What if no German Unrestricted Sub Warfare, Zimmerman Note intercept, US DoW on Germany in 1917?

[nomommsen]

... sry for such a 'piecemeal' approach but I'm rather struck by sickness (caught kinda 'flue' or whatever infection you've got by travelling days long in some airconditioned trains all across the country )

Sept 8, 2024 10:04:16 GMT stevep said:

Sept 8, 2024 9:34:20 GMT nomommsen said:

... who's capacity to rule were ever more detoriating from late 1916 (notably the takeover of the 3rd OHL by the 'dynamic duo' ) with the Reichstag gaining more and more of a say as well as even the trade unions in their role keeping up war time production.
Their participation now tightly written into law regarding military service exemption and the castration of the 'Gesetz über den vaterländischen Hilfsdienst' might serve as an indicator not to forget the Reichstag declarations against the 'leadersdhips' wishes.

  That is rubbish.  The parliament was increasingly bypassed by the military dictatorship that emerge from the aristocratic military elite and served only to continue and intensify the latter's ideas and interests.  The Reichstag, like people like Bethmann-Hollweg were increasingly powerless and ignored.

No need to be rude only if I argue against a/the widespread prejudice of the notorious 'silent dictatorship'.

Aside the events I pointed at to which I would like to add the development of of the negotiations at Brest-Litowsk in the end much more 'infuenced' by the Foreign Secretary v.Kühlmann than Hindy/Ludy for more background I would recommend the books of Gerald D. Feldman which describe very well the socio-economical developm,ent withing Germany with the increase of influence by the civilan side esp. the by the 'Junkers class' as so regularly as the-true-power (as a body) depicted hated trade unions. That begun already well before the dynamic duo 'took over' but in retaliation of their unsound bullying their real influence rather more dwindled in time with more influence of the 'workers class' representatives. ... regardless what only more bureaucracy causing reorganisations of command structures (i.e. the Kriegsamt) they and their tought-to-be politico-industrial specialist Max Bauer tried.

(... as always the wki-links are thought to serve as some first-stop-lookout for further research into their sources and further on from there)

Another source I rely strongly on are ~ 1700 ... ~1630 (without the intros) pages of documents of exchanges between the several administrations - domestic affairs, trade affairs, military affairs, of relasm as well as memberstate as well as i.e. provinces levels) showing how the at first almost unsurmountable seeming though very indivudually wielded powers of the military commanders were in time more and more challanged - and in time more and more successfully - by civilian adminsitrations may they've been stately or private. ... despite the takeover of the so-called silent dictatorship.
Another source are the several collections of diarys, private letters and other exchanges of people high up in the command chain (Admiral v.Müller, the generals and higher ranks like Falkenhayn, v.Lyncker, v.Plessen, 'civilians' like Baron v.Schoen, Prince Lichnowski, Bethmann-Hollweg, his secretary etc.).

And while the Interfraktioneller Ausschuss as a means of selforganisation of the Reichstag (unheard of prior) didn't achieved as much as they would have liked it lead to i.e. the "Friedensresolution" (I would like to recommend the german wiki article as the english one is IMHO rather tainted by unsupported accusations not at least 'founded' on selected/pimped citations) and increasing cooperation of the parlamentarians against wishes of the military.

It was rather the opposite as the further development since late 1917 showed: the parlamentarians gained more and more influence.
... though without a doubt far from what we of today would render 'proper parliamnetarism'.

Instead of decreasing the further development since 1917 at least showed: the parlamentarians gained more and more influence.
... though without a doubt far from what we of today would render 'proper parliamnetarism' but in context of comparision to August/September 1914 a GREAT step ahead.

While it was right, that Hindy/Ludy influenced the personal decisions of the ever in stamina and selfcertaincy dwindling Kaiser which became worse with almost every turn ... their influence didn't actually reached much further and as sourced above their simple 'bullying' of wishes was very much dependant of what wasnt opposed by individuals.
Not at least due to the rather low 'organisation' of top-down power projection outside the military. ... but that would require some delving into the admistrative structures (also see above) then present and their often un- to notdefined competencies over others.

... this time the links seem to work right away ... I'm learning 

[lordroel]

Okay going to step in, let’s be civil.

[stevep]

Sept 8, 2024 11:18:43 GMT nomommsen said:

links should work now ... at least they do for me.
(... still learning the whereabouts of proboards ...)

  OK thanks they work fine now. Have looked at the translation of the German wiki article and will give the document a quick skim through after lunch.  Since its nearly 200 pages it will have to be a skim to find the relevant details.

[stevep]

   Right, sorry about the delay and data dump but been reading through the 1st part of the document and made some comments.  Will try and read the other later but already spent a couple of hours on it - simply can't skim through as I thought I could. 

  the author is a bit unclear as to when he's putting his own interpretation on things or what is being said by other people.  Noticed this with the last bit I mentioned as he started calling the idea of Wilhelm being successful in getting a war with Britain over the Jameson Raid a potential disaster for Britain then seemed to suggest he realised later on that it was be a serious own goal for Germany.  Hence might have attributed some of the things he meant were the viewpoint of other people to his actual opinions.  He does seem to be lacking in knowledge of a number of matters and events.

Comments on article on the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and the later German-British negotiations.

