
German mines in the Channel could have been delivered by air or by submarine. The Navy's Freidreichshafen bomber was capable of carrying and dropping 750-kilogram naval mines. One such mine, in fact, sank a Russian destroyer during the Baltic Islands operation. Submarines were the other way to lay mines, with the UC-class boats specifically designed as minelayers. Most of the UC-boats carried 18 mines. The U-class boats were fleet submarines that fired torpedoes; but in 1918 the Germans launched ten of the Project 45 fleet U-boats that could lay 42 mines through their torpedo tubes and carry an additional 32 mines in deck containers.​
​
By the start of 1918, the Germans had 42 operational fleet U-boats; 66 operational coastal U-boats (UB-class); and 33 operational UC-class minelayers. During 1918 they built an additional 25 U-class (including the Project 45 boats); 47 UB-class; and 16 UC-class. The British, of course, had the Channel heavily mined, which increased the hazards of any U-boat operations. Mines caused 27 percent of the total German U-boat losses. Of the total of 53 UC type U-boats the Germans lost during the war, 19 were lost to mines. The Germans, nonetheless, had a capability to lay mines in the Channel and at least disrupt that leg of the BEF's LOCs. On 14 February 1918, the German Navy did launch one major and largely successful surface raid against British defenses between Dover and Calais. The Heinecke Torpedo Boat Flotilla sunk 28 British picket ships and other vessels, including an older cruiser. That raid, however, was never followed up. Nor had it been coordinated with OHL, rather it had been launched at the request of the Naval Corps in Flanders. Even after the failure of Operation MICHAEL in March 1918, General Ferdinand Foch still thought that increased submarine operations in the Channel posed a serious threat to cutting off the BEF. ​
​
Finally, German naval artillery could have been turned against the BEF's channel ports. The three so-called Paris Guns (Wilhelmgeschütze) were actually manned by naval crews. With a maximum range of 127 kilometers, they had the reach to hit the BEF's three primary northern Channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk) and even Dover, if the guns had been positioned in the Fourth Army sector. But between 16 and 30 March 1918, during 140 Operation MICHAEL, they did not fire in support of the attacking Seventeenth, Second, or Eighteenth Armies. Rather, the guns were positioned in the Seventh Army sector, delivering pointless terrorizing fire against Paris.​
​
At least two German coastal batteries in Flanders were capable of hitting Dunkirk and could have fired in support of ground forces during Operation GEORGETTE. But Batterie Deutschland (four 3 80mm guns) never fired against land targets, and Batterie Pommern (one 380mm gun) delivered only occasional fire against Dunkirk and the major British base at Poperinghe. A third battery, Batterie Tirpitz (four 280mm guns), had the range to hit targets in the northern quarter of the Ypres Salient, but it too never fired in support of ground operations.​

Zabecki alludes that this could work in 1916 too. To quote from Pages 147-148:

The BEF was far less fortunate with the rail network in its sector. The British position in Flanders had no depth at all. North of the Somme, the British front lines averaged only about 90 kilometers from the coast. Rail was the BEF's primary means of moving supplies and troops from the ports. The rail network was adequate at best, with most of the lines running east-west. By 1916, the British had to operate 250 trains per day to keep the supplies moving along an overstrained rail system. The entire British transportation system was on the verge of collapse until Sir Eric Geddes was brought in to reorganize it at the end of 1916. In April 1918, during the last phases of Operation MICHAEL and during Operation GEORGETTE, the British ran 725 ammunition trains to their front. "​

[nomommsen]

Aug 11, 2024 13:11:06 GMT Max Sinister said:

ewellholmes , just two things:

...

As for a suggestion: Couldn't the Brits and French sell some colonies in the Americas and the Pacific to the US to pay?

... one of the more often 'offered' proposals for the Entente to pay for their stuff aside the free ride on open bill as IOTL.

Some further points speaking against it:

    - would congress approve such aquisitions offhand so easily?

It's not the presidents only bzuisness to make such 'deals'.

And as sooo of ten everywhere again and again stated:

    - colonies are bad buisness and only moneysinks instead of profit-makers

  As colonies are most of the time 'valued' regarding pay-off the 'sellers' should pay some bonus for the take over to the buyer ...