Chapter 1: - The oldest alliance
a) It was actually Edward III on the throne in 1373, not Edward II.

b) Most sources I've seen was that in return for subsides to make Charles II independent of Parliament resulted in English/British action against the Netherlands rather than Spain with Charles engaging in a war on the French side against the Dutch.  Fortunately for all concerned that failed miserably.

c) I notice it mentions Portuguese tolerance of Protestant English merchant but the author doesn't say whether that was reciprocated? Would be interest to know? I suspect so given the nature of the alliance.

d) Its somewhat misleading to say that Britain lapsed into a half century of isolationism after the final defeat of Napoleon. Its was active in many areas including aiding Greek independence and later aiding the Turks against 1st Muhammad Ali and then of course the Russians during the Crimean conflict. Its was also diplomatically active, although it played no part in the so called Holy Alliance and blocked French suggestions to aid Spain in regaining its American colonies in the early 1820s. To pick cases that immediately come to mind.


Chapter II – The 1898 negotiations.
a) The start seems a bit muddled as the author doesn't seem to realise what was going on. Previous major clashes to maintain the balance of power in Europe had had world wide impacts and fighting on multiple continents. However possibly the point he seeks to make is that with the rise of the USA and Japan for the 1st time any such world wide war would have to consider the involvement of great powers not based in Europe.  What he rather surprisingly doesn't mention was the relative decline in British power between ~1840-1914 which was also a major issue.   Partly inevitable given the development of industry and technology in other powers but also partly because of dire internal political and economic policies from ~1850 onward.

b) Yes the German navy and its open and clear targeting of Britain was the primary issue in pushing Britain into a loose relationship with the Franco-Russian camp but colonial issues were relatively unimportant in this other than being used as an excuse by German figures for a huge overwhelmingly short ranged navy that would do nothing to protect those colonies but everything to meet the desire of Wilhelm II and Tirpitz to threaten Britain. As such it wasn't a “logical” excuse for a large navy.  However while the navy was the initial threat Britain was also growing concerned about the increasingly aggressive stance of Germany in Europe itself, with its traditional concern about a single power or bloc controlling the continent.

c) I rather doubt that traditional friendly relationships between the British and Prussian royal families was a factor in persuading the Russians to make a defensive pact with the French. Far more important was the decision of Berlin to dump relationships with St Petersburg in favour of a clear support of Austria rather than friendly relations with both.

d) Splendid Isolationism, which I agree was not splendid was a relatively short lived period in the last couple of decades of the 19th century. I would disagree with the interpretation of British policy in the 19thC as stated on page 27/42 [1st is number page of the document, 2nd is the pdf page] of the document. Both in terms of muddling through being confused with opportunism as their two different things. Reacting to a crisis doesn't necessarily mean taking opportunities, especially if that weakens your longer term prospects. Similarly Palmerston simply stated a fact for all powers throughout the history of human diplomacy. Its just that some people and nations confused that with opportunism and looking for immediate gain despite the longer term costs. Again this is something the author fails to understand.

e) He again shows what looks increasingly like a bias when he states that “England had occurred the hostility of France in several incidents” without going into any examination of why the two powers had tensions. The implied suggestion is that it was Britain's fault in all cases.  See comments further below where its stated that the single largest source of tension between the two nations, Britain's predominance in Egypt was due to a French error.

Similarly the threat from Russia is overstated, although it did cause a lot of concerns in Britain. Russia had serious problems projecting power over long distances with poor logistics and its attempts to expand its borders by force against recognised states, specifically the Ottoman Empire and Qing China caused concern among multiple powers not just Britain.

f) Again he talks up tension with France but ignores that those matters were resolved. He also fails to mention that the final clash he mentions, which he doesn't identify but is obviously the Fashoda Incident was technically over land officially ruled by the Khadive of Egypt which the latter had lost control of during the Maudist revolt. Note the entry on this cites:-

Fashoda had been founded by the Egyptian army in 1855 as a base from which to combat the East African slave trade. It was located on high ground along 160 kilometres (100 mi) of marshy shoreline at one of the few places where a boat could unload. The surrounding area, although swampy, was populated by Shilluk people, and by the mid-1870s, Fashoda was a bustling market and administrative town. The first Europeans to arrive in the region were explorers Georg Schweinfurth in 1869 and Wilhelm Junker in 1876. Junker described the town as "a considerable trading place ... the last outpost of civilization, where travelers plunging into or returning from the wilds of equatorial Africa could procure a few indispensable European wares from the local Greek traders." By the time Jean-Baptiste Marchand arrived, however, the deserted fort was in ruins.[3]
Fashoda was also bound up in the Egyptian Question, a long-running dispute between the United Kingdom and France over the British occupation of Egypt. Since 1882 many French politicians, particularly those of the parti colonial, had come to regret France's decision not to join with Britain in occupying the country. They hoped to force Britain to leave, and thought that a colonial outpost on the Upper Nile could serve as a base for French gunboats. These in turn were expected to make the British abandon Egypt. Another proposed scheme involved a massive dam, cutting off the Nile's water supply and forcing the British out. These ideas were highly impractical, but they succeeded in alarming many British officials.[4]

i.e. that the decision not to accept a British offer for a joint protectorate over Egypt was recognised by many in France itself as a French error and that at the time there were many French people who were as unreasoning hostile to Britain as elements in Germany were later to become. Also that Fashoda had been an Egyptian settlement prior to the revolt so that the French had no legal claim to it, as well as it being totally unsupportable for them despite some of the delusional ideas mentioned above.

g) Not sure how he gets the idea that the crisis caused by Rhode's ill thought out Jameson Raid threatened the collapse of British power in southern Africa???  Although Britain was embarrassed by the event and it lead to the dismissal of Rhodes as PM of the Cape Province. - Unless he's talking about the fact that the removal of so many armed men from Rhodesia was one factor that l49 ed just a couple of months later to the Second Matabele War.

You should however note that he points out it was Wilhelm II that posted the telegram that heightened tensions with Britain and a couple of years later it was Germany that rejected an alliance proposal by Britain. He goes on to point out at the bottom of page 34/49 that German then effectively rejected prior agreements with Britain over the status of the Boer republics. - more on this below as its covered in more detail in the rest of the chapter.

On page 37/52 he then goes on to quote Wilhelm's clear hostility towards Britain and the frankly idiotic view that by threatening to keep Britain in isolation by rejecting friendly relations it would force it to submit to German terms for joining the Triple Alliance – which as we know elsewhere were for a German free hand on the continent. Especially stupid as with Britain's age old recognition of the importance of stopping any single power dominating the continent he fails to consider this would drive then to take the obviously better option that he himself mentioned of siding with France and Russia against the TA.

He goes on to note that this deep seated hostility towards Britain was present before the Jameson Raid actually occurred. Also that Wilhelm sought to start a war with Britain but that this was prevented by a Portuguese refusal to allow German troops into the Boer lands through their territory. That the author seems to think that this would be a disaster for Britain shows how little he understands of the situation on the ground. At this point for all Wilhelm's desires Germany had a very weak fleet so any such forces set would be isolated as would other German possessions. Furthermore France and Russia know they had far, far more to fear from an aggressive Germany than from Britain so at best they would have been neutral, but probably aligned favourably toward Britain in a war that isolated Germany and its overseas trade. At worse you would have had WWI a bout 18 years earlier which would probably have ended with an allied success with far less bloodshed for all concerned. - As noted above he seems to realise later on that this was folly on Wilhelm's part so not sure why the hyperbola earlier on???

  Anyway that's taken a couple of hours.  Will try and read more tomorrow.

[stevep]

Sept 9, 2024 6:47:57 GMT nomommsen said:

... sry for such a 'piecemeal' approach but I'm rather struck by sickness (caught kinda 'flue' or whatever infection you've got by travelling days long in some airconditioned trains all across the country )

Sept 8, 2024 10:04:16 GMT stevep said:

  That is rubbish.  The parliament was increasingly bypassed by the military dictatorship that emerge from the aristocratic military elite and served only to continue and intensify the latter's ideas and interests.  The Reichstag, like people like Bethmann-Hollweg were increasingly powerless and ignored.

No need to be rude only if I argue against a/the widespread prejudice of the notorious 'silent dictatorship'.

Aside the events I pointed at to which I would like to add the development of of the negotiations at Brest-Litowsk in the end much more 'infuenced' by the Foreign Secretary v.Kühlmann than Hindy/Ludy for more background I would recommend the books of Gerald D. Feldman which describe very well the socio-economical developm,ent withing Germany with the increase of influence by the civilan side esp. the by the 'Junkers class' as so regularly as the-true-power (as a body) depicted hated trade unions. That begun already well before the dynamic duo 'took over' but in retaliation of their unsound bullying their real influence rather more dwindled in time with more influence of the 'workers class' representatives. ... regardless what only more bureaucracy causing reorganisations of command structures (i.e. the Kriegsamt) they and their tought-to-be politico-industrial specialist Max Bauer tried.

(... as always the wki-links are thought to serve as some first-stop-lookout for further research into their sources and further on from there)

Another source I rely strongly on are ~ 1700 ... ~1630 (without the intros) pages of documents of exchanges between the several administrations - domestic affairs, trade affairs, military affairs, of relasm as well as memberstate as well as i.e. provinces levels) showing how the at first almost unsurmountable seeming though very indivudually wielded powers of the military commanders were in time more and more challanged - and in time more and more successfully - by civilian adminsitrations may they've been stately or private. ... despite the takeover of the so-called silent dictatorship.
Another source are the several collections of diarys, private letters and other exchanges of people high up in the command chain (Admiral v.Müller, the generals and higher ranks like Falkenhayn, v.Lyncker, v.Plessen, 'civilians' like Baron v.Schoen, Prince Lichnowski, Bethmann-Hollweg, his secretary etc.).

And while the Interfraktioneller Ausschuss as a means of selforganisation of the Reichstag (unheard of prior) didn't achieved as much as they would have liked it lead to i.e. the "Friedensresolution" (I would like to recommend the german wiki article as the english one is IMHO rather tainted by unsupported accusations not at least 'founded' on selected/pimped citations) and increasing cooperation of the parlamentarians against wishes of the military.

It was rather the opposite as the further development since late 1917 showed: the parlamentarians gained more and more influence.
... though without a doubt far from what we of today would render 'proper parliamnetarism'.