... at least that's what's always said when discussing german colonies ..

[stevep]

Aug 14, 2024 5:19:46 GMT ewellholmes said:

Aug 12, 2024 21:41:52 GMT stevep said:

  The channel wasn't the North Sea.  The Germans are going to be taken a real risk trying to send surface forces into the former.  They would have to pass from German ports, past the Netherlands then into the Dover straits with guns on both sides and minefields then to where the transport routes are.  Followed by having to get all the way back to Germany, which for any ships damaged or low on fuel would be a serious problem.  Given the distances involved and the fact that Britain was tracking German radio signals there's a very good chance that the convoys will be suspended briefly so the Germans cause a mild disruption in return for marked, possibly heavy losses.

This exact scenario was a nightmare for the Anglo-French in 1916-1918, and comes up in their planning a lot. From Page 139-141 of The German Offensives of 1918, by David T. Zabecki:

After 1916 submarines, mines, coastal artillery, and naval aviation were the German Navy's only effective weapons in the West. Had these assets been directed against the BEF's lines of communications (LOCs) in the Channel in coordination with a focused attack ground attack against the BEF's rail network, the British might well have been forced to withdraw from the Continent. The German submarine threat against their sea LOCs was a constant concern to the British, and one of the objectives behind the bloody battle of Passchendaele was to clear the Channel coast of the U-boat bases.​
​
German mines in the Channel could have been delivered by air or by submarine. The Navy's Freidreichshafen bomber was capable of carrying and dropping 750-kilogram naval mines. One such mine, in fact, sank a Russian destroyer during the Baltic Islands operation. Submarines were the other way to lay mines, with the UC-class boats specifically designed as minelayers. Most of the UC-boats carried 18 mines. The U-class boats were fleet submarines that fired torpedoes; but in 1918 the Germans launched ten of the Project 45 fleet U-boats that could lay 42 mines through their torpedo tubes and carry an additional 32 mines in deck containers.​
​
By the start of 1918, the Germans had 42 operational fleet U-boats; 66 operational coastal U-boats (UB-class); and 33 operational UC-class minelayers. During 1918 they built an additional 25 U-class (including the Project 45 boats); 47 UB-class; and 16 UC-class. The British, of course, had the Channel heavily mined, which increased the hazards of any U-boat operations. Mines caused 27 percent of the total German U-boat losses. Of the total of 53 UC type U-boats the Germans lost during the war, 19 were lost to mines. The Germans, nonetheless, had a capability to lay mines in the Channel and at least disrupt that leg of the BEF's LOCs. On 14 February 1918, the German Navy did launch one major and largely successful surface raid against British defenses between Dover and Calais. The Heinecke Torpedo Boat Flotilla sunk 28 British picket ships and other vessels, including an older cruiser. That raid, however, was never followed up. Nor had it been coordinated with OHL, rather it had been launched at the request of the Naval Corps in Flanders. Even after the failure of Operation MICHAEL in March 1918, General Ferdinand Foch still thought that increased submarine operations in the Channel posed a serious threat to cutting off the BEF. ​
​
Finally, German naval artillery could have been turned against the BEF's channel ports. The three so-called Paris Guns (Wilhelmgeschütze) were actually manned by naval crews. With a maximum range of 127 kilometers, they had the reach to hit the BEF's three primary northern Channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk) and even Dover, if the guns had been positioned in the Fourth Army sector. But between 16 and 30 March 1918, during 140 Operation MICHAEL, they did not fire in support of the attacking Seventeenth, Second, or Eighteenth Armies. Rather, the guns were positioned in the Seventh Army sector, delivering pointless terrorizing fire against Paris.​
​
At least two German coastal batteries in Flanders were capable of hitting Dunkirk and could have fired in support of ground forces during Operation GEORGETTE. But Batterie Deutschland (four 3 80mm guns) never fired against land targets, and Batterie Pommern (one 380mm gun) delivered only occasional fire against Dunkirk and the major British base at Poperinghe. A third battery, Batterie Tirpitz (four 280mm guns), had the range to hit targets in the northern quarter of the Ypres Salient, but it too never fired in support of ground operations.​