Instead of decreasing the further development since 1917 at least showed: the parlamentarians gained more and more influence.
... though without a doubt far from what we of today would render 'proper parliamnetarism' but in context of comparision to August/September 1914 a GREAT step ahead.

While it was right, that Hindy/Ludy influenced the personal decisions of the ever in stamina and selfcertaincy dwindling Kaiser which became worse with almost every turn ... their influence didn't actually reached much further and as sourced above their simple 'bullying' of wishes was very much dependant of what wasnt opposed by individuals.
Not at least due to the rather low 'organisation' of top-down power projection outside the military. ... but that would require some delving into the admistrative structures (also see above) then present and their often un- to notdefined competencies over others.

... this time the links seem to work right away ... I'm learning 

  Sorry to hear your been unwell.   Hopefully feeling better soon.  Also apologies if I dismissed your statement too quickly and rudely.  However it does go against everything I've read about the situation in Germany, especially after Ludy gained dominance of the military.  Assorted parliamentary figures made proposals for ideas such as a peace settlement but generally got at best ignored and the army steadily tightened its grip.  B-H did have some successes, noticeably playing a role in removing Tirpitz but by then it was too late.

  I will try and look at some of what you mention above but the other source is the current top priority for this discussion and a lot else going on. - Damn I wrote this a few hours back and realised I didn't press send!!   The mind is definitely not what it was.

[stevep]

   Anyway 2nd data dump from reading the book about the Anglo-German negotiations. Most of the way through but going to take a break and look at some other things. Busy the next couple of days but will hopefully finish off on Friday.

Chapter III – Steps toward an Anglo-German Colonial Agreement

a) The author starts this off by directly contradicting what he has said before. Chamberlain's initial approach was unofficial but I'm not sure this was clear to the Germans at the time and they didn't know what Salisbury's stance was. [Its a bit odd that he refers to this as being the Salisbury element of the British cabinet when Salisbury was the actual PM?]. The clear factor stated before was that Wilhelm was opposed to any such agreement other than solely on German terms.  Wilhelm had already rejected Russia as an ally and it had turned to an agreement with France for mutual defence against Germany-Austria. Also saying “Germany indicated that while a large scale understanding was impossible, there was still a potential for a settlement of specific minor matters” also doesn't it in with the views stated as being held by Wilhelm that he would press Britain until it accepted his terms, which seems to suggest he was still proposing some form of alliance, albeit not one between equals.

b) I find it strange that in the discussion on page 56/72 between Portugal and Britain that Germany could see that because of Mozambique's bordering German EA and the Boer Republic – presumably the Transvaal as there were two - “believed it to be in her sphere of influence by right of justice if not by law”? That's a strangely arrogant stance and since the colony bordered even more British colonies and areas they did have influence via treaty Britain could by the same argument have an even stronger claim.

This is especially since the proposed deal at the time was for a loan from Britain which would be repaid via revenues from Portuguese Mozambique, nothing to do with its actual transfer to Britain. Which is something the author does say later, on page 58/72.

c) On page 68/84 the author states that “The die was cast, An agreement was ultimately to be made by two external parties – Germany and Britain – for the possible ultimate division between then of a third party's insecure colonial possessions”. The key word here was possibly which makes clear it was still a matter up for discussion as does the fact that Salisbury was reluctant to make such a deal. Its noted that he would present the German proposals to the cabinet he says nothing about supporting such a deal. As such the suggestion he makes “left consideration of Portugal aside” is incorrect.


Chapter IV – The Anglo-German Treaty of 1898

I will admit that once Portugal withdrew its request for a loan, from any source that Salisbury should have made clear to Germany that any attempt to seize Portuguese or British lands as Germany proposed would cause a conflict. Why his government continued negotiations with Germany, especially given the extreme terms Germany proposed, all of Angola, the vast bulk of Mozambique, Portuguese Timor and also two British regions. - Talking here about the initial German proposals.

a) The author does say that, long after the event von Bulow, P77/94 was claiming that it was “merely a trial of British fidelity which the treaty found to be lacking.” Given how extreme the German claims were it could be said there were far more evidence of a lack of fidelity by Germany. As stated on the following page, when a threat to seek an agreement with Russia, which wasn't practical and anyway Russia had no influence failed to “make Britain jump into Germany's arms” Germany did pull back on its more extreme terms, dropping demand for British territory and – for the moment Timor but demanded even more of the Portuguese African colonies.

b) Its also noted that at the bottom of page 79/96 Salisbury is still making clear that Portugal should be kept informed of any treaty and attempts made to protect their interests. Obviously the British attitude is that such a deal would only be made in the event of a collapse of Portuguese capacity to maintain their empire. - This is a stance repeated clearly by Balfour who as Foreign Minister in Salisbury's absence took over negotiations with Germany – see page 86/103. - On the following pages Germany attempts unilaterally to renew its demands for Portuguese Timor.

It could be that the author's conclusion at the end of the chapter, that Salisbury wanted to play for time until the situation improved for Portugal and it never needed to take the Anglo-German loan that Berlin saw as the 1st step to annexation.


Chapter V The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1899 – AKA the Windsor Treaty.

a) Again the author seems to not understand in the previous chapter. Britain may have played a skilled hand to protect its old ally from German predication without needing to consider a potential military conflict but that's hardly “having one's cake and eating it”.

b) There's a strange and definitely dubious reference on page 103/121 about the “impending Boer holocaust” with is odd as I doubt it was clear at that point that the Boer states would start a war or how far they were willing to go to persecute it rather than admit defeat.

c) Interesting suggestion on pages 103-104/122-123 that the Germans having realised how hopeless their position was in an aggressive colonial war against Britain was intending on the attempt to force a deal over the partition of the Portuguese colonies because the government realised they couldn't support the Boers and wanted compensation for British influence in those regions. Of course their clack-handed approach and the long standing British-Portuguese friendship made that an unlikely issue and hence their failure.

d) Its probably a factor in the nature of German politics at the time that German politicians seems to believe that Edward Prince of Wales's visit to Portugal, for which he had considerable affection played a major role in frustrating Germany's designs on Portuguese colonies. See page 110/128 This is despite the fact the difference between the two parties made the agreement dead in the water almost immediately and the stated visit wasn't until two months later.  The monarchy did still have some influence but a lot less actual power than the Kaiser in Germany or other continental monarchies.

e) Interesting that Germany sought to make a separate agreement with Portugal itself, to obtain parts of Angola and also coaling stations in the Azores which was itself in breach of their 1898 agreement with Britain, p121/139.

[ewellholmes]

Aug 19, 2024 3:40:48 GMT ewellholmes said:

Wilson had made a serious attempt to end the war in late 1916 and early 1917, and was open to what seemed a clear-if more limited than they otherwise wanted-German victory. Luxembourg annexed, border adjustments with France (Generally understood as Briey-Longwy and the remainder of the Vosges Mountains brought into Germany for defensive purposes) and the lands of the Ober-Ost (Congress Poland, Lithuania and Courland) conceded, while the Germans would also get their treaties with Romania and Serbia recognized. Can't remember what the plan was for Africa, but probably status-quo antebellum.

I suspect once it becomes clear the Americans aren't coming, the French and the Russians will rapidly drop out in April-May of 1917, and then the British follow suit before their whole position comes undone. The above would likely be the basis of the peace, with the Germans able to demand some extra concessions given the strategic situation increasingly leaning in their favor. Perhaps a demilitarized Belgium at the least, perhaps with German annexations up to the Meuse too? Congo being handed over seems a given, as does France now also losing Dahomey to Togoland and French Congo being joined with German Kamerun to get a continuous Mittel-Afrika empire. Perhaps the Germans are also able to extract Moldova and add it to Romania to mollify them somewhat, in addition to Kars to the Ottomans.

Been reading Holger Afflerbach's On a Knife Edge: How Germany Lost the First World War, in the Cambridge Military History series. Lots of interesting data in it as it spans the whole war, but for our purposes includes several interesting sections:

Wilson’s initiative opened up a chance of bringing the war to an earlier
and less violent end.58 The President was resolved to force both sides (even
the Entente) into a peace agreement. American diplomats such as Grew and
Lansing had briefed him on the catastrophic state of affairs in Germany, so
he was well informed. He knew that, despite its recent military successes,
Germany was struggling to keep its head above water and would therefore
be willing to make concessions.59 He was also aware, having calculated
British and French debts in November 1916, that the Entente’s finances
were stretched almost to breaking point.60 So far, the British government
had managed to keep the exchange rate between the dollar and the pound
stable,61 but it was now coming under pressure from the size of Britain’s
debts and the unilateral flow of goods that had raised prices on all British
imports from the USA. American economists did not believe that Britain
could sustain its current rate of expenditure on American goods, totalling
10 million dollars a day.62 Even taking into account all Britain’s securities,
loans, financial reserves and stores of precious metals, the situation was
untenable. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna,
warned that Britain would have wiped out its financial reserves by June 1917
at the latest and would then be forced to take orders from the Americans.63

So, in this context, what would be the likely German demands in the event the Entente try to fight on into 1917?

The Chancellor’s decision about war aims was further influenced by the OHL, which was attempting to bring the Kaiser (who was still based at Main Headquarters) on side. Hindenburg and Ludendorff wanted the Chancellor to commit to extensive war aims, while Bethmann himself refused, insisting on ‘building golden bridges with whichever of our enemies is the first to show an inclination for peace’.28 However, the OHL insisted. On 23 April 1917, the Chancellor visited Main Headquarters at Kreuznach and discussed the German demands with the Kaiser and his entourage, and also with Hindenburg and Ludendorff. These included the annexations of Courland and Lithuania in the east, an independent Poland linked to Germany by a military convention, and in the west, the annexation of Liège, the Flanders coast and the Briey area. This was now finally put down in writing.29 The outcome of the discussion was described by Admiral von Müller as ‘utter exorbitance in the east and in the west’, clearly driven by the OHL. The decision to set these aims down in writing was no doubt intended to ensure that the Chancellor also remained committed to them. During the meeting, Bethmann had not objected to any of the war aims, instead adding a note to the document to record that it was a correct reflection of the content of the meeting but that he had stressed his own view that the aims were achievable only ‘if we are able to dictate the peace’

[nomommsen]

Sept 8, 2024 10:01:09 GMT stevep said:

  If I follow your argument correctly your saying that British ambiguous on the question of Luxembourg negates German treaty break in both cases?  Given the repeated breaching of international agreements by Germany and their attitude throughout the war doubts about German trustworthiness is perfectly logical.  Not just the invasion of and quick desire to annex nations they had sworn to protect but other things like their breaches of international agreements on the use of poison gas and the use of USW in direct defiance of treaties they had signed.