Zabecki alludes that this could work in 1916 too. To quote from Pages 147-148:

The BEF was far less fortunate with the rail network in its sector. The British position in Flanders had no depth at all. North of the Somme, the British front lines averaged only about 90 kilometers from the coast. Rail was the BEF's primary means of moving supplies and troops from the ports. The rail network was adequate at best, with most of the lines running east-west. By 1916, the British had to operate 250 trains per day to keep the supplies moving along an overstrained rail system. The entire British transportation system was on the verge of collapse until Sir Eric Geddes was brought in to reorganize it at the end of 1916. In April 1918, during the last phases of Operation MICHAEL and during Operation GEORGETTE, the British ran 725 ammunition trains to their front. "​

  It was an obvious concern for the allies but that's why they had forces including their own big guns and minefields in place.  It would require the HSF to stick its forces into narrow enemy dominated seas with the threat of their retreat back to Germany being cut off.  Its unlikely to see significant damage to allied shipping but could well see losses for the Germans they can't easily replace.

  90km in this period, especially with a deadlocked front that moves only slowly and at great costs is quite a hinterland.  Yes a very few long ranged and inaccurate guns could bombard parts of the region but would it be worth the costs to the Germans.  Especially for attacks against the Ypres salient which could end up hitting the German positions in close proximity.  They would have to decide whether this is better than attacking the political target of Paris.  

  The rail network as stated was adequate and was to be considerably improved in its operation.

[michelvan]

sorry that I join this discussion so late.

But i have some points to add

1917 was very crucial in WW1, had thing went in different way it could change world history.

The Wilson administration and allot people in Capitol Hill wanted to join War and waiting on excuse, like sinking US Ship by Germany, what came with Zimmerman Telegram.
had be not for Zimmerman, it would the Sinking of US Ships or something else.

But there was another battle the US fought in 1917 and that could end in own US War: Mexico
During that time Mexico was in civil war and one of fraction let by Pancho Villa invaded US towns and loot them.
US start a Punitive Expedition under U.S. Army General John J. Pershing
sadly Pershing was unable to catch Pancho Villa and got more and more local hostility, and engaged in a skirmish with Carrancista forces. (President of Mexico)
This here could have escalated quickly were USA has to declare War on Mexico.
Its realistic that USA prioritise now on invasion of Mexico not on West Front of WW1 !
The USA was in that time not yet a great Military power of WW2 or Cold War. it logic that they focus on Mexico first.
what could (or not) end in Vietnam war like situation for USA in Mexico

Without US troops on West Front the french have serious problems: low man power, there moral broken, open rebellion under troops.
while the Germans made there final attack.
it could let uprise under french Troops even to Military Putsch in Paris. but does not have to.

on Spanish Flu
most scientist agree that Virus origin lies in the state of Kansas in the United States, were was first notice march 1918.
without involvement of USA in West front, but in Mexico, the H1N1 virus would ravage primarily in America.
This could delay spreading to Europe, if USA start quarantine.
what have serious outcome on west Frontline.

[stevep]

Aug 16, 2024 19:15:39 GMT michelvan said:

sorry that I join this discussion so late.

But i have some points to add

1917 was very crucial in WW1, had thing went in different way it could change world history.

The Wilson administration and allot people in Capitol Hill wanted to join War and waiting on excuse, like sinking US Ship by Germany, what came with Zimmerman Telegram.
had be not for Zimmerman, it would the Sinking of US Ships or something else.

But there was another battle the US fought in 1917 and that could end in own US War: Mexico
During that time Mexico was in civil war and one of fraction let by Pancho Villa invaded US towns and loot them.
US start a Punitive Expedition under U.S. Army General John J. Pershing
sadly Pershing was unable to catch Pancho Villa and got more and more local hostility, and engaged in a skirmish with Carrancista forces. (President of Mexico)
This here could have escalated quickly were USA has to declare War on Mexico.
Its realistic that USA prioritise now on invasion of Mexico not on West Front of WW1 !
The USA was in that time not yet a great Military power of WW2 or Cold War. it logic that they focus on Mexico first.
what could (or not) end in Vietnam war like situation for USA in Mexico