...

I do NOT argue or try to argue any 'negation' of whatever.

Yes, the treaties of 1839 and 1867 had been 'violated' ging by their letters in some ... narrow (?) kind of interpretation.

 

However, the already shown relativation of at least one of these treaties some decades before WW1 might have 'encouraged' i.e. Bethamnn-Hollweg to render the treaty of 1839 be as 'malleable'. 

Not at least as said Derby-Stanley doctrine seemed to be applicable to treaties regarding 'collective guarantees' by'n'large.

He might have had the Bismasrck word still in its ear about Derby: "The man of the day [Derby]... had explained away [the treaty reg. Luxembourg] almost as soon as it was signed." when he made the notorious "scrap of paper" notion to Goschen during the crisis.

Whatever actions happened after the shooting begun ... well ... there are enough 'questionable' actions on evey side that IMHO makes any reference to who violated what treaty or international agreement with whatever 'validy' (like the convention on sea warfare of 1907 signed but not ratified by the UK) for whoever participants on what point of time ... problematic.
(Btw.: gas as a weapon of war though 'only as kinda 'teargas' was  was first used by the french and with some nastier 'ingredients' by the british Army Army right from the beginning.  ... though ... one might argue from which point some substance is to or can be called 'poisenous' as i.e. for the stuffs in the links. The regarding convention doesn't specify this or any ... concentration limit values ..)

Our esteem of 'treaties to be served' under public observance and hence too often mislead trust in them is something grown out of the practice of the league of nations with its demand for registring every treaty between two (at least) countries (regardless that it still took time to learn this habit).
... but until then ... with the 'tradition' of secret treaties all around ... the only 'trust' one could have into a treaty was for both sides of a treaty an advantage to be gained from.

The point I was trying to make was that up to the war and given above said about british diplomatic behavior (not at least regarding the german Realm) which could be applied to every ... 'bigger' power at least before war propaganda on all sides began to effect still todays discussions the german 'records' of trustworthiness and honesty were in no way different to any other nation.

[nomommsen]

Sept 11, 2024 1:54:38 GMT ewellholmes said:

Aug 19, 2024 3:40:48 GMT ewellholmes said:

Wilson had made a serious attempt to end the war in late 1916 and early 1917, and was open to what seemed a clear-if more limited than they otherwise wanted-German victory. Luxembourg annexed, border adjustments with France (Generally understood as Briey-Longwy and the remainder of the Vosges Mountains brought into Germany for defensive purposes) and the lands of the Ober-Ost (Congress Poland, Lithuania and Courland) conceded, while the Germans would also get their treaties with Romania and Serbia recognized. Can't remember what the plan was for Africa, but probably status-quo antebellum.

I suspect once it becomes clear the Americans aren't coming, the French and the Russians will rapidly drop out in April-May of 1917, and then the British follow suit before their whole position comes undone. The above would likely be the basis of the peace, with the Germans able to demand some extra concessions given the strategic situation increasingly leaning in their favor. Perhaps a demilitarized Belgium at the least, perhaps with German annexations up to the Meuse too? Congo being handed over seems a given, as does France now also losing Dahomey to Togoland and French Congo being joined with German Kamerun to get a continuous Mittel-Afrika empire. Perhaps the Germans are also able to extract Moldova and add it to Romania to mollify them somewhat, in addition to Kars to the Ottomans.

Been reading Holger Afflerbach's On a Knife Edge: How Germany Lost the First World War, in the Cambridge Military History series. Lots of interesting data in it as it spans the whole war, but for our purposes includes several interesting sections:

Wilson’s initiative opened up a chance of bringing the war to an earlier
and less violent end.58 The President was resolved to force both sides (even
the Entente) into a peace agreement. American diplomats such as Grew and
Lansing had briefed him on the catastrophic state of affairs in Germany, so
he was well informed. He knew that, despite its recent military successes,
Germany was struggling to keep its head above water and would therefore
be willing to make concessions.59 He was also aware, having calculated
British and French debts in November 1916, that the Entente’s finances
were stretched almost to breaking point.60 So far, the British government
had managed to keep the exchange rate between the dollar and the pound
stable,61 but it was now coming under pressure from the size of Britain’s
debts and the unilateral flow of goods that had raised prices on all British
imports from the USA. American economists did not believe that Britain
could sustain its current rate of expenditure on American goods, totalling
10 million dollars a day.62 Even taking into account all Britain’s securities,
loans, financial reserves and stores of precious metals, the situation was
untenable. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna,
warned that Britain would have wiped out its financial reserves by June 1917
at the latest and would then be forced to take orders from the Americans.63

So, in this context, what would be the likely German demands in the event the Entente try to fight on into 1917?

The Chancellor’s decision about war aims was further influenced by the OHL, which was attempting to bring the Kaiser (who was still based at Main Headquarters) on side. Hindenburg and Ludendorff wanted the Chancellor to commit to extensive war aims, while Bethmann himself refused, insisting on ‘building golden bridges with whichever of our enemies is the first to show an inclination for peace’.28 However, the OHL insisted. On 23 April 1917, the Chancellor visited Main Headquarters at Kreuznach and discussed the German demands with the Kaiser and his entourage, and also with Hindenburg and Ludendorff. These included the annexations of Courland and Lithuania in the east, an independent Poland linked to Germany by a military convention, and in the west, the annexation of Liège, the Flanders coast and the Briey area. This was now finally put down in writing.29 The outcome of the discussion was described by Admiral von Müller as ‘utter exorbitance in the east and in the west’, clearly driven by the OHL. The decision to set these aims down in writing was no doubt intended to ensure that the Chancellor also remained committed to them. During the meeting, Bethmann had not objected to any of the war aims, instead adding a note to the document to record that it was a correct reflection of the content of the meeting but that he had stressed his own view that the aims were achievable only ‘if we are able to dictate the peace’

... interesting to see how Bethmann-Hollweg build in some 'emergency breaks' like the note that the document was 'only' as a possible retreating from interpretation a reflection of the content of the meeting with whatever later ev. questionable 'forcing weight' and that he also stressed own views and that these aims were conditional only.

... somewhat souds for me he - right from the beginning - planned to give some lip service only to the dynamoc duo and the by them influenced Kaiser but was prepared to negotiate whatever cam to the table and promised some ... 'honourable' peace. ... esp. regarding the low lands he very well knew what 'bone of contention' they were for Whitehall.

[stevep]

Sept 11, 2024 12:03:35 GMT nomommsen said:

Sept 8, 2024 10:01:09 GMT stevep said:

  If I follow your argument correctly your saying that British ambiguous on the question of Luxembourg negates German treaty break in both cases?  Given the repeated breaching of international agreements by Germany and their attitude throughout the war doubts about German trustworthiness is perfectly logical.  Not just the invasion of and quick desire to annex nations they had sworn to protect but other things like their breaches of international agreements on the use of poison gas and the use of USW in direct defiance of treaties they had signed.

...

I do NOT argue or try to argue any 'negation' of whatever.

Yes, the treaties of 1839 and 1867 had been 'violated' ging by their letters in some ... narrow (?) kind of interpretation.

 

However, the already shown relativation of at least one of these treaties some decades before WW1 might have 'encouraged' i.e. Bethamnn-Hollweg to render the treaty of 1839 be as 'malleable'. 

Not at least as said Derby-Stanley doctrine seemed to be applicable to treaties regarding 'collective guarantees' by'n'large.

He might have had the Bismasrck word still in its ear about Derby: "The man of the day [Derby]... had explained away [the treaty reg. Luxembourg] almost as soon as it was signed." when he made the notorious "scrap of paper" notion to Goschen during the crisis.

Whatever actions happened after the shooting begun ... well ... there are enough 'questionable' actions on evey side that IMHO makes any reference to who violated what treaty or international agreement with whatever 'validy' (like the convention on sea warfare of 1907 signed but not ratified by the UK) for whoever participants on what point of time ... problematic.
(Btw.: gas as a weapon of war though 'only as kinda 'teargas' was  was first used by the french and with some nastier 'ingredients' by the british Army Army right from the beginning.  ... though ... one might argue from which point some substance is to or can be called 'poisenous' as i.e. for the stuffs in the links. The regarding convention doesn't specify this or any ... concentration limit values ..)

Our esteem of 'treaties to be served' under public observance and hence too often mislead trust in them is something grown out of the practice of the league of nations with its demand for registring every treaty between two (at least) countries (regardless that it still took time to learn this habit).
... but until then ... with the 'tradition' of secret treaties all around ... the only 'trust' one could have into a treaty was for both sides of a treaty an advantage to be gained from.

The point I was trying to make was that up to the war and given above said about british diplomatic behavior (not at least regarding the german Realm) which could be applied to every ... 'bigger' power at least before war propaganda on all sides began to effect still todays discussions the german 'records' of trustworthiness and honesty were in no way different to any other nation.

  Have to disagree totally there.  The breach of the treaty was clear and total when Germany decided to breach Belgium neutrality and invade.

  Have a gaming session shortly so no time to reply further.

[ewellholmes]

Sept 11, 2024 12:12:03 GMT nomommsen said:

Sept 11, 2024 1:54:38 GMT ewellholmes said:

Been reading Holger Afflerbach's On a Knife Edge: How Germany Lost the First World War, in the Cambridge Military History series. Lots of interesting data in it as it spans the whole war, but for our purposes includes several interesting sections:

Wilson’s initiative opened up a chance of bringing the war to an earlier
and less violent end.58 The President was resolved to force both sides (even
the Entente) into a peace agreement. American diplomats such as Grew and
Lansing had briefed him on the catastrophic state of affairs in Germany, so
he was well informed. He knew that, despite its recent military successes,
Germany was struggling to keep its head above water and would therefore
be willing to make concessions.59 He was also aware, having calculated
British and French debts in November 1916, that the Entente’s finances
were stretched almost to breaking point.60 So far, the British government
had managed to keep the exchange rate between the dollar and the pound
stable,61 but it was now coming under pressure from the size of Britain’s
debts and the unilateral flow of goods that had raised prices on all British
imports from the USA. American economists did not believe that Britain
could sustain its current rate of expenditure on American goods, totalling
10 million dollars a day.62 Even taking into account all Britain’s securities,
loans, financial reserves and stores of precious metals, the situation was
untenable. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna,
warned that Britain would have wiped out its financial reserves by June 1917
at the latest and would then be forced to take orders from the Americans.63

So, in this context, what would be the likely German demands in the event the Entente try to fight on into 1917?