Without US troops on West Front the french have serious problems: low man power, there moral broken, open rebellion under troops.
while the Germans made there final attack.
it could let uprise under french Troops even to Military Putsch in Paris. but does not have to.

on Spanish Flu
most scientist agree that Virus origin lies in the state of Kansas in the United States, were was first notice march 1918.
without involvement of USA in West front, but in Mexico, the H1N1 virus would ravage primarily in America.
This could delay spreading to Europe, if USA start quarantine.
what have serious outcome on west Frontline.

michelvan,

  Some important points but the general view was that Wilson was very reluctant to enter WWI as a combatant.  He did just about everything to delay any activity including refusing to allow any preparation for a build up until the actual declaration of war.  Which further complicated the problems the US army had in raising the number of troops it attempted to.  It was the pressure of continued evidence that Imperial Germany couldn't be trusted not to be a threat to US interests.

  The US was a great power industrially and technology but still have a number of shortcomings in terms of organisation and lack of planning for mass moblization.  Britain had similar problems in 1914 although with a larger base army despite having to commit it immediately to heavy combat it was able to respond by maintaining the forces in operation and massively expanding them in a couple of years.

  The US, especially if the Germans are somewhat more restrained, could well get bogged down in Mexico although its unlikely to end up like Vietnam, at least in the short term.  Standards of behaviour in the US army were different and Mexico is a bordering nation so its a lot easier to send forces into it.  Would be very bad for the Mexicans and make the US even more deeply unpopular than OTL but probably not a massive drain as they would only need a much smaller army than they started deploying to France in 1917-18.

  It is an interesting point that with a lot less traffic across the Atlantic and the US concentrating on Mexico that assuming the flu outbreak still comes it could be concentrated in N America longer.  Especially if the allies had the time to realise the problem and sought to further restrict contact with the US they could avoid some of the OTL deaths.  One complication is that the pandemic came in two waves, both of which seem to have originated in the US and the 2nd more was far more deadly. 

  Steve

[nomommsen]

... actually there were already some other 'opportunities' for another mexican-american war before Pershings Pancho-Villa-Expedition invasion of another souvereign state.

    - Siege of Naco (the mexican part of the by the US-mexican border parted town)

        by 'Villistas' (or rather forces commanded by Maytorena) outside

        of 'Carrancistas' (commanded by some General Hill supported by Calles) inside

            lasting from beginning of october 1914 until beginning of February 1915

    (not without not unconsideral damage and losses of life on the US american side of the town)

    - "Plan de San Diego" First phase (very much recommended IMHO most accurate reading about)

        also called 'Bandits Wars' across the border into american territory

            but in retaliation by 'militias' or 'citizen bads' into Mexico as well

        lasting from ~ July to October 1915

        not without found 'connections' to Carrancitas-Generals

    - "Plan de San Diego" Second phase

        similar procedures as above

        parallel in time to the Pershing invasion

        even more openly supported by Carranzista-officials

It should also not been forgotten that during all this time the US Army had severer troubles getting enough troops to at least somewhat for the citizens there acceptable levels of protection.

During the Pershing-invasion they actually had to scrape the bottom of the barrel of their troop reserves, even putting some coastal artillery men on horses for patrol on the texan-mexican border.

(the several books of Heribert v.Feilitzsch about the times and persons involved into mexican affairs during WW 1 - and before might serve rich sources)

Therefore the so often offered 'easy goin' for the american superpower ... not really to be seen IMHO.

With the war opnely declared and supported by all mexican factions (there were many more than 'just' carranzistas and Villistas who without a doubt would continue zo fight each other in parallel) the Vietnam-meme for the US alreayd then but in Mexico looks very much more likely than a sweeping victory of the dough-boys.

(wiki links as always 'just' as a first stop, furtehr reading and research always recommended)

    

[nomommsen]

Aug 17, 2024 14:58:41 GMT stevep said:

...

  It is an interesting point that with a lot less traffic across the Atlantic and the US concentrating on Mexico that assuming the flu outbreak still comes it could be concentrated in N America longer.  Especially if the allies had the time to realise the problem and sought to further restrict contact with the US they could avoid some of the OTL deaths.  One complication is that the pandemic came in two waves, both of which seem to have originated in the US and the 2nd more was far more deadly. 