... interesting to see how Bethmann-Hollweg build in some 'emergency breaks' like the note that the document was 'only' as a possible retreating from interpretation a reflection of the content of the meeting with whatever later ev. questionable 'forcing weight' and that he also stressed own views and that these aims were conditional only.

... somewhat souds for me he - right from the beginning - planned to give some lip service only to the dynamoc duo and the by them influenced Kaiser but was prepared to negotiate whatever cam to the table and promised some ... 'honourable' peace. ... esp. regarding the low lands he very well knew what 'bone of contention' they were for Whitehall.

He had signaled his willingness to withdraw from Belgium and France during the peace overtures of late 1916-early 1917, but in the event of no American entry, the Central Powers will be in a position to enforce terms the longer the Entente hold out until they inevitably collapse. Difference between the Entente negotiating a peace on somewhat equal footing in the Winter of 1916-1917 vs having their position progressively undermined by mid-1917.

[nomommsen]

Sept 11, 2024 16:27:36 GMT stevep said:

  Have to disagree totally there.  The breach of the treaty was clear and total when Germany decided to breach Belgium neutrality and invade.

  Have a gaming session shortly so no time to reply further.

I still do not argue this (breach of the treaty regarding Belgium) at all.

What I do argue is the perception by the german politics/Bethmann-Hollweg of how 'serious' regarding consequences said treaties (reg. Luxembourg and in its wake also Belgium) might be taken by the british goverment.

How was your gaming session? ... "successfull"?

[stevep]

Sept 15, 2024 9:27:38 GMT nomommsen said:

Sept 11, 2024 16:27:36 GMT stevep said:

  Have to disagree totally there.  The breach of the treaty was clear and total when Germany decided to breach Belgium neutrality and invade.

  Have a gaming session shortly so no time to reply further.

I still do not argue this (breach of the treaty regarding Belgium) at all.

What I do argue is the perception by the german politics/Bethmann-Hollweg of how 'serious' regarding consequences said treaties (reg. Luxembourg and in its wake also Belgium) might be taken by the british goverment.

How was your gaming session? ... "successfull"?

   Ah thanks for clarifying.  In terms of how strong the British reaction would be I would suspect that between the traditional British desire to keep the reason outside the control of a great power that's seen as hostile and the growing tension and distrust between the two powers they should have expected a strong reaction. 

  Well several of the players had some issues with research updates not being accepted so some editing needed doing.  Which appears to be a problem with the game in multi-player mod.  Still only up to June 38 - as the campaign starts 1-1-36 so a long way to go yet.  China is holding up pretty well against Japan still largely holding the line of the Yellow River although I think the game, at least this mod in its current format, is strongly biased towards Japan and know in some single player games I've tried starting positions for China is often conquered by early 39.  The Nationalists have already won the civil war in Spain, which is not good as playing on the allied side.  - This war tends to end early in the game - sometimes with the Republicans winning but generally the Nationalists.  I'm only playing Australia as I haven't played a major power in MP mod yet and a couple of years since I've played.  As such a successful war for me would be major economic development, an allied victory, Japan kept at very long arms length and possibly never having my guys seeing conflict at all.

[stevep]

   nomommsen ,

  Before I forget I've finally looked at the last chapters of that book.  Sorry but the last week or so have been rather hectic with a number of things coming up.  Relatively little left when looking through it but decided to complete things today before it slipped again.

Chapter VI – Epilogue 1912-14

a) The opening sentence is rather misleading as the author has already mentioned the open hatred of Britain displayed by Wilhelm even prior to Victoria's death. The signing of the entente cordiale was caused by the common fear of Germany and the desire to reduce tension between the two given this danger. Remember it was not any sort of alliance but an attempt to resolve common disputes, unlikely the failure of approaches to Germany.

b) Its also a bit odd that on page 126/145 a German approach suggesting the partition of the colonies of a British ally this is represented as an attempt to improve relations between the two great powers.

c) Interesting discussion on the following pages that Britain desired full publication of both the new and previous treaties to remove any suggestion it was simply a desire to seize Portuguese assets and also to reassure France as to its intentions but that while the Germans negotiating for the treaty agreed with this this was rejected in Berlin for unclear reasons. Only being accepted as stated on page 138/157 when possibly Germany had already committed to a continental war and was looking to keep Britain neutral.


Chapter VII – Conclusions

a) The author again makes statements at the start of the chapter, P unnumbered/159 which contradicts what he has pointed out elsewhere. Although he does seem to pull back on that later on the same page?? Its clear from what was said earlier in the text that Britain at least was not a “ravenous power bent upon ultimately destroying the other”, or for that matter its old ally Portugal, which it took steps in 1898 and again in the 1911-13 negotiations to protect.

b) On page 145/165 I think he underestimates the importance of tensions in Europe which for Britain at least far outweighed any “duel for empire”. However I do think that a lot of the points he states in his conclusion have merit.