  Steve

As the in the US of A the then only working method of such-a-desease control : 

        isolation and quarantine

was already rather early on propagated in at least some urban region - with good results - other Cities might follow (though ... many acted at first similar as to the Corona pandemia ... tryin' to 'sit-it-out').

However, with the first wave rather being an 'american' problem the existant quarantine regulations then enactable in Europe would have been enacted during this first wave very likely at least with the advent of the second wave being much more effective enactable with much fewer persons comming across the atlantic.

[ewellholmes]

Aug 16, 2024 15:41:57 GMT stevep said:

  It was an obvious concern for the allies but that's why they had forces including their own big guns and minefields in place.  It would require the HSF to stick its forces into narrow enemy dominated seas with the threat of their retreat back to Germany being cut off.  Its unlikely to see significant damage to allied shipping but could well see losses for the Germans they can't easily replace.

Whom exactly is going to chase the HSF back to port or even somehow cut them off with the British and French fleets immobilized by fuel shortages? Such a sortie need not even sink shipping either; it's mere presence would turn shipping in of itself. The Germans achieved this off Norway in 1942 and the Japanese did much the same with their Indian Ocean raids in early 1942.

  90km in this period, especially with a deadlocked front that moves only slowly and at great costs is quite a hinterland.  Yes a very few long ranged and inaccurate guns could bombard parts of the region but would it be worth the costs to the Germans.  Especially for attacks against the Ypres salient which could end up hitting the German positions in close proximity.  They would have to decide whether this is better than attacking the political target of Paris.  

  The rail network as stated was adequate and was to be considerably improved in its operation.

The railway network as stated was inadequate in late 1916, bordering on collapse, and it required almost two years of work and reform to meaningfully improve it. I don't think the Germans really even have to touch it, just a prolonged campaign against the shipping routes and ports would do the trick.

[ewellholmes]

Aug 17, 2024 15:53:52 GMT nomommsen said:

... actually there were already some other 'opportunities' for another mexican-american war before Pershings Pancho-Villa-Expedition invasion of another souvereign state.

    - Siege of Naco (the mexican part of the by the US-mexican border parted town)

        by 'Villistas' (or rather forces commanded by Maytorena) outside

        of 'Carrancistas' (commanded by some General Hill supported by Calles) inside

            lasting from beginning of october 1914 until beginning of February 1915

    (not without not unconsideral damage and losses of life on the US american side of the town)

    - "Plan de San Diego" First phase (very much recommended IMHO most accurate reading about)

        also called 'Bandits Wars' across the border into american territory

            but in retaliation by 'militias' or 'citizen bads' into Mexico as well

        lasting from ~ July to October 1915

        not without found 'connections' to Carrancitas-Generals

    - "Plan de San Diego" Second phase

        similar procedures as above

        parallel in time to the Pershing invasion

        even more openly supported by Carranzista-officials

It should also not been forgotten that during all this time the US Army had severer troubles getting enough troops to at least somewhat for the citizens there acceptable levels of protection.

During the Pershing-invasion they actually had to scrape the bottom of the barrel of their troop reserves, even putting some coastal artillery men on horses for patrol on the texan-mexican border.

(the several books of Heribert v.Feilitzsch about the times and persons involved into mexican affairs during WW 1 - and before might serve rich sources)

Therefore the so often offered 'easy goin' for the american superpower ... not really to be seen IMHO.

With the war opnely declared and supported by all mexican factions (there were many more than 'just' carranzistas and Villistas who without a doubt would continue zo fight each other in parallel) the Vietnam-meme for the US alreayd then but in Mexico looks very much more likely than a sweeping victory of the dough-boys.

(wiki links as always 'just' as a first stop, furtehr reading and research always recommended)

    

Very good point. As late as 1919, the U.S. and Mexico nearly went to war. 

[nomommsen]

Aug 14, 2024 5:19:46 GMT ewellholmes said:

This exact scenario was a nightmare for the Anglo-French in 1916-1918, and comes up in their planning a lot. From Page 139-141 of The German Offensives of 1918, by David T. Zabecki:

After 1916 submarines, mines, coastal artillery, and naval aviation were the German Navy's only effective weapons in the West. Had these assets been directed against the BEF's lines of communications (LOCs) in the Channel in coordination with a focused attack ground attack against the BEF's rail network, the British might well have been forced to withdraw from the Continent. The German submarine threat against their sea LOCs was a constant concern to the British, and one of the objectives behind the bloody battle of Passchendaele was to clear the Channel coast of the U-boat bases.​
​
German mines in the Channel could have been delivered by air or by submarine. The Navy's Freidreichshafen bomber was capable of carrying and dropping 750-kilogram naval mines. One such mine, in fact, sank a Russian destroyer during the Baltic Islands operation. Submarines were the other way to lay mines, with the UC-class boats specifically designed as minelayers. Most of the UC-boats carried 18 mines. The U-class boats were fleet submarines that fired torpedoes; but in 1918 the Germans launched ten of the Project 45 fleet U-boats that could lay 42 mines through their torpedo tubes and carry an additional 32 mines in deck containers.​
​
By the start of 1918, the Germans had 42 operational fleet U-boats; 66 operational coastal U-boats (UB-class); and 33 operational UC-class minelayers. During 1918 they built an additional 25 U-class (including the Project 45 boats); 47 UB-class; and 16 UC-class. The British, of course, had the Channel heavily mined, which increased the hazards of any U-boat operations. Mines caused 27 percent of the total German U-boat losses. Of the total of 53 UC type U-boats the Germans lost during the war, 19 were lost to mines. The Germans, nonetheless, had a capability to lay mines in the Channel and at least disrupt that leg of the BEF's LOCs. On 14 February 1918, the German Navy did launch one major and largely successful surface raid against British defenses between Dover and Calais. The Heinecke Torpedo Boat Flotilla sunk 28 British picket ships and other vessels, including an older cruiser. That raid, however, was never followed up. Nor had it been coordinated with OHL, rather it had been launched at the request of the Naval Corps in Flanders. Even after the failure of Operation MICHAEL in March 1918, General Ferdinand Foch still thought that increased submarine operations in the Channel posed a serious threat to cutting off the BEF. ​
​
Finally, German naval artillery could have been turned against the BEF's channel ports. The three so-called Paris Guns (Wilhelmgeschütze) were actually manned by naval crews. With a maximum range of 127 kilometers, they had the reach to hit the BEF's three primary northern Channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk) and even Dover, if the guns had been positioned in the Fourth Army sector. But between 16 and 30 March 1918, during 140 Operation MICHAEL, they did not fire in support of the attacking Seventeenth, Second, or Eighteenth Armies. Rather, the guns were positioned in the Seventh Army sector, delivering pointless terrorizing fire against Paris.​
​
At least two German coastal batteries in Flanders were capable of hitting Dunkirk and could have fired in support of ground forces during Operation GEORGETTE. But Batterie Deutschland (four 3 80mm guns) never fired against land targets, and Batterie Pommern (one 380mm gun) delivered only occasional fire against Dunkirk and the major British base at Poperinghe. A third battery, Batterie Tirpitz (four 280mm guns), had the range to hit targets in the northern quarter of the Ypres Salient, but it too never fired in support of ground operations.​

Zabecki alludes that this could work in 1916 too. To quote from Pages 147-148:

The BEF was far less fortunate with the rail network in its sector. The British position in Flanders had no depth at all. North of the Somme, the British front lines averaged only about 90 kilometers from the coast. Rail was the BEF's primary means of moving supplies and troops from the ports. The rail network was adequate at best, with most of the lines running east-west. By 1916, the British had to operate 250 trains per day to keep the supplies moving along an overstrained rail system. The entire British transportation system was on the verge of collapse until Sir Eric Geddes was brought in to reorganize it at the end of 1916. In April 1918, during the last phases of Operation MICHAEL and during Operation GEORGETTE, the British ran 725 ammunition trains to their front. "​

There's a VERY FINE ATL I would highly recommend for everbody that very much exploits exactly this idea described in the citation of Zebecki.